LINGUISTIC CODING OF EVIDENTIALITY IN JAPANESE SPOKEN DISCOURSE
AND JAPANESE POLITENESS

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Theories of linguistic evidentiality 26
Chapter 3. Discourse modality in Japanese 69
Chapter 4. Methodology 114
Chapter 5. Model of Japanese evidentiality 188
Chapter 6. Japanese linguistic politeness and evidentiality 338
Chapter 7. Conclusion 412
Bibliography 432
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABL</td>
<td>ablative case (kara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>accusative particle (o)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD HON</td>
<td>addressee honorifics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUX</td>
<td>auxiliary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUS</td>
<td>causative affix (sase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>contrastive (wa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONF</td>
<td>sentencial particle for confirmation (ne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMP</td>
<td>sentencial complementizer (no, koto, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COND</td>
<td>conditional affix (to, tara, eba, nara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONJ</td>
<td>conjecture (daroo, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>copula (da, desu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAT</td>
<td>dative particle (ni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>desiderative affix (tai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIR</td>
<td>directional case (e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>emphathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR</td>
<td>formal (=AD HON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>gerund affix (te)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HON</td>
<td>honorific form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYP</td>
<td>hypothetical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>imperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>infinitive (o, i, ku)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>instrumental particle (de)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INJ</td>
<td>interjection and hesitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>irrealis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>locative particle (ni, de, e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODI</td>
<td>noun modifier (no)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEG</td>
<td>negative morpheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NML</td>
<td>nominalizer (no)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>nominative particle (ga)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ</td>
<td>object marker (o) = ACC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART</td>
<td>sentencial particle: VOC, RAPP, CONF, SHAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASS</td>
<td>passive affix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF</td>
<td>perfect affix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSS</td>
<td>possessive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POT</td>
<td>potential affix (re, rare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>progressive affix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>question particle (ka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUOT</td>
<td>quotative particle (to)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPP</td>
<td>sentencial particular of rapport (ne, wa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>realis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REF HON</td>
<td>referent honorifics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES</td>
<td>resultative affix (te-aru)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAT</td>
<td>stative affix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMP</td>
<td>temporal particle (ni, de)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOP</td>
<td>topic particle (wa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>vocative sentential particle (yo, zo, ze, sa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOL</td>
<td>volitional affix (yoo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

When teaching second or foreign language classes, teachers may often note various phenomena of "language transfer" from a student's native language to the target language. "Transfer" may be seen with any aspect of language. For example, if medicine should always be drunk according to a certain language's grammar, it is likely that a native speaker of the language would "lexically" transfer the expression to drink medicine to his second or foreign language. Language transfer can be phonological, semantic, syntactical, or morphological, and is also seen at the discourse level such as in discourse organization and discourse grammar (cf. T. Odlin, 1989). It is presumable that a language learner also "pragmatically" transfers the "viewpoint" (i.e., the way reality is viewed) of his native language or native culture to his target language. Seeing the same reality, people from different cultural or different linguistic backgrounds might perceive reality in different ways or at least encode their perceptions in vastly different ways.¹ Thus, even if it is not the case that perceptions differ, the rules of different languages (prescriptive grammar rules and/or pragmatic rules) certainly must have different emphases in expressing the same reality.

While teaching Japanese to American students, in addition to grammatical transfer, I have encountered pragmatic transfer which may be due to the cultural differences between Japan and America or
due to the differences between the pragmatic use of Japanese language and that of American English, or most likely due to an interplay of both factors.

In the translated Japanese conversation (1-1) below, for example, the speaker presented an extremely low-assertive mode of speech in discussing some religious cult members at large who were suspected to be responsible for the Sarin Poison Gas case in the Tokyo metropolitan subway system in 1995, which instantaneously killed or injured hundreds of people. Rising ( ) and falling ( ) arrows indicate rising and falling tones in the passage:

(1-1)

F2: (1) ....that person is, what shall I say, in short, did he make (Sarin gas) Well, he made Sarin gas, and should I say he scattered it by himself So, is he a scientist Aren't most of them specialized in that field So, probably, well, most probably, doing research University research institutes do not have much funding generally, so after all, it is said that they entered [the cult group] under the condition that they can do whatever scientific research they wanted to do. You know, it is said that "religion" was a quite different thing for those people. So, it is also said that they went into the cult group only because they had desire to study more than they could have done at graduate school. So should we say they are top class scientists

F5: (2) Is that so

F2: (3) It is said so.

(The Original Japanese transcription of this passage is in note 2.)

In the passage, although speaker F2 was talking about that which
is generally believed to be true, her "level of assertiveness" is very low. Her utterances sound very unsure in English translation but in Japanese this type of low-assertive speech is acceptable, or even preferred. The speaker used four major techniques to avoid being assertive: (1) use of structurally indirect sentences such as it is said.\(^3\) (2) use of questions and tag-questions; (3) use of lexical items with low commitment such as probably and (4) use of hedges (e.g. you know, well, and what shall I say). In my pilot study of "hearsay" speech in English and Japanese (Trent, 1994), Japanese speakers were observed to keep distance between themselves and the topic of their speech by consistently using structurally indirect sentences such as I heard.., I think.., and it seems.. as well as using question sentences and tag-question sentences that appeared to constantly seek for agreement of the hearers.\(^4\) Overall, in comparison with an English speaker's hearsay report, Japanese speech was seen as less assertive, and tends to sound more uncertain. Being low-assertive may be accepted as modest and well behaved in Japanese culture, however, this may not always result in being perceived favorably in intercultural communication: the over-use of less assertive speech may be considered "evasive", "irresponsible", "ambiguous", or "dubious" in the norm of other language environments.

People may well consider that the less assertive tendency of Japanese speech is simply a "cultural" phenomenon. Language and
culture are said to be "interwoven" and there is a view that language structure possibly influences our thought (e.g. Sapir, 1929; Whorf, 1956). In this study, I will assume that Japanese indirect and low-assertive speech is primarily a "linguistic" phenomenon, which can be systematically explained through a theory of pragmatics.

As a native speaker of Japanese, I intuitively feel the existence of "rules" which tell us how to be appropriately less assertive and indirect in interpersonal communication if we want to be a socially competent person in each speech situation. As Clancy (1986) wrote that "Japanese rely upon indirection in many common social situations especially when they are trying to be polite" (p. 215), the factor that motivates pragmatic rules here is politeness which eventually leads us to the cultural aspect of the Japanese language. The rules for less assertiveness are not so-called a "context-independent grammar", but rather are the rules for "performance" (i.e., "context-dependent interpretation" by Levinson, 1992).

Hence, this dissertation is a study of Japanese pragmatics, in particular, a study of less assertiveness in interpersonal communication in the Japanese language. This study investigates the relationship between the language and context that is encoded in the structure of language, and eventually the rules are examined in relation with linguistic politeness behavior in the Japanese cultural environment.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY
There are certainly numerous ways to be indirect in communication. Theories of pragmatics--speech act and politeness theories, in particular-- provide us with insightful thoughts on this issue (cf. Lyons, 1983, Searle, 1975). This study specifically attempts to explore Japanese pragmatic rules which result in less assertive communication through the "evidentiality" concept, which is encoded in the language structure. What, then, is evidentiality?

Under his "maxim of quality" for conversational principles, i.e., "Try to make your contribution one that is true", Grice (1967, first published 1975) assumed two submaxims: (1) Do not say that which you believe to be false; and (2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence (p. 46). Although conformance to these maxims is expected among rational adult speakers, one does not always have solid evidence for what one says; therefore, when a given utterance is not supported by "adequate" evidence, the speaker usually express low-commitment to his proposition in different ways. The study of evidentiality is concerned with how this is done. Evidentiality is generally defined as "the linguistic means of indicating how the speaker obtained the information on which he bases an assertion" (Willett, 1988:55). Chafe (1986) viewed evidentiality in a broader way so as to cover "any linguistic expression of attitude toward knowledge" (p. 271). If an individual has direct evidence (e.g. witnessing) on which his assertion is based, he will use direct language forms, while he may speak rather
indirectly when his assertion is based on, for instance, folklore. The types of evidence that human beings have (e.g. "attested", "reported", and "inferred") must be universal; however, how to express the difference such as the difference in evidence types, and the difference in "degree of certainty" must vary across languages. Based on these thoughts, I believe that evidentiality marking can be a useful concept to apply in Japanese indirect, less assertive communication. If Japanese speakers' language behavior is overly indirect from the universal standard concept of evidentiality, there must be reasons behind the Japanese behavior, and this behavior may be systematic enough to form a pragmatic rule.

Evidentiality markings can be seen everywhere; English, for example, is said to be abundant with evidentials (c.f. Chafe, 1986). There seems to be two ways to view evidentials. One way is through their grammatical categories; English evidentials are expressed with modal auxiliaries (e.g. may, must, might, and can), adverbs (e.g. probably, certainly, definitely, likely, and possibly), and miscellaneous idiomatic phrases (e.g. it looks like, it sounds, and it feel like). The other way to see evidentials is through their function types such as "reliability", "induction", "deduction", "hearsay", and "sensory". I quote some examples below of the functions of English evidentials from Chafe (1986):

[1-2]

- Evidentials which indicate "DEGREES OF RELIABILITY"
(a) We kept thinking *maybe* they'd be stationed at the Presidio.

- Evidentials which indicate "INDUCTION"

(b) It *must* have been a kid.

- SENSORY evidentials

(c) I *see/hear* her coming down the hall.

- Evidentials which express "HEARSAY"

(d) They were using more verbs than English speaking kids *have been said* to learn.

- Evidentials which indicate "DEDUCTION"

(e) He or she *should* take longer to respond following exposure to inconsistent information than when exposed to no information at all.

(f) Adults *presumably* are capable of purely logical thought.

(264-269)

In addition to the examples above, Chafe extended the scope of evidentials and listed "hedges" and "expectation" as other types of evidentiality functions. Certainly, this list must neither exhaustive, nor functionally appropriate cross-linguistically.

Although there is not yet a substantial study specifically on Japanese evidentiality, some thoughts on the issue have appeared in limited ways in the studies of "modality" of sentence (e.g. Nida and Masuoka, 1989). The "modality" or "mood" of sentences is another fairly un-articulated area in linguistics. Lyon's definition of modality as the "opinion or attitude of the speaker" (1977:452) seems to be widely accepted. What, however, does "opinion and attitude of the speaker" actually mean? Fillmore (1968:23) proposed that any sentence has two
main constituents: "proposition" as the basic constituent, and "modality" (negation, tense, mood, and aspect, etc.). Therefore, logically, all sentences have some kind of modality, and the evidentiality factor is part of it. In this dissertation, evidentiality is primarily investigated in relation with sentential modality. Generally, Japanese sentences mark modality explicitly at least at the end of the sentence. This is due to the Japanese SOV sentence structure (i.e., Subject + Object + Verb sequence), which places the verbal element at the very end of a sentence. Of course, Japanese has other ways to express a speaker's mood such as adverbs, deixis, and idiomatic phrases as English does, but to cover all evidentiality phenomena would make the scope of this study too broad. Thus, the main objective of this research is to examine evidentiality in terms of the sentence-final modality.

The purpose of this dissertation then is fairly straightforward: to examine the interpersonal communication of Japanese speakers, seeking to provide a theoretical construction of Japanese pragmatic rules, evidentiality rules in particular, which result in the standard speakers' preference of less assertive and indirect forms of the language.

The next chapter briefly overviews existing linguistic theories on evidentiality in general as well as work focusing specifically on Japanese, particularly in relation with sentence modality.

Chapter three discusses the lack of assertiveness in Japanese from the perspective of evidentiality. As noted earlier, there has not yet
been significant study of evidentiality in Japanese; the concept of evidentiality itself has not yet been paid sufficient attention to. One insightful ideal construct which may have some relation with the issue was proposed by Kamio (1979, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1994) in his theory of information territory of the conversationalists. Kamio argues that a speaker chooses different sentence-ending modalities to indicate the "territory" that he considers the information to belong to: the topic can be in the territory of the speaker if it is, for example, about his dinner plans; it can be in the territory of the hearer if it is a question about the hearer's health; or it can be shared by both speakers' territories if it is about a mutual acquaintance. The theory sees the "distance" between the topic and the conversationalist from the viewpoint of an information territory that each speaker has.

Although Kamio did not emphasize the question of evidentiality, the theory is fundamentally related to the issue of the concept of evidentiality in that both concepts deal with how a speaker linguistically expresses the degree of psychological distance which he feels between himself and the topic.

Chapter three also explores the issue of Japanese low assertiveness from the viewpoint of discourse management. Considering Kamio's theory and the concept of evidentiality raises the possibility that the Japanese concept of evidentiality involves not only the distance between the speaker and the topic, but also the distance between the hearer and the topic. From this perspective, it follows that
the Japanese evidentiality system is very hearer-sensitive. Takubo (1990, 1992) and Takubo & Kinsui (1990) argue that a speaker continually monitors the hearer's knowledge of the ongoing topic and selects appropriate linguistic forms to show this understanding. They analyzed Japanese deixis and some sentence-ending forms from this perspective. I found Takubo and Kinsui's perspective to be useful for the pragmatic conceptualization of evidential markings in that the distance between the topic and the participants is the key issue in Takubo and Kinsui's theory. They used the metaphorical idea of "memory storage" in the human brain: information the speaker stores in his direct memory and information which the speaker assumes his hearer has that is stored in the speaker's indirect memory are always referred to by the speaker to manage the discourse. As I understand it, the idea of "direct/indirect memory storage of the participants" of Takubo and Kinsui is relevant to the concept of "distance between the topic and the participants".

Chapter four explains the nature of the data on which this study is based and discusses the method of analysis. Discourse data of natural speech was collected from a variety of speech situations to which approximately sixty people from diverse age-groups contributed. Since the final goal of this research is to relate the Japanese system of evidentiality marking to the Japanese concept of linguistic politeness, in the analysis, which is both qualitative and quantitative, the degree of formality of speech settings is considered to be the main variable which
decides the speaker's choice of evidentiality markings. Other variables include the speaker's demographic data, the propositional content of the utterance, and the sentence-ending evidential form used for the utterance. The relationships between these variables are analyzed from the perspective of evidentiality. A custom database was developed and used in order to facilitate quantitative analysis.

Chapter five proposes a model of the Japanese evidentiality system based on the data and analysis from the preceding chapters. It is demonstrated that the Japanese system of evidentiality marking can be systematically explained by the concept of Japanese speaker's awareness of the information territories of the participants: a speaker is aware of the socially acknowledged "owner" of a topic, being particularly sensitive to his hearer's knowledge, and linguistically expresses his awareness of status of information. In doing so, a speaker may intentionally overextend his hearers' information territory so as to include the speaker's own information territory. In this way, the speaker linguistically pretends that participants share his information. This pretention makes his speech less assertive in that the speaker asks for his hearers' agreement continually during his speech. At the same time, a speaker may also be cautious and make his information territory appear smaller than it actually is by exaggerating the distance between the topic and himself. The speaker may do so by making his speech structurally indirect. In this sense, how the distance between the topic and the communication participants is expressed from different
perspectives is the core in Japanese evidentiality marking. The speaker's emphasis on the distant relationship between himself and the topic and emphasis on closeness between his hearers and his topic seem to be motivated by the speaker's desire to be polite in interpersonal communication. Actually "be indirect" and "show sharedness of information" are two of a variety of traditional politeness strategies. Politeness factors and rules such as "higher formality" (Fraser, 1990), "keep aloof" (e.g. Lakoff 1973a), "don't impose" (e.g. Fraser 1990, Brown and Levinson, 1978), more or less, suggest indirectness. Strategies such as "show camaraderie" (Lakoff), and "include both speaker and hearer in the activity" (Brown and Levinson) may be in line with the "show sharedness" strategy. In Japanese, the use of evidentiality expressions seems to be a useful linguistic strategy for being polite.

Chapter six then demonstrates how the Japanese evidentiality system is related to Japanese politeness. It is argued that the observation of the system proposed in chapter five is pragmatically required in the community in the same way that situationally appropriate use of honorifics and formal forms are required.

To discuss politeness in the Japanese language inevitably involves the issue of the relationship between language and culture. There have been some studies on Japanese politeness in areas such as honorifics (e.g. Hori, 1986; Hijikata, et. al. 1986) and women's language (e.g. Ide and McGloin, 1991; Wetzel, 1988) that delved into the issue of Japanese culture; however, there is as yet no fully conceptualized
theory of Japanese politeness as a whole.

Brown and Levinson's "face wants" framework, which has been probably most influential, views politeness in terms of sets of strategies on the part of discourse participants for mitigating potentially threatening speech acts. Their account sees language use as shaped by the intention of individuals. In contrast with Brown and Levinson, the "social norm" view by Japanese researchers (e.g. Hill et al., 1986), argues that politeness is a set of behavior patterns preprogrammed as a social norm by those possessing power, such as educators. The social norm view may be useful for Japanese culture in that this view sees politeness as having a social function. Bourdieu (1977) claims that "concessions of politeness are always political concession...practical mastery of what are called the rules of politeness, and in particular the art of adjusting each of the available formulae...to the different classes of possible addressees, presupposing the implicit mastery, hence the recognition, of a set of opposition constituting the implicit axiomatics of a determinate political order" (p.95, p.218 cited by Fairclough, 1992). Referring to Bourdieu, Fairclough (1992) suggests that to investigate politeness conventions is to gain insight into social power relationship. I think Bourdieu and Fairclough's view provides the foundation of the social norm view of politeness. However, the strategic view of politeness by Brown and Levinson should not be dismissed from the evidentiality-based viewpoint of Japanese politeness. Conformance to evidentiality rules are almost always socially preferred but their use
can also be strategic. This topic is expanded upon in chapter six.

Then what in Japanese culture has formed and maintained the Japanese politeness concept among the people? This question is explored in relation to the concept of "territory" in the following chapter seven. The insightful concept of "high context" culture versus "low context" culture which was originated by Hall (1976) and pursued by his followers (e.g. Ting-Toomey, 1985; Cohen, 1987), seems to be useful in understanding Japanese culture as contrasted with the Western cultures. Although researchers have presented a variety of distinctive differences between the two, in short, high-context cultural behavior is described as indirect, allusive, group-oriented, and shame-oriented. Japanese culture is described as being entirely high-context. On the other hand, Western cultures such as the American culture are termed as low-context and are characterized as direct, individualistic, and guilt-oriented. These differences may be seen covertly or overtly in all aspects of human life including systems of law, trials, politics, and education. Language behavior, in particular, may present one of the most crucial distinctions between high- and low-context cultures. So, the Japanese evidentiality system that makes utterances less assertive and culturally acceptable in that way may be attributed to the high-context Japanese culture, which may be sensitive to the distinction between outsiders and insiders (i.e., group territory). Concluding this study, chapter seven discuss this cultural issue behind the Japanese
evidentiality system and linguistic politeness.
CHAPTER 1: NOTES

In this dissertation, quoted conversational samples are written in the format "(x-y)", where x is the chapter number and y is a sequence number. For example, (1-2) refers to the second sample in the first chapter. Charts, tables, and figures are written in the same fashion with the exception that they use square brackets rather than parenthesis. For example, [1-3] refers to the third sample, a chart, table, or figure, in the first chapter.

Although a discussion of the relationship between "language" and "thought" is not the topic of this dissertation, it is certainly related with this study since how Japanese speakers develop their concept of evidentiality must depend on a given cognitive environment, Japanese culture.

The language-thought issue is often referred to in children's cognitive development; naturally we all underwent the process of building up our cognitive system when speaking our native language(s). Young children rapidly acquire their native language while organizing their experiences into concepts. How do they accomplish these two critical cognitive tasks? Do the linguistic patterns influence how they view reality? Whorf and Sapir, Piaget, Chomsky, and Vygotsky are major theorists in the classic works on perspectives on language and thought. A brief explanation of their theories follows.

The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis advocates that the structure of the language one speaks affects one's perception of the world in a way that would be different if one happened to speak another language instead. The boldest presentation of this notion was B. L. Whorf (e.g. 1956), and is known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Whorf saw thinking as largely a matter of language, inescapably bound up with systems of linguistic expression: the structure of the language one uses influences the way in which one understands one's environment.
Therefore, according to his theory, the picture of the universe differs from one language to another. This notion of language determinism has been criticized as being too strong, and scholars (e.g. Lenneberg, 1967) criticized this notion for lack of evidence, but a weak version of the Whorfian hypothesis, which says that lexical items and linguistic structures that a language provides can have an important influence on thought, seems to be more acceptable.

Piaget (e.g. 1968) demonstrated his insight about language-thought relationship in his theory of developmental sequence of stages in human cognitive development. In the Piagetian theory of "cognitive determinism", children learn about the world first, build a cognitive structure, then map language information on to the cognitive structure. Therefore, in Piaget's theory, language does not cause or affect a child's cognitive development.

Chomsky (e.g. 1975, 1980, 1988) proposed the concept of a "language acquisition device", an inborn human mechanism to acquire language (syntax, in particular). His assertion is based on three assumptions. First, grammars are creative generative rules that enable a speaker to produce an infinite number of sentences which he has never heard. Second, a child's linguistic environment is too "impoverished" to provide a child with a "perfect" model of language use, in that adult speakers make errors and use incomplete sentences or indirect expressions. So it does not seem that children could deduce the structure of language from the finite and imperfect sentences which they hear. Third, despite this unfavorable environment, the process of language acquisition is fairly uniform across languages. These assumptions illustrate the miraculous nature of language development. So Chomsky concluded there must be a highly abstract innate structure that constrains language acquisition (particularly syntax). Therefore, the human biological aspect is more emphasized in Chomsky's theory of language development than environmental factors such as culture.

Vygotsky's "interactionist" approach assumes that higher level
thought processes are derived from social interaction (e.g. Vygotsky, 1962). Vygotsky advocated that language plays an important role in human cognitive development although both language and cognition begin as independent processes (by the age two), but soon this prelinguistic thought interacts with language, and thought is gradually transformed by it. Once a child establishes the connection between his experience and language, development in each will influence the other. This is why Vigotsky was particularly concerned with the field of education, particularly literacy and child development.

2 Original Japanese utterances of discourse (1-1)

(1) aa, soo. Ano hito ga ichiban nante iu no, yoosuruni
Well so that person NOM most what shall I say in short
tsukutta
made

(2) sarin o tsukutte yoosuruni jibun de maita -tte
Sarin OBJ make(te-form) in short self INS scattered QUOT
iu ka...
say wonder

(3) yoosuruni kagakusha
in short scientist

(4) hotondo ga daigaku no toki ni sooiu bunya o
most NOM univ. MODI time TEMP such field OBJ
senmon to shite yatteta hito-tachi
major make(te) did(GER) people

(5) dakara tabun tabun-tte iu ka yoosuruni kenkyuu
therefore probably probably-QUOT wonder in short research

(6) daigaku no kenkyuujo-tte shikin ga amari nai
univ. POSS research center-QUOT fund NOM much NEG
kara kekkyoku jibun ga ima yatteru-no o
so eventually self NOM now doing-NML OBJ
nandemo sukinayooni tsukur-asete ageru-tte iu
whatever as pleased make-CAUS give-COMP

jyooken de yappari soo-iu-no ga haitta riyuu
condition INS as expected so-COMP-NML NOM entered reasons

g a soo-iu-no mo aru-n-janai-ka to wa
NOM so-called-NML also exist-n-NEG-COMP QUOT CONT

iwa-reteru kedo ne.
say-PASS but RAPP

(7) dakara kenkyuu shitakute daigaku de wa dagakuinn
 therefore research want (te-form) univ. LOC CONT grad.school

toka de benkyoositeru iijoo-ni motto benkyoo shitai-tte iu
such as INST studying more than more study want-QUOT

ishi to iu no toka mo atte itta-n-janai ka to
desire COMPcalled NM etc also exist(te-from) went-n-NEG QUOT

mo iwa-rete- iru no ne.
also sa -PASS STAT VOC RAPP

(8) dakara moo toppu reberu no kagakusha-tte iu-ka...
 therefore EMP top level MODI scientist -COMP I wonder

3"Indirect speech" in this research is different from "indirect illocutionary acts" (Searle, 1975). According to Searle, an illocutionary act can be produced indirectly when the syntactic form of the utterance does not meet the illocutionary force of the utterance. For example, the syntactic form of the utterance could you keep quiet? is yes/no interrogative while its illocutionary force is actually "directive" (i.e., be quiet). On the other hand, a "direct illocutionary act" is issued when the syntactic form of the utterance matches the illocutionary force of the utterance. For example, the utterance you are fired is syntactically "declarative" and its illocutionary force is "declaration".

Indirect speech in this dissertation simply means structurally (syntactically and morphologically, in particular) indirect speech
which is often expressed by complex sentence structure (in case of English) in that the matrix verb-phrase has some modality of indirectness. The utterance it looks like he is failing the course is indirect in terms of assertiveness as well as evidentiality as opposed to the direct the statement he is failing the course. Questioning forms are also indirect in terms of the speaker's degree of assertiveness, and tag-question sentences are also structurally less assertive.

4In my paper about hearsay speech (Trent, 1974), I pointed out two possible causes of the Japanese preference of indirect sentences. One is the speaker's concept of speech territory; hearsay does not belong to the speaker's information territory so the speaker ought to express distance between the information and himself through indirect sentence forms. The other factor is simply syntactical. Japanese sentences have an SOV structure in that a verbal constituent always comes at the sentence ending. I assumed that with an SVO sentence structure, as in English, a speaker is not necessarily required to repeat the same verb phrase of hearsay ("I heard", for example) to tell a hearsay story; if he is telling five sentences of hearsay, the first I heard phrase may possibly cover the whole discourse. However with an SOV sentence structure, if a speaker tries to minimize the use of I heard phrase, he needs to put I heard at the very end of the whole discourse. This is not acceptable because, in this way, there is no way for the hearer to know the speech is about hearsay before the very end of the discourse. Therefore, SOV language speakers may tend to repeat the V (I heard) at the end of every sentence. I found that many Japanese speakers preferred making hearsay sentences incomplete and connect them by using te-form of verbs at each sentence. By doing so, a speaker is able to make the whole discourse sound as if it is an extremely long single sentence ("te-linkage"), and the speaker simply puts verb-phrases which indicate that the information is hearsay (e.g. I heard, it
seems, I think) at the very end or at the beginning of the discourse. So, this is, in a sense, a Japanese speaker's strategy to avoid the inconvenience of an SOV sentence structure when one has to repeat the same verb phrase. This is my hypothesis, and I have not investigated with other SOV language speakers' behavior.

An example of te-linkage is shown below (English translation of the discourse immediately follows):

(1-3)

(1) M3: Maïkeru Jakuson ga jyuusansai no otokonoko o
Michael Jackson NOM 13 years-old MODI boy OBJ

*tsurekonde*

bring in (*te*)

(te-incomplete)

(2) nani shita-n-kana? nani shitatte, nanka seishikini wa
what did-n-Q what do (*te*) somewhat officially CONT

happyo saretenai kedo chairudo molesuteision
announce(PAS) (NEG) but child molestation (*Noun-ending*)

(3) sono otokonoko ga beddo de konna koto o
that boy NOM bed LOC like this matter OBJ

sareta toka itte,

did(PASS) such say (*te*)

(te-incomplete)

(4) uttae o motteitte.
claim OBJ bring (*te*)

(te-incomplete)

(5) moo sorosoro keijisaiban ni narookana-tte iu chokuzen
yet shortly criminal trial become COMP just before

de wakai ga seirisu site
TEMP conciliation NOM establish (*te*)

(te-incomplete)

(6) de, okane, wan milion ka tuu milion ka moratte
then money one million or two million or receive (*te*)

(te-incomplete)

(7) fairu wa nakatta koto ni sita kedomo
filing SUBJ happened(NEG) COMP made but...
(8) **demo dakara sono ko kara no uttae wa**
but because that boy from MODI charge TOP
nakatta kedo ima keisatu gawa ga nannka
happened(NEG) but now the police side NOM somewhat
kenji-gawa toshite sore o saiban ni motte-iku
procecuters'side as that OBJ trial TEMP bring(te) go
toka dounokou yattoru to omou
such such and such doing QUOT think. (Indirect)

(9) Int.: By the way, do you know something about the relationship between Michael Jackson and Elizabeth Taylor?

(10) M3: iyana nanka, naka ga ii kedo....
well somewhat relationship NOM good but....

(11) nannka Maikeru Jakuson ga sono saibanzata ni
somewhat Michael Jackson NOM that trial matter
nari hajimete taaa o ichinichi futuka
become start(te) tour OBJ one day two days
yooroppa de yatte, de nokori canserusite
Europe LOC did(te) then the rest cancel(te)
(\textit{te-incomplete})

(12) amerika ni kaetta kana tte ittotta kedo jituwa
America LOC returned Q COMP said but as a mater of fact
kaette nakute return(te) (NEG) happen(te)
(\textit{te-incomplete})

(13) Erizabesu Teilaa no uti ni chotto maa otte
Elizabeth Tayler POSS house LOC shortwhile stay(te)
(\textit{te-incomplete})

(14) aa, jituwa koko ni ottandesuyo-tte nanka
Oh, as a matter of fact here LOC stay QUOT somewhat
ni shuukan go gurai ni hyokotto kaettekita
two weeks after about TEMP unexpectedly returned
(English Translation)

(1) A: Michael Jackson brought a 13 year-old boy in, (TE-ending)

(2) What did they do? That is not officially announced so I don't know well, but child molestation... (noun ending)

(3) That boy said Michael Jackson did this and that to him in bed, (TE-ending)

(4) [The boy] sued, (TE-ending)

(5) When the case was about to reach the criminal court, conciliation was made, (TE-ending)

(6) Then, he got the money, one or two million, (TE-ending)

(7) Then, nothing was filed, (TE-ending)

(8) But, even though there was no charge from that boy, now, the police are trying to bring the case to court being the prosecution, they are doing that sort of thing or another, I think, (indirect)

(9) Int.: By the way, do you know anything about the relationship between Michael Jackson and Elizabeth Taylor?
(10) A: Well, they are somewhat on good friendly terms. (direct)

(11) When the case [above] was beginning to be serious, he canceled his European tour after two or three days, (te-ending)

(12) They were saying that he returned to America but actually he did not return home, (te-ending)

(13) But stayed at Elizabeth Taylor's house for a while, (te-ending)

(14) Then after about two weeks, he came home saying he was at Taylor's, it is said like that. (indirect)

The speaker intentionally avoided completing each sentence to connect each to the last indirectness marker I think (8), and also it is said in (14). In a sense, he planned his discourse ahead to evade saying I hear, I think in each sentence ending. The speech sounds fairly informal due to the repeated use of incomplete sentences. I feel this is good evidence that basic Japanese syntax influences our hearsay discourse.

Some Japanese evidentiality expressions (e.g. expressions of sensation) appear to be grammaticalized; thus, it is difficult to say if the proper use of these expressions is part of sentence grammar or a pragmatic requirement.

Defining "pragmatics", Katz (1977), Kempson (1975) and others agreed that grammar and pragmatics are different concepts:

Grammars are theories about the structures of sentences while pragmatic theories do nothing to explicate the structure of linguistic construction of grammatical properties and relations...
They explicate the reasoning of speakers and hearers in working out the correlation in a context of a sentence token with a proposition (Katz, 1977:19 quoted by Levinson, 1983:8).

However, on the relationship of pragmatics and grammar, I agree with Levinson (1982) in that pragmatics and grammar cannot be separated since sometimes aspects of linguistic structure directly encode the features of the context ("context-dependent grammar").

In Japanese grammar, the use of giving and receiving verbs is an example of context-dependant grammar. For example, there are five verbs meaning to give: ageru, kudasaru, kureru, sashiageru, and yaru. The correct use of these giving verbs requires an analysis of the semantic roles of AGENT, GOAL, and OBJECT based on "semantic scenes" (cf. Wetzel, 1984). In short, ageru (and the honorific sashiageru) is used when giving to an out-group target, kureru is used when giving to an in-group target, and yaru is used when giving to a lower-status target. This grammar requires a speaker to analyze the context of a particular act of giving.

The definition of "evidentiality" varies among scholars. The main reason for this is that evidentiality marking is often interwoven with other concepts of grammar such as mood and modality particularly in terms of epistemology. Details are discussed in the next chapter.

Aoki (1986) is the only study known to focus specifically on Japanese evidentiality. It is a short overview of evidential-like aspects in Japanese grammar. The study lists evidential-like expressions in three areas: descriptions of sensation, hearsay markers, and no-marking which allows a speaker to assert a statement as a fact even if direct evidence is not available (cf. chapter two).

In Hall's definition, "context" is "what one pays attention to". He
explained that culture functions as a selective screen of our information in-taking; culture designates what we pay attention to and what we ignore. In high-context culture, awareness of the selective process is high whereas in low-context cultures people's awareness of that is low. The process of screening is called "contexting". Hall defined cultures such as those of the American Indians, in which people are deeply involved in each other, to be high-context cultures, and defined individualistic cultures --such as those of the Swiss and the German--in which there is relatively little involvement with people to be low-context cultures. (1989: 39-40)
CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF LINGUISTIC EVIDENTIALITY

WESTERN THEORIES OF MODALITY AND EVIDENTIALITY

The study of evidentiality as a linguistic topic has a long history starting with Greek and Platonic tradition and prevails to this day in philosophy. It has become a linguistic issue in dealing with sentential modalities. The word 'modality' in the English language finds its root in the Latin modus (manners). Although there are perspectives that do not acknowledge modality as an independent grammatical category as "tense" or "aspect" is acknowledged to be, the fundamental premise of this dissertation is that both modality and evidentiality are grammatical phenomena, and both categories are treated in that way. As a matter of fact, in traditional English grammar, modal auxiliaries such as may, can, must, shall and certain verbal endings have been considered a category that presents the mood of the sentence. Earlier in this century, logician von Wright (1951) proposed four groups of modals: alethic modes (modes of truth); epistemic modes (modes of knowing); deontic modes (modes of obligation); and existential modes. He claimed that the modal concept as a whole is concerned with the concept of "necessity and possibility". In modern times, in linguistics, a new viewpoint regarding modals was proposed. Linguists (e.g. Fillmore, 1968; Lyons, 1977) assumed that a sentence is constructed with two basic components: a propositional element (the core part of the sentence) and a modal element (e.g. tense, aspect, and mood). As previously noted, Lyons
defined modality as the "opinion or attitude of the speaker" (1977:452) toward the proposition as expressed by himself.

Evidentials are defined by Chafe (1986) in the "broad sense" as marking epistemology, coding the speaker's attitude toward his knowledge of a situation, and in the "narrow sense" as marking the source of knowledge (1986:262). In proposing two dimensions of evidentials, Chafe suggested that evidentiality is nearly equivalent with modality. Certainly, in general opinion, evidentiality as a semantic domain is considered primarily modal. The notion of modal or modality is less clearly defined, but it is commonly agreed that evidential distinctions are a subset of "epistemic modality" marking (e.g. Lyons 1977, Bybee 1985, Palmer 1986). In epistemic modality, the notions of evidentiality, i.e., necessity and possibility, are viewed with respect to a speaker's knowledge and belief upon which he bases his judgement of the necessity/possibility that the proposition is true. The following chart [2-1] indicates a summary of the existing views about the position of sentence evidentiality in the category of sentence modality (e.g. Lyons, 1977; Palmer, 1986; Bybee, 1985). One linguistic view regards evidentiality as the synonym of epistemic modality (e.g. Willet, 1988). In the other view, evidentiality is narrowly defined as being a part of epistemic modality which concerns with source of information as shown in [2-1] (e.g. Palmer, 1986).
Epistemic modality and evidentiality

**Evidentiality**
(Concerned with source of information.
(e.g. hearsay, report, senses.)

**Epistemic modality**
(Truth-oriented, concerned with matters of belief, knowledge, opinions, etc. A speaker qualifies his commitment to the truth of his proposition.)

**Judgement of necessity and possibility**
(e.g. speaker's speculation, deduction)

**Modality**
(Speaker's opinions and attitude to his proposition)

**Deontic modality**
(Agent-oriented, concerned with the necessity or possibility of act performed by a morally responsible agent.

(ex. John may come. (Permission-deontic possibility)
John must come. (Obligation-deontic necessity)

Epistemic modality was defined by Palmer (1986) as "showing the status of the speaker's understanding or knowledge; this clearly includes both his own judgement and the kind of warrant he has for
what he says' (p.51). Palmer meant that there are two systems of epistemic modality: one is the speaker's judgement of necessity or possibility, and the other is evidentiality. Palmer also indicated how these two systems work differently from one language to another. He cited English as an example of a language with grammaticalized epistemic judgement, and German and others as languages that appear to combine the two in a system of grammatical marking. Palmer, although having defined evidentiality as being different from epistemic judgement, in analyzing various languages, often involved judgement type epistemic modalities such as "deductive", "speculative" and "assumptive" (his terms) in the scope of evidentiality. Indeed, whether we should separate "pure" evidentials (i.e., source of information) from epistemic judgement (i.e., statements of necessity and possibility) seems to be a persistent problem because a speaker's judgment is based on his qualification of evidence.

Chung and Timberlake (1985) claim a different framework for mood, which combines epistemic judgement and epistemic evidentiality (in Palmer's terms) together in one category. In doing so, their main attention was on the contrast between a realis and an irrealis world:

Mood characterizes the actuality of an event by comparing the event world(s) to a reference world, termed the actual world. An event can simply be actual (more precisely, the event world is identical to the actual world); an event can be hypothetically possible (the event world is not identical to the actual world); the event may be imposed by the speaker on the addressee; and so on. Whereas there is basically one way for an event to be actual, there are numerous ways that an event can be less than completely actual. For this reason our discussion of mood is
concerned principally with different types of non-actuality.

It is also clear, however, that languages differ significantly as to which events are evaluated as actual (and expressed morphologically by the realis mode) vs. non-actual (and expressed morphologically by their irrealis mood).

(1985:241)

It must be true that the ways to show realis/irrealis are certainly diverse among languages; some languages may have grammaticalized rules to mark realis and irrealis, some language may have only pragmatic rules, and some may be dependent on each speaker's subjective decision. Chung and Timberlake posit three types of mode: "epistemic mode", "epistemological mode"; and "deontic mode". The difference between their "epistemic mode" and "epistemological mode" is firmly within the scope of this dissertation. They characterize each mode as follows:

The epistemic mode characterizes the event with respect to the actual world and its possible alternatives. If the event belongs to the actual world, it is actual; if it belongs to some possible alternative world (although not necessarily to the actual world) it is possible; and so on.

Two subtypes of epistemic mode are often distinguished: necessity (the event belongs to all alternative worlds) and possibility (the event belongs to at least one alternative world). These subtypes are illustrated by one sense of the English modal auxiliaries; consider John must be in Phoenix by now ( = in all alternative worlds that one could imagine at this time, John is in Phoenix) and John can/may be in Phoenix now ( = there is at least one world one could imagine in which John is in Phoenix).

(1985:242)

Given that the epistemic mode characterizes the actuality of an event per se, it does not include a participant target or strictly speaking, a source.

The epistemic mode can be contrasted with a related mode,
the epistemological mode, which differs only in that it more clearly involves a source. The epistemological mode evaluates the actuality of an event with respect to a source. The event may be asserted to be actual, or else its actuality may be dependent on the source in one of several ways.

(1985:244)

Chung and Timberlake claimed to have discovered, in their survey of the essentials of tense, aspect and modal in Lakhota, Takelma, German, and others, that a speaker uses the epistemic mode and the epistemological mode differently. As quoted above, they define epistemic mode as the mode that characterizes the situation the speaker is describing with respect to both the actual world and another possible, non-actual world (i.e. the world of necessity vs. the world of possibility) and epistemological mode as the mode that is used to evaluate the actuality of the situation with respect to the speaker's source of information. Therefore, Chung and Timberlake's "epistemological mode" theoretically involves both "evidentiality" and "judgement of necessity and possibility" which are separated in the traditional view [2-1]. Within this "epistemological mode" they proposed four parameters:

[2-2] Parameters of epistemological modes proposed by Chung and Timberlake (1985:244)

(a) "EXPERIENTIAL", in which the event is characterized as witnessed or otherwise experienced by the "source" (i.e the speaker);  
(b) "INFERENTIAL", or "EVIDENTIAL", in which the event is characterized as inferred by the speaker from evidence;  
(c) "QUOTATIVE", in which the event is reported from another source, told to the speaker by someone else;  and
(d) "CONSTRUCT", the submode in which the event is a speaker's construct (thought, belief, fantasy) of the source.

Parameter (a) is direct evidence, parameter (b) is "judgement of necessity and possibility" in the traditional sense, and parameter (c) is so-called evidentiality in a traditional narrow sense. Parameter (d) is, perhaps, speaker's "judgement", but which is more subjective than (b). These four parameters are similar to those of Chafe (1986) presented in chapter one.

At a glance, the distinction between epistemic mode and epistemological mode in Chung and Timberlake's term is not so straightforward as they claim it to be. On this point, Chung and Timberlake state that some languages may "use the same morphology to encode the epistemic and epistemological modes, suggesting that these modes are concerned with similar types of non-actuality" although "a language may express epistemologically uncertain events with morphology used basically for epistemic non-actuality" (p.245); therefore, the distinction may not be applicable for some languages. Examples of both "epistemic mode" and "epistemological mode" from Chung and Timberlake's framework may help one understand their distinction between the two modes. The following example from Takelma is in distinct realis mode with a verb of distinct realis:

\[(2-3) \text{Menà yap'ā t'omō-k'wa} \]
\[\text{bear man kill(REALIS)-3HUMAN OBJ} \]
\[(\text{The bear killed the man})\]
Chung and Timberlake claim that the next Takelma sentence is in the inferential epistemological mode, with a different stem used for all non-actual moods and a special inferential suffix -k:\n
\[(2-4) \text{Menà yap’a } \text{tdomō-k’wa } -k’\]

bear man kill(IRR)-3HUMAN OBJ-INFERENTIAL

(It seems that the bear killed the man/The bear must have, evidently has, killed the man.— Epistemological)

The irrealis mode of the above sentence (2-4) (i.e., highly possible world) is grammatically contrastive with the "actual world" but, at the same time, the mode of inference (based on some evidence obviously) is grammatically presented. The next example is from Lakhota (Boas and Deloria, 1941 also quoted by Chang and Timberlake) where a verb suffix form tkhá is analyzed to be used for a "counterfactual but hypothetically possible event"; therefore, the case represents the epistemic mode of Chung and Timberlake:

\[(2-5) \text{Leháyela me-tʔá } \text{tkhá}\]

now I(SG)-die HYP

(I could have/almost died.— Epistemic)

In Lakhota, a simple sentence without any evidential basis to support it can only use the realis mode. Willett (1988) argues that all four parameters (a) to (d) in [2-2] proposed by Chung and Timberlake are "evidential-like" and maintains that he found the same parameters in the languages he examined. Willet concludes that inference is "best treated as a third major type of evidential, on a par with sensory and reported evidence", and that these three "form a set of epistemic
distinctions that contrast semantically with those of confidence (i.e., judgement)” (1988:54). Thus he defines evidentiality as "the linguistic means of indicating how the speaker obtained the information on which he bases an assertion (and reliability of a speaker's knowledge)", which I have adopted as a general definition in this dissertation. Therefore, the scope of evidentiality in this study is approximately the same as the phenomena termed "epistemic modality" in the traditional sense, "epistemological mode" characterized by Chung and Timberlake, and "evidentiality" by Willett. The meanings of different types of evidentials are summarized by Willett (1988) as follows in [2-6].

Please note that the scope of [2-6] still deals with two major types of information source: direct (experiential) and indirect (inexperiential) evidence; although inexperiential evidence involves more than hearsay being different from popular "lay" understanding of evidential, i.e., evidentials equal hearsay. Therefore, logically, what an "evidentiality-conscious" speaker does is to involve information about his information source (direct, reported-indirect, or inference-indirect) into the modality of his proposition.
Meanings of grammatical evidentials by Willett (1988:96)

I. Direct evidence: the speaker claims to have perceived the situation described, but may not specify that it is sensory evidence of any kind.

A. Visual evidence: the speaker claims to have seen the situations described.

B. Auditory evidence: the speaker claims to have heard the situations described.

C. Sensory evidence: the speaker claims to have physically sensed the situation described. This can be viewed as (a) in opposition to one or both of the above senses (i.e. any other sense), or (b) unspecified as to sensory mode (i.e. any sense).

II. Indirect evidence: the speaker claims not to have perceived the situation described, but may not specify whether the evidence he does have is reported to him or is the basis of an inferences he has made.

A. Reported evidence: the speaker claims to know of the situation described via verbal means, but may not specify whether it is hearsay (i.e. second-hand or third-hand), or is conveyed through folklore.

1. Second-hand evidence: the speaker claims to have heard of the situation described from someone who was a direct witness.

2. Third-hand evidence: the speaker claims to have heard about the situation described, but not from a direct witness.

3. Evidence from folklore: the speaker claims that the situation described is part of established oral history.

B. Inferring evidence: the speaker claims to know of the situation described only though inference, but may not specify whether such inference is based on observable results or solely on mental reasoning.

1. Inference from the results: the speaker infers the situation described from his observable evidence.

2. Inference from reasoning: the speaker infers the situation described on the basis of intuition, logic, a dream, previous experience, or some other mental construct.
However, as I wrote earlier, the simple difference between direct and indirect is not enough to explain Japanese evidentials which seem to involve not only the speaker's knowledge but also the hearer's knowledge. In a later section I will attempt to incorporate the view from Revisionist Epistemology (Givon, 1982) that emphasizes the influence created by the hearer's knowledge of the speaker's proposition. Also, some indirect evidence (both reported and inferred) in [2-6] can be treated as direct evidence (in a sense) by a speaker in discourse depending on how intimate the speaker feels about the proposition. This Japanese concept of direct evidence will be explained by the concept of the speaker's psychological information territory. These factors regarding the Japanese concept of evidence require a unique evidentiality system framework that is not fully explainable by what is assumed to be the universal standard concept summarized in [2-6].

EXAMPLES OF GRAMMATICALIZED EVIDENTIALS

Before getting into the evidentials in the Japanese language, it would be useful to look at some examples of systems of evidentiality from various languages. Most languages do not have a grammaticized system of evidentials as some languages have; often evidentiality expressions reflect a speaker's subjective judgement so that a speaker is, theoretically speaking, free to choose his own system. English, as well as Japanese, belongs to this "free" group.
The following example is from the Tuyuca language (Brazil and Columbia) investigated by Barnes (1984). The following sentences in [2-7] can all be translated into English as "he played soccer." Tuyuca cases have been quoted in many studies since the language shows a clear example of a grammaticalized evidential system.

[2-7] Tuyuca evidentials
(a) \textit{díiga apé-wi} (he play-evidential)  (I saw him play. \textit{--------- visual})
(b) \textit{díiga apé-ti} (he play-evidential)  (I heard the game and him, but I didn't see it or him.\textit{-------senses other than visual})
(c) \textit{díiga apé-yē} (he play-evidential)  (I have seen evidence that he played: his distinctive shoe print on the playing fields. But I did not see him play. \textit{-----------------apparent})
(d) \textit{díiga apé-yigi} (he play-evidential)  (I obtained the information from someone else. \textit{--------hearsay})
(e) \textit{díiga apé-hiyi} (he play-evidential)  (It is reasonable to assume that he did. \textit{---------assumed})

(Palmer, 1986:67)

Palmer commented that the Tuyuka system is a case of grammaticalized "pure" evidentials (1986:67). It is reported that in Tuyuca, morphological forms of the verbal tense/person suffix function to indicate the source of information which the speaker's proposition is based on. Two types of direct evidence, (a) and (b), and three types of indirect evidence (c), (d), and (e) in [2-7] are encoded in the grammar. Since this is a part of the grammar of the language, speakers of Tuyuca
are required by the grammatical system to articulate the source of information.

The next example of grammaticized evidentials is from Kogi (Chibchan, N. Columbia) studied by Hansarling (1982), and discussed also by Palmer (1986). The grammar of this language requires its speaker to be conscious of the hearer's knowledge. If a speaker judges his proposition to be known to both parties, he has to use the particle **ni** ("reminding"); if he assumes that his proposition is not known to the hearer, the **na** particle is used to indicate that the speaker is "informing". In case the speaker does not have a certain piece of information and assumes that his hearer has that information, he uses the **shi** particle ("asking"). If the speaker does not have a certain piece of information and he assumes that his hearer does not know either, the speaker uses the modality of the **skan** particle (expression of "doubt"). And if he is not sure if his hearer has information that he does not know, he is required to use the modality of the **ne** particle ("speculation"). A summary chart of the Kogi system is shown in [2-8] with sentencial examples. In the following figure, "+" indicates that the information is known, while "-" means that information is not known.
Kogi evidential system (Palmer, 1989: 76)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidential particles</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Hearer</th>
<th>Function of evd.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) ni</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>remind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) na</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>inform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) shi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) skan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) ne</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>speculate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample sentences using (a) - (e) evidentials:

(a') ni- gu- ku- á. (I did it just a while ago, as you know - remind)
(b') na- gu-gú. (I tell you he did it some time ago - inform)
(c') shi- ná (Is that the way it is? - ask)
(d') shag- gú (Who knows if it did just now? - doubt)
(e') näbbi no guste ne ha gna (I wonder if it is a small lion, he thought - speculate)

The evidential system in Kogi indicates "who knows what about the situation being discussed" (Hansarling, 1982:52 quoted by Palmer, 1986:76). Interestingly, this system is related to the psychological concept of information territory of a speaker which is, in this dissertation, introduced to conceptualize the Japanese system of evidentiality (see later section of this chapter). The most significant difference between Kogi and Japanese is that Kogi evidentials are grammarticized where those of Japanese are not.

Palmer (1986) also suggested that Nambiquara (Brazil) is another example of a language in which epistemic modality is grammaticalized.
in that various combinations of the speaker's and the hearer's knowledge are used as indicators of different epistemic modality. Lowe (1972) analyzed rather complex evidentiality in Nambiquara as a two-dimensional system with an "individual mode" and "collective mode" for event verification:

speaker orientation : observation, deduction, or narration
event verification : individual or collective verification

According to Palmer, the speaker-orientation system of Nambiquara is equivalent to an evidential system: "observation" means sensory acquisition of information, "deduction" means existence of enough evidence for the proposition, and "narration" is hearsay speech. Event verification should be applied to each type of "speaker orientation". Therefore there are six matrices in Nambiquara's evidentiality system as summarized in [2-9] below:

[2-9] Nambiquara evidentiality system

(a) Individual observation: "I report to you what I saw the actor (=subject) doing." (e.g. He worked.)

(b) Individual deduction: "I tell you my deduction of an action that must have occurred because of something I see or saw." (e.g. He must have worked.)

(c) Individual narration: "I was told by someone that a certain action occurred." (e.g. I was told that he worked.)

(d) Collective observation: "I report what both I and the addressee saw the actor doing." (e.g. Both you and I saw that he worked.)
(e) Collective deduction: "From what the speaker and the addressee saw, they deduce that a certain action must have taken place." (e.g. He worked, as deduced from what we saw.)

(f) Collective narration: "Both speaker and addressee were told that a certain event took place." (e.g. It was told us that he worked.)

The system of Nambiquara is different from that of Kogi in that it does not involve information which is known only to the addressee (the hearer). In Nambiquara, the speaker is required to pay attention to whether information is known only to the speaker or known to both parties.

The cases of Tuyuka, Kogi and Nambiquara support the Revisionist Epistemology theory of Givon (1982) in that the existence of the hearer is an influential factor in evidentials in these languages. As is noted earlier, in the traditional idea of epistemology, the essence of the sentential mode was a matter of true or false. Therefore, traditionally, neither the speaker's subjective certainty nor the existence of hearers was considered to be important in theories of evidentiality. However, truth is rarely absolute. As Chafe claimed, "the study of evidentiality is about the human awareness that truth is relative, and particularly about the ways in which such awareness is expressed in languages" (1986: vii). In modern times, attempts have been made to show that at the bottom of propositional/sentential modalities lies an implicit contract between the speaker and the hearer.
From this perspective, Givon (1982) proposed to categorize propositions into three types:

(a) propositions which are to be taken for granted, via the force of diverse conventions, as unchallengeable by the hearer and thus requiring no evidentiary justification by the speaker;

(b) propositions that are asserted with relative confidence and open to challenge from the hearer and thus require—or admit—evidentiary justification; and

(c) propositions that are asserted with doubt as hypotheses and thus beneath both challenge and evidentiary substantiation. They are, in terms of the implicit communicative contract, "not worth the trouble".

(1982:24, italics in the original)

As suggested above, for Givon, the knowledge level (the degree of necessity of the proposition) of the speaker and the hearer matters in deciding the necessity of evidentials. Givon rejected the concept of linguistic sentential modality which had been under the influence of the classic Platonic tradition, i.e., the traditional view of epistemology in which the essence of mode is whether the proposition is true or false by virtue of various modes of access to truth or knowledge. Givon stated:

This [Platonic] tradition has derived the bulk of its support from linguistic analysis of a distinct kind: Propositions are considered in isolation from each other as to their truth and epistemic status. Sentential modalities thus appear to be an objective matter, to which neither the speaker nor the hearer—the two participants in the communicative transaction in which human language is actually used—bear any relevance. The recent renaissance in the study of communicative pragmatics has so far made nary a dent in this tradition. The speaker's subjective certainly is not considered seriously in traditional epistemology, but rather relegated to the realm of psychology. The hearer's role in the communicative transaction is not even contemplated. (p.24, italics in the original)
Consequently, the speaker's subjective certainty is an inferential by-product of the evidentiary, experiential aspect of knowledge, while the logician's "truth" is again an inferential by-product of both evidentiary source and subjective certainty. (p.25, italics in the original)

Lyons (1977) also made a similar distinction between subjective and objective types of epistemic mode (as well as deontic mode): in his theory, the objective epistemic mode is a matter of degree of necessity, and subjective meaning is evidential by nature, but he did not elaborate on this concept.

I think that Givon made two particularly noteworthy points: first, we should realize that we are dealing with the speaker's subjective certainty in dealing with necessity and possibility of the proposition which we assume to be objectively measurable; second, the speaker certainly pays attention to the hearer in choosing the evidentials since the chosen evidentials indicate the speaker's subjective certainty that might be offensive to the hearer in some way.

I believe that these theories and analyses of sentential modality are also useful in analyzing discourse modality; they provide us with good understanding of modal meanings of isolated words and phrases which can be utilized in a larger scope of discourse modality. Givon's view is in line with the theories of "discourse modality" (e.g. Maynard, 1993) in arguing that a theory of sentence modality does not always reflect actual language use. This point will be elaborated on in later sections.
STUDIES ON JAPANESE MODALITY

Interestingly enough, earlier this century, some Japanese linguists proposed that a sentence has propositional and modal contexts (e.g. Tokieda, 1950, Hashimoto, 1948). The idea was similar to Fillmore's later proposition (1968), although naturally the linguistic form of Japanese modality is different from that of English. English modals are easy to understand due to their close relationship with auxiliary verbs (e.g. do, have, shall, be, will, may, ought) which are morphologically independent. The functions of English auxiliary verbs are defined to express tense, person, number, and mood in accompanying and helping another verb. In Japanese, jo-dooshi ( ) are closest to English auxiliaries in their function. However, since the Japanese language is "agglutinative" by nature (cf. English is "inflectional"), the Japanese jo-dooshi are not morphologically independent, but usually attached to the main verbs or adjectives in a way that they look like a part of the main lexical item's conjugation. Hashimoto (1948) viewed jo-dooshi as independent lexical items. He suggested two types of jo-dooshi: those attached to nouns and adjectives, and those attached to verbs. Hashimoto proposed the concept of bunsetsu (phrase) in that, as he argued, jo-dooshi--together with the main lexical item which it is attached to--constitute a bunsetsu (phrase), and one or more bunsetsu constitute a bun (sentence). Tokieda (1941, 1950), in conjunction with his grammatical theory "gengo katei setsu" (theory of language as a
mental process), proposed to divide sentences into two parts: \textit{shi} (objective/subjective notions such as \textit{book}, \textit{sad}, etc.) and \textit{ji} (concept outside of objectifiable expressions). For Tokieda, \textit{shi} is a result of "abstraction" (e.g. the word "book" is not the same as the object "book" but a linguistic abstraction of the object "book"), while \textit{ji} directly represents a speaker's position which is in the abstraction process. In the following sentence, for example, \textit{yuki ga furu} (snow falls) is \textit{shi}, and \textit{kamoshirenai} (might, perhaps) is \textit{ji}:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{cc}
\textbf{Bun (sentence)} & \\
\textbf{[2-11]} & \\
\textit{shi} & \textit{ji} \\
\textit{Yuki ga furu -kamoshire-nai} & \\
\textit{snow NOM fall AUX(might)} & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

(It might be snowing.)

\textit{Kamoshire-nai} expresses the speaker's view of \textit{shi} (an objective event): \textit{yuki ga furu} (snow falls). Thus, Tokieda claimed that \textit{jo-dooshi} is an independent part-of-speech category, and \textit{shi} and \textit{ji} have different functions in that \textit{shi} are "enveloped" in \textit{ji} (1955:278). Tokieda also proposed to include verbal- adverbial- and nominal-suffix into the \textit{shi} constituent as a \textit{setsubi-go} (suffix) as shown in the following example:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{cc}
\textit{Sentence} & \\
\textit{Taroo wa sushi o tabe -nakat -ta -rashii.} & \\
Taro TOP sushi ACC eat NEG PAST seem & \\
\textit{jodooshi setsubigo jodooshi} & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
(It seems that Taro did not eat sushi.)

In [2-12], the negative auxiliary, -nakat-, is a part of shi (i.e., proposition). Thus, in Tokieda's view, jo-dooshi (i.e., Japanese AUX) is not always in the ji-phras (i.e., modal) while in English, auxiliary verbs are usually modal. Tokieda's theory influenced subsequent research on Japanese syntax. There are differences among the researchers' concept of models; however, all seem to agree that a sentence has a modal constituent to "envelop" propositional context: Tokieda's ji, Yamada's chinjutsu (1951), Mikami's muudo (1963), Teramura's muudo (1979), and Nakau (1976) and Nitta's (1989) modality, all describe the same linguistic phenomena. Thus, it seems that the dichotomy of propositional content and modal content has been adopted in Japanese. Tokieda claimed that modal content syntactically involves all the constituents from a tense-marker to the end of the sentence and functions to express a speaker's subjectivity toward his proposition. This point also seems to have been adopted by other Japanese linguists, but exactly what should be included in modality is a topic of ongoing discussion.

Nakau (1976) has defined modality as a speaker's psychological attitude at the time of speech. Nakau included tense, aspect, negation, question, and complementation in the domain of propositional content, and therefore, meant that modality content exists outside of this domain. Masuoka (1989) claimed that modality can exist in every constituent of a sentence, meaning that modality is also in propositional content. He
wrote that apart from the speaker-subjective "primary modality", a sentence has a "secondary modality" which can be objective. According to Masuoka, secondary modality includes politeness, transmission of thoughts, judgement, explanation, topicalization, and other functions in addition to traditional modal function (e.g. tense, aspect, and negation). It seems that the scope of Japanese modality is still unclear at least partly because the acknowledged definition of modality, "speaker's psychological attitude", can be interpreted in various ways involving numerous linguistic and psychological phenomena of language, but at least sentence-final に is generally acknowledged as modality.

STUDIES ON JAPANESE EVIDENTIALITY

There are only a few studies which have focused on Japanese evidentiality per se (e.g. Aoki, 1986; Watanabe, 1984), although some studies of modality superficially refer to evidentiality (e.g. Nitta and Masuoka, 1989; Nakau, 1976). In the traditional view of sentential modality with a focus on auxiliaries, there are seven major modal auxiliaries that express epistemic modality, or epistemology (i.e., evidentiality, in this study), which qualifies a speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition. Among them, four auxiliaries express modality of epistemic judgement:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auxiliary</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hazu</td>
<td>strong logical conviction, equivalent to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These auxiliaries in [2-13] are used to express "inferences" in that the proposition is based on some kind of warrant. Here, inference includes ones from results and reasoning (as in [2-6] in this chapter) which approximately covers inferential functions of so-called "deduction", and "induction", and perhaps "assumption", and "speculation" in the wider scope.

Each auxiliary word expresses a different degree of necessity/non-actuality as well as speaker subjectivity. Johnson (1994:90) showed the following figure to indicate the possible relationship of necessity/possibility and speaker subjectivity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Necessity</th>
<th>Hypotheticality</th>
<th>Subjectivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>azu</td>
<td>(must)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ni-chigai-nai</td>
<td>(must)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daroo</td>
<td>(conjecture-probably)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kamo-shire-nai</td>
<td>(might)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In [2-14], we see that the "necessity" of the proposition is inversely proportional to "non-actuality" (i.e., "possibility"), "hypotheticality", and "subjectivity" ("a speaker's degree of conviction" by Johnson). This intuitively makes sense. Haizu implies the existence of strong evidence in the speaker's mind which allows him to make a strong deduction of necessity of the proposed event; therefore, in a sentence with haizu, degree of hypotheticality, possibility, and subjectivity of the proposition is very low; so, at the sentencial level, haizu should be used when the highest necessity is guaranteed.

However, it might not so at the discourse level. For example, it can be assumed that the implication of the speaker's strong confidence attached to haizu (must) or ni-chigai-nai (no doubt) tends to be avoided when a speaker would like to be less assertive. As a result, it is presumable that, in discourse, haizu (must) and chigai-nai (no doubt) are followed by certain kinds of sentence-ending modalities to decrease the level of evidentiality.

In the same epistemic modality group, four main modal auxiliaries are traditionally (in a limited sense) considered to express epistemic evidentiality as defined for this dissertation, which are often called "hearsay evidentials". A brief explanation of hearsay evidentials is as follows:
soo (1) conveys second-hand information obtained directly or indirectly through any channel, equivalent to English *I heard* or *I read* or *I was told*: (2) expresses a speaker's conjecture about future or present events based on the information he obtained through sensory impression, equivalent to English *it appears*;

yoo/mitai (1) expresses a speaker's suppositional judgement, equivalent to English *it looks like*, (2) expresses counter-factual impressions;

rashii expresses a speaker's conjecture based on second-hand information, equivalent to English *it seem*, *it looks like*, or *I heard*:

The first Japanese auxiliary of hearsay is *soo*. *Soo* is usually used with a copula as in *sooda* (plain), *soodesu* (polite). *Soo* (da) is used with two different meanings: "hearsay *soo*(da)" and "conjecture *soo*(da)". When preceded by tensed forms, a sentence with hearsay *soo*(da) conveys secondhand information obtained directly or indirectly by the speaker through any channel (e.g. hearing, reading) without any alteration by the speaker's subjectivity. As in the following example, in a hearsay *soo* (da) sentence, syntactically, the entire predicate before *soo* (da) is usually secondhand information:

(2-16)

- *Shinbun ni yoru to Furorida ni yuki ga futta sooda.*
  - Newspaper according to Florida TEMP snow NOM fell hearsay

  (According to the newspaper, it snowed in Florida.)

  (Makino, 1986:499)
In sentence (2-16), the part before the auxiliary *sooda*, i.e., "Furorida ni yuki ga futta" (it snowed in Florida) is hearsay information. Of course, Japanese has a verb phrase, S to kiita, which literally means *I heard S*. So the meaning conveyed by the next sentence (2-17) does not differ at all from sentence (2-16) except that the means of information gathering (audio) is more explicitly stated in (2-17):

(2-17)

*Furorida ni yuki ga futta to kiita yo.*  
Florida TEMP snow NOM fell QUOT heard VOC

(I heard that it snowed in Florida.)

The other meaning of *soo(da)* is that of conjecture. *Soo(da)* can be an auxiliary adjective which indicates that what is expressed by the preceding sentence is the speaker's conjecture concerning an event in the future or the present state of someone or something based on the speaker's visual or other sensory impression, or intuition (Makino et al., 1986:410). "Conjecture soo(da)" occurs after the stem form of adjectives and verbs, and means *appears to be*. Syntactically, adding *soo(da)* to adjectives and verbs converts them into adjectival nouns. Observe the following example (2-18):

(2-18)

*Furorida ni yuki ga furi soo da yo.*  
Florida TEMP snow NOM fall(INF) appear VOC

(It **appears/looks** like it will snow in Florida.)
Conjecture soo(da) does not necessarily require the speaker's commitment to the proposition, thus "cancellation" of the proposition is possible:

(2-19)

\begin{align*}
\text{Florida} \quad \text{TEMP} \quad \text{snow} \quad \text{NOM} \quad \text{fall}\text{(INF)} \quad \text{appeared} \quad \text{but} \\
\text{fura-nakatta} \quad \text{ne}.
\end{align*}

(It appeared/looked like it would snow in Florida, but actually it didn't- as we know)

Hearsay soo(da) does not involve a speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition. For this reason, there is an opinion that hearsay soo(da) should be excluded from the epistemic modality since it does not involve speaker's supposition with regards to the necessity of the proposition (e.g. Johnson, 1994). I consider this view to be appropriate for the sentence-level epistemology. But, from the pragmatic point of view, hearsay soo(da) certainly functions to present mood, since a speaker uses soo(da) when he does not want to commit himself to the necessity of the proposition, i.e., he is expressing reservation about the proposition or about the people to whom he is presenting the proposition. Further, from the evidentiality point of view, soo(da) is indispensable in representing the mood of "lack of direct evidence". For these reasons, I have included soo(da) in the genre of Japanese epistemic modality (and it actually turned out to be a very frequent mood-indicator in Japanese discourse data).
The second so-called hearsay auxiliary is yoo, an adjectival noun which is also usually used with a sentence-ending copula, da or desu. Yoo(da) also has two major meanings: suppositional judgement and metaphor. First, "suppositional yoo(da)" expresses a speaker's suppositional judgement in cases where the speaker does not have solid evidence to argue that his proposition is true, but for some reason, supposes it must be very close to the truth (e.g. Teramura, 1984). The following sentence is an example of suppositional yoo(da):

(2-20)
Doomo, sore ga umaku ikana-katta yoo- na no ne.  
somewhat that NOM well go(NEG)-PAST appear-STEM VOC RAPP

(It somewhat appears that it did not go well.)

Yoo(da) and mitai(da) function in the same way. They are almost interchangeable, but mitai(da) is more colloquial than yoo(da):

(2-21)
Are, yappari dame datta mitai yo.  
that as is expected no-good COP(Past) appear VOC

(It appears that 'that' did not work as had been expected.)

Yoo(da) and mitai(da) are also used in counter-factual situations to indicate metaphoric observation as in the next example, (2-22). However metaphoric yoo(da) and mitai(da) are used when the speaker knows the truth value of his proposition, so they are not indirect evidentials.
Suçotto-san -tte marude Nihon-jin mitai desu ne.
Mr. Scott QUOT as if Japanese appear COP COMF

(Mr. Scott is just like a Japanese person-although he is not.)

The fourth hearsay evidential, rashii indicates the preceding predicate to be the speaker's conjecture based on second-hand information, such as what he has heard, read, and seen. An English equivalent to rashii is it appears, I heard or it looks like. Rashii expresses a speaker's conjecture based on some kind of reliable evidence. In this sense, rashii functions in a very similar way to "suppositional" yoo(da) and mitai(da).

Karuforunia -tte sugoku ie ga takai rashii no ne.
California QUOT very house NOM expensive appear VOC RAPP

(It appears that houses are very expensive in California.)

However, as is noted, yoo(da) is often based on sensory information (visual information, in particular) while rashii is based on the information the speaker obtained in any numbers of ways from the environment. Makino et al. (1986) suggested that if there is relatively little conjecture in the speaker's mind, rashii is almost the same as the hearsay sooda, as is the case with the above sentence (2-23) in which the information (i.e. houses are expensive in CA) is widely known.

We have seen so-called hearsay evidentials: sooda, yoo(da), mitai(da), and rashii. It should be noted that it is wrong to simply call
this group of auxiliaries hearsay evidentials. Although all evidentials are based on information outside the speaker, with each auxiliary, the degree of the speaker's supposition involved and emphasis on sensory fields through which information is obtained are different. Hearsay soo (I heard) indicates that the speaker is simply conveying information that he obtained "as-is" without his manipulation; so, the speaker is not responsible for the truth value of the proposition when he uses soo(da). Therefore, hearsay soo sentence is least subjective. Rashii (it seems) is very similar to hearsay soo(da), but it differs from soo(da) in that it involves the speaker's supposition. Yoo(da) /mitai(da) (it looks like) also deal with information conveyance with the speaker's supposition. Yoo(da) is the auxiliary that a speaker uses in emphasizing the visual aspect of the information. The other soo(da) (i.e., "conjecture soo") also has an emphasis on visual and other sensory impressions on which the speaker bases his conjecture. But it differs from yoo(da), in that speaker does not commit himself to the truth of his conjecture; he simply states his conjecture from what he has seen.

Teramura (1984) attempted to measure degrees of the speaker's presupposition involved in the auxiliaries on a 3 point scale. He ranked "conjecture daroo" (probably), and "conjecture soo" (appears to be) at 3 (highest involvement), yoo (appears to be) at 2, rashii (seems to) at 1, and "hearsay soo" (I heard) at zero (p.260).

These auxiliaries of evidentiality do not represent the entire epistemic modality but they are only part of it; there are numerous

56
other expressions of modality even at the sentence level across grammatical categories such as adverbs, adjectives, particles and hedges, and other specific semantic areas regardless of grammatical categories. Aoki (1986) paid attention to a specific semantic area, Japanese expressions of "sensation", the area in which evidential-like expressions are fairly grammaticalized.7 Japanese grammar requires its users to make a syntactic distinction between the description of a sensation experienced by the speaker and a sensation experienced by someone (or something) other than the speaker. When the speaker makes an inference regarding the feeling of others, it is necessary to add the verbal suffix, -garu, as in (2-27) below:

(2-25) Watashi wa atui. (I am hot).
     I TOPIC hot

(2-26)* Kare wa atui. (He is hot). (*ungrammatical)
     He TOPIC hot

(2-27) Kare wa atu-gatte-iru. (He is hot.)
     He TOPIC hot STATIVE

Since kare (he) is the third person, sentence (2-26) is not grammatical. Sentence (2-27) with -gatte (gerundive form of garu) + iru (stative, non-past) is grammatical. Aoki explains that -garu has the function of expressing inference (based on indirect evidence) rather than direct experience.8 He supported his point by arguing that Japanese mimetic words expressing pain (usually adverbs) such as
chikuchiku (pricking), gan gan (pounding), shikushiku (throbbing),
and zukizuki (throbbing surface wounds) cannot be used with -garu.
Pain may be perceived as something a person feels directly, so mimetic
adverbs cannot be used with a third person subject as demonstrated in
the following ungrammatical sentence (2-28).

(2-28) *Kare wa zukizuki ita -gatteiru.
   He TOPIC throbbingly pain
   (He has a throbbing pain.)

From the perspective of evidentiality, it is reasonable to assume
that these expressions of sensation have been generally accepted as part
of grammar due to the inherent difficulty of "knowing" other people's
sensory feelings. A proposition such as he is hot is hardly attainable
except in the case of literary texts in which a speaker (i.e., narrator) is
supposed to be omniscient and knows all the characters' inner thoughts
(cf. Banfield, 1982).

Aoki also pointed out the function of the Japanese noun no (or
"n", which is often called "nominalizer-no") as an evidential marker of
fact. He noted that no may be used "to state that the speaker is
convinced that for some reason something that is ordinarily not directly
knowable is nevertheless true" (p. 228). For example, as shown earlier,
the following sentence (2-29) is ungrammatical. But if the speaker adds
no to the end, as in (2-30), the sentence will imply that the speaker has
some evidence to assert that he is hot is a "fact". Perhaps, the speaker
might have witnessed the referent kare sweating or have heard kare complain about heat (evidence).

(2-29)* Kare wa atui.  
He TOPIC hot

(2-30) Kare wa atui no da.  
He TOPIC hot NML COP

Aoki comments that semantically no "removes the (preceding) statement from the realm of a particular experience and makes it into a timeless object. The concept becomes nonspecific and detached." (p. 229) I think what Aoki meant is that the propositional part of (2-30) kare wa atsui (he is hot) is presented as a fact in the speaker's interpretation by using the no-da sentence ending. Therefore, for Aoki, no can present the speaker's subjective judgement based on some kind of strong evidence. Actually, the function of no-da (or no-desu) seems varied even within a limited scope of evidentiality markings without being limited to Aoki's analysis (see chapter four and five for more discussion on this topic).

So far examples of evidentials from auxiliaries and other areas have showed fairly "explicit" evidentiality in terms of lexical meanings. There are also discussions of the "implicit" phenomena of modality in Japanese. Akatsuka (1978, 1985) found that Japanese subjective judgment lies in subtle ways of using words such as the selection of conditionals and complementizers. Akatsuka paid attention to the aspect of epistemology of the speaker influencing sentence structure and
claimed that Japanese conditionals can be arranged on a scale of irrealis (hypothetical non-actual world). Iwasaki (1993) proposed the concept of "information accessibility" between a speaker and his proposition. Iwasaki claims that the speaker's awareness of how accessible his proposition is to him determines the speaker's choice of linguistic modality (i.e., tense, in particular). He found that a speaker tends to use more present tense in talking about a third person's past events than in talking about his own past events (cf. historical present tense by Wolfson, 1982). According to Iwasaki, a possible deduction is that a speaker usually has good knowledge about his own experience in the past which forces him to use past tense according to prescriptive rules: one's own information is more accessible than others'. These studies of "speaker subjectivity" (e.g. Iwasaki, Akatsuka) or "speaker epistemology" (e.g. Akatsuka) are related to the issues of evidentiality in that even at the sentence level, the grammatical structure of an utterance is partly a product of subjective judgement of the speaker.

So far, we have briefly reviewed the studies of Japanese evidentials within the scope of sentence level modality. The existing theoretical scope of sentence modality is very limited in that it does not involve analysis of speech events, in particular, the existence of a hearer. As the theory of discourse modality (e.g., Maynard, 1992) suggests, it is necessary to broaden the focus of evidentiality phenomena when we deal with natural use of language.
FROM SENTENTIAL MODALITY TO DISCOURSE MODALITY

Language users do not need to incorporate auxiliaries and other evidential expressions in "factual" statements which are unchal lengingly true to everyone (cf. Givon, [2-10]). When this is not the case, a speaker often wants to show that he does not guarantee the truth value of his proposition one hundred percent by adding some kind of marker of epistemic modality. Therefore, theoretically, in an extreme case, if a speaker only talks about "facts" (not only in his understanding but widely known to be so), he does not need any kind of markers of epistemic modality. But is this possible? At the level of sentence grammar, it may be so; but at the discourse level, it is not. Even if a statement is known to be a simple fact, we certainly have occasions in which we feel some additional marker of epistemic modality will do good. One plus one is two is a logical fact known to most of us. However, in some kind of speech situations, we certainly say this phrase with some marker of modality added, for example, Isn't one plus one two? (although the statement One plus one might be two is rarely used). Imagine the case in which you know that your hearer is forty years old, and the hearer knows you know that. Then, if it is necessary to remind the hearer that he is a grown-up, perhaps the statement You are forty years old can be said, but you might add some epistemic "flavor" to it depending on when, where, and whom you are talking to. Aren't you forty years old?. You must be forty years old by now, or I thought you
were forty years old often sounds better than the declarative You are forty. Even though it is not true at all to say that generative and discourse grammar are mutually exclusive (Chomsky, 1980), a discrete concept of discourse grammar must be necessary in order to deal with the issues of pragmatic language use (e.g. Teratsu 1983, Inoue 1983). As Ricoeur (1981) said, discourse has a particular speaker or writer, a particular hearer or reader, and is made at a particular time, in a particular world. These traits of discourse naturally make its acceptable features distinctively different from the ones in Saussure's concept of "langue".

The discourse meaning of epistemic modals differs from their meaning at the sentence level. The hearsay marker rashii (it seems) is said to be used to indicate that the speaker has obtained the proposition from outside and made an inference based on the information, but in actual conversational discourse, there are instances in which the speaker uses rashii in describing a proposition which he has directly obtained and is thus confident of its truth value. Observe the following sentences.

(2-31)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kazo wa</th>
<th>kando</th>
<th>kachoo</th>
<th>ni</th>
<th>naru</th>
<th>-rashii yo.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He SUBJ</td>
<td>this time</td>
<td>section-head</td>
<td>DAT</td>
<td>become</td>
<td>seem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Kinoo | buchoo | ni | soo | iwarete-ita | no | o | kiita | -n-da. |
|--------|-------|----|-----|-------------|----|   |       |       |
| Yesterday | dept-head | DAT | so | told (PASS) | STAT NLM | OBJ | heard | N |

(It seems like he is going to be the section head this time. I
heard he was told so by the department-head yesterday, I tell 
you.)
In sentence (2-31), the speaker directly obtained the information
(overheard-auditory direct experience), but his usage of -rashii (seem)
is quite acceptable. An indirect statement is indeed better than a direct
statement since the propositions in (2-31) are about a third person's
matter. In (2-31), the speaker obtained the information by overhearing
rather than through a public announcement or from the referents
(buchoo or kare). These factors prevent the speaker from using a direct
expression although he knows the information is true. A direct
statement would sound as though the speaker is meddling with other
people's affairs.

In this way, the actual usage of evidential markers is not always
what would be expected from the rules of sentence modality: the matter
of necessity/possibility of the proposition. The variation of markings is
largely ruled by pragmatic discourse modality. Recently, Johnson took
the position that sentence-level modality is "a subcategory of a larger
picture of modality that is defined as a speaker's psychological attitude"
(1994:46), meaning that sentence modality is only a part of the
phenomenon of linguistic modality as a whole. As Maynard (1993)
proposed, modality should not be limited to the sentence level but
expanded to the discourse level. At the discourse level, a speaker usually
has one or more hearers; therefore, knowledge about the hearer(s) will
have some influence on the speaker's use of evidentials (cf. Givon, 1982
for the Revisionist view). Further, the speaker needs to be concerned
with the pragmatic consequence of his statement as it effects his goal of
communication, his social image, and the relationship between himself
and his hearer(s). Maynard (1993) suggested that the "modality of social
interaction" cannot be wholly accommodated within the limited
framework of previous studies of modality in that "discourse modality is
a broader notion which includes not only the speaker's attitudes
expressed by independent lexical items or combinations thereof but also
those that can be understood only through discourse structures and in
reference to other pragmatic means" (p. 39). Discourse modality, as
referred to by Maynard, is, in short, a matter of language pragmatics in
conversational or speech discourse since Maynard focused on how some
selected discrete lexical items--for example, discourse connectives
dakara (therefore) and dakedo (however), sentence-ending da (plain)
and desu/masu (formal), interactional particle yo and ne--function in
discourse. It is true that theories of sentential modality were often based
on conveniently created sentences, or if they were authentic, such data
was often from a limited range of speech events. The concept of
discourse modality is a broader view of modality. Certainly, various
aspects of discourse pragmatics can be viewed from the perspective of
modality, and, this dissertation should also be considered a study of
discourse modality.
Obviously Chafe did not desire to commit himself to an overly restricted view of evidentiality. As Willet observed, evidentiality marking is so often interwoven with other areas of grammar, particularly tense and aspect (also cf. Chung and Timberlake, 1985), that to "extract" the "pure" aspect of evidentiality is often difficult. One example from Takelma is quoted below from Chung and Timberlake. In Takelma, the future tense differs from other modes in that future tense cannot be negated simply by adding a negative adverb; negative future events are expressed by the inferential mood (i.e., evidentiality) plus the negative adverb as in (2-33) (b) below. In Takelma, both "future" and "inferential" use the irrealis stem.

(2-32)

(a) \textit{Yaná-?t}
\begin{footnotesize}
\text{go(IRR)-3SG(FUTURE)}
\end{footnotesize}
(He will go.)

(b) \textit{Wede yaná-k t}
\begin{footnotesize}
\text{not go(IRR)-INFERENTIAL}
\end{footnotesize}
(He will not go/Evidently he didn't go.)

I have observed that various aspects in modality are interwoven in English too. For example, in the sentence \textit{I could have done so and so}, the modal auxiliary \textit{can} is combined with "past tense" and "perfective aspect" resulting in signifying the mode of irrealis, i.e., a non-actual world with no-possibility.

Often "source" means information source such as the speaker's direct sensory experience or somebody else's direct experience. But, Chung and Timberlake used the word to mean some entity whose point of view characterizes the event as either actual or non-actual:
For primary events, the source is typically the speaker; it is the speaker who identifies the event as actual, or imposes it on the addressee, or denies responsibility for its truth, and so on. For secondary events the source is typically the subject of the matrix clause. For example, with governing verbs of intention ('want', 'try') or obligation ('order', 'forbid') the subject of the verb provides the source of modality for the subordinate clause. (232-233)

Thus, for Chung and Timberlake, the source is speaker's subjective certainty if not transferring someone else's viewpoint for which the syntactical subject of the sentence is the source.

3Jo means help and dooshi means verb. Historically, there have been arguments on whether Japanese jo-dooshi are a part-of-speech or not. Ootsuka (1904) first introduced the concept of jo-dooshi into school grammar as a part of speech. Later, some linguists (e.g. Matsushita, 1930, Suzuki, 1978) argued that jo-dooshi are not a part-of-speech in that jo-dooshi simply help a verb to be conjugated and constitute a predicate. Hashimoto (1948) and Tokieda (1950) took the position that Jo-dooshi are a part-of-speech. Hashimoto proposed the concept of bunsetsu (phrase) in which jo-dooshi together with an independent lexical item (e.g. verbs, adjectives) constitutes a phrase which is treated independently as a new lexical item.

4Japanese verbs, adjectives, adjectival-nouns and copula are conjugated to mark for tense (non-past/past) and affirmative/negative alternations for several functional forms such as command, potential, imperative, conditional, volitional, passive, causative, and causative-passive. Each conjugated form has both plain and polite (formal) forms. Inflected parts (other than the "core" part) are often jo-dooshi (auxiliary) or setsubi-go (suffix).
The description of the behavior of Japanese modal auxiliaries offered here is very limited. For more information, see Alfonzo (1966), Teramura (1984), Makino and Tsutsui (1986), Johnson (1994) and others.

According to Johnson's definition, the term "subjectivity" indicates the degree of speaker's confidence in asserting that the proposition is true. When evidence is strong, the speaker can have a high degree of confidence (low or little subjectivity); and when a speaker lacks confidence in judging a situation, the judgment becomes highly subjective.

Most Japanese evidentiality expressions are not grammaticalized; however, some evidential-like aspects seem to be grammaticalized although their status is not clear (e.g. Watanabe, 1984). These days, expressions of a third party's sensations are being treated as grammar rules in many textbooks for Japanese-as-a-foreign language classes.

On this point, I disagree with Aoki. I consider that -garu expressions are based on a speaker's strong belief or inference which is based on his "direct" sensory information such as being directly told about the third person's feeling. Watanabe (1984) also discussed the verbal and adverbial suffix -garu in expressing sensations of a non-speaker. Watanabe viewed the phenomenon from the perspective of transitivity. He argued that, in Japanese, the construction of NOM-ACC has higher transitivity than that of NOM-NOM, and if a statement is based on direct evidence, the NOM-ACC of higher transitivity is required:

\[(2-33) \text{Masao ga kaminari o kowa-gatte-iru.}\]
Masao NOM thunder ACC fear-DIR-STAT
(Masao is showing fear of thunder.)

(2-34) *Masao ga kaminari ga kowa-gatte-iru.
Masao NOM thunder NOM fear-DIR-STAT
(Masao is showing fear of thunder.)

(2-35) Masao ga kaminari ga kowai rashii.
Masao NOM thunder NOM fear seem
(It seems that Masao is afraid of thunder.)

Since word order is fairly flexible in Japanese, particles (e.g. ga, and o above) are used to assign cases. Watanabe considered -garu to be an auxiliary of direct evidence (cf. Aoki considered that -garu expresses a speaker's inference based on indirect evidence) which is only used for a high transitivity construction such as in (2-33), accordingly (2-34) with the combination of a low transitivity construction and -garu results in an ungrammatical utterance. A low-transitivity sentence construction is only used for an indirect statement such as (2-35). I think that Watanabe's theory of the relationship between kinds of evidence and sentence transitivity is insightful. Watanabe characterized -garu as a direct evidence marker being directly opposed to traditional analysis of -garu as an indirect evidence marker. Being in agreement with Watanabe, I consider that the so-called indirect suffix -garu is an evidential of "fact": a speaker can state other people's sensation subjectively as a fact (necessarily with some strong evidence, e.g. directly hearing from the target person.) This view is deduced from many speakers's use of -garu with other indirect evidential markers (e.g. rashii, mitaida, yooda, all meaning seems) suggesting that sentence-ending -garu is rather assertive. This fact implies, at least pragmatically, -garu is understood as a "fact" marker. Usually, in conversation, unless the third person clearly states his feeling to the speaker, sentence (2-27) is said with the indirect marker such as -rashii as in (2-36) below:
I have observed that direct statements (as 2-27) inferring other people's sensation based on the speaker's simple observation (e.g. finding that someone is sweating) are not often used in conversation. Usually, an evidential of a high degree of possibility is added (e.g. rashii, yooda, mitaida) in order to mitigate the potential offensiveness of the act of talking about someone else's feelings. Therefore, I consider that-garu is not a complete evidential at the discourse level. Certainly -garu indicates the sensation of someone other than the speaker, which suggests there is distance between the speaker and the information. But if -garu is used as a direct sentence ending, the overall sentence modality is direct, implying the speaker's confidence in the proposition. This case shows that sentence-final modality may overrides inner sentence modality expressions at lease in some cases.

-Garu allows a speaker to subjectively state other people's internal state of mind. This is one example of the subjective aspect of the Japanese language.

Each of the four main conditionals in Japanese (nara, tara, ba, and to) requires a different semantic environment for its grammatical use, but the four share the same meaning, which is equivalent to English if, when or whenever depending on the meaning of the consequent clause. Conditional expressions do not require the speaker's commitment to the proposition because they simply presents possible worlds in the conditional clause. Conditionals do not represent evidential meanings; thus, they are beyond the scope of this study, but they are certainly an important part of Japanese modality.
CHAPTER 3: DISCOURSE MODALITY IN JAPANESE

In the last chapter, I demonstrated that modals--evidentials in particular--need to be investigated on the discourse level in order to understand their pragmatic use. On the discourse level, it is speculated that the existence of a hearer has a significant influence on the system of Japanese evidentiality. In this chapter, the issue of "hearer-sensitivity" of Japanese discourse, which appears in the form of modality, will be further discussed.

Discussing Japanese communication style, Clancy (1986) claims that, in Japanese culture, the main responsibility of communication lies with the listener: the listener must know what the speaker really means regardless of what the speaker literally says, however ambiguous, indirect, and reticent he may be. In contrast, she argues, in American-style communication, "the main responsibility for successful communication rests with speakers who must know how to get their ideas across" (p. 217): the speaker expresses his wishes, needs, thoughts, feelings in adequately explicit ways in words rather than indirectly or nonverbally. This claim seems to present an overly simple dichotomy on both sides. Clancy emphasizes that the Japanese style of communication depends on interpersonal "empathy" of a homogeneous society in which people anticipate each other's needs, wants and reactions without explicit verbal interaction. Clancy's contention makes it sound as if Japanese are "telepathic", which is, of course, not
necessarily the case. However, Clancy is likely correct in her claim that Japanese mother-child interaction focuses on the development of an empathetic speech-style in child cultural cognition. She suggests that Japanese empathetic communication style is a case of the language-culture relativism view advocated by scholars such as Whorf (1956) and Scollon and Scollon (1981). An important remark made by Clancy, which is relevant to this dissertation, is that Japanese communication is listener-oriented.

LISTENER-ORIENTED MODALITY AND SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS

Clancy said that in Japan "Communication can take place without, or even in spite of, actual verbalization. The main responsibility lies with the listener who must know what the speaker means, regardless of the words that are used." (p. 217) As suggested here, the listener may have the "responsibility" to correctly determine the meaning that the speaker intended to express. In this sense, Japanese communication style is listener-oriented because the speaker relies on the listener to understand his meaning which may be expressed in ambiguous ways.

Clancy, perhaps, only paid attention to intentional "contextual" ambiguity in Japanese speech. Another important factor of listener-orientation in Japanese communication, which Clancy did not mention, and one that I believe is ultimately more important, is the speaker's careful observation of the listener's knowledge level. How does a speaker indicate his observation of the listener's knowledge? Sentence-
ending modality marker functions to do this. It has been pointed out that the sentence-ending modality provides the strongest marker of mood in a Japanese sentence. Theoretically, a sentence can have several modals, but the mood of the last modal is usually accepted as the sentence modal. For example, as explained in the last chapter, the modal of hearsay evidentiality, \textit{yooda (appear)}, is the dominant modal in the following sentence as "report based on observation":

\begin{equation}
\text{Kare wa atugatte iru yooda} \quad \text{(It seems he is hot.)}
\end{equation}

In (3-1), \textit{kare wa atugatte-iru (he is hot)} grammatically presents the mode of realis but sentence-ending evidential \textit{yooda} turns the mood of the whole sentence into irrealis. Masuoka (1989) explains that the general idea of mood construction in a sentence as follows:

\begin{equation}
\text{Bun (sentence)}
\end{equation}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\textit{Meidai} & \textit{Mitomekata} & \textit{Tensu} & \textit{Shingi-handan} \\
no modality & no modality & & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\text{Modality} & \text{Modality of} & \text{Modality of} \\
of subject & acknowledgment: tense & truth: necessity and possibility \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Masuoka points out that there exists a hierarchical relationship
between modalities within a sentence. As the following diagram [3-3] indicates, the last modality of shingi-handan (necessity and possibility) holds the responsibility of deciding the final mode of the sentence. In this sense, this view is similar to that of Tokieda's (1941, 1950), which was introduced in chapter two, [2-12]. In the sentence, ame ga fura nakatta rashii (it seems it did not rain), rashii (it seems) presents the mode of the sentence as a whole:

![Diagram of sentence structure]

Until very recently, the modality of the sentence ending had not received sufficient attention, while only the explicit lexical meanings of modal words were investigated independently on a word-by-word basis. The function of the sentence-final particles such as ne, yo, no, wa, sa, ze, and zo is one of popular issues of discourse pragmatics (e.g. Tokieda, 1951; Saji, 1956; Kitagawa, 1984). The study of the sentence-ending particles is a genuine discourse issue because sentence level grammar
does not require them, and accordingly, functions of sentence-final particles were not emphasized in Japanese-as-a-foreign-language classrooms until recently. According to Maynard's historical review (1992), traditionally, sentence-ending particles (shuu-joshi in Japanese), which only appear in speech with distinctive addressees, have been considered to be somewhat "interactional" since at least Tokieda (1951). Tokieda claimed that ne particle is used to the request hearer's sympathy and zo and yo function to force the speaker's view onto the hearer. Uyeno (1971) classified these particles into two categories: (1) those which express the speaker's insistence on forcing the proposition on the hearer (yo, wa, zo, ze, sa); and (2) those which express a request for compliance with the proposition but leave the option of confirmation to the hearer (ne, nee, na, naa). Kitagawa (1984) and Watanabe (1968) considered ne to indicate that the proposition of the sentence is related to the addressee. McGloin (1990) distinguished three types of functions of sentence-final particles: (1) zo, ze, sa, and yo function to "impart information which belongs to the speaker's sphere to an addressee"; (2) ne and na are "used to seek confirmation from the hearer"; and (3) ne, na, wa, and no function to create "rapport" (p. 36). All these researchers share an almost identical perspective on these particles.

In summarizing the existing views and focusing on interpersonal aspects of the particles, Maynard (1992) called sentence-final yo and ne "interactional particles" and indicated that they were
also "discourse modality indicators" in focusing on different aspects of discourse modality: yo focuses on the informational aspect of the proposition, and ne focuses on interpersonal aspect in soliciting confirmation and emotional support. Since these sentence-final particles may involve the speaker's judgement of his hearer's knowledge (ne, na) and/or judgment of the necessity and possibility of the proposition (yo, sa, etc.), it is predictable that these sentence-final particles share important rules in Japanese evidentiality (cf. chapter four and five for details). In particular, the pragmatic function of the particle ne has been drawing attention since Kamio (1979) as an important modal in discourse.

SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS AND THE SPEAKER'S TERRITORY OF INFORMATION

When there was no general concept of the sentence-ending mood, the Japanese psychologist Akio Kamio (1979, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1994) proposed an insightful theory that a speaker, using sentence-final forms, linguistically marks the information territory to which his proposition belongs. Kamio applied the theory to English and Japanese and discussed the differences between the two languages in the speaker's concept of information territory. Regardless of the practicality of his view in modeling reality, Kamio's model offered a new perspective to the field of discourse pragmatics. As has been recognized, other than sentence-level grammar, there is a wide range
of uses of language that a person may need to have knowledge of and skill in performing to be considered a competent speaker of that language (e.g. Hymes, 1979; Halliday, 1979). Through teaching Japanese, I have often felt that the appropriate usage of the sentence-final modality markings is one of the biggest issues for learners in becoming competent speakers of the language. Although this aspect of Japanese is not part of the language's grammar, it is an important pragmatic requirement of discourse (i.e., discourse grammar) which even native speaker language teachers would have a difficult time describing systematically.

In Japanese, researchers have put some thought into the concept of discourse grammar. For example, Kuno (1978) attempted to formulate the rules of ellipsis and syntactical phenomena in discourse, and Inoue (1983) discussed Japanese particles wa and ga as markers of new/old information in a given discourse. The theory of territory of information by Kamio was, however, the first to discuss sentence-ending modalities as pragmatic rules of spoken discourse.

Kamio's framework can be interpreted in such a way that most Japanese sentences in discourse must have the "right" kind of modality in the sentence ending if they are concerned with the hearer. The theory's major concern is the relation of the sentence-ending forms and the speaker's psychological concept of territory. Since epistemic markers usually reside in sentence modality (e.g. Palmer 1986; Willet 1988), and sentence modality is often found in the sentence-ending in
Japanese (e.g. Nitta & Masuoka, 1989), I consider Kamio's information territory theory to be also a theory of epistemic evidentiality.

Kamio paid attention to the sentence-ending forms at the discourse level instead of at the sentence level. For example, the following Japanese sentences in direct forms are perfectly grammatical at the sentence level, but may sound inappropriate at the discourse level. The following sentences are all in direct ending forms:

(3-4) O.J. wa muzai ni nat-ta.
     O.J. TOP innocent to become -PAST.
     (O.J. was found innocent by the jury.)

(3-5) watashi wa anata ga suki desu.
     I TOP you ACC like COP(FOR) (I love you.)

(3-6) Kyoo wa ii tenki desu.
     Today TOP nice weather COP(FOR) (It's a fine day.)

The Japanese sentences above, which we teach in Japanese-as-a-foreign-language class, are grammatical as they are. However, when used in actual communication, each of them sounds fairly "declarative" as they disregard the hearer's existing knowledge about the proposition. Or these sentences may sound "careless" about the hearer's possible disagreement with the proposition. Therefore, these utterances are often considered to be too assertive at the discourse level in many speech situations. Sometimes an assertive declarative sentence works well to serve the speaker's purpose; for example, sentence (3-5) is often used by a speaker who wants to confess his "one-sided" love to his target.
who is not aware of the speaker's secret feeling.

The following utterances (3-4'), (3-5'), and (3-6') encoded consciousness of, or attempt to involve, the hearer's knowledge about the proposition by attaching modality markers at the end of the sentence:

(3-4') \textit{O.J. wa muzai ni natta sooda ne.}  
\textit{(I heard that O.J. was found innocent by the jury.)}

(3-5') \textit{watashi wa anata ga sukina n-desu.}  
\textit{(I love you, please understand/as you might know.)}

(3-6') \textit{Kyoo wa ii tenki desu ne.}  
\textit{(It's a fine day, as we both know.)}

In sentence (3-4'), auxiliary \textit{sooda} indicates that the information is second-hand. \textit{Sooda} (I heard) shows the speaker's consciousness of distance between himself and his proposition. English translations for (3-5') and (3-6') are almost the same as the corresponding ones for (3-5) and (3-6), while the pragmatic Japanese meanings are different. The nominalizer -\textit{n} (or \textit{no}) in (3-5') is said to mark the speaker's intention to explain, to persuade, to convince, or to give background information or new information as if it is already known to the hearer (e.g. McGloin, 1980: 144), and \textit{ne} in (3-6') as well as (3-4') is said to indicate the speaker's awareness that the information is shared with the hearer (e.g. McGloin, 1990, Maynard, 1993, Kamio, 1979-1994, Takubo & Kinsui, 1990-1992). Therefore, in sentences (3-4') to (3-6'), modification to reduce
assertiveness is made through the sentence-ending forms.

In relation with sentence-final modalities, Kamio proposed that there are two fundamental conceptual information territories: the speaker's and the hearer's territories of information. His early theory had only four types of information: the factors of "inside/outside of the speaker's territory" and "inside/outside of the hearer's territory" make two by two matrix resulting in four different types. And each information category was assigned with a single surface sentence-ending form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside the speaker's territory</th>
<th>Outside the hearer's territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TERRITORY A</td>
<td>TERRITORY B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(information belongs to both speaker's and hearer's territories)</td>
<td>(information belongs only to the speaker's territory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct+ne form</td>
<td>direct form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRITORY C</td>
<td>TERRITORY D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(information belongs only to the hearer's territory)</td>
<td>(information is out of both speaker and hearer's territories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indirect+ne form</td>
<td>indirect form</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This earlier framework of Kamio is relevant to a well-known psychological concept, the "Johari Window", developed by psychologists Joe Lust and Harry Ingham (e.g. Goffman, 1968). The Johari Window is
"a flat-pack, conceptual model for describing, evaluating, and predicting aspects of interpersonal communication" (Jarvis, 1996). This idea describes four different ways of how you are seen by others and how you see yourself, which demonstrates patterns of how people communicate with the outside world. This psychological view of human communication style assumes four different windows of the human mind which are classified by two sets of contrastive factors: "self" vs. "others", and "known" vs. "unknown":

This concept suggests that an individual views himself as well as others through one of these panes in each social interaction. Although

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WINDOW</th>
<th>SELF</th>
<th>OTHERS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION of KNOWLEDGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PANES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>known</td>
<td>known</td>
<td>public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>known</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>hidden from others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>known</td>
<td>blind to self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unconscious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This concept suggests that an individual views himself as well as others through one of these panes in each social interaction. Although
the concept deals with the self-image of an individual, the foundation of
the Johari Window is equivalent to Kamio's concept in that information
(for Kamio) or self-image (for the Johari concept) is viewed with in
relation with how it is known or perceived by himself and other people,
thus the concept of information territory is also a psychological issue.

Later Kamio (1994) revised the theory and argued that
information has a relative and gradable character, so sometimes it falls
completely in the territories of both sides and sometimes it falls more in
one side than in the other. Based on this idea, Kamio assumed six
different "cases" of interaction of the speaker's and hearer's
information territories, in which most of our daily utterances fall.
Kamio said that the sentence-ending form of each utterance reflects the
types of interaction of the information territories to which utterances
belong as shown in [3-9]:

[3-9]
Cases of interaction of the speaker's and hearer's information territories
Sentence-ending forms the in Japanese discourse

(A) The speaker's territory only  (e.g. I have a headache.)---------direct form

(B) Both Speaker's and Hearer's territories
   (and information is completely shared)
   (e.g. It's a beautiful day.) ---------direct+ne form

(BC) Both Speaker's and Hearer's territories
   (but the speaker considers the information to fall more within his own
   territory than in the hearer's territory.)
   (e.g. My sister is pretty, isn't she?) ---------daroo(deshoo) form
(CB) Both Speaker's and Hearer's territories  
  (but the speaker considers the information to fall more deeply within the  
  hearer's territory than in the speaker's territory.)  
  (e.g. You are Mr. Yamada, aren't you?) --------- **deshoo** form  
  **janai** form

(C) The hearer's territory only  
  (e.g. It looks like you are feeling sick, aren't you?)------ indirect+**ne** form

(D) Neither the speaker’s nor the hearer’s territory  
  (e.g. It seems that it will be fine tomorrow.)----------- indirect form

Japanese sentences which correspond to the above English sentences are shown below:

[3-10]

(A)  **watashi, atama ga itai.**  
  I head NOM aches. (**direct**)  
  (I have a headache.)

(B)  **ii tenki desu ne.**  
  fine weather COP(FOR) PART(CONF)  
  (It's a nice weather **as we both know**.)

(BC)  **Uchi no imooto, kirei daroo.**  
  my POSS younger sister pretty AUX(tag-question)  
  (My sister is pretty, **isn't she?**)

(CB)  **Yamada-san deshoo?**  
  Mr. Yamada AUX(confirmation)  
  (You are Mr. Yamada, **am I right?**)

(C)  **kibun ga warui mitai desu ne.**  
  feeling NOM bad appear COP(FOR) PART(CONF)  
  (You seem to be feeling sick, **aren't you?**)

(D)  **Ashita wa hareru deshoo.**  
  tomorrow CNT get fair AUX (conjecture)  
  (It will **probably** be fine tomorrow.)

(The sentences are selected from Kamio, 1994: 87-98 and presented with minor modifications)
Kamio argued that a speaker unconsciously uses the distinctive sentence-ending forms described above depending upon the "case" type to which his proposition belongs. Perhaps, however, the framework represented in [3-9] and [3-10] is too simplistic: a speaker's awareness of each of the six cases of territory interaction is simply connected with the use of a single surface linguistic form to represent each case of territory interaction. Actually, I have found in the data additional linguistic forms used related specifically to each case; therefore, further analysis on the use of all the possible sentence-ending forms, and on how those forms can be integrated into the whole system of information territory is necessary to complete Kamio's framework.

Kamio's theory explains the phenomenon that the usage of direct sentence forms in Japanese is pragmatically limited at the discourse level. According to Kamio's model, only information which belongs to (A) type information of [3-9] and [3-10] (the speaker's territory only) is legitimately expressed in direct forms. Kamio identified three groups of information resources which are relevant to the notion of the speaker's territory of information as described in [3-11] below:

[3-11]

(a) information obtained through the speaker's direct experience;

(b) information about persons, facts, and things close to the speaker, including information about the speaker's plans, actions, and behavior, places to which the speaker has a geographical relation; and

(c) information embodying detailed knowledge which falls within the speaker's professional or other expertise. ²
The theory suggests that a speaker is considered to have "socially-licensed" privileged access to information which belongs to classes (a), (b), or (c) of [3-11] (at least in the Japanese communities). Factor (b) (i.e., a speaker is entitled to consider the information about persons, facts, and things "close" to the speaker as his own territory information) presents an outstanding aspect of the Japanese sociolinguistic norm. For a Japanese speaker, information about other people in his uchi (inside) group (e.g. family matters) is in his own territory although Kamio did not emphasize the sociolinguistic meanings of the (b) factor. The (a) factor is universally acknowledged direct evidentials. Factor (c) is also understandable. The pragmatic restriction placed by (a), (b), and (c) to the direct sentence-ending results in a large proportion of Japanese sentences being produced with indirect modality which belongs to territorial interaction types (B), (BC), (CB), and (D) of [3-9] and [3-10] i.e., the indirect form territories. For type (B) information, the speaker needs to use the direct form plus particle ne. It is another direct territory of the speaker, but since the information is shared by the hearer, the particle of information sharing, ne, should be added. For (BC) type propositions, since the speaker is asking for compliance of the hearer to the proposition of his own information territory (which is also shared by the hearer to some extent), the auxiliary of compliance-getting, daroo (deshoo in polite form) should be used. Type (CB) propositions should end with auxiliary
daroo or negative question form janai since the proposition falls more into the hearer's territory, and the speaker is asking for agreement to what he believes is shared with the hearer. Only the hearer is supposed to have access to (C) type propositions, so the speaker must make sure to express that he is out of his territory by using an indirect form to utter the proposition. Particle ne is also obligatory with (C) type information as in (B) since the proposition falls deeply within the hearer's territory and the speaker asks for the hearer's assent. (D) type information does not fall in either the speaker's or the hearer's information domain, therefore, should be expressed exclusively in the indirect form. In this case, "optional ne" can be added. Optional ne is different from the "obligatory ne" of cases (B) and (C) in that optional ne functions to send "rapport" (e.g. McGloin, 1990) while obligatory ne asks for the hearer's assent or compliance (see chapter four for the analysis of ne).

Kamio's interest was in the functional analysis of the Japanese language, so he did not literally emphasize the sociolinguistic and pragmatic aspects obviously involved in his model. I believe that Kamio's model may contribute to the studies of sociolinguistic and pragmatic analysis of the Japanese language in the following three major aspects:

[3-12]

(a) The theory presented the domain of sociolinguistic territory of the Japanese concept of "close" information to the speaker, and accordingly provided a reason why indirect mood is dominant in Japanese spoken discourse.
(b) It suggested that the use of Japanese evidentiality of given information is "relative" to the hearer's knowledge within a given discourse.

(c) In accordance with (b), the theory characterized the pragmatic function of the final forms, e.g., particle ne, auxiliary daroo (deshoo), direct, and indirect forms as the sentence-final mood indicators. This concept is remarkable in contrast with the traditional approach from sentence grammar.

Although Kamio's theory deals with human psychological territory of information which potentially involves some sociolinguistic aspects, attention was not paid to contextual variables of discourse which are possibly influential to the model of information territories. Therefore, discourse variables such as nature of participants, speech settings, were extensively emphasized in this study in order to locate the sociolinguistic aspects of the Japanese evidentiality system. Japanese evidentials are not only based on the ways that information is obtained as universal rules of evidentiality define (i.e. direct evidence/experience vs. indirect evidence/experience). It seems that the Japanese system is also based on the speaker's awareness of his hearer's knowledge. As noted earlier in chapter two, languages such as Kogi and Nambiquar share the same kind of hearer-conscious concept of evidentiality with the Japanese language (and Kogi and Nambiquar's systems are grammaticalized). So the phenomenon of "psychological territory for information" is not unique to Japanese.

In fact, the phenomenon is not limited to a small number of languages: we find similar concepts in English too. Labov and Fanshel
(1977) analyzed "therapeutic interviews" between mental patients and their psychotherapists. In doing so, they categorized the initiation from the psychotherapist into five event categories which are A-, B-, AB-, O-, and D- events. This classification of statements according to the shared knowledge involved was done for the purpose of anticipating the "syntagmatic" structure of responses from the patients, therefore, the authors' interest was in the characteristics of responses to each event category, and is irrelevant to this study. However, the authors' method of categorizing therapeutic speech from the viewpoint of information territory is useful. Their categorization of the therapist's speech events follows in [3-13]:

[3-13]

A-event: events to which the speaker (A) has privileged access.

B-event: events about which the hearer (B) has privileged knowledge.

AB-event: knowledge which is shared by A and B.

O-event: events which are known to everyone present and known to be known.

D-event: events which are known to be disputable.

The authors said that "these classifications refer to social facts---that is, generally agreed upon categorizations shared by all those present" (p. 100). Stubbs (1983) evaluated their study and explained the concept of event-classification as follows:

A-events are events to which the speaker has privileged access, and about which he cannot reasonably be contradicted, since
they typically concern A's own emotions, experience, personal biography, and so on. Examples include *I'm cold* and *I don't know*. Notice how, in school classrooms, a statement such as *I don't know* may be the only one to which a pupil is not open to correction. B-events are, similarly, events about which the hearer has privileged knowledge. A cannot therefore normally make unmitigated statements about B-events, such as *you're cold*, unless A is in authority over B, for example, as mother to child. Statements about B-events would normally be modalized or modified: *You must be cold* or *You look cold*. (118-119)

Labov also uses three other related terms. AB-events are defined as knowledge which is shared by A and B, and known by both to be shared. O-events are known to everyone present, and D-events are known to be disputable. There is therefore a classification of utterances according to the amount of shared knowledge involved. These definitions of AB- and O-events are comparable to the way in which the term *pragmatic presuppositions* is often defined, as propositions which are established by the preceding discourse, or which can be assumed to be generally agreed. (119)

As to A-events and B-events, Labov's and Kamio's views are almost identical in that "A-events are those that typically concern A's emotions, his daily experience in other contexts, elements in his past biography, and so on" (1977:100). Accordingly, Labov and Fanshel stipulated the "Rule of Confirmation" for a response to be coherent to the discourse that "if A makes a statement about B-events, then it is heard as a request for confirmation."

Responses to assertions are heavily determined by the relation of the proposition being asserted to knowledge shared by the participants. If A asserts an A-event, he normally requires only an acknowledgement of a minimal kind: he often uses such assertions to introduce a narrative; B simply must show that he is prepared to pay attention during an extended turn at talk. In the special case that A makes an assertion about a B-event, his utterance is heard as a request for confirmation. Assertions about AB- or O-events come closest to the concept of remarks: utterances that make minimal demands for response. (101)
Therefore, Labov and Fanshel paid attention to the hearer's responsibility, in English communication, to understand the event category to which the speaker's proposition belongs (through both context and structure, perhaps) and to correctly reply as expected. In my observation, in Japanese communication, the speaker is responsible for indicating the category of the proposition properly through sentence-ending forms and a reasonably polite hearer respects a reasonably polite speaker's decision on sentence-ending forms. If the speaker used a direct evidential for a given piece of information, the listener accepts that the proposition belongs to the speaker's territory and will use indirect forms to talk about it himself; thus, if the hearer does not agree, when he talks he might need to show where he considers the propositional information belongs.

Labov and Fanshel acknowledged O-events and D-events as two distinctive categories. They said that "the clearest interactional consequences follow when A makes an assertion about a D-event...If A makes an assertion about a D-event, it is heard as a request for B to give an evaluation of that assertion" (the "Rule of Disputable Assertions" of discourse coherence). (p. 101) In their view, it seems, whether the event is thought to be known or disputable makes a difference in English speakers' acceptance of what is heard.

We can raise some issues with their analysis. First, the border between O-events and D-events can be very fuzzy. On this point, the authors claimed that one's "pragmatic presupposition" decides whether
a certain event is O, or AB, or D. A speaker's subjective decision is assumed to be in this process. I find this exercise of subjectiveness to be a very interesting issue. In a given culture, how much subjectiveness are people allowed to exercise in terms of linguistic expression? The social norm of the degree of acceptance of the speaker's subjectivity must be different from one culture to another, and from one language to another. In my 1994 study, it was found that American informants expressed third party information as everybody's events more often than Japanese informants did. So I have argued that for Japanese speakers, public information remains, true or not, other people's information until the end, at least linguistically; and in the Japanese speaker's psychology, it seems, both O-events and D-events belong to the same territory (i.e., other people's information) and stay there forever. Even after the epistemic "necessity" of the proposition is confirmed, this information is expressed in indirect forms. Based on this observation, I have further argued that American culture is more belief-oriented than Japanese culture in that each speaker's belief on the proposition influences the linguistic forms of public events in American culture, while in Japanese psychology, the border of the information territories between "others" and "mine" is not flexible. However, in this research, Japanese speaker's behavior with regards to O- and D-events was not significantly different from that of English speakers. I attribute this discrepancy between the two studies to a significant difference in degree of general public familiarity with certain public events at each
time (cf. chapter five).

There are opinions that there is no such thing as information territory. For example, in criticizing Brown and Levinson's "face" concept, Matsumoto (1988) quoted Nakane (1967) and said that the Japanese culture is group-oriented so that the concept of individual territory is not typical among Japanese people. Matsumoto said, correctly I think, that the Japanese language is particularly sensitive to social context, especially to one's position in relation to others. But I consider that this group-orientation of Japanese society does not necessarily mean that Japanese people do not have a sense of territory. Every human being (probably all animals) has some concept of personal territory. Discussing "space" in Japanese behavioral psychology in relation to the group-oriented nature of Japanese society, Japanese psychologist Kimura (1977: 20-24) referred to the theories of world-famous psychologist Levin, German behavioral scientist Lorentz, and others. These scholars experimentally investigated the functions of human concepts of self "position" and "territory, and required psychological energy to move out an individual's territory into other people's territories. I believe that Japanese people have a sense of personal territory as well as group territory, at least they demonstrate this linguistically. The following sentences show the speaker's sense of group territory and personal territory respectively:

(3-14) Uchi no kaisha no jinji-bu,
my household POSS company POSS personnel dept.

zenzen dame yo.
at all bad PART(VOC)

(My company's personnel dept. is inefficient very much.)

(3-15) Uchi no okusan warito nonbiri shitete sa.
my household POSS wife fairly laid-back STAT PART(VOC)

(My wife is fairly laid-back.)

In (3-14), the speaker called the company he works at uchi-no-kaisha (lit. my household company) and used a declarative form to talk about it. In (3-15), talking about his wife, the speaker also used a declarative mood. In both utterances, it seems that each of the speakers felt that the information was within his territory; group territory in (3-14) and personal territory in (3-15).

The overall discourse data indicates that people talked about their professional knowledge, their direct experience, their family, hometown, and other things as information to which they have privileged access, (i.e., the knowledge in their territory) and used direct mode to talk about them. Good evidence is the linguistic negotiation of territory borders which is often seen in subtle morphological modification by conversationalists. If you said to your conversational partner who happens to be a linguist that there is a linguist called Noam Chomsky. He is coming to Texas to lecture on his political view, your behavior would be considered inappropriate in disregarding your partner's information territory. But if your conversational partner is a rational
adult, instead of yelling I know Noam Chomsky!, he might say nicely oh, is that what he's talking about this time? In saying so, he shows that the person named Noam Chomsky and his affiliated information are within his information territory as a linguistic professional. This kind of negotiation of territory on the deictic level often happen in Japanese since direct and indirect deixis are important evidentials in the language. In Japanese, unlike English, third person personal pronouns and proper nouns cannot be used by both conversationalists if the referent is not known to both of them. Observe the following English conversation:

(3-16) A: I met Dr. Yen yesterday.

B: Who is Dr. Yen?/he?/that person?

In (3-16), in English, speaker B can use the proper name, the pronoun he or the phrase that person referring for the referent. In Japanese, since speaker B does not personally know the referent, Dr. Yen, speaker B cannot use the proper name (Dr. Yen) or the pronoun he. The following (3-17) and (3-18) are acceptable utterances in Japanese which correspond to English (3-16B):

(3-17) B: Dr. yen -tte dare?

(3-18) B: Sono hito wa dare?
that person TOP who (Who is that person?)

In (3-17) the indirect quotation marker -tte (or -to iu) (called) and in (3-18) the demonstrative sono (that) are used to indicate a referent who is out of the speaker's information domain. The following (3-19) and (3-20) with the proper noun and the personal pronoun he respectively are not grammatical when speaker B does not know the referent:

(3-19) B: *Dr. Yen wa dare? Dr. Yen TOP who (Who is Dr. Yen?)
(3-20) B: *Kare wa dare? he TOP who (Who is he?)

Ungrammatical sentences (at the discourse level) such as (3-19) and (3-20) are frequently used by learners of the Japanese language, even by those of advanced levels, and teachers do not dare to correct them because the utterances are grammatical at the sentencial level.

As a matter of fact, in both English and Japanese, speaker A in (3-16) should have said from the beginning that "I met a person called Dr. Yen, yesterday" if he had known that B did not know Dr. Yen, or if he was not sure about B's knowledge:

(3-21) Kinoo Dr. Yen -tte iu hito ni atta n da. yesterday Dr. Yen QUOT person DAT met n COP

(Yesterday, I met a person called Dr. Yen.)
Sentence (3-21) is more natural than (3-16)A in most cases in both English and Japanese conversation when the speaker knows that the hearer does not share the knowledge of the referent. Therefore, it is evidently true that in both English and Japanese, the speaker is supposed to be conscious of his hearer's knowledge in deciding the sentence structure (cf. the use of definite and indefinite articles in English). In terms of deixis, Japanese is more "persistent" than English in that a Japanese speaker cannot use proper nouns/third person pronouns for the referent if the referent is not in his information domain. This restriction does not change within a given discourse even after the referent is introduced and fully explained by one of the discourse participants (e.g. Kuno, 1988, Shibatani, 1990, Takubo and Kinsui, 1992).4

Lacoste (1981) showed some interesting examples of negotiation of speech territory between doctors and their patients in French. Doctors are positioned higher than their patients since they use their professional skills to help patients, but, at the same time, they also depend on the patients' description of their physical condition to enable them to use those skills. Lacoste found, therefore, that often in medical interviews the boundary between "patient's events" and "doctor's events" are blurred and fluctuating. Patients used their knowledge of their physical condition, and made attempts to linguistically invade doctor's territory, while doctors, on the other hand, defended their
professional territory by brandishing their professional knowledge. One example of linguistic territory negotiation on the lexical level is shown below:

(3-22)

Doctor: (a) *Depuis quand avez-vous mal au ventre?*  
(How long have you had this pain in your stomach?)

Patient: (b) *J'ai jamais eu mal au ventre, j'ai eu mal à la rate.*  
(I've never had a pain in my stomach. I have a pain in my spleen.)

Doctor: (c) *Ecoutez, la rate vous n'êtes pas forcé de savoir où c'est, vous avez eu mal au ventre.*  
(Listen, the spleen, you are not supposed to know where that is, you had a pain in the stomach.)

Patient: (d) *J'ai mal là (geste de désignation).*  
(I have a pain there/designative gesture)

Doctor: (e) *Comment vous appelez ça? C'est le ventre. Vous avez mal au ventre.*  
(What do you call that? That's the stomach. You have a pain in the stomach.)

Patient: (f) *Si vous voulez.* (If you say so.)  
(Lacoste, 1981: 172)

Obviously, the doctor in the above conversation was not happy with the patient's use of the word *la rate* (*spleen*) as well as patient's assertion that he had pain in his spleen. The event belongs to the doctor's territory (i.e., professional knowledge). In (3-22c), the doctor's utterance *vous avez mal au ventre* (*you have a pain in the stomach*) sounds too direct in speaking about other people's pain, but is supposed to be acceptable due to his profession.

The next example shows negotiation of territory in Japanese
through the sentence-ending modality.

(3-23)

Child A: *ashita okaasan i-nai yo*  
(Tomorrow, our mother will be out.)

Child B: *uso da yo.*  
(It's a lie. She will be here).

Adult C: (talking to A)  
*A-chan, okaasan soo i-tte-ta?*  
(Your mother said so? I thought she would be here, but...)

In sentence (3-23A) and (3-23B), both children (brothers) used direct endings (declarative modality) indicating that the information about their mother is within their personal information territory. Child A indicated that the information was "his" using the direct modality, therefore, Child B also used direct forms to negotiate territory. Both of them could have used an indirect sentence such as *I thought mother would (or wouldn't) be here* as Adult C did in (3-23C), but children did not prefer this alternative, presumably because they do not want to be polite to each other; they are young and their relationship is intimate.

ANOTHER VIEW OF LISTENER-ORIENTED MODALITY IN JAPANESE

There have been some criticisms of Kamio's model. Except for one researcher who specifically stated that Kamio's model is not
applicable to the Japanese system of demonstratives (Ono, 1995), those rejecting or criticising his model have not presented clear reasons of disapproval; generally, the antagonists of the model simply claim that the concept of information territory does not seem to be applicable to Japanese linguistic phenomena as a whole.\(^5\)

There has, however, been another major approach to the pragmatic functions of Japanese sentence-ending forms on the discourse level. Takubo and Kinsui (Takubo, 1990 and 1992; Kinsui, 1990; Takubo and Kinsui, 1990, 1992) proposed a Japanese discourse model based on Fauconnier's mental space theory\(^6\) as well as discourse marker theories by Schiffrin (1987) and others. They named the theory "danwa kanri riron" (theory of discourse management). I will call their theory "mental space theory" in this chapter. As the name implies, this theory attempts to explain Japanese linguistic issues from the viewpoint of the speaker's assumption about the hearer's knowledge about the proposition expressed. It is true that we usually have some particular hearer in mind any time we make an utterance. A speaker needs to take the hearer's knowledge into consideration, and choose appropriate linguistic forms such as words or sentence structures. When the speaker introduces a new issue in discourse, he needs to linguistically indicate that the issue is new (e.g. \textit{Yesterday, James found a peach in our yard}.) After the speaker introduces a new issue, which is not shared by the hearer, the speaker, before making his next utterance, needs to
consider how the hearer's knowledge has been changed by the information that he has just given to the hearer (e.g. The peach was actually a giant peach). This kind of discourse managing behavior based on the hearer's assumed knowledge is normally seen in every language, but how to do so must vary across languages.

The theory of discourse management assumes that mental space is a discourse management system. Mental space is considered to be a layered database, and each utterance in conversation is a kind of command to use the database to register, search, infer, and so forth. The authors claimed that in Japanese, mental space is divided into two areas: a "direct experience area" and an "indirect experience area". The direct area involves long-term memory, episodic memory acquired through direct experience, and knowledge that is obtained from the on-going conversation. The indirect area contains information that is obtained linguistically (i.e., reading or hearing as indirect experience). In the mental space theory, the hearer's assumed knowledge is speculated to be in the indirect memory area of the speaker. In short, Takubo and Kinsui suggested that we have three interacting areas of memory: the direct information field (for directly obtained knowledge), the indirect information field (indirectly obtained knowledge), and the hearer's knowledge field within the speaker's indirect information field (since it is only assumed by the speaker as his indirect experience). Their theory assumes that the sentence-ending modality and other modals are the speaker's "message" to the hearer or the speaker himself to organize
memories in different memory areas. As Fauconnier hypothesized that the same information exists in multiple mental spaces and is described differently linguistically, Takubo and Kinsui assumed that the same information can exist in different connected memory spaces. They attempted to explain nouns/third person pronouns, sentential-final particles, and demonstratives in order to indicate how the speaker interacts with the same information in different memory spaces.\(^7\)

I do not consider Takubo and Kinsui's approach to be significantly different in effect from Kamio's model at least on the issue of the relationship between the sentential ending forms and proposition types. As Kamio had, Takubo and Kinsui paid attention to hearer-sensitivity of Japanese sentence-final forms and explained the function of the forms. Takubo and Kinsui used the concept of memory space of the speaker and the hearer, while Kamio used the concept of information territories of speaker and the hearer as [3-24] shows below. In both models, forms of sentential modality are related with the types of information.

Both theories assume four similar basic categories of evidentiality types. The difference between the two model is that in Kamio's model sentence-ending forms and information domain are simply connected, while the mental space theory viewed particular words (including the sentence-ending forms) to show distinctive "signs" or "commands" presented by the speaker in organizing
information in memory space of both himself and his hearer. For example, Takubo and Kinsui (1992) claimed that the Japanese sentencial final particle *ne* expresses the speaker's "command" for confirmation if information exists in two places (his memory and hearer's memory).

[3-24] Information territory theory vs. mental space theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of events</th>
<th>Information territory theory</th>
<th>Mental space theory</th>
<th>Evidentiality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>direct information for the speaker</td>
<td>In the speaker's territory (A) (direct ending)</td>
<td>In the speaker's direct memory space (a)</td>
<td>direct (speaker's evidence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indirect information for the speaker</td>
<td>In the other people's territory (D) (indirect ending)</td>
<td>In the speaker's indirect memory space (b)</td>
<td>indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct information for the hearer</td>
<td>In the hearer's territory (C) (indirect + <em>ne</em> ending)</td>
<td>In the hearer's memory space in the speaker's indirect memory space (c)</td>
<td>indirect (hearer's evidence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shared information for the speaker and the hearer</td>
<td>In the shared territory (B, CB, BC) (daroo, <em>ne</em>- related endings)</td>
<td>(a) or (b) and (c)</td>
<td>direct (shared)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: A, B, CB, BC and D are from [3-9, 3-10] in this chapter.)

(3-25)

kimino tanjoobi wa san-gatsu desu- *ne*.  
your birthday TOP March COP(FOR) PART(CONF)
(Your birthday is March, we have the same information, don't we?)

In (3-25), the proposition is the hearer's matter but the speaker knows it too, so the speaker confirmed the existence of the same piece of information in two places of his own memory--the speaker's indirect memory area and assumed hearer's memory area in the speaker's indirect memory area--by saying (3-25), where ne is the "sign" of this "memory-matching" action. Takubo and Kinsui characterized the final particle yo as a speaker's command to the hearer to write information in the indirect memory. That function perhaps can be phrased as "speaker's declaration of some speaker's matter" which the hearer does not have knowledge.

(3-26) A: ogenki desu- ka? well/active COP(FOR) Q (How are you?)

B: watashi wa moo 70 desu- YO.
I TOP already 70 COP(FOR) VOC

(I am already 70 years-old, now you know I must not be very well.)
(Takubo, 1992: 23)

In above conversation, the surface meaning of B's answer (i.e., I am already seventy) is not straightforwardly relevant to A's question, therefore, considered to be a case of an "implicature" in Grice's concept. In English, the hearer is required to contextually analyze the implicated meaning (or to find out whether it is an implicature or "blatant" failure to fulfill a maxim), while in Japanese the final forms such as particles help to suggest the existence of implication expressed by the speaker as indicated in [3-26]. In a sense, this phenomenon implies the importance
of final forms in the Japanese pragmatics from the viewpoint of Cooperative Principles.

In Kamio's theory, sentence (3-26) B is simply within the speaker's own information territory so that the direct form desu is acceptable, and particle yo is optional. Actually, ne is the only sentence-final particle that matters in Kamio's model. This is reasonable since, among particles, only ne (and possibly na) seems to function to indicate the shared knowledge (e.g. McGloin, 1990, Ueno, 1971). In the same way, the mental space theory defined particle yone as a sign to confirm the sameness of the information which has just been written in the speaker's indirect memory area and the information which already exists in the hearer's memory area.

So far, Kamio's model and Takubo and Kinsui's model do not appear significantly different from each other with regard to the function of the sentence-ending forms; they merely have different viewpoints. However, the difference appears in the analysis of ending form daroo (deshoo), demonstratives, and other noun phrases. As is noted in chapter two, the Japanese auxiliary daroo is traditionally said to have two distinctive meanings: one is conjecture (probably) and the other is confirmation (tag-question isn't it? etc.) as in the following examples:

(3-27) Uchi no imooto, kirei daro.
   my POSS younger sister pretty AUX(confirmation)

   (My sister is pretty, isn't she?)
Sentence (3-27) shows "confirmation 辿oo" and (3-28) shows "conjecture 辿oo". In the mental space theory, since the proposition of a speaker's conjecture is not supported by direct evidence, it should be written in his indirect memory area. Therefore, conjecture 辿oo is a sign that a proposition is to be written in the speaker's indirect memory while confirmation 辿oo is the speaker's sign (or command) to the hearer to write information into the hearer's direct memory area since the information which needs to be confirmed is naturally shared by the hearer. The theory specifies that the hearer's information area resides in the speaker's indirect memory area; therefore, in the mental space theory, the auxiliary 辿oo (both "conjecture" and "confirmation") is characterized as a sign that the speaker inputs his information into his indirect memory space. By doing this, the theory puts the function of the two types of 辿oo together. I believe that this view is also insightful.

The mental space theory seems to be more expandable to other areas of linguistics, but how far it can be applied is not yet known. One problem with Takubo and Kinsui's mental space theory is that only information obtained by direct experience or long-term memory that is stored in direct memory space can be linguistically described in direct forms. This premise of their theory does not meet actual Japanese usage.
of direct/indirect language forms. In reality, as Kamio clarified, Japanese speakers use direct forms to describe the information which they did not obtain through direct experience but to which they feel they are socially entitled to claim intimacy. The theory of territory of information explains the Japanese concept of direct information well.

Also, some phenomena in Japanese that do not conform to the universal evidentiality rules are easy to understand in the framework of information territory. In (3-29), speaker A provided an episode concerning Princess Masako. She made her statement in direct form which caught the attention of her hearers.

(3-29) F2: Masako-san, kekkon suru mae ni Princess Masako marriage get before TEMP

esute janai kedo, nannka kayotte -ta -no yo.
aesthetic NEG but something go (STAT)-(PAST)-n VOC

(Princess Masako frequently went to somewhere like aesthetic salon before she got married, I am telling you.)

Others: sugoooi .. johoo ga
extravagant information NOM

(What an information source you have!)

This is an example in which a speaker evidentially claims that a given piece of information is in her territory although it is not supposed to be. This violation of territory rules was intentionally made by the speaker who proudly announced that she watches almost all mid-day TV talk shows and became very "resourceful" about popular gossip.
Violation of territory rules also occurs in the opposite way. In the following (3-30), by using the indirect auxiliary *mitai* (it seems), speaker B appears to have reserved her right to claim the ownership of her information:

(3-28) A: *Go-shujin no kaisha doo?*  
Your husband POSS company how

B: *Chotto dame mitai. Raigetsu heisasuru-koto ni no-good it seems Next month close COM DAT kimatta -tte. Shujin ga kinoo itteta wa.*  
declared QUOT My husband NOM yesterday said STAT RAPP

A: How is your husband's company doing?

B: It seems that it is not doing well. I heard they decided to close the company next month. My husband told me yesterday.

In (3-30), the speaker, in talking about her husband's business that is closely related with her life, used an indirect form *mitai* (*seem*). Her intention can be understood to be modest in respecting her husband information territory. These phenomena of the "assertion of information ownership" (i.e., non-use of socially required indirect forms) as in (3-29) and "speaker's intentional neglect of information ownership" (i.e., non-use of socially approved direct forms) as in (3-30) can be well explained under the assumption of existing information territories.

In light of these observations, it seems reasonable to hypothesize psychological information territories which a speaker perceives in interactional spoken discourse. The concept of territory may be only a
surface view of Japanese modality but it is very useful to systematize the use of sentence-ending evidentiality.
However, it is true that Japanese speakers do not often "explain" the details of their contention under the assumption that the hearer knows what the speaker is talking about. Thus, an extensive explanation of a topic tends to be considered impolite. This behavior is problematic because it often results in mis-communication. This cultural issue is discussed in chapter seven in relation to the Japanese background of evidentiality markings.

A grammatical aspect of Japanese which emphasizes the speaker's delicate concern with the listener is called the "empathy" phenomenon in Japanese grammar. It involves the speaker and listener relationship as an important aspect of, for example, syntax.

Kuno (e.g. 1976, 1978, 1987) drew academic attention to "speaker-empathetic" phenomena in Japanese grammar. He defined "empathy" as "the speaker's identification, which may vary in degree, with the person/thing that participates in the event or state that he describes in a sentence" (1987:206). Actually, such phenomena are not limited to only Japanese. As an example, Kuno cited the following English sentences which describe a situation where John hit his brother Bill:

[3-31]  
John hit Bill.  
John hit his brother.  
Bill's brother hit him.  
Bill was hit by John  
Bill was hit by his brother.  
?? John's brother was hit by John.  
* His brother was hit by John.

The last two sentences are syntactically grammatical but their acceptability is lower than the others due to the discrepancy between the speaker's empathy and the sentential subject: Kuno argued that the structural subject legitimately receives the highest focus of the speaker's empathy but the phrases "John's brother" and "his brother"
are not "empathetic" from the speaker's perspective. Kuno gives five
different hierarchies which interact with each other to produce
different degrees of acceptability. The following is the summary of his
empathy hierarchies:

[3-32]

The Speech Act Empathy Hierarchy: the speaker must empathize with
himself rather than any other person or object;

The Topic Empathy Hierarchy: the speaker must empathize with a
discourse topic rather than a non-topic;

The Descriptor Empathy Hierarchy: between given two descriptors (e.g.
'John' and 'John's brother'), the one on which the other descriptor
depends show the speaker's focus of empathy;

The Surface Structure Empathy Hierarchy: the subject of a sentence is
the focus of empathy;

The Word Order Empathy Hierarchy: the left hand NP in a coordinate
structure is more readily empathized with than the right hand NP.

According to the theory, there cannot be more than one focus of
empathy within a given sentence, therefore, if there is a conflict of
plural numbers of empathy targets, the sentence will not be acceptable
("Ban of Conflicting Empathy Foci"). This observation might be valid
across languages.

Based on his series of empathy theories, Kuno explained certain
phenomena of Japanese grammar such as the auxiliary use of "giving
and receiving" verbs, reflexives and empathy adjectives are empathy-
oriented. Kuno's argument emphasized the role of the speaker's
subjectivity in producing sentences.

2 As introduced in chapter two, Kamio listed and characterized the
three major categories of the information which belongs to (A)type
(only speaker's) territory as follows:
(1) Information about direct experience:

Information that is obtained through the speaker's direct experience is a central component of information that falls within his territory of information.

(e.g.) *Watashi atama ga itai.*

I head NOM ache. (I have a headache.)

(2) Information about personal data:

(2a) Personal information:

Even if a speaker lacks a direct experience, personal information such as family matters falls within the speaker's territory.

(e.g.) *Kanai wa 46 desu.*

my wife TOP 46 years' old COP(FOR)

(My wife is 46 years' old.)

(2b) Geographical information:

A subclass of personal information involves those concerned with geographical information which is intimate to the speaker. The following sentence should be expressed as falling in the speaker's territory if the speaker is from Kyoto.

(e.g.) *Kyoto no jinkoo wa 150-man gurai desu yo.*

Kyoto POSS population TOP 1,500,000 about COP(FOR)(VOC)

(The population of Kyoto is about 1,500,000.)

(2c) Information about plans, actions, and behavior

Another subclass of personal information.

(e.g.) *Kore kara Osaka e ikimasu.*

this from Osaka LOC go(FOR)

(I am going to Osaka now.)
(3) **Information about expertise**

(e.g.) Travel agent:

\[ \text{Pari e wa chokkoubin ga benri desu.} \]
Paris LOC TOP direct flight NOM convenient COP(FOR)

(To Paris, a direct flight is convenient.)

(e.g.) Professional demographer:

\[ \text{Kyoto no jinkoo wa 150-man gurai desu yo.} \]
Kyoto POSS population TOP 1,500,000 about COP(FOR)(VOC)

(The population of Kyoto is about 1,500,000.)

Therefore, in Kamio's model, a direct assertion which falls in the speaker's territory is based on not only the speaker's direct experience but also knowledge from his profession and personal data. The speaker is "socially authorized" to speak about these topics in direct forms.

3 Pragmatic use of auxiliary **daroo** (tag-question) was first systematically explained by Kinsui (1992) with his mental space theory. Kamio's original model (1990) had four territories of information but he later revised it into one with six "cases" of interaction of the speaker's and the hearer's territories (1994). In Kamio's original model, the auxiliary **daroo** was not involved as an important form of sentence-final modality.

4 Observe the following example of direct/indirect deixis choice of Japanese shown in conversation between person A and person B:

(3-34) A: **UCLA no Akatsuka- tte iu gengogakusha ga kondisyonaru to episutemorogee no hanashi**
UCLA POSS PROPER NAME QUOT linguist MODI topic
wroteSTAT I recall

(A: A linguist whose name is Akatsuka at UCLA wrote an article about epistemology and conditionals, I remember.)

B: Akatsuka wa episutemikku sukeeru no aatikuru ga
PROPER NAME POSS epistemic scale MODI article NOM

moo hitotsu at-ta deshoo.
more one exist-AUX(PAST) AUX (confirmation)

(B: There is another article of Akatsuka's concerning epistemologic scale, isn't there?)

In (3-34), speaker A used the quoted expression Akatsuka-tte-iu gengogakusha (a linguist named Akatsuka) implying that A assumed that B does not know Akatsuka. If B did not know the referent as A assumed, B is suposed to accept the indirect modality of the noun phrase for the referent which is assigned to him by speaker A and use it (e.g. sono Akatsuka-tte iu hito [that person named Akatsuka]). But, in reality, B knew Akatsuka, so speaker B in (3-34) did not use the indirect quoted form of the referent, instead she simply used the direct noun form Akatsuka. By doing so, speaker B demonstrated that she knows Akatsuka well and that Akatsuka is in her speech territory contrary to speaker A's assumption, which might have been perceived as being impertinent. In Japanese, a speaker is required to use the deictic as it is introduced to the discourse by his conversation partner until they find that both parties have the same information. I feel that B's act in (3-34B) is nothing but a negotiation of personal speech territory, which I perceive aggressive. If speaker B had desired to be polite, B should have used the quoted indirect expression that A had used, admitted that he knows Akatsuka, and then shifted a different referring expression as in (3-35):
(3-35)

B: Aa, sono UCLA no Akatsuka-tte iu gengogakusha
Oh, that UCLA POSS proper name QUOTcall linguist

nara shitteru wa.
COND know PART(RAPP)

Akatsuka no episutemikku sukeeru wa moo
PROPER NAME POSS epistemic scale TOP more

hitotsu aatikuru ga atta desho.
one article NOM existed doesn't it?

(B: Oh, I know that person called Akatsuka at UCLA. Wasn't there another article of Akatsuka concerning epistemologic scale?)

In (3-35), speaker B replied using the indirect quoted form of the proposition (linguist called Akatsuka) as introduced by the conversational partner A, not asserting her information territory. By context, B in (3-35) indicated the proposition is shared by both sides. Since (3-35) B used the indirect modality first, it would be considered to be polite by all. Also, speaker A could have been polite in showing that he assumed that the proposition was shared by hearer B from the beginning by using the direct noun without the quotation markers. In this way, the use of deictics presents another important "territory" factor in Japanese pragmatics.

Whether or not Kamio's concept is applicable to the whole system of Japanese pragmatics is not known. That issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, Kamio (1990) certainly attempted to show that the concept is fairly applicable to wider range of linguistic phenomena in both English and Japanese. He attempted to apply the theory of information territory to various language structures such as sentence structures (e.g. cleft sentence, presuppositional phrases,
performative sentence, thetic judgement), nouns phrases (e.g. anaphors, demonstratives), lexical meanings of some words (e.g. come vs. go, this vs. that), and other discourse aspects such as intonation and honorifics.

6Fauconnier's mental space theory: Fauconnier (1985) originated a pragmatic theory of semantics named the mental space theory (espace mentaux). This theory is useful for evidentiality studies in that it deals with the psychological connection between linguistic forms and direct/indirect memories. The theory uses basic mathematical concepts to solve some problematic semantic issues. Fauconnier argued that the central features of language organization depend on their links with other cognitively motivated structures, and that linguistic expressions contribute to setting up connected mental domains. Fauconnier posited that we have multiple mental worlds (or spaces), which are connected with each other, and reflect the real world differently. He said that "Linguistic expressions will typically establish new spaces or refer back to one already introduced in the discourse." (p. 17) He explained that linguistic "space-builders" may be prepositional phrases (e.g. in Len's mind, in 1929, at the factory), adverbs (e.g. really, probably, theoretically), connectives (e.g. if A then B, either A or B), and underlying subject-verb combinations (e.g. Max believes, May hopes).

For example, consider the following sentences.

(3-36) Susan likes Harry.
(3-37) Max believes that Susan hates Harry.

According to Fauconnier's theory, sentence (3-36) presents space R (origin="speaker's reality") in establishing relation between Susan and Harry in space R (=Reality). In sentence (3-37), the phrase Max believes is a space-builder which establishes space M. The phrase Susan hates
Harry established relation between Susan and Harry in space M which happened to be different from reality. The theory explains that, for sentences (3-36) and (3-37), we must assume two mental worlds, and both worlds are connected with a function called "connector F", and the relationship between Susan (a) and Susan (b) in two worlds is described as F(a)=b. This identified relationship means that both girls are the same person.

The theory has relevancy to the study of territory as well as evidentiality in that it argues that a speaker expresses linguistically the space in his mind his information/knowledge belongs to.

Fauconnier applied the theory to various linguistic issues: anaphoric pronouns, definite descriptions, assumption, conditionals, comparative sentences, and others.

I speculate that mental space theory is promising in providing a "deep structure" of Japanese modality usage, while the territory theory provides a sort of "surface account structure". It is true that when we talk to somebody we consistently need to refer to our hearer's knowledge (what we assume they have) somewhere in our memory and linguistically show our understanding of the hearers' changing knowledge in on-going discourse. So neurologically, the mental space model might reflect the biological behavior of our brain. The consequence of this mental behavior, i.e., a speaker's choice of evidential and other modality of each utterance, may be seen as reflecting the model of territories of information as in Kamio's framework on surface.
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

Creating a realistic model of the Japanese evidentiality system naturally requires a thorough investigation of the actual use of Japanese evidentials. This study may be considered sociolinguistic quantitative empirical research in that the analysis is genuinely based on data collected from informants' natural everyday speech in various speech situations. I have examined individuals' linguistic performance in my native language and culture. In this sense, I have an advantage in understanding the language user's meanings, both surface and intended meanings, but at the same time, my perspective may lack "objectivity" due to my status as an insider. I tried to be cautious regarding this concern, and have sought out third persons' opinions as much as possible to ensure that my interpretation of informants' meaning is proper. In particular, understanding the speaker's meaning encoded in a subtle difference of intonation (sentence-ending tone, for example) is a difficult task which may produce disagreement even among native speakers. However, the primary judgement of the meaning of informants' speech behavior was performed by myself.

DATA COLLECTION

Most of the data collection was done in the informants' familiar environment with native culture (i.e., Japan, or quasi-Japanese-community in the U.S.A.). The data corpus was collected between 1990 and 1997 but the majority was obtained in 1996. The American sites were
primarily Madison, Wisconsin, and Austin, Texas, where I engaged in M.A. and Ph.D. studies. During this time, my primary interest was in discourse analysis; main areas included "tense-alternation", "discourse organization", "Represented Speech and Thought (or RST)" (cf. Banfield, 1982), "speaker's subjectivity and discourse grammar", "common cultural understanding for discourse background", and "hearsay discourse". In performing research on these interests, I collected a variety of spoken discourses (e.g. storytelling, conversational, and interviewed discourse). Since I taught Japanese during this period in both places as teaching assistant and assistant instructor, I became acquainted with a number of Japanese graduate students who were my main informants from American sites. Most of them belonged to, more or less, the same age group (25 to 35 years old), and speech events were generally informal. With the purpose of obtaining more divergent data in regard to speech setting, I spent six weeks in Japan (Tokyo area) in 1996. During this time, I met friends, their families and friends and visited their work-places and other social occasions to acquire an extensive data collection. More informal data was collected than formal data, but I believe that videotaped/audiotaped formal speech events from publicly available speech situations (e.g."TV interview program", "news report show", and "public talk") supply sufficient formal speech data. Informants were from a wide range of age groups: ranging from eight-years-old to seventies. The following table shows the schematic stratification of the informants and quantity and type of speech data I
actually used for this research.

[4-1] Number of informants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(age)</th>
<th>0-9</th>
<th>10-19</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60-</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>17*</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(37*)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* Students' data were not individually analyzed, but were treated as group data.)

Recording hours:
- Audio tapes: approx. 20 hrs
- Video tapes: approx. 5.5 hrs

Number of speech events:
- Formal group: 14
- Informal group: 11
- Public: 5
- School: 2
- Courtroom: 4

Number of speech units examined: approx. 10,700

Number of speech units (i.e., sentences) with clear modality and used for analysis: 7,024

Number of speech unit analyzed:
- Formal group: 1,993
- Friends: 1,904
- Family: 1,462
- Public: 401
- School: 630
- Courtroom: 634

Informants are numbered M1 through M28 for males, F1 through F29 for females, and S1 and S2 for two groups of students. (cf. Appendix A). In the above [4-1], the informants are partitioned simply according to biological background information, age and sex. My intention was to collect a variety of speech events which involve different types and degrees of formality created by speech situations including a variety of
relationships among the speakers. So overall, information concerning speakers' relationship, such as power difference, is considered to be included in the categorization of speech situations. Speech situations are roughly grouped into six types: "formal group conversation", "discourse of talking to public", "informal group discourse", "family discourse", "teacher and student discourse", and "court discourse". Family discourse is, naturally considered to be "informal", but it is regarded as an independent group based on the speculation that Japanese family members share a strong sense of in-group membership and this might affect the rules of evidentiality within the group. Therefore, "family discourse" and "informal group discourse" are under the overall category of "informal discourse" while "formal group conversation", "talking to public", "teacher's discourse", and "courtroom discourse" are considered to fall under the category of "formal discourse". However each discourse type was analyzed independently due to some observed difference in evidentiality phenomena among the groups.

Most informants were well-educated members of the middle class. The sample is actually a "convenience sample" given the constraints of gathering field data from familiar people, so that informants are not evenly nor equally stratified. While there may be more suitable groups of informants equally distributed among age groups, I believe that the given group of speakers suffices for the
I also believe that the process of data collection was highly natural due to my function as a participant in a high proportion of the data. It has been suggested that face-to-face interviews are appropriate for quantitative research that requires volume and quality of recorded speech; however, the "experimental effect" is unavoidable in interviews (e.g. Labov, 1984). Fortunately, this was not a serious problem in this research since I was, most of the time, a "participant-observer" in group settings, although I was sometimes an interviewer in initiating talks. With the exception of data collected from public speech, in group discussions, there were often more than two speakers besides myself, and I was familiar with most of the informants. However, it is still undeniable that the act of recording may have caused "recording effect", but I noticed that my informants often forgot the existence of the tape recorder when in a group of people. Part of the data was procured from face-to-face interviews for which the experimental effect can be anticipated.

When doing interviews and also when participating in group conversation, when applicable, I used some prepared discourse topics for the informants to talk about. The main concern of this research as an evidentiality study was to see how informants talk about information from different "information sources"; therefore topics were chosen on the spot to elicit utterances about information of both direct and indirect experience of the speaker. In order to elicit discussion of the
informants' direct experience, I asked about their work, family, and other things, in the past, at present, and in the future, which seemed most interesting to them. In order to let them talk about issues which are not directly concerned with them, I used social issues of the time. Fortunately for me, but unfortunately for the community at large, at that time, Japanese society had several serious public issues about which people were very well informed: the Aumu-shinrikyoo (Aum-cult) case and the Yakugai-AIDS (AIDS blood serum) case.

Spoken discourses were tape-recorded with a SONY cassette-recorder TCM-S67V with microphone. Informants' written permission was sought prior to tape recording, and an outline of research purposes was briefly explained to each informant. Since the research topic is fairly linguistically specific, I believe that most of the participants did not pay much attention to my academic interest. I think that their nonchalant attitude to the purpose of my recording worked favorably in that the speech data were not influenced by the speakers' awareness of the purpose of research.

Data collection was not combined with more comprehensive long-term studies of overall linguistic performance of the informants since I am familiar with the culture of their speech environment. Therefore, the data are, more or less, "on-the-spot" data. For some informants, data from different speech situations was obtained to see the same speakers' variation of language use in response to changing social factors, but a
large part of the collected speech was treated as "speech chunks" to present evidence of linguistic forms (i.e., evidentiality markings) in different speech situations. In this sense, the quantitative part of the analysis of linguistic forms will appear to be fairly mechanical matter of looking for consistency in occurrence of certain linguistic phenomena in certain types of social situations.

However, qualitatively, attention was paid to the nature of the speech setting because it was speculated in the research plan that Japanese evidential expressions are under the influence of different kinds of "hearers", while many evidentiality studies (e.g. Palmer, 1986; and Chafe, 1986) suggest that the speaker’s experience is the basic and major factor that the speaker relies on to employ evidential markers. We are all aware that even a short conversation can involve all attributes from the speaker, the hearer, and their relationship as well as other environmental factors of the speech (e.g. bystanders and location). As the target of sociological analysis of evidential forms, the hearer's social relationship with the speaker is the issue of analysis, i.e. how distant the relationship of the conversationalists is. Naturally, speakers have different types of hearers. Hearers can be superior (e.g. boss at work) or inferior (e.g. child) to the speaker, or on an equal status with the speaker (e.g. friend), and a speaker must have different "speech styles" respective to each kind of hearer. Theoretical linguistics as well as linguistic pragmatic theories often assume an idealistic speech situation with an idealized addressee, but in actuality, each
speech situation may have different rules of linguistic epistemic coding: Perhaps we do not hesitate to say *my salary is too low!* to somebody intimate to us, but certainly we will be less direct to our superiors and phrase it as, for example, *my salary seems to be lower than one would expect judging from reported industry averages.* A speaker's epistemology level is marked differently by the choice of sentence modality. Therefore, sentence modality expressions are also a sociological issue of speech environment. In this sense, even though this research is not about comprehensive human speech behavior, it will be able to show us a subset of Japanese speech behavior in relation with social realities through a very small focal point, i.e., linguistic forms of evidentiality.

THE DEFINITIONS

First of all, formal and informal speech situations need to be defined. The primary subject of this study is to determine how situational features (e.g. types of occasion, speakers' biological and social background, power-relationship between speakers) influence speaker's evidential coding in naturally occurring speech in a variety of formal and informal speech situations. The speech level is usually controlled by the formality factors, in which the speaker's speech style varies along a dimension of formality. It has been pointed out that a formal occasion calls for polite language use (e.g. Shibatani, 1990; Ide 1982). The factors that contribute to formality are various: the nature of
the addressee, the perceived formality of the occasion, the nature of the topics of discussion, the nature of the bystanders, and others (e.g. Shibatani, 1990). Formal and informal speech situations are often defined by the use of linguistic features such as syntactic standardness, phonological standardness, morphological fullness, etc. (e.g. Labov, 1972b; Ervin-Tripp, 1972). However, for convenience, I consider in-group speech settings to be informal, and out-group settings to be formal.

Discrimination of **uchi** (**in-group**) from **soto** (**out-group**) is one of the fundamental principles of Japanese social interaction together with the social concept of vertical hierarchy. Historically, Japanese society has been considered to be group-oriented, in which people are conscious of their status as a member of their groups. A group can be any gathering of people such as colleagues at work, schoolmates, club members, family members, couples, siblings, neighbors, and town-dwellers. People often refer to groups they belong to as **uchi**. **Uchi**, which is nearly the same as **ie**, literally means **household**. A businessman may call the company he works for **uchi no kaisha** which literally means **my household's company**. In the same way, a university professor or a university student may refer to his school as **uchi no daigaku** (lit. **my household's university**). Sociologists such as Pelzel (1970), Bachnik (1983), and Nakane (1967) argued that **ie** is not only a kin-based domestic group, but any unit in which social and economic life is involved. This concept of "my group is my household", as a matter
of fact, contributed to the development of the Japanese economy through worker devotion to their corporative employers. Interestingly, some sociology studies suggest that Japanese people do not have a solid sense of nationality (e.g. Sakaiya, 1991). This is probably due to the relation with immediate groups being of primary importance. Groups can be small or large, and an individual normally belongs to a number of groups. Some anthropological studies characterize Japanese people as being psychologically comfortable within their groups, and very apathetic to groups they do not belong to (e.g. Nakane, 1967; Doi, 1973).

It can be argued that Japanese people are conscious of group territories as well as personal territories, which has the potential to influence language use. Usage of Japanese honorifics in the selection of verbs, nouns, and grammatical forms is often dependent on the relative group membership of the listener, speaker, and referent. In this research, the types of groups will involve "family", "close friends", "work friends", and others for informal settings, and "TV interview", "public talk", "teacher/student interaction", "formal conversation", "courtroom discourse", and others for formal speech settings. One problem that may arise here is that an individual may behave informally in a supposedly-formal setting, or vise versa. Even though Japanese linguistic behavior is significantly influenced by highly structured honorifics, speakers' language use is not completely automatic in a given speech situation. Within an acceptable range,
there are variations in situational use of honorifics (e.g. Ikuta, 1983; Wetzel, 1984; Dunn, 1992, 1996). "Affection" between the speakers may override the status difference and realize informality out of formal environment, or "ill feelings" may bring forth an entirely informal-style conversation or ultra formal language. Therefore, to make the analysis simple, alongside with the distinction between objective formal/informal types of speech situation, I paid attention to the formal/informal sentence-ending forms that informants used.

Japanese plain sentences for informal conversation end with verbal and adjectival dictionary forms, or copula -da (present tense) and -datta (past tense) after noun and adjectival-noun, or their related forms (e.g. negative forms). Japanese polite sentences end with either verbal endings of -masu (affirmative present) and -mashita (past tense), or the copula forms of -desu (present) and -deshita (past), or their related forms. Usually, these polite sentence-endings are considered to be a form of honorifics known as "performative honorifics" (or "addressee-oriented honorifics"). When a speaker used polite sentence-endings for most of a discourse, I understood that the speaker considered the conversation to be formal for himself although the degree of formality largely varies. I used this criterion for grouping discourse types. However, I was also aware that one particular usage of honorifics does not indicate a unique social context. For example, plain form speech can be used by a speaker to a lower status
addressed as well as to an equal status addressee. Addressee-oriented honorifics (i.e., polite sentence-endings) can be used by the speaker to addressees of lower, equal, and higher level. This indicates that a speaker's decision to use either "plain" or "polite" form involves other factors of "perceived distance" between himself and the speech situation besides the addressee's status. Therefore, it must be true that one particular social context may require one particular level of honorifics (e.g. a formal discussion with equal level addressees requires the speaker to use polite level of honorifics), but the reverse is not always true (e.g. the use of polite level of honorifics does not always indicate that the speaker speaks to his equal level addressees). The following table [4-2] indicates the relationship between speaker-addressee's social-status relationship and the possible use of plain, polite honorifics, and hyper-polite honorifics in spoken discourse:

[4-2] Possible grammatical forms of Japanese and types of addressee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>lower-status addressee</th>
<th>equal-status addressee</th>
<th>higher-status addressee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>plain form</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polite form</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(performative honorific)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hyper-polite form</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(performative honorific)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Therefore, the polite form of honorifics as well as the plain form does not have decontextualized social meanings. This means that a speaker's decision to use the "plain" (informal) or the "polite" (formal) form indicates his integrated perception of the nature of a given speech situation.

It is also necessary to clarify the "unit" of analysis. In this research, a "sentence" is regarded as a unit. A sentence is often considered as unsuitable as a unit of speech. For example, in her research on discourse markers, Schiffrin (1987) pointed out that the sentence structure and the meaning of a "speech act" are not relevant to each other, and suggested that "interactionally situated language use is sensitive to constraints quite independent of syntax." Schiffrin concluded that "sentence structure is not the most useful unit to understand language use and social interaction" (1987:32). This may be true for many conversation/discourse analyses on interactional meanings of language use (e.g. turn-taking, silence, hedges, back-channeling). This dissertation is also about interactional language behavior; however, this research views the issue from the sentence form, in particular, from sentence-ending morphological forms. Therefore, treating the sentence as a unit of analysis is inevitable. Unfortunately, spoken sentences are often so incomplete that identifying sentence boundaries is often difficult (e.g. Crystal, 1980). This is a very critical problem in the Japanese language; the sentence-
ending is often intentionally omitted in Japanese to make the modality ambiguous. The following conversation shows examples of incomplete sentences.

(4-3)

F5(1): *Nani sore*  
What that? (What is that?)

F2(2): *Nani gasu tte-iu-n-dakke*  
What gas QUOTE-n- Q (What was the gas called?)

F3(3): *Wakannai kedomo, VH toka, dokugasu...*  
don't know but VH(PROP) something like poison gas...

[I don't know but poison gas as like "VH"...(incomplete).]

F2(4): *Nanka sono gasu o sutta dake de moo shin-jau...*  
somewhat that gas NOM inhale only INS soon die-(regret)...

[Something like, only inhaling the gas [regretfully] kills people...(incomplete).]

F3(5): *Dakara chuushaki o hito no soba de pyutto yatte...*  
so syringe NOM people POSS side LOC ONOM do (te)

[So, with one squeeze of syringe beside people..(incomplete).]

F2(6): *Dakara moo hito tare yo.*  
so only one drop VOC

(7): *Pon-tte taraseba sono gasu ga yoosuruni nannte*  
ONOM (dripping) drop COND that gas NOM in short how

*iuno, kuuchu ni kakusan- sarete..*  
say in the air LOC scatter PASS(te)

[So, it's only one drop. If dropped (with onomatopia sound), that gas, in short, how can I say, is scattered in the air ..(incomplete).]

In the conversation (4-3), which is informal, sentence (1) and (3)
end in nouns without verb-endings. Sentences (5) and (7) end with te-forms of verbs that suggest the sentences are not completed yet. As noted in chapter one, te-form of a verb means "action and~" or "progressive action" (e.g. Makino and Tsutsui, 1986) and therefore connotes the "incompleteness" of action or the "state of being"; therefore, it is ungrammatical to end a sentence with te-forms according to Japanese prescriptive grammar. In short, sentences (1), (3), (5), and (7) in the discourse do not have clear modality at the sentence end. This avoidance of the sentence-ending makes "period-less" sentences that produce a "fading-out" effect. A Japanese sentence-ending modality expresses the speaker's psychological attitude toward the context of the speech; he can show, for example, to what degree he commits himself to his statement. Therefore, it seems quite logical to assume that individuals use avoidance of clearly-formed sentence-endings as a strategy to express some degree of reservation toward their propositions (cf. also the case of te-likage in chapter one, note 4).

In this research, attention was paid only to completed sentences with sentence ending modalities, although some incomplete endings are exceptionally considered to have modalities as will be explained later in this chapter.

THE LANGUAGE

In this research, the target vernacular is "standard" Japanese
(i.e., Tokyo dialect).\textsuperscript{5} Even though Japan is geographically a small country (smaller than the state of California), the Japanese language has hundreds of regional dialects. Some dialects are remarkably different from others phonologically, lexically, and morphologically to the extent that communication problems can occur among people from different areas; while other dialects are not very distant from the standard vernacular (e.g. Sanada, 1983; Kindaichi, 1977; Sato et al., 1986). In the Tokyo area, basically standard Japanese is spoken, but regional dialects are also heard.\textsuperscript{6} As noted earlier, the data from American sites for this study were obtained from Japanese speakers who resided in Madison, WI and Austin, TX. Informants' origin in Japan varied widely. The data collection in the summer of 1996 was carried out in the Tokyo area, but the informants' native dialects were also diverse. In both America and Japan, most of the informants used the standard Japanese, but there were some informants who used their native dialects. If we assume that Japanese linguistic epistemology and culture are related, it is necessary to look into both standard and regional languages to see if their systems of evidentiality marking share the same concepts. However, in this research, standard forms have received the primary focus while the attention paid to regional differences is minimal. An effort is, however, made in this study to make some reference to non-standard utterances. Non-standard dialect speakers usually learn the standard dialect through institutions (e.g. schools) and other
environmental factors such as media and human contacts. All Japanese speakers are assumed to understand standard Japanese, and a large proportion of native speakers of non-standard Japanese are perhaps practically "bidialectal". Since no significant difference was found in sentence modality between native and non-native standard dialect speakers in the data, I speculated that learners of the standard dialect perhaps learn the pragmatic rules of evidentiality coding as a part of the patterns of the Tokyo dialect, or that the major dialects share a common concept of evidentiality marking. If a unique pattern of evidentiality marking is seen systematically in certain non-standard dialect speakers' standard Japanese, it is possible to assume that the phenomenon is a "transfer" from their native dialect. Unfortunately the dialect issue is too far beyond the scope of this study; there are simply too many different dialects and the boundaries between them tend to be fuzzy. For these reasons, possible differences in evidentiality coding among regional dialects was not seriously pursued in this research.

THE DATA

I transcribed discourse utterances with attention to each word, complete or incomplete. Attention in transcription was not paid to phonological aspects such as variation of phonemes, nor most of the aspects of conversational pragmatics such as "timing of speech", "silent or hesitated period", "length of pronunciation", "overwrapping speech"
other than "intonational patterns". As to intonational pattern, careful attention was paid to the sentence-final intonation: rising, falling, flat, or other. These intonational distinctions are described in case the pattern affects the evidential meanings of the sentence final forms. For example, Japanese sentence final particle -ne, which often functions to indicate the speaker's awareness of shared status of his proposition with the hearer, is considered to have several different intonational tones (e.g. Oishi, 1985). It was assumed that a subtle tone difference may indicates significant difference of evidentiality meaning reflecting a speaker's cognition of the reality.

THE DATA ANALYSIS

Scope of analysis

As the overall scope of this study is clarified, although there are a variety of evidentiality codings, in analysis, attention was paid primarily to the sentential-ending form which is the main linguistic issue of this research. Other types of modality expressions which involve evidentiality aspects (e.g. "deixis", "adverb", "incomplete sentence", and "hedges") were also analyzed in relation with the sentence-ending forms. For example, occasionally when a sentence-ending form does not involve modality of indirectness or low-assertiveness of the speaker, other types of modality are often substituted to produce a low-assertive mood in the sentence. An example is shown below:
(4-4)

F3: *nannka jyu-nenn mae no karute ga mada* somewhat 10 years before MODI medical chart NOM yet

*nai-tte sawai-deru.* does not exist-QUOT fuss(te-form)-STAT

(F3: Somewhat [they] are clamoring saying the medical chart [of AIDS patient] of 10 years ago has not yet been found.)

In the utterance (4-4), the speaker's topic belongs to the genre of public information that is not in her information territory. She used the bare direct-ending *sawai-deru* (fussing), without incorporating addressee-conscious final-particles although the proposition was assumed to be known by her hearers. The sentence-ending modality of the utterance may be too direct from the standard viewpoint, but the words at the beginning *nannka* (somewhat) functions to mitigate commitment expressed by the speaker to the proposition. Other examples with lexical modality of indirection are sentences with adverbs such as *tabun* (probably), *osoraku* (probably), and *toka-nanntoka* (something like that). Syntactically, negative and passive forms are used for the same purpose. Prosodically, changing tones provides a way to do so without making sentence-ending forms less assertive. However, as noted earlier, the sentence-ending form provides the most dominant modality with the sentence (cf. Chapter three).

**Method of analysis**

There are three factors involved in the analysis: (1) frequency of
occurrence and the type of sentence-ending evidential form, (2)
propositional content of the sentence, and (3) speech situation in which
the sentence was uttered. Quantitative analysis was carried out through
the creation of a database containing a representation of each relevant
speech ending in this study. This data was then analyzed by writing a
series of computer programs to extract various patterns in this data.

The database is conceptually a collection of 7024 speech
utterances which have the following information associated:

(1) Informant identification (sex, age)
(2) Discourse type/group setting (formal conversation, informal,
family, courtroom, school, public)
(3) Sentence-ending forms
   (a) Group identification for the forms (1-10)
   (b) Formal form (polite form)/informal form (plain form)
   (c) Ascending tone/descending tone
(4) Information (proposition) type (A-H) of each sentence

The computer programs used to analyze this data were written
according to my specifications in PERL Version 5.003 on an IBM RS/6000
workstation running AIX version 4.2.1. PERL was chosen since it is a
widely available language with powerful regular expression
manipulation and associative arrays.

Sentence-ending evidential forms

The following [4-5] is a summarized list of the sentence-ending
evidential forms for both informal and formal forms that occurred in
the data. The completed list of all forms (approx. 350 forms) is in
Appendix B. For the purpose of systematic and realistic analysis of the
entire data, the list was created based on the theoretical background
attributed to each form as well as early-stage analysis of the actual data.
For convenience, prior to the detailed analysis, I classified them into ten
different groups according to their syntactical and morphological
forms. The largest distinction is made among "direct" (D), "indirect"
(ID), and "question" (Q) forms. Direct-ending-forms were further
divided into five groups following the types of suffixed sentence-final
particles or other final lexical items as well as intonational differences.
One group consists of direct forms with questioning tones (DQ "direct-
form question"), some groups involve the direct forms showing the
speaker's sensitivity to the hearer's knowledge (SD "semi direct")
through tag-question style, etc. Indirect forms are divided into two
groups, hearsay and inferential evidentials. Epistemic-auxiliary
-ending forms (AUX) and "I think"-type ending forms (THINK) are
indirect forms, but grouped separately from the hearsay and inferential
forms. In doing so, my intention was also to classify the final forms by
their degree of estimated assertiveness.

[4-5] Japanese sentence-ending evidentials 8

Group 1: D  Single-noun-ending,
D  Direct-form.

D  Direct-form with sentence-final particles such as -yo, -wa, -sa, -no, and -wake, -kara, -node

and related forms.

Group 2: D  Direct-form with the sentence-ending particles -ne and -na with falling tone

(-ne and -na)

and related forms.

Group 3: SD  Semi-direct-form with auxiliary "confirmation-daroo " (falling one) and negative suffix -janai (falling tone)

and related forms.

Group 4: DQ  Direct-Question-form with sentence-final particle-ne with rising tone (-ne ), and "confirmation -daroo " and negative suffix, -janai with rising tone.

DQ  Quasi-question forms

and related forms.

Group 5: SD  Semi-direct form with the particle -ne# (with rising + falling tone) (as we both know)

and related forms.

Group 6: Q  Question forms with a question particle -ka, or -no

and related forms.

Group 7: ID  Inference forms such as -mitai, -voor, and -rashii.

and related forms.

Group 8: ID  Hearsay evidential forms such as -datte, and -soo.

I HEARD
and related forms.

**Group 9: AUX** Epistemic auxiliaries such as
- *kamoshirenai*, MIGHT BE
- *hazu*, MUST BE
- "conjecture -daroo", PROBABLY
and related forms

**Group 10: ID** 'I think" forms such as -*omou*, I THINK
and -*kangaeru*.

In [4-5], most of the **D (direct form), Q (question form) and ID (indirect form) endings** have both **informal** and **formal** forms. For example, the direct affirmative non-past **informal** ending for to eat is (in context) *taberu*, and the **formal** ones are *tabe-masu* (addressee-honorific), *itadaki-masu* (humble), *mushiagari-masu* (hyper honorific), *otabe ni narimasu* (hyper honorific) and possibly others. No formal/informal distinction is made for sentence-final particles such as *yo*, *sa*, *na*, *wa*, *no*, and *ne*, therefore, when the ending is suffixed with a particle, the form of the verb, adjective, or copula before the particle is either formal or informal.

Most ending-forms have a version with the particle -*n* (or -*no*) inserted after the direct forms of *Verb, Adj* ective, or *Noun* before the ending copula -*da* (-*desu* for formal) constituting a *V/Adj/N + n+da* cluster. These forms are listed on the right-hand column in the list in appendix B. Particle -*no* with this function is called the "nominalizing" particle which is claimed to have an evidential function (Aoki, 1986 in chapter two). Kuno (1973) says that patterns of this type of -*no da* (or
-n da) cluster, give some "explanation" for the speaker's propositional context for declarative sentence, and for interrogative sentences, -n o desu ka? (with question particle -ka) asks of the hearer's explanation for what the speaker has heard or observed as (4-6) example shows.

(4-6)
M8(1): naiyoo wa omoshiroi desu yo.
context CONT interesting COP(formal) PART(VOC)
(2): rabu ni kansuru koto desu kara.
love DAT relate COMP COP(formal) because
popularity ACC aim(te-form)-STAT-n-COP(formal) (VOC)
(2): Because it concerns love.
(3): [because]I am hoping to be well received [by readers] (I am telling you).

(4-6) Utterances are part of the discourse in which M8 was explaining the research topic of his dissertation. In (3), he said that he decided on the topic expecting people's curious attention. This utterance gives explanation for his previous utterance (1): the topic is interesting. The following discourse is an example of a n-da cluster in interrogative sentence:

(4-7)
M13(1): sore wa chotto ikura soozeiki no terebi da
that TOP little even initial-stage MODI TV COP
to ittemo amari nai deshoo
QUOT-COND not many exist(NEG) AUX(CONF)
F22 (2): uun... maa naku mo nakatta desu
Well well exist(NEG) exist(NEG)(PAST) COP(FOR)

ne
PART(RAPP)

M13(3): aru-n-desu ka
exist-n-COP(formal) Q

M13(1): Even though it was one of the initial-stage TV programs, that did not happen often (didn't it?)

F22(2): Well, it is not that [the things like that] did not happen.

M13(3): Did it happen (as you said)?

Here, M13 and F22 were discussing a "live" TV soap drama of some twenty-five years ago in which unplanned replacement of main characters was carried out without informing the viewers. In (1), M13 was thinking that such an occurrence must have been unusual. F22 has more experience in the field and said it was not unusual in (2). M13 requested more explanation from F22 in sentence (3) by simply using the -n-desu-ka? cluster. From the perspective of evidentiality, n-da in M13's utterance (3) suggests that the utterance is based on the evidence, i.e., the utterance (2) from F22.

McGloin (1980) further developed this analysis of -n_da and argued convincingly that a speaker uses the -n_da cluster to subjectively explain, to persuade, to convince or to give background information in a situation where certain information is known by both parties, or either the speaker or the hearer. Kuno and McGloin's
analysis can be interpreted to mean that the \textbf{-n\_da} expression is concerned with (1) sharing information between two parties (from the speaker to the 'ignorant' hearer), (2) checking the truth value of the speaker's information with the resourceful hearer, or (3) confirming the shared status of the information between the two parties. Therefore, \textbf{-n\_da} clearly functions as an evidential in various ways. McGloin also found that "in purely objective information giving/seeking situation, \textbf{no desu} cannot be used" (1980: 144) suggesting the subjective nature of the particle \textbf{-no} which asserts that the speaker's proposition is supported by evidence.

More explanation of group-by-group sentence-ending evidential forms which were summarized in [4-5] are provided below:

\textbf{(Group I sentence-final evidential forms)}

The first group of the sentence-ending forms (Group I) is assumed to be most direct forms used in Japanese, and accordingly is considered appropriate for presenting any information to which the speaker attaches high truth value. Theoretically, the first listed form, \textbf{noun-ending}, is not a completed sentence ending so it should not be of major concern to this study. However, it was observed in casual conversation, family discourse in particular, that the simple noun-ending was used too often to be ignored. So, I listed incomplete endings with a noun as a kind of direct modality form. \textbf{Direct ending} is the plain forms of the verb, adjective, and copula without any suffix.
In conveying information which is truthful from the speaker's viewpoint, however, in many instances, speakers who are sensitive to the existence of hearers may consider plain direct-forms to be too "un-interactional" and add some kind of sentence-final particles or other kind of modality expressions to their proposition to create different types of direct mode. As briefly noted in chapter three, sentence-final particles are hearer-sensitive and, like *-n da* clusters, are not used in formal Japanese writing or formal public speech which does not assume a specific audience (e.g., Saji, 1956). Each particle is said to connote some kind of conversational nuance from the speaker to the hearer. It is very difficult sometimes to translate the meanings attached to the proposition by the use of final particles, so they are often left untranslated in other languages. As noted in chapter three, it is said that the particle *-yo*, and *-sa* function to "impart information which belongs to the speaker's sphere to an addressee" (McGloin, 1990), "forcing the speaker's view on to the hearer" (Tokieda, 1951) or "focusing on the informational aspect of the proposition" (Maynard, 1993). Kinsui (1992) said that by using the particle *-yo* a speaker "declares" his intention to input the information (i.e., his proposition) into his indirect memory which is reserved for the hearer's assumed knowledge (p. 8). Examples of *-yo* usage are shown in sentence (1) and (3) in (4-6). *-Sa* is used in the same way as *-yo* although it probably connotes masculinity more strongly than *-yo*.

*-*Wa*, and *-*no* have been characterized in two different ways:
Ueno (1971) said that they have the same function as -sa and -yo, while McGloin (1990) considered that -wa and -no create rapport, or request sympathy from the hearer. It seems that -wa and -no are, as McGloin argued, slightly different from "declarative" -yo and -sa. In my analysis, they are not "declaring" but rather "extending" the speaker's rapport to the hearer. However, at the same time, it is also true that -wa and -no particles convey less sense of rapport than -ne. For this research, I included -wa and -no evidentials into Group (1), the category of highly-direct-evidential. Therefore, these Group (1) final particles are generally speaker-oriented.

The followings are some examples of -wa and -no.

(4-8)

F5(1): *nihon-tte* ima nan-nin *kurai eizu kanja ga*
Japan-QUOT now how many people about AIDS patient NOM
*iru ka shitte- masu*
exist COMP know(te-form) formal

F16(2): *seikakuni wa wakaranai wa.*
correctly CONT know(NEG) PART(VOC)

F5 (1): Do you know how many AIDS patient are here in Japan now?  
F16(2): I do not know precisely.

-**wa** use by F16 in sentence (2) shows a common usage of -**wa** in imparting speaker's own state of being. -**wa** typically connotes femininity (in starndard dialect), as does -**no**. It is also difficult to
translate the nuance of -**wa** and -**no** into English.

(4-9)

F6 (1): *gakkoo ga owatte, minna de atsumatte,*

school NOM finish(te-form) everybody INS gather(te-form)

*ja Sakae e ikoo ze -tte koto ni*

then Sakae DIR go(VOL) PAR(VOC) QUOT COMP DAT

*natte minna de jitensha de kuridasu no.*

become(te-form) everybody INS bicycle INS crowd to

(2): *de machi e itte, chika-gai ga aru no.*

then downtown DIR go(te-form) underground mall NOM exist

(3): *soko e haitte, shabekuru to iu...*

there DIR enter(te-form) chat QUOT

(4): *sorede ie e kaette syukudai o suru no.*

then house DIR return(te-form) homework ACC do

F6 (1): After school, [we] all gather, and decide to go to Sakae, and everybody goes by bicycle (*no*)

(2) Then, go into the town, there is an underground mall (*no*).

(3) [We] go into there, and talk,

(4) Then, [we] go home and do homework (*no*).

In (4-9), the speaker explained what she habitually did in her high school days, therefore, naturally her commitment to the proposition is very high. -**No** ending is used in (1), (2), and (4) sentences.

I have included -**kedo** (and -**ga**) (meaning *but*) and -**kara** (and -**node**) (meaning *because*) as sentence-final forms although they are not usually considered to be so. They are conjunctions and if a sentence ends with one, the sentence is, grammatically speaking, incomplete.
However, the original meanings of these conjunctives are often ignored, and they are used to end a sentence in a fading-out fashion without clear direct modality. Since, utterances ending with one of these conjunctives do not usually entail the hearer's knowledge but simply muffle the directness of the utterance, I included these in the direct-ending group. An example of -ga use is shown below:

(4-10)

F24 (1): *eeto chiryoo houhoo no minaoshi o nasatta* well, treatment method MODI reexamination OBJ did(HON)

*ka dooka to iu koto ni tsuite ukagatte mitai* whether QUOT COM regarding ask(HON) try(DES)

*to omoimasu ga.* COM think(formal) but

(2) *jiko chuushahoo o hikaeru desu toka ne,* self injection method OBJ refrain COP(FOR) like RAPP

*kurio e no kirikae, shinsenna toketsu kesshoo o* domestic medicine DIR MODI change fresh frozen serum ACC

*katsuyoosuru toka desu ne,* utilize like COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)

*dooiufoona koto o gutaitekini nasai-mashita ka* what kind thing OBJ practically did(HON) Q

F24 (1) Well, I would like to ask if you reexamined your treatment (*kara*).

(2) What sort of thing did you do actually in terms of re-examination of treatment of hemophiliacs, such as refraining from self-injection, use of domestic blood, utilization of fresh frozen serum?
The use of -**ga** in above (1) does not have any particular meaning. It helps to give an impression that the sentence is less declarative. This is the same as the use of sentence final -**kara** (because) or -**node** (because) as shown below:

(4-11)

M1 (1): *yuushuuna jinzai dattara oyakusho de mo excellent human resource COP(COND) government LOC also kigyoo de mo onaiyooni kyosoosite hippattekurutte company LOC also alike compete(te) recruit-QUOT iu no ga soo iu koto ga atte shikaru-beki na-n-da. COMP NOM such COMP NOM exist(te) should -n-COP*  

F5 (2) *soo desu ne. so COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)*  

M1: (3) *shikamo amerika no baai wa ne moreover America POSS case CONT PART(RAPP) dentootekini yakumin ni nattara kyuuryo ga historically civil servant DAT become(COND) salary NOM sagaru-tte iu no ga aru kara. decrease-QUOT COMP NOM exist because*  

(4): *futuudato maa sukunatutomo ne, usually well at least PART(RAPP) daitooryoo ga kawaru tabi ni ue no renchuut-tte President NOM change turn TEMP top MODI people-QUOT iu no wa kubi o sugekaerareru-tte. COMP TOP neck OBJ replace(PASS)-QUOT.*

M1(1): If [they are] excellent staff, the government and private companies should compete to recruit those people.

F5 (2): It is so.

M3(3): Moreover, (*kara*) in case of America, traditionally, one's income decreases if he became a civil servant.
Usually, well at least, each time a new president is selected, high class officials are said to be replaced.

The sentence ending with -kara in (3) does not denote its literal meaning, because: there is no phrase or sentence to be meaningfully connected with sentence (3) with the conjunctive -kara. Therefore, when talking about American politicians, a topic which is supposed to be other people's information, the speaker used -kara, thereby avoiding the bare direct-ending of the verb, -aru (exist) in (3).

The ending form -wake (literally reason) functions in a similar way with -nda in extending "explanation" from the speaker about his propositional background:

(4-11)

F3(1): gakuhi ga zero.
   tuition NOM zero

F5(2): zero ii wa ne#.
   zero good PART(VOC) PART(SHARE)

F3(3): daigaku made zero yo.
   university till zero PART(RAPP)

F5 (4): sore zenbu zeikin
   that all tax

F3 (5): zeikin
   tax

M22(6): sono kawari josei mo yamenakute sumu yooni
   that instead female also quit(NEG)(te) settle in such a way

   hatarakeru kankyo-tte tukutte -aru wake.
   work(POT) environment-COMP make(te)-RES reason
School tuition is free
Free? That is good.
It is free to university (I am telling you).
That is all [paid by] tax?
Tax.
Even though [Swedish people have to pay high tax], the environment is well-conditioned to allow females to continue working (that is the background of high tax).

Wake as used in M22's utterance (6) performs the function of explaining that the utterance is giving the background information for what has just been said. The degree of evidentiality attached to wake-ending seems high.

Combined forms of Group (1) evidential ending forms, such as wayo and wakesa, also belong to this group.

(Group 2)

Group (2) final forms typically involve the particle -ne. Ne and -na are said to be used to "seek confirmation from the hearer" (McGloin, 1990), or "solicit confirmation" (Maynard, 1993), but at the same time, -ne, and -na, function to create rapport, or request sympathy from the hearer (e.g., McGloin, 1990 Tokieda: 1951) or interpersonally to "solicit emotional support" (Maynard, 1993).

It is noted that each of the particles -ne and -na is affirmed to have two different functions: "requesting confirmation" and "requesting/sending rapport". However, how these two functions are
linguistically distinguished has rarely been discussed. The prosodic
features of sentence-final particles seem to have been rarely
investigated other than by Tanaka (1973, 1977) and Oishi (1985).
Oishi argued that intonational patterns determine the different functions of
the particle -ne. He pointed out that -ne (and yone) can be uttered
with four different tones:

(1) the pitch of the final syllable of the word preceding the final
particle ne is lower than the pitch of its first vowel /ne/ and the
pitch of this vowel is higher than the second /e/;

(2) the pitch of the final particle is higher than that of the final
syllable of the preceding word in one syllable particle; or the pitch
of the final syllable of the final particle is higher than that of the
penultimate syllable;

(3) the pitch of the final particle is lower than that of the final syllable
of the preceding word in one syllable particle; or the pitch of the
final syllable of the final particle is lower than that of the
penultimate syllable,

(4) no pitch differences between the two identical vowels (/e/) in ne.

Oishi argued that the discourse meaning of each ne is different. He
referred to only ne and yone, but this observation must apply to other
ne-related final particles (e.g. wane) and the particle na which is
slightly vulgar version of ne. (p. 60)

Four different pitch types were also confirmed in my data.
Taking Oishi's distinction into consideration, I assumed three types of \textit{ne} in my model as described below: 9

(a) \textbf{Ne : Ne} with a falling intonation, which is not necessarily asking for either confirmation or agreement from the hearer, is simply placed by the speaker between phrases or at the end of sentences to make utterances interactive by requesting attention and rapport from his hearer or by mildly asserting the speaker's contention. So logically, and also empirically, a speaker can insert this \textit{ne} after every word or phrase of his sentence.

\begin{align}
\text{F12(1):} & \quad \text{nanka \ ne \ aakansoo \ ni \ ita \ toki \ ni \ ne} \\
& \quad \text{something like \ Arkansas \ LOC \ lived \ when \ TEMP} \\
& \quad \text{ano \ hito \ ne \ gabanaa \ ka \ nanka \ datta \ desho.} \\
& \quad \text{that \ person \ Governor \ something \ like \ COP(PAST) \ AUX(CONF)}
\end{align}

\begin{align}
\text{F12 (2):} & \quad \text{sono \ toki \ ni \ ne \ sekuretarii \ datta \ to \ omou \ kedo \ ne} \\
& \quad \text{that \ time \ TEMP \ secretary \ COP(Past) \ QUOT \ think \ but} \\
& \quad \text{maa, \ chotto \ bijin \ no \ ko \ ga \ ite \ ne} \\
& \quad \text{well \ a \ little \ pretty \ girl \ MODI \ girl \ NOM \ exist} \ (te)
\end{align}

Characteristically, this \textit{-ne} seems to be related with the information that belongs to the speaker's territory, and is not known by the hearer. I call this \textit{-ne} "rapport \textit{-ne}". Some small proportion of
the speakers habitually pronounce this -ne as a short rising sound. This use of rising -ne functions as if the speaker is asking "Are you listening?" to the hearer in conveying information that is likely unknown to the hearer. This rising version of "rapport -ne" is easily distinguishable from the real "rising -ne" (the second type -ne) because it obviously does not involve the speaker's concern about the hearer's knowledge. I decided to group these two types of "attention-getting -ne" into the same category because the evidential function of the both ne's is the same: to get the hearer's attention or sympathy to his proposition.

Falling -na has the same function as the falling rapport -ne.

(4-13)

M1 (1): friita.  "Freeter" (self-employed person usually working independently)  

(2): friitaade ne freeter-(te form) PART(RAPP)

(3): de, kekkyoku syuushoku mo seu ni ne then after all get a job even do(NEG)-adverb PART(RAPP)

jyuu-nen bakari asonda-n-da na 14 years about had leisure-n-COP PART(VOC)

(4): nanka kissaten no keiei ka nanka somewhat coffee shop MODI management or something

yatteta-n da na did (te-form)STAT -n COP PART(VOC)

M1 (1): "Freeter."

(2): [He was] a "freeter"

(3): Then, after all, he did not get a solid job [as every university graduate does immediately after graduation] and had a leisure time for about 10 years (na).
(4): [He] did something like managing a coffee shop \((na)\) (this refers to my previous utterance).

In (3) and (4), \(-na\) is used sentence-finally. The speaker was talking about a Japanese author's personal information. The use of \(-na\) in (3) and (4), as well as \(ne\) in (1) and (2), suggests that the speaker assumed the hearers did not know the information (so he was informing the hearer of what he knew). Now, we turn to the second type of \(-ne\).

(b) \(Ne\) : \(Ne\) with a rising intonation is often used by a speaker to ask for confirmation on the truth value of his proposition from the hearer. Therefore this \(-ne\) is often used for the proposition which is assumed to be known by both parties. This \(-ne\) often sounds like a question because the speaker's surface intention is to ask for the hearer's agreement. The major evidential function of this \(-ne\) is to confirm that both parties have the same information in either one's information territory or simply as knowledge. I call this \(ne\) "confirmation \(-ne\)".

In the following example, a school teacher was asked by a student to change what the student had written on the board, and the teacher changed the writing and then tried to confirm her understanding of the student's meaning:

(4-14)

F25: \(koo\) \(iu\) \(fuu\) \(ni\) \(kakikaeru\) \(to\) \(iu\) \(koto\) \(desu\) \(ne\)
\(\text{this way}\) \(\text{like}\) \(\text{rewrite}\) QUOT COMP COP(formal) CONF

F25: It is said to rewrite this in the way like this \((\text{am I right?})\)
In a sense, this -*ne* functions in a similar way as the question particle -*ka*. The difference between the two is that -*ka* is used for a question for which the speaker is supposed not to have an answer; the proposition is not in the speaker's territory or knowledge. Next -*ne* (the third one) involves the hearer's knowledge more deeply than the confirmation -*ne*.

(c) -*Ne#: Third type of -*ne* is the one with an intonation that first rises then falls, and usually pronounced longer than (a) or (b) type -*ne*, or with a flat prolonged intonation without falling. This -*ne* is characteristically used to end the proposition which the speaker knows to fall into both parties' information territories. I call this -*ne* "*sharing-ne*".

From the viewpoint of discourse management, this -*ne* functions to send the sense of camaraderie, or in-group intimacy in sharing information, and functions evidentially to show that the truth value of the speaker's proposition is fully acknowledged between both parties. In the following example, (4-15), the speaker and the hearer were talking about the hearer's shadow-picture products, and since they were both observing these products at the time, they were actually sharing the same experience which enhances the use of "*sharing-ne#: "

(4-15)  
F22: *kore wa ari desu ka* Ari to *kirigirisu no o-hanashi desu ka*  
this TOP ant COP(FOR) Q Ant and grass-hopper MODI  
HON-story COP(FOR) Q
F22: Is this an ant? Is this the story of ant and grass-hopper?
This one is also very finely-cut (as we both can see).

Although Kamio (1994) emphasized the importance of -ne as a pragmatic discourse marker, he discussed one general -ne which is obligatory when being used for information that belongs at least to the hearer's territory. Takubo and Kinsui's theory also considered -ne as one general concept, in that -ne confirms the sameness of existing information in the speaker's memory and the hearer's memory area, i.e., type (b) and (c) -ne in this study. However, considering the concept of evidentiality coding, these three types of -ne must be differentiated.

There are individual differences in -ne pronunciation and some people prefer one type of -ne over others regardless of the propositional type. However, generally, it seems that a high proportion of informants had these three types of -ne. Each type of -ne was often used independently as if it were deictic and representing the sentences which were spoken before. Observe the following examples:

(4-16)

F5(1): *de souru daigaku-tte arimasu -deshoo*
*then Seoul Univ. QUOT exist(FOR)-AUX(CONJ)*

*maa kankoku no toodai, asoko ni hairu no wa*
*well Korea POSS Tokyo Univ. there DIR enter COMP TOP*
kankoku de wa ichiban no eiyo rashikute
Korea LOC CONT primary MODI honor AUX (te)(it seems)

F18(2): un un rashii
yes yes seems

F5(3): ima, nihon wa soo de mo nai-deshoo
now Japan CONT so COP NEG AUX (CONF)

sorehodo de mo mukasi hodoja-nai to
such degree COP old times degree(NEG) COMP

omou-n-desu.
think-n-COP(FOR)

nannka sugoi mitai. jisatusha mo ooi mitai.
somewhat extreme seem suicide also many seem

F18(4): nee#

F5(1) Then, there is a university called Seoul University, as you know. It is like Tokyo University of Korea, it seems very difficult to enter there,
F18(2): Yes, it looks like so,
F5(3): Isn't Japan as bad as before (regarding the entrance competition into the Tokyo University)? I think the situation is not so bad as old times. It seems that (competition to enter the univ in Korea) is very hard. It looks like there are a lot of suicides.
F18(4): nee# (Yes I agree it does so.)

In this conversation, in F18(4), the speaker uttered "sharing -ne" only meaning she shares the information presented by F5(3). "Sharing- ne" represents Group 5 endings. Group (2) ending forms are mostly "rapport -ne" and its related forms.
(Group 3)

This is a group of semi-direct (SD) forms. Important forms in this group are the auxiliary "confirmation-daroo" (-deshoo in polite form) with falling intonation which is almost equivalent to English tag-question, *isn't it*, in effect, and -janai (or dewa nai) with a falling intonation which also functionally similar to English tag-question, *isn't it*

(4-17)
F1 (1): *video wa itsu miru no*

video CONT when watch Q

F2 (2): *watashi yoru nechau hito dakara,*

I night sleep(regret) person because

*video mitete mo nechau kara.*

video watch(STAT) also sleep(regret) because

(3): *Un, dakara, asa miru no.*

Yeah, so morning watch PART(VOC)

(4): *de doyoobi wa okeiko ga atta- ri suru kara*

then Saturday CONT teaching NOM exist-(etc.) do because

*kekkyoku asa hayaku okite, osooji toka-tte iroiro*

after all morning early rise(te) cleaning etc-QUOT various

*shinakya naranai desho.*

do-obligation AUX (CONF)

F1 (1): When do you see videos?

F2 (2): Because I sleep (early) at night, I fall asleep even when I am watching movie videos,

(3): Yes, so, I watch them early morning.

(4): Then, on Saturdays, I have students or something, therefore eventually, I wake up early in morning and
have to do laundry and other things, (don't I)

F2 in (4-17) talked about part of her life-style: she watches movies in the morning. Since, the proposition is her own information, she did not need to ask for hearer's agreement on it; the direct sentence-ending for (4) is perfectly acceptable. However, how F2 spends Saturdays as a house-wife who teaches flower-arrangement on those days is not beyond the hearer's imagination given the fact that F(2) and her listeners are close friends. Moreover, doing laundry and cleaning in the morning (everyday) is a well-shared Japanese wives' daily schedule. In this way, "confirmation-desho " is often used to express the speaker's information which may be known by the hearers. Negative suffix -janai seems to be used in the same way as in (4-18):

(4-18)

F7: (1) tonari ga juuniji kara sutereo ookiku kake-dashita
next door NOM 12a.m. from stereo loudly play-started

no ne.
PAR(VOC) PAR(RAPP)

(2) urusai toka omotte, jibun de iu no mo sankai me toka
noisy like think(te) myself INS say COM three times like
yonkai me toka onnaji koto o iu no iya -janai
four times like same thing ACC say COMP don't like- (NEG)

(3) dakara furonto ni denwashite ano urusai-n desu yo
so front DIR call(te) well noisy-n COP(FOR) VOC
nannte ittara "We'll send somebody up" toka itta
something like said(COND) like said
kara sutaffu ga kuru no ka na toka omottara
because staff NOM come COMP wonder like thought(COND)

158
突然 bang bang like say(te) police officer NOM

came(regret)

(4) majison poliisu. Madison Police

(5) de watashi ga repootoshiteru janai then I NOM report(STAT) (NEG)

(6) tonari no heya no ruumu-meito o next door MODI room MODI room-mate ACC

(7) watashi-tte meen-janai I -QUOT mean-(NEG)

F7: (1) My next door neighbor started to listen to music loudly from twelve midnight (rapport -ne).

(2) I thought it was noisy or something, it was embarrassing to complain three, four times [to the neighbor] myself (isn't it).

(3) So, I called the front desk [of the dormitory apartment] and said [the neighbor was] noisy, then [they] said "we'll send somebody up" or something, so I thought the staff might come, then suddenly, bang bang bang [at the door], then policemen came (te- incomplete).

(4) Madison Police.

(5, 6) Then, I am the person who reported on the roommate (aren't I)

(7) Aren't I mean?

In explaining how she reported on her own roommate to the police in effect, the speaker used -janai (isn't it) in ending sentences which the hearer can reasonably identify with himself: it is
understandable that to complain repeatedly is embarrassing (sentence 2), and the hearer has already been informed that the speaker is the person who reported the case (sentence 5). *Janai* is the contracted form of *de-wa-nai* (S + copula + contrastive + negative). Although this form does not function to negate the proposition which it is attached to, its surface syntactical structure implies that S (i.e., proposition) is understood information among conversationalists.

Group (3) ending forms are called "semi-direct form"s (SD) in this research.

(Group 4)

The "**rising-ne**" belongs to the Group (4) sentence-ending forms which generally are used for expressing the speaker's intention to request the hearer's agreement. "**Rising -janai** " (isn't it or negative question) and "**rising daroo** " (isn't it ) give the impression that the speaker is asking a question to the hearer. These forms are also semi-direct forms, however, since the forms of this group are direct with an obvious questioning intention of the speaker, I call thee forms "**direct-question forms**" (DQ forms). Therefore, the ending forms in this group are likely used as evidentials to propositions which are known by both parties. An example of this rising -janai is seen in (7) of (4-18). It is different from the falling -janai in the same discourse. In (7), the speaker is really asking if the hearer agrees to the proposition that the speaker is mean. The following discourse shows a case of rising deshoo.
usage:

(4-19)

F27 (1) eizu happyoo shita hito sukoshi wa
AIDS announcement did person little CONT

enjosaretan deshoo
helped(PASSIVE)-n AUX (CONF)

(2) sorede jibun ga eizu-datte juukyu-sai no nantoka -iu...
then oneself NOM AIDS-QUOT 19 years old MODI somebody-QUOT

F5 (3) Aa, sono hanashi yonda.
Yeah, that story read(PAST)

(4) otoko-no-ko deshoo
boy AUX(CONF)

(5) ano hito nannka kawaisoo janai
that person somewhat pity NEG

F27 (1) Those people who declared that they caught the virus (from
the blood-forming medicine) have been helped at least a
little, haven't they?

(2) So 19-years old one said he has AIDS..

F5 (3) Oh yes, I have read that story.

(4) That is a boy, isn't he?

(5) That person is, somewhat, miserable, isn't he?

I believe that the argument that ending forms with rising
intonation (i.e., -ne, -deshoo and -janai) without question-particle
(ka?) belong to this group is intuitively appealing. The speaker uses
the rising tone to ask if his proposition is right in light of the hearer's
knowledge but he does not use -ka because it is not a genuine question;
the speaker also has the information.
Also sentence-medial or final use of rising intonation, which I call a "quasi-question" is included in this group. Lately, sentence-medial and final rising tone of phrases/words in declarative sentences are very popular among young speakers. A good example is (1-1) the discourse excerpt cited at the beginning of this dissertation:

(1-1)

F2 (1): A, soo.
   Well so

(2): ano hito ga ichiban nan-te iu no yoosuruni tsukutta
   that person NOM most how-COMP Q in short made

(3): sarin o sukutte yoosuruni jibun de maia-tte iu ka.
   Sarin OBJ make(te) in short oneself INS scattered-COMP or

(4): yoosuruni kagakusha
   in short scientist

(5): hotondo ga daigaku no toki ni soo-iu bunnya o
   most NOM university MODI time TEMP so-QUOT field ACC
   senmon to shite yatteta hitotachi da kara tabun
   major DAT make(te) did people therefore probably
   tabun-tte iu ka yoosuruni kenkyuu
   probably-QUOT or else in short research

F2(1): Well, it is so.

(2): that person did, the most, what shall I say, in short, made
   (Sarin gas)?

(3): He made Sarin, and, in short, shall I say he scattered himself?

(4): In short, a scientist?

(5): Most of them studied that kind of field as their major in their university days, so probably, shall I say probably, in short, research?
F2 used a rising intonation at the ending of phrases and sentences which makes the declarative sentence sound like a question without an explicit question marker -ka (i.e., sentence final -ka in Japanese). But the speaker was not posing questions. This use of rising intonation at the end of, and also within, a non-question sentence is novel among speakers of Japanese.\textsuperscript{10} The phenomena was very new to me in 1996, so I had opportunities to discuss this issue with my friends in Japan. It seems that a speaker uses a rising tone for his sentence or some words within the sentence to express, on the surface, that he is not confident in his proposition or selection of lexical items. I understand that this "untraditional" rising tone produces an effect of modesty; with the rising tone, the speaker pretends to ask his hearer's agreement to what he is saying. In this sense, the quasi-question sentences or phrases are substituting the traditional sentence-ending such as -\textit{janai}, or -\textit{deshoo}.\textsuperscript{11} At least this new "fad" phenomenon indicates that intonation can be an evidential marker.

\textbf{(Group 5)}

Group (5)'s main ending-form is the \textit{sharing -\textit{ne#}}, which is most likely used as an evidential for fully shared information among speakers as noted earlier. Usually, a sense of camaraderie is emphasized in the use of \textit{ne}. The forms in this group are semi-direct forms (SD).
(Group 6)

Group (6) contains question endings which involve the question particle, -ka (polite sentence) and -no (casual sentence). Some question forms with falling intonation are not pragmatically intended to be questions to the hearer. It seems that the speaker uses these falling-tone question endings to pretend to be modest enough to ask the hearer's judgement of the truth value of his proposition.

Question sentences with a rising tone are normally seeking for the information which the hearer is assumed to have. Therefore, Group (6) ending forms are likely to be used for the hearer's information that is not known to the speaker.

(Group 7 and 8)

So far the sentence-ending forms are all direct except questions. Groups (7) and (8) consist of indirect sentence-ending forms (ID).

-Mitai (it looks like), -yoo (it appears to be) and -rashii (it seems) are the forms for inference (Group 7). (Da)tte (I heard), -soo (I heard), -to kiita (I heard), -to iwareta (I was told), -to iu hanashi (It is said), and others are all hearsay expressions (Group 8).

(Group 9)

Group (9) represents sentence-ending forms using epistemic auxiliaries of necessity and possibility (cf. chapter two). Kamoshirenai (it might be), hazu (it must be), ni chigainai (it must
be), and "conjecture daroo" (probably) are used to indicate the possibility that the proposition is true, in that the speaker makes subjective judgement based on some kind of evidence. As well as the evidentials of hearsay and inference, epistemic auxiliaries are instances of the combination of structural and lexical expressions of evidentiality; while group (1) - (6) ending forms are morphological expressions of evidentiality. Therefore, these auxiliaries are often followed by particles and other sentence-ending forms, either direct or indirect, to allow those suffixed forms to bear the final sentence modality. Therefore, only direct- and semi-direct-type endings of auxiliaries (e.g. hazu desu, hazu yone, and hazu deshoo) are listed and investigated to see the speakers' use of these subjective items; auxiliary forms with indirect endings (e.g., hazu mitai) were included in the forms of indirect endings in Group (7).

(Group 10)

Group (10) is I think expressions including -to omou, -to kangaeru, -to rikaisuru, and others. As the existence of -to (quotation) before the expressions suggests, most of these expressions are usually used as matrix verbs in complex sentences. These forms are treated as indirect sentence endings although the expressions show the speaker's subjective judgment as same as Group (9) evidentials. To see how directly or indirectly the informants handle information through these subjective indirect expressions, these items were separated.
The occurrence of these sentence-ending evidential forms of ten groups were analyzed in relation with two factors: types of speech situation, and propositional content of the speech including the speakers' age and sex. In this research, I argue that the hearer is important in two distinct aspects: the hearer's knowledge about the speaker's proposition is crucial for the speaker's choice of evidentiality, and the hearer's social relationship to the speaker is also crucial for the speaker in order for him to use the evidentiality markings to show appropriate politeness. The hearer's knowledge of the speaker's proposition is considered as the distance of the proposition from the hearer and the speaker. Do they both know the proposition very well? Is it public information? Is it the speaker's personal matter that he can commit himself to? Is the speaker talking about the hearer's matter? and so forth. The speaker may employ evidentiality expressions of different degrees of certainty in each situation considering the hearer's psychological distance from what he is presenting. Therefore, it is necessary to classify propositional context for the purpose of analysis.

**Proposition types**

At the first stage of the analysis, the occurrence of the forms were analyzed in relation with the types of propositions, i.e., to what degree the speaker commits himself to the proposition's truth value. My
grouping of propositions of sentences is largely based on the concept of information territory of the speaker and the hearer. I grouped all propositions into basic six different groups:

[4-20] Proposition types for direct and indirect evidential forms

**Proposition for direct evidentials**

(A) information that is in the speaker's information territory, that the speaker assumes the hearer does not know

(B) information that is in the speaker's information territory, that the speaker assumes the hearer knows

(C) information that is in the speaker's information territory, that the speaker assumes also falls into the hearer's territory

**Proposition for indirect evidentials**

(D) information that is in the hearer's information territory, that the speaker does not know

(E) information that is in the hearer's information territory, that the speaker knows

(F) information out of both speaker's and hearer's territory

(G) public information

(G) type propositions were included in the category of (F) type information at the beginning of the research, but were later separated for experimental purposes. (A) to (F) are the basic six propositional types in this research.

This stratification of proposition types is based on empirical and theoretical analysis of the data. In my 1993 study, I looked into discourse
data and confirmed that Japanese informants had unconsciously conformed with the rules of information territory and used different sentence-ending forms as suggested by Kamio (1987, 1990). At that time, as noted earlier in chapter two and three Kamio's early model has only four cases of interaction of information territories as [4-21] show:

[4-21] Kamio's original concept of four information territories for a speaker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside the speaker's territory</th>
<th>Inside the hearer's territory</th>
<th>Outside the hearer's territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TERRITORY A</td>
<td>(information belongs to both speaker's and hearer's territories)</td>
<td>TERRITORY B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct + ne form</td>
<td>direct + ne form</td>
<td>direct form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRITORY C</td>
<td>(information belongs only to the hearer's territory)</td>
<td>TERRITORY D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indirect + ne form</td>
<td>indirect form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Kamio's earlier model, each territory was assigned a single surface sentence-ending form as shown in [4-21]. Such an analysis was confirmed in my 1993 and 1994 studies that the Kamio's model basically reflects reality, but there were findings which did not agree with this theory. The major disagreements and additions were as follows:

[4-22]

(1) For territory (A) information, not only the form "direct + ne"
was used as expected by Kamio, but also deshoo (tag-question), and -janai (negative tag-question) and other related forms were used by the informants.

(2) For territory (B) information, which Kamio claimed is the only case in which the simple direct form is possible, male informants used simple direct forms generally as expected while female informants used direct forms with sentence-final particles such as ne (information sharing), yo (informing), and n-desu (explaining). These are addressee-oriented particles; therefore, it was suggested that the female speakers may have greater consciousness of the presence of hearers.

(3) For territory (C) information, for which Kamio assumed indirect forms with ne form are appropriate, questioning forms and janaino (negative tag question + questioning), were used by the informants instead of "indirect + ne" forms. It was also noted that this janai was different from the ones for territory (A) information; the use of janai for territory (C) information was observed with rising intonation.

(4) For territory (D) information, for which indirect forms with ne were expected, informants used simple indirect forms and question forms rather than the expected indirect plus ne forms.

(5) Analysis of family discourse showed that more direct forms were used among family members regardless of information territories.

(6) Data from formal interview discourse suggested that, in formal situations, speakers unanimously did not use simple direct forms at all in talking about information that belongs to their own territory; ne-related forms were preferred.
(7) Kamio assumed that English speakers have a different concept of information territory; he argued that in English there are only two information territories, the speaker's territory and others; that is to say, English speakers do not care about the information territory of the hearers. However, my data suggested that English speakers also have a concept of hearer's territory and shared status of information between the speaker and the hearer. For territory (A) information, native English speaking informants used indirect forms in more than 62% of utterances, and for territories A and (B) information for which Kamio expected only direct sentence forms would be used by English speakers, some kinds of indirect forms were used in more than 70% of the utterances analyzed. Therefore, basically, English and Japanese may have a similar concept of information territory.

(8) However, English speakers treat "public information" as everybody's information and used direct mode. This was a significant difference between the two cultures.

The results of these earlier studies suggest the possibility of different concepts of information territories between males and females, in-group members and out-group members. The studies also showed that the relationship of the propositional content and sentence-ending forms is not as simplistic as Kamio expected, suggesting that more finely sectioned information territories may exist in the Japanese speaker's mind.

In these pilot studies, I analyzed data based on Kamio's categorization of information territory (four territories), and I now think the method that I used could be misleading; in doing analysis, the
possibility of the existence of other territories, or other types of interactions between the speaker's and the hearer's knowledge could have been ignored. In fact, as introduced in chapter three, in his 1994 revisional paper, Kamio proposed eight cases in which the speaker's and the hearer's information territories are differently interrelated. He added two more surface sentence-ending forms which represent a new concept of speaker/hearer territory interaction with daroo forms. The usage of daroo is actually found in my 1993 study, but I plainly concluded they are an extension of direct forms since the study was centered on Kamio's framework and I did not clearly see the implication of the use of daroo (tag question/negative question) by my informants. Based on this retrospective thought, for this dissertation, I desired not to limit my analysis within existing frameworks laid out by either Kamio or other evidentiality studies, but at the same time, it is hardly practical to analyze the relationship between the sentence forms and the evidential context of the speaker's proposition without some framework which provides a way to "sort out" propositions into different categories.

Thus this time, I first went through one part of the data, and examined the relevance of Kamio's newer version framework (1994) to the data. I have gained some results through this process, and constructed my original model, and examined more data which resulted in more modifications of the model. I repeated this process a few times, and finally reached my final model. I believe that this method worked better than an approach in which the framework of an evidentiality
system is first decided on and next the forms of evidentials are sorted from the data. Therefore, an attempt was made to examine the data without the restriction of existing theoretically hypothesized frameworks. In this sense, again, the method of analysis and the data analysis itself are interwoven at the first stage of this research. The more detailed process that has led to the above categories of propositions [4-20] is explained in the next chapter.

An analytical problem

The crucial analytical problem, however, is how judgement of the propositional type of an utterances is correctly performed. This is not an interpretation problem of the speaker's "meanings", but a problem of judging how much the speaker should assume the proposition is known/shared by his interlocutors. The speaker's proposition (or information) types are categorized upon the assumed status of informational content of the proposition in the speaker's, the hearer's, or both parties' information territory or knowledge. In order to precisely determine how a given proposition is identified among conversationalists, it is necessary to know the nature of the proposition and how much each participant is supposed to know about the proposition. This is not very difficult if one is in the discussion and able to observe the reaction of the hearer to an utterance and the subsequent reaction of the speaker to the hearer's reaction. However, since I cannot represent every informant's memory, sometimes, the judgement is
difficult. Oishi (1985), who investigated Japanese final particles based on the theory of "linguistic particularity" (Pike, 1982; Becker, 1979), argued that an analyst's memory is unreliable:

In understanding what was meant by a participant's utterance, an analyst relies on nothing but his own unique set of remembered prior texts without having direct access to the participant's set. In investigating how this utterance was interpreted by other participants in the conversation, the analyst again has to use his own set of remembered prior texts, which of course is different from that of the participants. As has been noted, one of the difficulties in the study of conversation lies in the fact that participants' assumptions are not immediately accessible to an analyst. These assumptions seem to be formed and stored in people's memory through their language uses in the past. We will see in our data that even between fairly new acquaintances, in the course of conversation, each participant's unique set of remembered prior texts is adjusted to the other's set, and common assumptions are formed through negotiations. In other words, it is a shared language activity that eventually forms such an assumption. In the relationship between an analyst and the participants, however, these processes of forming common assumptions are not logically available because an analyst typically does not share the conversation with the participants, and therefore lacks the shared memory of language uses with them. (1985: 19-20)

Due to the memory barrier, Oishi said, correctly I think, that the actuality of conversation (i.e., text) is "distant" to the analyst and even to the participants. To minimize the effect of memory barrier, an "appropriation of text" was suggested by Oishi following Recouer (1981) and Becker (1977); however, the suggestion is not practical for this particular study. Since I desired to find general tendencies within my informants' use of evidentiality expressions, I looked into fairly
large discourse data provided by about 60 informants (besides students), about 20 of which are from public discourse. Therefore, it was difficult to go back to each informant to discuss the data, although review discussions were held with several of the informants concerning the type of proposition and the particular forms of sentence-ending. Some discussions were useful while others were not. However, since I was a participant, I shared the common assumptions formed in our temporal memories with other participants for many discourses. In this sense, I was less helpless than a simple observer-analyst. To make the analysis consistent, after analyzing a few discourse excerpts, I formulated some rules of analysis which I felt necessary in order to minimize my subjective interpretation of the speaker's proposition types. Although the possibility of subjective analysis is unavoidable, an effort was made to mitigate the influence.

Rules of analysis

Sometimes, it was difficult to properly categorize the nature of a speaker's proposition within the milieu of the seven different information types of [4-20]. For example, public information (i.e., type G) can often be information out of the speaker's territory (i.e., type F) as well as mutually known information if it is experienced in some way by both parties (i.e., type C). In order to make consistent analysis, I formulated the following rules:

Rule (1): If the type of a given proposition is ambiguous, for
example, ambiguous between (B) and (C), the utterance will be ignored in the analysis.

Rule (2): Hedges, conventional greetings, and conventional set-phrases which do not represent their literal meanings will be excluded from the analysis.

Rule (3): Incomplete sentences which do not include sentence final modality, and sentences with deontic modality (i.e., modality concerning permission, prohibition, and obligation) will be excluded from the analysis.

Rule (4): Information which is out of both parties' information territory and is well-known to most of the community members including the discourse participants and which is known to be known will be categorized as "public information" (G), while information that does not fall into either party's information territory and which is known by some or all participants will be treated as (F) type information.

Regarding Rule (4), the informants showed that they distinguish between these two types of public information: (G) and (F). Often a speaker tried to confirm his hearer's knowledge about the public knowledge that he is presenting in order to decide on the mode of the proposition. The next discourse sample is an example:

(4-23)
F12 (1): a, igirisu, london ni sundeta toki ni
Well England london LOC lived time TEMP
kanojo ga koten o yattete,
she NOM exhibition OBJ did(STAT)
sono hanashi, shitteru desho?
that story know AUX(CONF)

F5 (2): shiranai
        don't know

F12 (3): aa, honto? Ja, koten o yatteta -n datte.
        Well, really Then exhibition did(STAT)-n hearsay

F12 (1): Well, in England, when they lived in London, she was
        holding an exhibition of her own, you know the story,
        don't you?
F5 (2): No, I don't know.
F12 (3): Well, then, it is said that she was holding an exhibition.

In the above conversation in which speaker F12 was talking
about Yoko Ono, a famous public figure, she assumed that the hearer
knew the famous episode of the first meeting of Yoko Ono and John
Lennon, so she presented the proposition in a direct mode in (1)
suggesting she was treating the proposition as public truth (i.e., a G-
type proposition). But after checking the hearer's knowledge by (2),
F12 realized F5 does not know the proposition, then she switched her
mode into the hearsay mode (i.e., F-type) in (3). However, not every
speaker is this sensitive to the hearer's knowledge about public issues.
In that case, the speaker possibly uses only direct mode to present
public information which possibly gives the hearer the impression that
the speaker is treating the proposition that is out of his territory as if it
is in his territory. The next discourse is an example of this type of
interaction:

(4-24)
F2 (1): **kawaiso**oda yo ne.  
   miserable PART(VOC) PART(RAPP)

(2): **sorede kodo**mo ga futari mo dek**i**chatte.  
   then children NOM two as many as born(regret)

(3): **sorede rikon** o shinai yooni san-nin me,  
   then divorce ACC do(NEG) in such a way third one  
   *tsukuritai-tte itta kedo Chaaruzu, moo iranai.*  
   have(DES)-COMP said but Charles any more desire(NEG)

(4): **sokode moo hitori kodo**mo o tsukutte-oke-ba  
   then more one child ACC have(te)-(RES)-(COND)  
   *warui kekka ni naranai-n-janaika-tte*  
   bad result DAT become(NEG)n-(NEG)-Q-(COMP)  
   *iunde itta-n-dakedo Chaaruzu ga kobanda no yo.*  
   so said-n-but Charles NOM rejected PART(VOC) (VOC)

Others (5): sugoooi, yoku shitteru nee#  
   great well know PART(SHARE)

F2 (1): [Diana is] so miserable, isn't she?  
(2): Then they had two children.  
(3): So in order to prevent divorce, [Diana] said [to Charles] she  
   wanted a third one, but Charles said he did not want  
   anymore.  
(4): [Diana] said so because [she thought] they can avoid bad  
   ending if they had the third child, but Charles rejected the  
   idea (I tell you).  

Others (5): Wow... you know very well, don't you?

In this conversation, speaker F2 was talking about the collapse of  
Princess Diana and Prince Charles's relationship, and since she used the  
direct mode (as underlined), the hearers (four of them) unanimously  
reacted to pretend they were impressed by speaker F2's knowledge.
However, as the proposition is someone else's very private matter which can hardly be in speaker F2's information territory, others' reaction can be understood as critical. A proposition of this type is usually treated as a (F) type proposition and spoken with hearsay mode.

Rule (5): If a given proposition that is public happened to fall in the speaker's or the hearer's, or both parties' information territory, personal territory will be considered to have the primary status.

Rule (6): Common sense knowledge which almost everybody agrees to will be considered to be known by "experience" so it falls into proposition type (C).

Following the rules above, all applicable propositions were sorted into (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F) as proposed, and two other additional types (G) (public information) and (H) self-talk for experimental purposes (see the next chapter), and within each propositional category, the occurrence of sentence-ending evidential forms was monitored.

The process for creating the database for quantitative analysis is illustrated in the following chart, [4-25].
[4-25] Database for quantitative analysis

(1) Data collection (recording)

(2) Transcription

(3) Data input

(3-1) Informant data (SITUATIONAL CONTEXT)

Code name (e.g., F1, M2) ->
Age ->
Gender ->

(3-2) For each sentence-ending form with clear epistemic modality:

(a) Informant's code ->

(b) Evidential form information:
form of sentence ending -> D
plain/polite distinction -> A
group type of the form -> T

(c) Discourse type (SITUATIONAL CONTEXT) -> A

1) discussion with high formality
2) court interaction (prosecutor/defendant) -> B
3) public talk
4) conversation with low formality with friends
5) conversation with low formality with family members
6) teacher-student interaction at school (teacher/student) -> E

(d) Proposition type (PROPOSITIONAL CONTEXT) ->

(A) ~ (H)
CHAPTER 4: NOTES

1 Although I did not ask for information regarding social class, I assume the informants would claim that they are middle-class city-dwellers since most of Japanese people claim to be middle-class. All of the informants happened to be office workers (presently or retired) or housewives. But this may not be applicable to all of the student informants in schools I visited.

2 A brief account of each case is given below, which may help readers understand the transcribed speeches used in this dissertation.

Yakugai-AIDS case (case of medical products tainted with AIDS virus): In 1996, it was revealed that twelve years earlier, the Japanese Ministry of Health (MOH) had delayed the termination of the use of possibly AIDS-tainted blood products (ketsueki-seizai) imported from the U.S.A. for hemophiliac patients. This happened before the Japanese people became familiar with the disease. Teikyo University found that more than twenty of their hemophiliac patients were HIV positive yet the university continued to use the blood products with the excuse that they were not sure if the patients were really infected by AIDS virus. MOH and its affiliated AIDS research committee led by a Teikyo University doctor were suspected of trying to delay the recognition of the first AIDS patient in Japan. It was suspected that this delay was due to the relationship between the ministry (MOH) and the manufacturer of the blood product, Midori-juji (Green Cross), a pharmaceutical company, run by officials retired from MOH. For more than ten years, the existence of hundreds of AIDS patients who had become infected by this blood product was not well known by the public. Finally in 1996, one young man who is a victim of the case requested public attention, and the newly assigned minister of MOH, who carried out the investigation, disclosed details of the misconduct to the public. This case
revealed two problems with Japanese society: problematic cohesion of government and industry which works contrary to the benefit of the public, and the secretive nature of Japanese governmental activities.

**Aum-shinrikyo case** (case of Aum cult):

A cult, led by Asahara Shokoo, who claimed to be "God", attempted to seize Japanese Governmental functions. Interestingly, Asahara had a lot of intellectual and successful followers who supported him financially and technically. They invented weapons (conventional and biological) and other materials to occupy the country physically and killed those who tried to escape from the cult or who were about to find out what the cult was attempting. They surfaced for the first time when seizure of the governmental body at the Kasumigaseki area was attempted by strewing Sarin poison gas in the area. Several core members were involved, and even after Asahara himself was finally arrested, some of them were still at large. Since further attempts to physically seize the governmental control were feared, the police carried out one of the most extensive searches the country had ever seen.

3 For example, the following chart demonstrates the relationship of the group membership of the parties involved with the selection of the verb "to be":

[4-26] Different "to be" verbs depending on listener and referent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>listener</th>
<th>referent</th>
<th>verbs used by the speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in-group</td>
<td>in-group</td>
<td><em>iru</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out-group</td>
<td>in-group</td>
<td><em>oru</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in-group</td>
<td>out-group</td>
<td><em>irassharu</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out-group</td>
<td>out-group</td>
<td><em>irassharu</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The system of Japanese honorifics has been considered to have two axes: the speaker-addressee axis ("performative" honorifics) and the speaker-referent axis ("propositional" honorifics) (e.g. Harada, 1976, Shibatani, 1990).

"Addressee-oriented" honorifics are said to be wide-spread throughout the world. The use of French vous and German sie is an example (Shibatani, 1990:375). Addressee-oriented honorifics do not require the presence of "socially superior to the speaker" in the propositional content of the sentence (Harada, 1976:502). Japanese polite sentence ending (i.e., desu/masu) forms fall in the category of this performative honorifics. For example, the following three sentences in (4-26) have the same referential meaning, "this is a book", but (a) is used to familiar, or equal status addressees in casual speech settings, while (b) is used to someone who is socially distant or higher. (b) is also used among equals or to lower-status addressees in formal settings with bystanders. (c) is used to an addressee who is significantly superior than the speaker, or to anybody in a very formal environment.

(4-27)

(a) Kore wa hon da.
    this TOP book COP

(b) Kore wa hon desu.
    this TOP book COP(FOR)

(c) kore wa hon degozaimasu.
    this TOP book COP(hyperpolite)

"Referent" honorifics (or propositional honorifics) includes the target of honorific use in the subject position of the sentence ("subject honorifics") or the object position of the sentence ("object honorifics").
Each "performative (addressee)" and "propositional (referent)" honorific usage has three different levels of formality: "plain", "polite", and "hyper-polite" as shown in the above sentences (a), (b), and (c). The axis of performative honorifics and the axis of propositional honorifics are independent from each other except when the subject or the object of a sentence coincides with the addressee or the speaker. Therefore, theoretically six different formality levels are possible. The following sentences (d) to (f') have the same referential meaning, the teacher laughed. Among them, (d) is a plain sentence without either propositional or performative honorifics. Sentences (e), (e'), (f) and (f') are examples of propositional (i.e., referent) honorifics in that the target of the honorific is sensee (teacher). Combination of the nominalized verbal form warai ni (to laugh) with the honorific prefix o- and adverbial complement of the verb naru (become) indicates a form of referent honorific. Sentences (d) and (d') are with the plain level, (e) and (e') are with the polite level, and (f) and (f') are with the super-polite level. In terms of performative (addressee) honorifics, (d), (e), and (f) are in plain form while (d'), (e'), and (f') are in polite form:

(4-28)

(d) sensee ga warat-ta. ---plain
   teacher NOM laugh-(PAST)

(d') sensee ga warai mashita. ---polite (addressee honorifics)
   teacher NOM laugh-(FOR)(PAST) plain (referent honorifics)

(e) sensee ga o- warai ni nat-ta.
   teacher NOM HON-laugh HON-(PAST)---plain (addressee honorifics)
   polite (referent honorifics)

(e') sensee ga o- warai ni nari-masita.
   teacher NOM HON- laugh HON-(FOR)(PAST)
   --- polite (addressee honorifics)
   polite (referent honorifics)
Performative honorifics are shown in addressee-oriented sentence-ending forms so they are directly related with the issue of this dissertation. In the use of performative honorifics, the plain form level (da, -ta, etc.) is perfectly acceptable for communication among people who share a close relationship such as family, friends, colleagues of similar age, without any implied disrespect. The plain form may also be used by a speaker in a superior position in informal situations to inferior-status addressees with no connotation of rudeness. The form is not suitable for any kind of formal setting such as meetings or speeches.

Polite forms of performative honorifics (desu, -masu, etc.) are used among strangers and distant acquaintances indicating social distance, and are also used by lower-status speakers to higher-status hearers in the same group (family, company, school, etc.) showing casual respect from status differences. Polite forms are as commonly used as the plain forms.

The use of hyper-honorifics is limited to formal speech settings. This form of honorifics uses a different lexicon (e.g. to eat is meshiagaru in super-polite form vs. taberu in plain form), or is indicated by an honorific suffix or prefix. There are usually three different types of hyper-polite meanings: humble, exalted, and neutral.
Considering the long history of Japan, the Japanese language has been standardized only fairly recently. It was started in 1869 at the time of the Meiji-restoration. Japanese people were historically "confined" to their birth prefecture that was governed by a Daimyo (lit. big samurai), without the freedom to leave that prefecture. This policy was maintained for a long time in order to keep farmers "tied" to the land to secure the tax income of each Daimyo. Therefore, there was no communication among the sixty odd local prefectures. This restriction enhanced the development of local dialects. It is reported that during the middle of the Edo-era (i.e. seventeenth century) people were unable to communicate outside of their own prefecture. In addition to local dialects, "class" dialects developed; people in different social classes (e.g. monks, soldiers, general public, women) spoke different "languages". Further, each class used different written and spoken languages. Overall, before language standardization, there were diverse versions of the Japanese language. Then, after the political unification of all prefectures was achieved to establish the nation of Japan as a whole, it was realized that language standardization was urgently needed for "communication convenience" and also for "national unity". This necessity was heightened by the contingency of wars. Language planning started with the collection of data from local dialects to select one standard dialect. The national committee in charge decided to select the Tokyo dialect, and prescribed grammar details including phonological expressions. Written and spoken languages were unified in the standard language. Implementation of the standard Japanese was successfully performed through school education. Rapid development of mass-communication such as TV and radio also helped the implementation to a great extent. Mass-communication has also contributed to shape the standard language to the current form. (e.g. Kamei, et al., 1965a, b; Matsumura, 1986; Mashita, 1953; Sanada, 1983; Sato; 1982)
Sanada's quantitative research (1983) in every prefecture in Japan on the range of standardized forms of selected words indicated that Tokyo dwellers scored 61.1% on average. Although it is not as high as a non-dialectologist may expect, the score was the highest among forty-eight prefectures. The Kanto-area prefectures (surrounding Tokyo) were all ranked high: Saitama, 60.8%, Tochigi, 60.7%, Kanagawa, 59.4%, Gunma, 57.7%. Although Hokkaido, the northmost island is ranked next (53.8%), generally, the farther away from Tokyo a prefecture is located, the lower its score was. The southern islands, Okinawa (3.3%) and also prefectures in Kyushu island (25-31%) scored low as well as northern Honshu prefectures (21-27%).

Dialectal differences entail a variety of linguistic features: therefore, it is difficult to articulate how many regional dialects are spoken in Japan. Dialect maps are drawn to show regional differences in each single feature: phonemes, accent, tone, lexicon, semantic categories, and a number of grammar aspects (e.g. conjugated forms of verbs and adjectives, nominal-adjectives, noun-compounds, particles, honorifics) and others. It has been generally understood that dialectal divisions based on different linguistic features with different dialect boundaries. However, Kindaichi (1977) described general divisions among dialects that support phonological, grammar, and accentual differences among dialects. In Kindaichi's general dialectal map, there are three principle dialect groups: Nairin-dialect, Churin-dialect, and Gairin-dialect, and each group is further divided into twenty-five subdivisions.

[A] Nairin-dialect -------------------------------------------(5 sub dialects)
1. Standard Ko-type dialect
2. Tosa dialect
3. Western Kagawa prefecture dialect
4. Eastern Kagawa prefecture dialect
5. Southern Noto dialect

[B] Churin-dialect------------------------------------------(10 sub dialects)
(a) Standard *Otsu*-type dialect
1. Eastern Japan *Churin* dialect (Tokyo, Kanagawa, etc.)
2. Western Japan *Churin* dialect
   (i) *Noobi* dialect
   (ii) *Totsugawa* dialect
   (iii) *Chugoku* dialect
   (iv) *Shikoku Inan* area dialect
   (v) Northeast *Kyushu* dialect

(b) Quasi- *Ko*-type dialect
1. *Hokuriku* dialect
2. *Sekiho, Nagahama* dialect
3. *Kumanonada* dialect
4. *Shikoku Uwa* area dialect

[C] *Gairin*-dialect---------------------------------------------------------------(10 sub dialects)
(a) Eastern Japan *Gairin* dialect
1. North *Oh-u, Hokkaido* dialect
2. South *Oh-u, Northern Kanto* dialect
(b) *Hachijoo-jima* dialect
(c) *Ooigawa, Yamanashi-Narada* dialect
(d) Northwest *Noto* dialect
(e) *Izumo, Oki* dialect
(f) *Kyushu* dialect
   1. *Chikuzen, Iki, Tsushima* dialect
   2. *Miyazaki* dialect
   3. Northwest *Kyushu* dialect
   4. *Satsuma, Goshima* dialect

Sentence-ending forms are described in standard Japanese. The data contains limited numbers of dialectal forms (most of them are from the Kansai area); they are "assimilated" in description into the standard forms in quantitative analysis. The following are dialectal forms included in the list:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(local dialect)</th>
<th>(standard forms)</th>
<th>(meanings of expression)</th>
<th>(example)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Vta</em> form <em>n-ka na</em></td>
<td><em>Vta</em> form <em>no ka na</em></td>
<td>I wonder (self-talk)</td>
<td>(e.g. <em>atta-n-ka na</em> ) (e.g. <em>atta no ka na</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. <em>atta-n-ka na</em>)</td>
<td>(e.g. <em>atta no ka na</em>)</td>
<td>(I wonder there was..)</td>
<td>(I do not know)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-n *kedo* ----------------------> -nai *kedo*  
(e.g. *shira-n kedo*)   (e.g. *shira-nai kedo*)  
    direct negative  
    (I do not know)
-toru  ---------------→  -Vte form + iru  
(e.g. ittoru)  (e.g. itteiru)  
stative  
(they are saying)

-totta  ---------------→  Vte form ita  
(e.g. ittota)  (e.g. itteita)  
somebody said...  
(Somebody said so)

ya  ---------------→  da, yo  
(e.g. soo ya kedo)  (e.g. soo da kedo)  
(It is so, I am telling you)  
(Someone came, I am telling you.)

-yate  ---------------→  -datte  
hearsay

-to chigau?  ---------------→  -janai?  
tag-Q, negative question

-yaro  ---------------→  -deshoo  
tag-Q

-henya-n-ka  ---------------→  -hen janai?  
Isn't it strange?

-nen  ---------------→  -n da  
(e.g. kireru nen)  (e.g. kireru n da)  
Explanation  
(This cuts, you understand)

-yate  ---------------→  -datte  
(e.g. akan yate)  (e.g. dame datte)  
hearsay  
(Someone said "No")

9 Oishi characterized ne with rising tone as indicating that information belongs to the speaker's territory. I suspect, however, this rising -ne in the data described by Oishi is the rising version of "rapport ne" in my analysis which simply sends an "I am talking, are you listening?" message to the hearer. Oishi found this ne (in his data) from a single speaker, therefore, the high pitch of rapport -ne may be this individual's personal trait (actually there are some people who habitually do this). In my model, "rising -ne" (as well as rising -yone) involves both parties' knowledge.

10 There are traditional ways to raise declarative sentence-endings meaning questions. Actually this usage is very common,
especially in casual speech. However, these "traditional" rising endings in declarative sentences and "quasi-questions" in declarative sentences are different in tone.

In quasi-questions, often the very last vowel of the sentence (or of a word) final syllable (cf. Japanese unit of sound is syllable) is prolonged and sharply raised. If a speaker asks a question by raising the end of declarative sentence (e.g. You are a UT student?), sentence-ending is raised naturally and gradually in the sentence-final word. The quasi-question forms are used as a surface presentation of the speaker's willingness to solicit agreement from his hearer, so the form may result in superficial raising of the final vowel of the final syllable.

11 But at least to me, the quasi-question strategy did not sound modest; it was rather annoying in that I felt as if I was bombard with tons of requests for agreement to which I was actually not asked to answer. Often, quasi-question forms are used for type (A) propositions, i.e., information which is exclusively known to the speaker which does not need to be agreed/confirmed by the hearer.

12 Oishi (1985:33) quoted Ricouer in order to explain the concept of "appropriation":

If it is true that interpretation concerns essentially the power of the work to disclose a world, then the relation of the reader to the text is essentially his relation to the kind of world which the text presents. The theory of appropriation which will now be sketched follows from the displacement undergone by the whole problematic of interpretation: it will be less an intersubjective relation of mutual understanding than a relation of apprehension applied to the world conveyed by the work. A new theory of subjectivity follows from this relation.

To understand is not to project oneself into the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the apprehension of proposed worlds which are the genuine object of interpretation. Following Gadamer's analysis in Truth and Method, we shall introduce the theme of "play". This theme will serve to characterize the
metamorphosis which, in the work of art, is undergone not only by reality but also by the author (write, artist), and above all (since this is the point of our analysis) by the reader or the subject of appropriation.

(Ricouer, 1981: 185)

His explanation is rather abstract but in short, it seems Ricouer meant that through "play", the analyst realizes an "enlarged self" and "the actualization of meaning as addressed to someone" (1981: 185), and in this process, the reader (analyst) forgets himself and things he previously thought to be natural in language. Then, what should be done practically in appropriating the text? Oishi himself drew a three-step-framework of his text data: the first step of appropriation followed by a description of the text by the analyst, the second step of appropriation followed by description of the text by the analyst and the participants, and the third step of appropriation by the analyst with the view integrated through the first and second steps. It was emphasized that the interview of the informants by the analyst provides an important appropriation of the text to approach the actuality of a conversation.
CHAPTER 5: MODEL OF JAPANESE EVIDENTIALITY

In this chapter, I will propose my model of the framework for Japanese evidentiality based on empirical data as well as the theories of the universal concept of evidentiality and the Japanese concept of information territory.

THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION TERRITORY AS BACKGROUND FOR THE MODEL

Direct versus indirect evidentiality

The Japanese evidentiality system model which I propose consists of two basic types of evidentials that are considered universal: "direct evidence" and "indirect evidence" as in Willett's model (cf. chapter two and appendix C). The principal difference between the universal concept of direct evidence and my model is that direct evidence in my model is not limited to that which the speaker has obtained through direct experience; it includes any information to which he has socially authorized primary access, i.e., information (or propositions) which belongs to the speaker's "information territory" (in Kamio's term). Information other than this is considered to be based on indirect evidence and expressed in structurally indirect forms such as hearsay evidentials and questions. This is the first corollary of the model:

**COROLLARY 1** (direct/indirect evidentials):

Direct evidentials express a speaker's proposition which falls in the speaker's information territory and to which the speaker has socially licensed primary access in each speech situation.

191
Indirect evidentials express a proposition which does not fall in the speaker's information territory.

**The speaker's and the hearer's information territory**

As assumed, the Japanese concept of evidentiality is very deeply related with the knowledge of the speaker and the hearer just like the Kogi language (Hansarling, 1984 by Palmer 1986 in chapter two). Furthermore, Japanese evidentiality is specifically related with the concept of information ownership, and is not a simple matter of "knowing" or "not-knowing". Therefore, as the initial task of this research, it was mandatory to come up with the most realistic model of the speaker's psychological information territory.

In the process of reaching the final model of evidentiality through data analysis, I found the fundamental concepts in Kamio's model to be very useful. However, from the viewpoint of evidentiality, Kamio's theory does not fully reflect the reality of informants' use of evidentials, consequently, a new framework was necessary.

In the model which I am proposing, a speaker's "knowledge" and the "information in his own territory" are treated distinctively different. In this sense, the condition of being classified as information belonging to the speaker's territory is the most essential corollary in the model. As explained in chapter three, Kamio provided three conditions for the speaker's territory information\(^1\) which I modified based on the results of data analysis as follows:

192
COROLLARY 2 (the speaker's information territory):

A speaker's information territory contains the following four major types of information:

(a) Information obtained through the speaker's past and current direct experience through visual, auditory, or other senses, including the speaker's inner feelings;

(b) Information about people, facts, and things close to the speaker, including information about plans, actions, and behavior of the speaker or other people whom the speaker considers to be close, and information of places with which the speaker has a geographical relation;

(c) Information embodying detailed knowledge which falls within the speaker's area of expertise (professional or otherwise).

(d) Information which is unchallengeable by the hearer due to its historically and socially qualified status as truth.

The above corollary suggests that even if a speaker has some knowledge about his proposition if the proposition does not meet at least one of these four qualifications, the proposition does not belong to his territory; it is knowledge out of his territory.

These days an individual is destined to be exposed to huge amount of information from various sources. Actually one's daily life is often based on dealing with information, i.e., getting, producing, transferring, evaluating, and manipulating information. Among the assorted information sources, the most reliable one is, naturally, a speaker's direct experience. The information from direct experience is
only small fraction of the entire information which a speaker linguistically expresses in direct forms [i.e., condition (a) in Corollary two]. Target information for direct evidentials involves certain types of information besides direct experience as (b), (c), and (d) of Corollary two qualify. This kind of information, theoretically and also empirically speaking, motivates a speaker to be linguistically direct. Examples of the information defined as speaker's information by Corollary two are shown as follows:

(a) Information obtained through the speaker's past and current direct experience through visual, auditory, or other senses, including the speaker's inner feelings:

\[(a)\]
\[
\text{Information obtained through the speaker's past and current direct experience through visual, auditory, or other senses, including the speaker's inner feelings:}
\]

(5-1)
F26: *amerika made dono kurai jikan kakatta ka oboeteru*
USA till how long time took COMP remember(STAT)?

S2: *wasureta neta yo.*
forgot slept VOC

F26: Do you remember how long it took to go to America?
S2: I forgot. I slept.

The information, "I forgot" and "I slept", is based on the speaker's direct experience and most genuinely belongs to the speaker's information territory. Both sentences by speaker S2 are direct sentences with direct endings in Japanese. These kind of propositions are sufficiently straightforward as not to require further examples.

(b) Information about people, facts, and things close to the speaker, including information about plans, actions, and behavior of the speaker or other people whom the
speaker considers to be close, and information of places with which the speaker has a geographical relation;

Following two statements are from fathers referring to their sons. Both fathers treat their sons’ information as their own as they consider that their sons and matters related to them to be close to themselves:

(5-2)
M12: ano ima borantia undoo o iroiro yatteru
    well now volunteer activities OBJ various doing(STAT)
    mon desu kara ne
    COMP COP(FOR) ABL PART(RAPP)

M12: [my son] is now doing all sorts of volunteer work.

(5-3)
M1: kare, jibun no shumi de atsumeteru hon ga ne,
    he himself POSS hobby collecting(STAT) books NOM RAPP
eikoku ni ooi kara ne. militarii bukku.
    England LOC many because military books

kore wa nee, mukoo iku-to monosugoi ookina
    this TOP RAPP overthere go-COND tremendously large

boodaina korekushon ga aru-n-da.
    huge collection NOM exist-n-COP

M1: He[=my son], the book he collects as hobby are abundant in
    England. Military books. This is, when you go to England,
    they have a huge collection of this kind of books.

In the following statement, M1 and F18 talked about the current anti-British trend in Australia. Although the speakers are Japanese, they lived in Australia for a long time and even after returning to Japan, they routinely visit Australia every year. All the attendants knew their close relationship with Australia. Therefore, the speakers
are considered to be entitled to speak about the country as their close information. This is an example of a direct evidential of close "geographical relationship".

(5-4)

M1 (1): *de ne, ano daiana nanka no ikken ne.*
then RAPP that Diana et al. MODI incident RAPP

(2): *eikoku no ooshitsu ni taisuru ishin ga*
England POSS crown DAT toward dignity NOM

*masu masu sagatte-kita.*
more and more decrease(te form)-came.

(3): *kanari oosutoraria no hoshutoo ano*
very much Australia POSS conservative party that

*hoshutekina ootouha ga ne, konogoro osaregimi.*
conservative Tories NOM RAPP these days drop-off

F18(4): *eikokukei ga honto sukunaku natta.*
British people NOM really became few

M1 (1): Well, that affair of Diana and the spouse.

(2): British royal family is losing prestige [with Australian people] increasingly.

(3): Seriously, Australian conservative party, that conservative royalist faction is recently declining.

F18 (4): People of British origin have become fewer indeed.

(c) Information embodying detailed knowledge which falls within the speaker's area of expertise (professional or otherwise).

In the following speech, M15 is talking about multi-media, especially cyber-space and its future. He is a professor of a related field so that his knowledge can be explained with direct evidentials although
he must have gained knowledge through indirect channels:

(5-5)

M15 (1): *sukunaku tomo ima no intaanetto no yoona* at least current Internet MODI like

*bunsantekina joohoo sisutem de iimasu-to* dispersed information system INS say-COND

*hijooni ookuno hito ga jibun no hoomu-peegi* very much many people NOM oneself POSS home-page

*no yoo na mono o motte, jibun no sakuhin o* MODI like thing OBJ have(te form) oneself POSS creation OBJ

*oitari dekiru wake desu ne.* put able COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)

(2): *sooshite goku kagirareta hito shika sore o* then very limited people only that OBJ

*mi-ni-konai* look-in order to-come(NEG)

(3): *sonokawari sono hito ni kannshinn o motta* instead that person DAT interests OBJ had

*hito no tame hijyooni fukai mono o yooishite* person POSS benefit very deep context OBJ prepare(te-from)

*oku-tte koto ga yariyasuku naru-n desu.* prepare-QUOT COMP OBJ easy to do become-n COP(FOR)

(4): *syooosuu no masu-media dake desu-to* a few MODI mass-media only COP(FOR)-COND

*soo wa ikanai-n-desu ne.* soo TOP work(NEG)-n-COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)

M15 (1): At least, if it is a dispersed type information system like current Internet, an extremely large population can have their own home-page, and display their creations in there.

(2): Then, only limited number of people will come to see it.
(3) Instead, it will be easier for us to prepare enriched information base only for those who are interested in us.
(4) If we rely on a few limited mass-media systems, it won't be like that.

In the next example of "professional evidence", speakers M14 and F17 spoke to the public in a TV news program. Although the proposition was not obtained through their direct experience, the speakers transferred their messages as truth as required as professional reporters. In this sense, showing high commitment to the proposition is part of their professional "register". I interpret these as the cases of professional knowledge.

(5-6)

M14: shijoo saiaku no kibo de shokuchuudoku no kibo
history worst MODI size INS food-poisoning MODI scale

\[ ga \ sara \ ni \ hirogatte \ orimasu. \]
NOM further spreading(te-form) COP(FOR)

M14: Victims of the food-poisoning which is spreading at a the national-record are further increasing in number.

(5-7)

F17: Taifuu ga mottomo sekkin-suru no wa asagata
typhoon NOM most approach COMP TOP dawn

\[ ni \ naru \ to \ iu \ koto \ desu. \ korekara \ ame \ ya \ kaze \]
DAT become QUOT COMP COP(FOR) from now rain also wind

\[ mo \ kanari \ tsuyoku \ natte \ kimasu. \]
also very strong become(te) will become(FOR)

F17: It is announced that the typhoon will be closest to the islands around dawn. From now on, rain and wind will get
stronger.

(d) Information which is unchallengeable by the hearer due to its historically and socially qualified status as truth.

This type of direct evidence is similar to one of Givon's (1982) proposition types: "propositions which are to be taken for granted via force of diverse conventions as unchallengeable by the hearer and thus requiring no evidential justification by the speaker" (p.24). The proposition which suffices condition (d) is not the same with public information in that public information is known widely but not necessarily known to be true. (d) Type information is known to be true or agreed to be true. A historical fact is an example. Usually this type of information is common-sense knowledge so as to be described with a direct ending, often with shared-information evidentials. The next discourse involves a matter related with the Japanese governmental administrative system that satisfies condition (d) of Corollary two.

(5-8)

F5 (1): kondo shoohizei go paasento ni naru-n-datte
this time consumption tax 5 % to become-n-hearsay

M4(2): soo soo.

it is so

F5(3): soo iu-no katteni kimete ii wake
such QUOT-COMP freely decide good

aru janai nanka soo-iu no. juumintoohyoo
exist isn't there something so-QUOT COMP referendum

janakute.
NEG(te-form)

M4(4): juumin toohyoo.
referendum
F5(5): *katteni kimete ii wake*
freely decide good

M4(6): *katte janai yo.*
selfish (NEG) PART(VOC)

*tejun o funderu wake.*
procedure OBJ take(STAT) (explain)

*toohyoo suru dankai de.*
voting do step TEMP

F5(1): I heard that the consumption tax will be 5%.
M4(2): It is so.
F5(3): Can they decide it all by themselves?
    There is something like such and such (isn't there?)
    It isn't referendum..
M4(4): Referendum.
F5(5): Can they decide it without it?
M4(6): They *did not decide* it all by themselves.
    There *was* a process [to lead to the resolution].
    At the time of voting.

In M4(6), the speaker explained to F5 that the government had not ignored the "public will" in deciding to raise the consumption tax rate; they are members elected by the public and are supposed to represent the public. This proposition agrees with the well-known theoretical background of the political representative system of democracy, and is within the scope of common-sense information. Therefore, the argument that the government did not ignore the public in the matter of the consumption tax raise should be handled as logical truth. This logic in the speaker's mind appeared linguistically in his
direct sentences in (6) as "unchallengeable truth".

The next example shows a different aspect of condition (d). Speaker F3 experienced the Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, which caused serious destruction in the city of Kobe, a town in Western Japan. Although Japan as a whole has frequent earthquakes and the residents are used to them, Kobe had never had such a serious one and people believed Kobe would never have such an earthquake. Since "Kobe is an earthquake-free city" was a kind of socially accepted truth (but probably not stratigraphically), speaker F3 treated this information as unchallengeable:

(5-9)

F3 (1): de kore wa jishin da to wa omotta-n-dakedo
then, this TOP earthquake COP COMP TOP thought-n-but

(2): keikenshita koto ga nai shi
experience COMP OBJ NEG also

(3): demo nannka kobe wa jishin ga nai-tte iwareteta
but somewhat Kobe TOP earthquake NOM NEG-QUOT-said(STAT)

kara
ABL

(4): watashi ga kite kara nankai ka atta-n-dakedo
I NOM came since a few times happened-n-but

(5): sonnani ookii jishin ga kuru to wa
such big earthquake NOM come COMP TOP

yume ni mo omowanai janai.
dreamLOC eve think(NEG) don't we

F3 (1): Then, I thought this was an earthquake, but
(2): I had no experience, and
(3): But because somewhat Kobe was said to have no earthquake

(4): There were a few earthquakes ever since I came [to Kobe] but..

(5): We did not think such a big earthquake would come even in a dream, did we

The speaker said line (5) "We did not even dream that we would have such a big earthquake, did we " as a socially accepted natural assumption shared by people. This is a kind of common-sense thought which should be considered to belong to the direct information territory of everyone (who lives in the area). Since the topic of this case involves geographic information, the case can also present "geographic closeness" of condition (b) of Corollary two. In the discourse, the speaker used an indirect ending for sentence (3) probably because of the 'distance' which she still felt with the area. She said that she moved to the area five years prior to the incident and did not consider herself to be a real 'local' resident yet.

In summary, if certain information meets one of the four conditions of Corollary two, the information belongs to the speaker's information territory and he is entitled to use direct evidentials to express the information. Otherwise, the information belongs to someone else's information territory and so, in my model, even if the speaker has knowledge about the information, the use of indirect evidentials is desirable.
For a speaker, "other people's information territory" includes his hearer's information territory. It seems very important to clarify the conditions for information to be in the hearer's territory. Logically, Corollary two conditions should be straightforwardly applicable to characterize information in the hearer's territory. I think it is necessary to assume that a speaker has the same kind of criteria for the hearer's authorized information ownership. This leads to the next corollary:

**COROLLARY 3 (the hearer's information territory):**

A hearer's information territory *which is assumed by the speaker* contains the following four major types of information:

(a) Information obtained through the hearer's past and current direct experience through visual, auditory, or other senses, including the hearer's inner feelings;

(b) Information about people, facts, and things close to the hearer, including information about plans, actions, and behavior of the hearer or other people whom the hearer considers to be close, and information of places with which the hearer has a geographical relation;

(c) Information embodying detailed knowledge which falls within the hearer's area of expertise (professional or otherwise).

(d) Information which is unchallengeable due to its historically and socially qualified status as truth, and *shared by the speaker*.

All these hearer conditions are applied to the knowledge status of the hearer as *assumed or presupposed by the speaker*. Presuppositions and assumptions are based on some kind of evidence; therefore, naturally this corollary for the hearer side is related to evidentiality.
Information in the hearer's territory but not in the speaker's territory is part of the target of the indirect evidentials which are to express information to which the speaker does not have direct socially authorized access. This framework, in which direct experience and indirect experience are contrasted, is, as is noted, based on the universal concept of evidentiality and is also relevant to the mental-space model in which direct and indirect memories are contrasted. As was described in chapter three, the mental-space theory (e.g., Takubo and Kinsui, 1990) argues that both hearer's knowledge (assumed by the speaker) and other indirect information for the speaker reside in the speaker's indirect memory space, and are accessed and described through indirect linguistic forms. I believe this concept is logical. In my model, indirect evidentials have two target-information sub-types: the information which the speaker assumed to be hearer's, and information which is neither in the hearer's nor in the speaker's territory.

The conditions from Corollaries one, two, and three are summarized figuratively in the following diagram:
Direct/indirect evidentials and speaker's/hearer's information territory in the model

(A) direct evidentials
information in the speaker's territory

Evidentials---

information only in the hearer's territory

(B) indirect evidentials
information outside of both speaker's and hearer's territory

Information shared by the speaker and the hearer

As the next stage, it is necessary to position information which is "shared" by both speaker and hearer in the model. Data from the informants indicated that there are a few different situations in which certain information is shared.

Kamio's model has some problems concerning the issue of shared information. In his early model, in short, Kamio assumed one information category was shared by both speaker's and hearer's information territories (i.e., territory A in [4-21]). This shared information category was divided into three different levels in his later study (1994) as introduced in chapter three (pp. 80-81) as cases (B), (BC) and (CB) shown below again:
Three types of shared information between the speaker and the hearer by Kamio (1994)

(B) the speaker considered that a given piece of information falls completely into both the speaker's and the hearer's territory of information [i.e., information is completely shared]; or information falls completely into the hearer's territory, and only partially into the speaker's territory.
(Case B: $n_{\text{Speaker}} \leq Hearer = 1$)

(BC) the speaker considers that a given piece of information falls within his own territory to the fullest degree, while it falls within the hearer's territory to a lesser degree.
(Case BC: $1 = \text{Speaker} > \text{Hearer} > n$)

(CB) the speaker assumes that information falls within his own territory to some extent but falls more deeply within the hearer's territory (but the speaker does not necessarily assume that it falls into the hearer's territory to the fullest degree).
(Case CB: $n \leq \text{Speaker} < \text{Hearer}$)

(1994: 86-95)

In the above, "n" is the threshold value for the speaker's or the hearer's territory, and the basic premise of Kamio for [5-11] above is "the assumption that information takes values between (and including) 1 and 0 on the speaker's and the hearer's scale" assuming two linear psychological scales, one for the speaker and the other for the hearer (1994: 86): That is to say, a given piece of information can fall in one party's information territory to a great degree and at the same time it can fall in the other party's information territory to a small degree. At a glance, one may feel that this makes sense because we, as speakers, "feel" that we know some things really well and other things only to some extent. However, analyzing the data using concept [5-11] for shared information made me realize that the idea is problematic from
the viewpoint of evidentiality.

In this study, the conditions for the speaker's/hearer's territory information are clarified by Corollaries two and three. The status of information in relation with the speaker's/hearer's territory is either IN or OUT: there is no partial fulfillment of the condition. Therefore, Kamio's information classification in [5-11] is not appropriate for this study. Kamio's classification in [5-11] that is based on the concept of relative distance among the speaker, the hearer, and the information is difficult to conceptualize concurrently with the conditions of the speaker's territory information.

However, as a matter of fact, there are cases which seem to present Kamio's (B), (BC), and (CB) situations in [5-11] on surface, but those cases show the difference of "owning information" and "knowing information": A speaker can have a piece of information out of his territory through hearing, deducing, inducing, and other ways, and naturally he can claim that he knows it, but actually the information may not be his own. The degree of evidence attached to each kind of information should theoretically be different.

I simplified the concept of shared information in my model based on the above view. Cases in which a piece of information is completely shared by both parties are often available; for example, in the case where both conversationalists are exposed to the same on-going event. Utterances such as "It is a fine day, as we both know",
koko chotto urusai ne# (It is a bit noisy here, as we both know) are examples of the linguistic outcome of sharing direct experience. On the other hand, the speaker and the hearer do not necessarily share the same direct experience to allow the information to fall into both party's territories. For example, two parties can share knowledge from the same profession, knowledge from familiarity with the same places, or other knowledge to which they are both authorized to have privileged access. For example, two students taking the same course can have the same authorized knowledge about the course and say ano sensei kibishii ne# (That teacher is strict, as we both know). Two managers in the same business field may say to each other saikin, chotto keiki ga warui ne# (These days business is not good, is it?). The case of "complete sharing" of information is the only case in which information falls into both party's information territory in my model.

The model assumes the following four cases of shared-information in relation with the concept of information territory:

[5-12] Types of shared-information in this study:

(a) Information is completely shared in both speaker's and hearer's territory (i.e., direct information to both speaker and hearer),

(b) Information is primarily in the speaker's information territory, but the hearer may know the information (i.e., the speaker's direct information, the hearer's indirect information),

(c) Information is primarily in the hearer's information territory, but the speaker knows the information (i.e., the speaker's
indirect information, the hearer's direct information),

(d) Information is neither in the speaker's territory nor the hearer's territory, but both parties may know it (i.e., both parties' indirect information).

In the above four cases in which the information is "known" to both parties, types (a) and (b) information are the speaker's information, type (c) information is the hearer's information, and type (d) information is outside of both parties' territories. The outline of the whole system of the relationship between evidentiality and information types, which was briefly introduced in chapter four, is described here as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct/indirect evidentials and speaker's/hearer's information territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct evidentials</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMATION IN THE SPEAKER'S TERRITORY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) information that the speaker assumes the hearer does not know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) information that the speaker assumes the hearer may know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) information that the speaker assumes also falls into the hearer's territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidentials</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMATION IN THE HEARER'S TERRITORY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) information that the speaker does not know (question)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E) information that the speaker knows (reported or inferred evidence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect evidentials</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMATION OUT OF BOTH SPEAKER'S AND HEARER'S TERRITORY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

209
HEARER’S TERRITORIES

reported or inferred evidence

The above chart [5-13] provides the basic framework of the evidentiality model of this study. Corollaries provide rules and characterization of evidential usage in the given framework. The nature of each of the proposition (or information) types (A) to (F) in chart [5-13] is illustrated in the following section in relation with commonly used sentence-ending evidential forms which were used for each proposition type.

ANALYSIS OF THE SENTENCE-ENDING EVIDENTIAL FORMS

As shown in the previous chapter, I have obtained a list of sentence-ending evidential forms from natural discourse data, and those forms were separated into groups according to their evidentiality types (cf. chapter four [4-5], also appendix B). "Direct forms" (D) are from Group (1) and (2) ending forms, "semi Direct forms" (SD) from Group (3) and (5) which are direct but acknowledge the hearer's knowledge, and "DQ forms" from Group (4) ending forms which are syntactically direct but seeking for the hearer's agreement. All of these three sub-groups of direct forms are listed as "D", "SD" or "DQ" in appendix B (list of ending-forms). "Indirect forms" are listed with ID [i.e., Group (7), (8), and (10) ending forms], AUXs are epistemic auxiliary endings [i.e., Group (9)], and "questions" are listed with Q [i.e., Group (6) and some
forms from other groups].

The relationship among the three factors, i.e., (1) the occurrence of the sentence-ending forms, (2) type of propositional content of the sentence (cf. [5-13] in this chapter, also Appendix D), and (3) the speech situation in which the sentence was uttered (cf. appendix A), was quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed.

Information (i.e., proposition) types and sentence-ending evidential forms

As earlier explained, finally, six basic types of information are assumed in the model (cf. [5-13]). Prior to the data analysis, I had expectations regarding popular forms of evidentials in each information type: information types (A) to (C) were expected to be the target for the direct evidentials; however, (B) and (C), due to the involvement of the hearer's knowledge, were expected to be expressed generally with semi-direct evidentials which are less direct than genuinely direct evidentials, and so on. I initially grouped sentence-ending forms based on such expectations (cf. appendix B).

However, the result did not so beautifully meet my expectations. There was fairly wide range of evidential usage in the same propositional type due to differences in speech situations and probably also due to each informant's personal preference, but certainly a set of observable systematic pattern of behavior were also found. Statistical data for the occurrence of sentence-ending forms for each proposition type is summarized and explained below.
The nature of (A) type propositions, i.e., "INFORMATION IN THE SPEAKER'S TERRITORY that the speaker assumed the hearer does not know" may not need to be further explained. The function of language for this type of proposition is transferring new information to the hearer. The utterance by a student (S2) in the following discourse between a teacher and a student, which was shown earlier, is a good example of (A) type propositions:

(5-14)

F26: *amerika made dono kurai jikan kakatta ka oboeteru*

USA till how long time took COMP remember

S2: *wasureta.*

forgot slept PART(VOC)

F26: Do you remember how long it took to go to America?

S2: *I forgot.*

I slept.

I forgot and I slept are direct expressions of the speaker's own experience. Therefore, this type of proposition was expressed by direct sentence-endings. This is reasonable intuitively as well as theoretically.

Occurrences of sentence-ending forms are counted by groups for proposition (A) type utterances for different types of speech situations. The data from "formal conversation", "informal friend" and "family" discourses are listed below to indicate general preference by the informants:
[5-15] Occurrences of sentence-ending forms by groups for (A) type propositions for formal conversation discourse, informal friend discourse, family discourse, and combined discourse types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENDING-FORMS</th>
<th>FORMAL</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>ALL TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>629 (59%)</td>
<td>591 (73%)</td>
<td>490 (79%)</td>
<td>2370 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (D rapport -ne)</td>
<td>299 (28%)</td>
<td>132 (16%)</td>
<td>77 (12%)</td>
<td>556 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question )</td>
<td>5 (0%)</td>
<td>37 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
<td>44 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but questioning)</td>
<td>40 (3%)</td>
<td>12 (1%)</td>
<td>9 (1%)</td>
<td>67 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD &quot;sharing&quot; ne#)</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 (Question forms)</td>
<td>17 (1%)</td>
<td>5 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (1%)</td>
<td>33 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>14 (1%)</td>
<td>0 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (0%)</td>
<td>21 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>55 (5%)</td>
<td>25 (3%)</td>
<td>29 (4%)</td>
<td>154 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>3254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, across speech situations, Group (1) and Group (2) type ending forms were preferred for (A) type propositions. In formal discourse and informal friend discourse the following ten ending-forms were most popular among informants.

[5-16] Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (A) proposition, formal conversational discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(1) D direct (formal)</td>
<td>122 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(1) D n da yo (formal)</td>
<td>90 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(1) D n dakedo (formal)</td>
<td>79 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(2) D ne (formal)</td>
<td>77 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(1) D n da (formal)</td>
<td>74 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(2) D n da yo ne (formal)</td>
<td>62 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(2) D direct (informal)</td>
<td>58 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(2) D n da ne (formal)</td>
<td>52 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(1) D kara (formal)</td>
<td>38 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(2) D yo ne (formal)</td>
<td>28 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although Group (1) type direct endings were dominant in both discourse types, (A) type propositions were expressed with more assertive sentence-ending forms in informal discourse. In informal discourse, particles -no, -yo, and -sa, which are fairly assertive, were preferred together with most informal noun-ending forms. In formal discourse, descending -ne (i.e., rapport -ne) was used in 14% and the -nda cluster (e.g. "explaining", "sedning empathy") was used in 29% of sentences implying that the informants are more sensitive to the existence of the hearer in formal discourse.

From the entire result of the analysis of the data for each discourse type, it seems reasonable to assume that Group (1) type ending-forms and rapport -ne from Group (2) represent the most preferred sentence-ending evidentials for proposition type (A). Also it seems that the formality of conversation motivates the speaker to use of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(1) D direct (informal)</td>
<td>176 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(1) D no (informal)</td>
<td>128 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(2) D no ne (informal)</td>
<td>64 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(1) D no yo (informal)</td>
<td>41 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(1) D kedo (informal)</td>
<td>32 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(1) D noun (informal)</td>
<td>32 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(1) D yo (informal)</td>
<td>30 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(1) D sa (informal)</td>
<td>30 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(1) D kara (informal)</td>
<td>29 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(1) D n dakedo (informal)</td>
<td>24 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 others</td>
<td>217 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the -n da cluster and Group (2) type rapport -ne. Furthermore, formal discourses involved more frequent occurrence of indirect endings for this type of proposition, such as Group (4) ending forms (i.e., a direct sentence but seeking the hearer's agreement) and also Group (10) "I think -endings. 3

(B) INFORMATION IN THE SPEAKER'S TERRITORY

and the speaker assumes the hearer may have some knowledge:

From the universal theory of evidentiality, propositions of this type should be expressed with direct evidentials also. However, as the speaker assumes that the hearer has some knowledge of his proposition, some difference from the (A) type proposition is expected.

(5-18)

M22: Tatoeba, uchi nanka issetai de okane
for example my household QUOT one household in money

kaseide kuru no boku dake desho
earn come COMP me only isn't it

M22: For example, in case of our household, I am the only person who earns money aren't I?

In this utterance, M22 talked about his household matter, which is private, but he assumed that the hearers knew that the proposition is true.

(5-19)

M4 (1): uchi no USA de seerusu man de iwayuru
our POSS USA office LOC salesman so-called

215
nihon no seerusu man ga hashirimawatteru no de
Japan MODI salesman OBJ running-around(STAT) COMP

nenshuu 30 man doru toka 40 man doru to ka
yearly income 300,000 dollars etc. 400,000 dollars etc.

sonna mon da yo.
such thing COP PART(VOC)

F5 (2): 3 man doru desho
30,000 dollar isn't it

M4 (1): Our salesman in USA, who is so-called, as in Japan, a salesman who is moving around receives $300,000 or $400,000 or only like that.

F5 (2): It is $30,000, isn't it

In this discourse, F5 corrected the figure that M4 introduced in (1) assuming that he made a simple calculation mistake, knowing the correct figure should be $30,000. The entire topic is in M4's territory, but the proposition in F5(2) (America's average salary) is F5's territory information as she lives in America. F5 believed that her proposition in (2) was known by the hearer M4 although M4 gave different figures in the previous sentence.

As these cases suggest, for (B) type propositions, "confirmation daroo " form and negative-ending janai, both of which are tag-question forms with falling intonation, were preferred as expected, but this is largely true of informal discourse. In formal discourse, more question type ending forms were observed. For (B) type propositions, Group (1) to Group (4) ending forms were generally preferred with
differences in each discourse type as shown in the following three charts:

[5-20] Occurrence of sentence-ending forms by groups for type (B) propositions, for formal conversation discourse, informal friend discourse, family discourse, and combined discourse types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENDING-FORMS</th>
<th>FORMAL</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>ALL TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>9 (21%)</td>
<td>20 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (D rapport -ne)</td>
<td>9 (19%)</td>
<td>7 (15%)</td>
<td>12 (29%)</td>
<td>38 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question )</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
<td>28 (62%)</td>
<td>9 (21%)</td>
<td>50 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but questioning)</td>
<td>19 (41%)</td>
<td>9 (0%)</td>
<td>10 (24%)</td>
<td>46 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD sharing ne#)</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 (Question forms)</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[5-21] Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (B) propositions, formal conversation discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Group (4) DQ daroo (tag-Q, formal)</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Group (4) DQ yo ne (formal)</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Group (4) DQ ne (formal)</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Group (3) SD daroo (tag-Q, formal)</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Group (2) D yo ne (formal)</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Group (6) Q ka (formal)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Group (1) D n da (formal)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Group (6) Q n desu ka (formal)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Group (2) D da ne (formal)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Group (3) SD n daroo (tag-Q, formal)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 others</td>
<td>16 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

217
Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (B) propositions, informal friend discourse

**SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS** | **OCCURRENCE**
--- | ---
1. Group (3) SD *ja nai* (tag-Q, informal) | 16 (35%)
2. Group (3) SD *daroo* (tag-Q, informal) | 7 (15%)
3. Group (4) DQ quasi-q intra-s (informal) | 3 (6%)
4. Group (3) SD *daroo* (tag-Q, formal) | 3 (6%)
5. Group (2) D *yo ne* (informal) | 2 (4%)
6. Group (4) DQ *ja nai* (tag-Q, informal) | 2 (4%)
7. Group (4) DQ quasi-q ending (informal) | 2 (4%)
8. Group (2) D *no ne* (informal) | 2 (4%)
9. Group (2) D *n da ne* (formal) | 2 (2%)
10. Group (6) Q *ja nai ka* (formal) | 1 (11%)
   5 others | 5 (11%)
   **total** | **45**

The total number of (B) type propositions was relatively small. This is partly due to the difficulty of categorizing utterances into this particular type. Although it was often not difficult to find proposition (B) type utterances from the background information I had about the speakers and also the propositions, to what degree the speakers should expect their propositions to be known to the hearers was sometimes difficult to know. Accordingly, the volume of (B) type data remains small because sentences that are ambiguous in terms of proposition-type were excluded from the analysis.

From the limited data, it is still observable that Group (3) type ending forms (ie., falling tag-questions), *janai* (isn’t it?) and *daroo* (isn’t it?) were preferred for (B) type information. In formal conversation, question type forms (Group 6) and direct sentences with
questioning intonation (i.e., DQ, Group 4 type) were used more often than the expected G(3) type endings. It is presumable that question-like utterances were preferred in formal discourse to show the speaker's respect to knowledge which the hearer possibly has. For informal discourse, more assertive Group (2) type endings (rapport-ne) were also used, suggesting there is a wide variety of choice of ending forms among speakers for this type of proposition. It may be concluded that Group (3) type descending-tone tag-questions represent the most-preferred evidential type for (B) type propositions. In less formal speech situations, Group (2) type rapport-ne is also common, and in high formality situations, Group (4) type "seeking-agreement" evidentials as well as real questioning endings are preferred.

(C) INFORMATION IN THE SPEAKER'S TERRITORY

that the speaker assumes also falls into the hearer's territory:

This type of proposition meets the conditions of information in both speaker's territory and hearer's territory; both parties have socially authorized primary access to the propositional information. Some examples of (C) type propositions are shown below:

(5-23)

M11 (1): jitsuwa ne, doomo oomu shinrikyoo ga sarin o
in fact RAPP it looks Aum-cult NOM Sarin OBJ
fukumeta dokugasu o tsukutteiu to iu uwasa wa
including poison gas OBJ making(PROG) QUOT rumor TOP

219
M11: Actually, there was somewhat a rumor from the previous year that Aum-cult seems to be producing poison gas including Sarin gas.

F22: There was a case of Matsumoto-Sarin, wasn’t it? But, they didn’t know that was done by Aum, did they? At that time.

M11 is a journalist investigating the Aum-cult case, and F22, who also seems to know the case well as a TV commentator, assumed that the propositions in her sentences are shared by the hearer, M11. The event of Matsumoto-Sarin is a well-known historical fact. F22’s utterances end with tag-questions with a rising tone.

In the next speech, M13 is talking about the life of a Japanese Sumoo-wrestler. Since the topic is widely shared knowledge among Japanese people, the speaker assumed the hearer has the same information in her information territory:
M13 (1): Speaking about Sumoo-wrestlers, they enter the world of sumoo at the age of 12 or around (am I right?).

(2): Then continue to do that [=sumoo] persistently (incomplete).

(3): Then retire at the age of 32 or around and become Toshiyori (lit. old man), don’t they?

In the two examples above, the use of the ending forms of tag-question with a rising tone, and "confirming -ne" indicates that the speaker assumed that the proposition was shared by both parties' territories. The form that I had particularly expected for this propositional type was "sharing -ne#", which was also observed frequently in formal discourse. Informal discourse showed a high frequency of direct forms. DQ forms were preferred in all discourse types.
## Occurrence of Sentence-Ending Forms by Groups for Type (C) Propositions

### Formal Conversation Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ending-Forms</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>All Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>31 (11%)</td>
<td>19 (9%)</td>
<td>78 (31%)</td>
<td>297 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (D rapportive -ne)</td>
<td>34 (12%)</td>
<td>33 (17%)</td>
<td>40 (16%)</td>
<td>140 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>9 (4%)</td>
<td>11 (4%)</td>
<td>31 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but questioning)</td>
<td>88 (31%)</td>
<td>78 (40%)</td>
<td>82 (34%)</td>
<td>314 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD sharing-ne#)</td>
<td>102 (36%)</td>
<td>32 (16%)</td>
<td>24 (9%)</td>
<td>182 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 (Question forms)</td>
<td>10 (3%)</td>
<td>9 (4%)</td>
<td>11 (4%)</td>
<td>50 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>10 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>14 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>1039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ending-Forms</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
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<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>247</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Family Discourse

<table>
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<th>Ending-Forms</th>
<th>All Types</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>78 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (D rapportive -ne)</td>
<td>40 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question)</td>
<td>11 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but questioning)</td>
<td>82 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD sharing-ne#)</td>
<td>24 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 (Question forms)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### All Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ending-Forms</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>All Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>19 (9%)</td>
<td>78 (31%)</td>
<td>297 (28%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>G2 (D rapportive -ne)</td>
<td>34 (12%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question)</td>
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<td>9 (4%)</td>
<td>11 (4%)</td>
<td>31 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but questioning)</td>
<td>88 (31%)</td>
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<td>9 (4%)</td>
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<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>10 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>14 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>1039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Top Ten Sentence-Ending Forms for Type (C) Proposition, Formal Conversation Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence-Ending Forms</th>
<th>Occurrence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(5) SD yo ne# (share, formal)</td>
<td>45 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(5) SD ne# (share, formal)</td>
<td>45 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(4) DQ daroo (tag-Q, formal)</td>
<td>23 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(4) DQ ne (confirm, formal)</td>
<td>21 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(4) DQ yo ne (formal)</td>
<td>20 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(2) D ne (formal)</td>
<td>17 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(1) D dakedo (formal)</td>
<td>11 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(4) DQ_n da ne (confirm, formal)</td>
<td>8 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(2) D yo ne (formal)</td>
<td>6 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(5) SD kara ne# (confirm, formal)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 others</td>
<td>76 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (C) proposition, informal friend discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(4) DQ daroo    (tag-Q, informal)</td>
<td>21 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(4) DQ ja nai  (tag-Q, informal)</td>
<td>21 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(5) SD yo ne# (share, informal)</td>
<td>17 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(2) D yo ne   (informal)</td>
<td>11 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(4) DQ n ja nai (tag-Q, formal)</td>
<td>10 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(5) SD ne # (share, informal)</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(2) D ne      (informal)</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(3) SD ja nai (tag-Q, informal)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(2) D ne      (informal)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(1) D direct (informal)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 others</td>
<td>79 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both discourse types, Group (5) type-ending-form, ne# ("sharing -ne"), and Group (4) type tag-questions with a rising tone (daroo, janai) were preferred. Therefore, these types can represent the sentence-ending evidentials for (C) type propositions although Group (1) and (2) type evidentials, which are fairly assertive, were also used.

Simple direct endings which were not even most preferred in expressing (A) type propositions (i.e., only speaker's information) appeared to be popular in the combined results of all types of discourse (10% share with formal forms and informal forms combined). This is due to frequent use of simple direct forms in family discourse (12%), courtroom discourse (42%), and school teacher discourse (12%) for type (C) propositions. It seems that in these discourse types, shared
knowledge tends to be treated in direct forms for different reasons. Analysis of this phenomenon will be discussed in a later section.

(D) INFORMATION THAT THE SPEAKER ASSUMED TO BE IN THE HEARER'S TERRITORY, and that the speaker does not know.

Naturally, this kind of proposition, when uttered, seeks information from the hearer so that it is expressed in the form of a question or a statement form with a clearly questioning intonation. A Japanese formal question is formed by simply adding the particle -\text{ka} at the end of statement. Therefore, in a formal sentence, (D) type information is expressed in a sentence ending with -\text{desu ka}, -\text{masu ka}, -\text{ja arimasen ka}, -\text{deshoo ka}, and other combinations of a formal sentence-ending form plus \text{ka}. However, in informal conversation, the questioning particle \text{ka} is hardly used. A direct sentence-ending with rising tone is the most popular way to express (D) type propositions casually. Also particle \text{no} with a rising-tone is often used to make an informal question sentence, as seen in the following two examples:

(5-28)

F22 (1) : (Looking at a picture of M15's cat)
\begin{quote}
\textit{Ogyoogi yoku, hai doozo-te iu, \textit{ne}.}
behave well "here I am"-\textit{QUOT}, \textit{PART(SHAR)}
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textit{kichitto suwatte}.
neatly \textit{sit (STAT)}
\end{quote}
(2): *osu*  
**Male**

M15(3): *osu desu ne.*  
Male COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)

F22 (1): (Looking at a picture of M15’s cat)  

It sits neatly, as if saying "Here you are [take my picture]  

(2): Male? (direct noun ending)  

M15(3): It is male.

(5-29)

F13 (1): *America mo shoohi-zei aru no.*  
America also consumption-tax exist Q

F5 (2): *aru yo. eeeto, hatten-go paasento. tekisasu wa.*  
exist PART(VOC) well 8.5% Texas CONT

F13(1): Do you have consumer tax in America? (direct rising no )  
F5(2): Yes, we do. Well, it is 8.5% in Texas.

Statistical data for formal and informal friend discourse showed similar results except for the point which has just been explained.

[5-30] Occurrences of sentence-ending forms by groups for type (D) propositions, for formal conversation discourse, informal friend discourse, family discourse, and combined discourse types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENDING -FORM</th>
<th>FORMAL</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>ALL TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>8 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (3%)</td>
<td>21 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (D rapportive -ne)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD+ tag question)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but questioning)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (3%)</td>
<td>13 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD sharing ne#)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 (Question forms)</td>
<td>163 (87%)</td>
<td>121 (92%)</td>
<td>139 (92%)</td>
<td>615 (90%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>14 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
[5-31] Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (D) proposition, formal conversational discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(6) Q ka (formal)</td>
<td>52 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(6) Q ka (formal)</td>
<td>21 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(6) Q n desu ka (formal)</td>
<td>17 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(6) Q desu ka (formal)</td>
<td>16 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(6) Q direct (formal)</td>
<td>14 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(6) Q n desu ka (informal)</td>
<td>12 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(6) Q noun (informal)</td>
<td>9 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(6) Q direct (informal)</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(6) Q no (formal)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(6) Q ka (informal)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 others</td>
<td>28 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[5-32] Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (D) propositions, informal friend discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(6) Q no (informal)</td>
<td>51 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(6) Q direct (informal)</td>
<td>25 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(6) Q noun (informal)</td>
<td>16 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(6) Q direct (formal)</td>
<td>8 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(6) Q ka (informal)</td>
<td>6 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(6) Q wake (informal)</td>
<td>6 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(6) Q ka (formal)</td>
<td>4 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(6) Q n desu ka (formal)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(2) D yo ne (formal)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(6) Q wake desu ka (formal)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 others</td>
<td>10 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casual question forms such as -no? and -wake? are dominant in informal discourse along with direct-form endings and single-noun utterances with a rising tone. Direct endings with a rising tone and single-noun endings with a rising tone are frequently used in family
discourse suggesting the casualness of the forms. Representatives for this category will be "(N)(desu) ka ", "no ", "direct-ending with a rising tone", and "noun-ending with a rising tone".

(E) INFORMATION THAT THE SPEAKER ASSUMES TO BE IN THE HEARER'S TERRITORY, and that the speaker has some knowledge about it.

The following utterance was said when speaker (F22) was watching "shadow pictures" with the artist who created them, listening to the artist's explanation and asking him questions. Although the topic was already shared as the speaker's direct experience by viewing them directly, still the artist himself had the primary access to the proposition concerning the production process. Therefore, statements from F22 about the products are an (E) type proposition:

(5-33)

F22: konohen no usui inu nanka ironna
desu ka □

this area POSS thin dog QUOT various

iro o kasanete irassharu wake deshoo □
ares they
deshoo
deshoo

color OBJ make layers do(HON) aren't they

F22: The pale colors of this area are produced by making layers of various colors, aren't they?

In the following example, the speaker F5 is talking about a civil servant's post-retirement life with M5, who is a civil servant. F5's first utterance (1) is a question, and (3) is a simple inference from M5's
answer to line (1). Since the entire topic is in M5's information territory, statement (3) is also an example of (D) type propositions:

(5-34)

F5 (1): *ano koomuin wa teinen wa rokujuu*

Well, civil servant CONT retirement age TOP 60 years old

desu ka

COP(FOR) Q

M5(2): *soo*

so

F5 (3): *ja rokujuu ijoo wa i-rare-nai-n desu yo ne*

then, 60 over CONT stay-POT-NEG-n-COP(FOR) VOC RAPP

M5 (3): *soo. so*

F5 (1): Is civil servant's retirement age 60?

M5 (2): It is so.

F5 (3): Then, you cannot stay in the office after 60, am I right?

M5 (4): It is so.

As with type (B) propositions, the volume of data for this proposition type is fairly limited (a total of 349 utterances). Since the hearer has the primary access to the target information in (E) type propositions, intuitively expected forms for this proposition type were some kind of questioning forms (Group 5-DQ and Group 6-Q) or indirect forms (e.g. Group 8 - hearsay).

Quantitative data supported this expectation as shown in the following [5-35] although there seemed to be a wider range of choice. The proportion of syntactically indirect forms, Group (6) to Group (10), was between 20% to 45% across different types of discourse, but a
considerably large proportion of preferred use of direct forms with questioning nuances (Group 4-DQ evidentials) such as tag-questions (daroo , janai ) and the "confirming-ne" makes the total preference of indirectness very high for this proposition type:

[5-35] Occurrences of sentence-ending forms by groups for type (E) propositions, for formal conversation discourse, informal friend discourse, family discourse, and combined discourse types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENDING-FORMS</th>
<th>FORMAL</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>ALL TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>7 (4%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>30 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (D &quot;rapport&quot; -ne)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>7 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question )</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>13 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but questioning)</td>
<td>69 (45%)</td>
<td>26 (51%)</td>
<td>19 (43%)</td>
<td>139 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD &quot;sharing&quot; ne#)</td>
<td>8 (5%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>16 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 (Question forms)</td>
<td>29 (19%)</td>
<td>15 (29%)</td>
<td>9 (20%)</td>
<td>76 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>24 (15%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>30 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>8 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>13 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>24 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[5-36] Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (E) propositions, formal conversational discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(4) DQ daroo (tag-Q, formal)</td>
<td>15 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(4) DQ yo ne (confirm, formal)</td>
<td>13 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(4) DQ ne (confirm, formal)</td>
<td>12 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(8) ID n da tte yo (hearsay, formal)</td>
<td>10 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(4) DQ n da ne (confirm, formal)</td>
<td>9 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(4) DQ n daroo (tag-Q, formal)</td>
<td>7 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(6) Q daroo ka (formal)</td>
<td>7 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(4) DQ n da yo ne (confirm, formal)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(6) Q n desu ka (formal)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(6) Q ka (formal)</td>
<td>5 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 others</td>
<td>61 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Top ten sentence-ending forms for proposition (E), informal friend discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(4) Q -kke (informal)</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(6) DQ janai (tag-Q, informal)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(4) DQ n daroo (tag-Q, informal)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(4) DQ ne (confirm, formal)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(6) Q n ja nai no (NEG Q, informal)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(4) DQ n ja nai (tag-Q, informal)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(6) Q n desu ka (informal)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. D(1) D direct (informal)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(1) D kara (informal)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 others</td>
<td>25 (49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the proportion of other forms which are not listed is large in the above two figures, we cannot really induce a conclusion here. At least, it is observable that question-type endings (Q and DQ) are the most preferred in both discourse types, and indirect hearsay forms are used only in formal discourse, suggesting that speakers do not consider the hearer's information as secondhand information when he has some information about the proposition except in highly formal settings. Also in informal discourse, the appearances of negative suffixes with rising tones such as -n janai , janai , janai no and question forms for confirmation such as -kke? (Was it such and such?) insinuate that the speaker may be emphasizing the existence of knowledge on his side in informal speech.

The combined data from all discourse types show that "confirmation -ne " (including -yo ne and -n da ne ), which was also
popular to express completely-shared information (i.e. proposition type C), was used for 13% of the instances of (E) type propositions. Genuine questions with question particle -ka, which was used for the hearer's information (D type propositions), and the indirect form "I think" also appeared in (E) type proposition sentences, treating the hearer's information territory as 'distant' information. In addition, considering that 64% of all utterances belonging to proposition (E) are not in the top ten list, it should be concluded, again, that the speakers' choice of distinctive ending-forms cannot be generalized for this proposition type. At least, the simple summation of the occurrence of ending-forms by groups shows that Group (4) (DQ) and Group 6(Q) type ending forms are the most preferred sentence-ending types for (E)-type propositions.

(F) INFORMATION OUT OF THE BOTH SPEAKER'S AND HEARER'S TERRITORIES

Representatives of this type of information are the ones that a speaker obtained from other people's talk or writing and inferred information from observable evidence or reasoning based on logic, intuition, previous experience, and other mental constructs (Willet, 1988). Although examples of such use may not be necessary, I will show a sample below:

In (5-38) speaker M1 was talking about a famous book written by a Japanese author. The author currently lives in Princeton as a visiting professor and wrote about his experience in dealing with VIP
Japanese officials studying in the university. So M1’s speech is basically hearsay with his commentary that is inference.

(5-38)

M1 (1): yohodo amerika e kite kara ne, very much America DIR came after PART(RAPP)

(2): sono jibun no nanteiukaneraiito-ishiki ni aa well, oneself POSS what-to-say elite-consciousness LOC well kageri ga detekita-tte iu ka na, shadow NOM showed-QUOTE wonder PART(RAPP)

(3): sono eriito-ishiki o hakki dekiru yoona bamen ga that elite-consciousness OBJ display able such scene NOM nai kara usseki-shiteru-n-daroona NEG because frustrated-n- probably PART(RAPP)

(4): dakara, tamani au nihonjin o tukamaete therefore once in a while meet Japanese people OBJ grab(te)

kaikoo ichiban watashi wa nihon-ja jitsuwa opening mouth at first I TOP Japan LOC in fact

hensa-chi ikura ikura to iu sugu hensachi o deviation-rate* such and such QUOT soon deviation-rate OBJ

mochidasu-n-datte, bring forth-n-hearsay

*An individual's deviation score is simply the difference from their actual score and the average score in the nation-wide university entrance exam (similar to the SAT or ACT in the United States), and is one of the most important factors in being accepted at a university.

(5): dakara Murakami wa ne, souiu sono therefore, (author's name) TOP RAPP such that kanryoo no eriito ne official MODI elite PART(RAPP)
(6): purinsuton atari ni ryuugaku-shite-kuru,
Princeton around LOC study-overseas-do-come
maa aru imi dewa eriito chuu no eriito kamoshirenai
say, in a sense elite among MODI elite might be

F5 (7): aa soo deshoo ne.
well, so probably PART (RAPP)

M1 (8): soo-iu renchuu no koto o ne
so-QUOT people POSS matter OBJ PART(RAPP)
junsui-baiyoo-gata-hensachi-ningen-tte
pure-cultured-style-deviation rate-people-QUOT
itten-da yo na .
said-COP VOC RAPP

F5 (9): Murakami Haruki-tte omoshiroi hito mitai desu ne .
Murakami Haruki-QUOT interesting person seems COP(FOR) CONF

(10): tabun, soo desu yo ne .
probably so COP(FOR) VOC RAPP

M1 (1): To a great extent, ever since they came to America,
(2): Well, their own "elite-conscious ego", well what shall I say, shall I say like their elite-consciousness got depressed.
(3): Probably their frustration may get pent-up since they have no place to show-off their elite-conscious-ego.
(4): So it is said that they readily bring up their "deviation value" [at the time of university entrance exam] when they have occasional chances to meet Japanese people.
(5): So the author Murakami calls those government officials like that.
(6): Those who come to America, such as to Princeton to study, who might be, in a sense, the "elitist" elite.

F5 (7): Well, they may be so.

M1 (8): Murakami calls those people "purely-cultured-deviation-value-form-human beings".
F5 (9): Murakami appeared to be an interesting person.
(10): Probably he is so.

Speaker M1, from my point of view, has a preference for direct-style speech. The preference may be due to his background; he belongs to an older generation (70s) and had held managerial positions in the trading business for most of his life. The informant's personal data shows that he preferred to use direct forms for proposition types (B), as well as (C), both of which are shared information. However, in talking about the above topic (i.e., Japanese officials in Princeton), he kept some distance between the information and himself, probably due to the fact that he was very conscious of the fact that the episode was from a book. Clear hearsay evidential -n da tte (I heard) is used in line (4), an indirect evidential -tte iu ka (I wonder I should say) is in line (3), and mitai (appeared to be) is in line (9), auxiliaries of conjecture -n daroo na (probably) is seen in line (4), -kamoshirenai (might be) in (6), and deshoo ne (probably) in line (7). So the example fully represents an (F) type conversation.

The difference between an (F) type proposition and the previous (E) type proposition is that an (F) type proposition does not fall in the hearer's information territory, and the common condition between the two types are that speaker has some out-of-territory knowledge about the proposition. Therefore, theoretically, from the speaker's point of view, (E) and (F) type propositions are not different in terms of "evidence" on his side. But I had expected some, possibly minor,
different results between the two in terms of evidentiality coding since (F) type information is more "distant" from both conversationalists. As Kamio assumed in his theory, I had anticipated the appearance of a large number of indirect evidential forms, i.e., inference (Group 7 endings) and hearsay (Group 8 endings), which were not popular enough for (E) type propositions. The result meets the expectation in that indirect forms, as well as auxiliary endings, were preferred for this proposition type. However, the most preferred form as a whole was, unexpectedly, Group (1) type direct-endings as the following chart indicates:

[5-39] Occurrences of ending-forms by group, for type (F) propositions, from all discourse types, formal conversation discourse, and informal friend discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>263 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (D rapport -ne)</td>
<td>68 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question )</td>
<td>14 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but</td>
<td>96 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>questioning)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD sharing ne#)</td>
<td>11 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 (Question)</td>
<td>26 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>89 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>183 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>85 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>96 (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In formal discourse, although assertive direct endings were observed to be 18% (G1 + G2) of the data, the informants preferred Group (7) to (10) endings that are indirect. The overall occurrence of indirect
forms in formal discourse was 72% (the sum of Group 6 to 10) for (F) type propositions. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that speakers are indirect enough formally in talking about other people's matters. On the other hand, in informal discourse among friends and family members Group (1) type direct-endings occurred most often, although the sum of indirect forms that occurred in informal speeches was large enough (e.g. 55% for informal friend discourse) to posit indirect forms as "recommended" forms for this proposition type.

The preference of direct forms in informal discourse for (F) propositions can be understood from the "politeness" point of view. Being different from (E) type propositions which are owned by the conversational partner, the speaker does not have immediate need to be polite to the owner of (F) type information who is not present at the speech site. This may enhance extension of the speaker's information territory, and accordingly, the use of direct evidentials. As a matter of fact, formal discourse data suggests that higher formality requires a speaker to carefully attend to the use of direct forms which are supposed to be for propositions from the speaker's information territory. However, at the same time, the speculation that Japanese people always treat other people's information as indirect information (cf. chapter three) turned out to be false, in a sense, in this research (also see later section for further discussion).

In the following, the most popular sentence-ending-forms for proposition (F) are listed for formal conversation discourse and
informal friend discourse:

[5-40] Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (F) propositions, formal conversational discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(10) ID omou (&quot;I think&quot;-formal)</td>
<td>8 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(10) ID omou n da kedo (&quot;I think&quot;-formal)</td>
<td>8 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(2) D n da ne (formal)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(9) AUX conjecture daroo ne (&quot;probably&quot;-formal)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(9) AUX conjecture daroo (&quot;probably&quot;-formal)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(7) ID mitai da kedo (&quot;It appears&quot;-formal)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(8) ID -to kiita kedo (&quot;I heard&quot;-formal)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(8) ID n da tte (&quot;It is said&quot;-formal)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(9) AUX conjecture daroo ne# (&quot;probably&quot;-formal)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(2) D -ne (formal)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 others</td>
<td>117 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[5-41] Top ten sentence-ending forms for type (F) propositions, for informal friend discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE-ENDING FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. G(1) D direct (informal)</td>
<td>30 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. G(8) ID n da tte (&quot;I heard&quot;-informal)</td>
<td>24 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. G(4) DQ ja nai (&quot;Isn't it?&quot;-informal)</td>
<td>18 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. G(8) ID n datte (&quot;I heard&quot;-informal)</td>
<td>17 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G(1) D no yo (informal)</td>
<td>15 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. G(1) D no (informal)</td>
<td>14 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. G(8) ID n datte (&quot;I heard&quot;-informal)</td>
<td>12 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. G(1) D yo (informal)</td>
<td>11 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. G(7) ID rashii no ne (&quot;It appear&quot;-informal)</td>
<td>10 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. G(1) D noun (informal)</td>
<td>9 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 others</td>
<td>184 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, since the proportion of the other forms that are not listed is large in the above two tables. The forms chosen are spread out widely across Group (6) to Group (10) for formal discourse, and all the groups
except the question group for informal discourse. Therefore, in combined data, there were no particular ending forms which were used in more than 10%.

Due to differences in preference across discourse types, it is difficult to choose representative forms for type (F) propositions for the model, but probably it is reasonable to assume Group (7)-inference forms, Group (8)-hearsay forms as the standard forms for all discourse types, and for informal speech situations, direct forms such as a simple direct-ending, noun-endings, vocative -no and -yo endings should be added. Group (10), "I think"-type endings, should also be added to the group of formal speech for proposition (F).

So far, I have explained the differences among the six types of information in relation with the concept of "having information in territory" and "knowing information". In addition to the basic six types of information, in the process of data analysis for this study, two additional types were also assumed for experimental purposes. These additional categories are: (G) public information, and (H) self-talk (talking to oneself).

First, category (G), public information category, was originally included in category (F), information outside of both speaker's and hearer's territories since public information is usually reported information. My earlier studies found that Japanese speakers kept treating public information as other people's information (i.e., outside of their information territory) linguistically with indirect
hearsay forms. However, this time, during the course of data collection, it was noted that quite a high proportion of the informants used direct expressions occasionally in describing publicly well-known information. I speculated that this was due to my selection of topics (when available) which were highly digested among the community members. If public information is understood as belonging to the speaker's territory, the modification of the definition of the information within the speaker's territory would be necessary to involve mere "knowledge". Therefore, in order to locate the position of public information within the evidentiality framework, this category was separated.

As expected during the data collection, Group (1) direct-endings were more preferred than indirect hearsay endings for (G) type proposition.

[5-42] Occurrence of sentence-ending forms by groups for type (G) propositions, for formal conversation discourse, informal friend discourse, family discourse, and combined discourse types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENDING-FORMS</th>
<th>FORMAL</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>ALL TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
<td>100 (35%)</td>
<td>56 (50%)</td>
<td>168 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (D rapport -ne)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>18 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (3%)</td>
<td>26 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question )</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>17 (5%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>20 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>40 (14%)</td>
<td>22 (19%)</td>
<td>68 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD sharing ne#)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 (Question forms)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>25 (8%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
<td>36 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 (ID inference)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>16 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>23 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 (ID hearsay)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>62 (21%)</td>
<td>11 (9%)</td>
<td>75 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 (Auxiliary)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10 (ID I think)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>6 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>15 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The total number of occurrences of (G) type propositions was too limited for formal discourse to positively identify trends. Data for informal discourses, both friend and family, show that informants preferred Group (1), Group (4), and Group (8) forms for type (G) propositions. This result is also applicable to the combined data of all discourse types. The results clearly indicate that for a large proportion of the informants, very well-known public information belongs to everybody's information territory, and therefore, G(4) "seeking-agreement" endings were also preferred. For some speakers, this information is socially accepted truth, so they used Group (1) direct evidentials.

Theoretically legitimate evidentials for type (G) propositions may be Group (7) (inference) and Group (8) (hearsay) type indirect forms, and they were actually frequently used. However, at the same time, for some speakers, whether or not the information is shared by the hearer is more important than who originally owned the information. This view also explains the high frequency of Group (4) type ending-forms (i.e. shared-information evidentials). The preference for Group (1), (4), and (8) ending forms for (G) propositions (public information) is very similar to the result for (F) type propositions (information outside of both speaker's and hearer's territories), suggesting that speakers may perceive the two categories as being almost identical. The observed high co-relation between the two can be explained as follows: Public
information (G) is, theoretically, a subset of other people's information (F). The only difference is that (G) propositions are known to all as truth, while (F) propositions are not necessarily known to all. However, in actuality, conversationalists tend to speak about (F) propositions which are known to their partners. Thus we see a marginal difference between the results of the analysis on (G) and (F) type propositions.

**Information type (H)**, the speaker's talk to himself, is actually beyond the scope of this research, since the main scope of the study is epistemic modality of the proposition by which the speaker expresses his degree of commitment to the truth value of his proposition *in the presence of the hearer*. Mackey (1968) considered language to have two distinctive functions: external functions and the internal functions. Regarding internal functions, he assumed language is used for counting, reckoning, cursing, dreaming, diary writing, and note taking. Mackey's view is different from the well-known classifications of language functions proposed by Jakobson (1960) or Hymes (1968) in that Mackey paid attention only to whether or not language use is aimed at communicating with someone outside of the speaker.

A speaker makes frequent self-talk-style utterances in conversation with hearers; often these utterances obviously are not directed to the hearer but the speaker lets the hearer hear the utterances. See the following example:

(5-43)
F18 (1) : sensei moningen da kara suki kirai -tte
teacher also human COP because favorite-QUOT
aru deshoo# to iu ka, hachoo no au seito
have don't they?(SHAR) or chemical harmonious student
to hachoo no awanai seito -tte aru deshoo
and chemical disharmonious student-QUOT exist don't they?
dakara soo iu tokoro ni ittan hairikon-dara
therefore such place LOC once enter-COND
moo unn ga warui-tte koto ni naru deshoo
already luck NOM bad-QUOT COMP DAT become isn't it?

F5 (2) : soo desu ne#
soo COP SHAR

(3) : taihendaa..... gakkoo -tte
rough school COMP

F18(4) : unn..
yes

F5 (5) : sorede doo nasatta-n-desu ka?
then how did(HON)-n-COP(FOR)-Q

(6) : gakkoo kaenakatta-n desu ka?
school transferred-n -COP(FOR)-Q

F18 : (shook head)

F5 (7) : ja, ganbatta-n-da...
then hanged on-n-COP

F18 (8) : demo are wa yappari shippai deshita ne É.
but that TOP as expected mistake COP(FOR) COMF

18(1): As teachers are human beings, they have their favorite
students and non-favorites, don't they? Or I should say,
there are students who go along with the teachers, and
others who do not, aren't there? Therefore, once you got
stuck in that kind of place, you are just unlucky, aren't
you.
F5 (2): It is so, isn't it.

(3): School is difficult (plain VOC form)...

F18(4): Yes...

F5 (5): Then, what happened?

(6): Did he chang schools? [F18 shook head]

(7): Then he hung on (plain form)...

F18(8): But that was after all a wrong decision.

This conversation is formal between two female speakers with an age difference. There is no substantial power difference between the speakers except for the age factor, and they are fairly close as they have had a good relationship for a period of ten years. But the language form was formal. Speaker F5 (the younger one) occasionally showed the intimacy she felt toward the speaker F18. In doing so, speaker F5 used plain form utterances but they were not, on the surface, directed to speaker F18; speaker F5 formed them in a self-talk-style as in utterances (3) and (7).

In this way, a speaker may use self-talk type speech as a discourse strategy. Ikuta (1983) viewed speech level shifts from polite forms (e.g. desu, masu) to plain forms (e.g. da) as often being used to signal the flow of empathy between speakers since polite endings are primarily an expression of social or attitudinal "distance" which the speaker perceives between his addressee. Ikuta further argued that plain forms are also used to organize the discourse effectively in expressing "illustrative instances" within a discourse. She argued that plain form use in basically-formal conversation produces different
social "space" within the same discourse. Although all conversational utterances were regarded to have been targeted to the addressees in Ikuta's research, the function of plain form use in formal speech is regarded as "strategic", as my analysis of sentence ending forms for (H) type proposition suggests. Since self-talk type utterances are supposed to be made without taking a hearer into consideration, their modality is naturally direct. Category (H) was added to track speech behavior without a hearer, whose presence was speculated to be crucial in Japanese evidentiality concept.

The total number of occurrences of (H) type propositions in the entire discourse data was small (i.e., 164), but the informants' preference of direct forms for this proposition type was clearly observable. Since (H) type utterances should be considered informal, in discourses with restricted speech situations such as in public talk, school, and courtroom, no (H) type utterances were found. It seems there is no substantial difference in evidential forms across the types of discourse with which (H) type utterance occurred:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENDING-FORM</th>
<th>FORMAL</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>ALL TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1 (direct)</td>
<td>54 (73%)</td>
<td>13 (24%)</td>
<td>8 (25%)</td>
<td>78 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 (direct + rapportne)</td>
<td>4 ( 5%)</td>
<td>5 ( 9%)</td>
<td>13 (41%)</td>
<td>23 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 (SD tag question )</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 (DQ direct but question-type)</td>
<td>4 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 (SD sharing ne#)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
<td>0 ( 0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[5-44] Occurrences of sentence-ending forms by groups for type (H) propositions, for formal conversation discourse, informal friend discourse, family discourse, and combined discourse types

244
Group (1), Group (2), and Group (6) type ending forms were preferred across discourse types for (H) type propositions. Naturally, the forms were all informal. With Group (1) and Group (2) type direct-endings, i.e., "simple-direct forms" and "noun-endings", "vocative na or naa endings" are used, and also "n-da cluster" and "rapport -ne" were used as if a speaker was explaining his own utterance to himself. In Group (6) question forms, forms with descending -ka forms, -ka + na forms, are used in such a way that the speaker asks question to himself.

**THE MODEL**

Based on the data analysis and the discussion, I propose the framework of Japanese sentence-ending evidentials in [5-45] in relation to the types of propositions. The framework will function with the proposed corollaries.
In short, the model indicates the commonly-preferred pattern of evidential codings among Japanese speakers at the sentence ending; thus, there are wider varieties of codings which do not strictly conform to this model yet are pragmatically acceptable. In constructing the model, I did not assume an ideal perfect speaker, but simply tried to realize a generalizable pattern of evidential usage in reality from the perspective of speech situation and propositional context.

The basic nature of this evidential framework is "speaker-orientation" and "hearer-sensitive". The model is speaker-oriented because all information which falls in the speaker's territory, solely or shared with the hearer, is considered to be direct evidence since the speaker is socially entitled to have primary access to the information. This view matches the "mental-space" view in that all of the speaker's direct information is supposed to be stored in the speaker's direct memory area, or the speaker can presumably access this type of information most directly. Therefore, when he utters a sentence, the speaker first needs to determine whether or not the proposition is within the reach of his primary access; whether or not the information is in his direct memory. If it is, the speaker uses direct evidentials, if not, some kind of indirect evidential form is preferred.

Regarding propositions which fall in the speaker's information territory, in actual speech to specific hearers, three different types of propositions were assumed, i.e., (A), (B), and (C) in [5-45]. The difference among these three types deal with the hearer's knowledge or
information territory. Both information of type (B) propositions and type (C) propositions are shared with the hearer's but distinction between the two types of propositions in the speaker's psychology is empirically supported by sentence-ending evidential forms used by informants across variety of speech situations. Therefore, I would like to argue that the model shows a generalized "pattern of preference" in choosing sentence-ending forms among Japanese speakers regarding (A), (B), and (C) type propositions. Accordingly, if an individual does not differentiate among (A), (B), and (C) proposition types by sentence-ending evidential forms to the degree that the speech situation requires, his language behavior can be problematic, i.e., he might be considered to be offensive to his hearer.

In the same way, proposition types (D) and (E) are used for information to which the hearer has primary access even though the speaker has some knowledge based on hearsay or inference about the proposition (i.e., E type). It is preferred by the speaker to identify each of these two types of information by different questioning-style sentence-ending evidentials. Syntactic questioning forms (G6) were preferred for (D) type propositions, and direct sentences with questioning intonation (G4) were preferred for (E)-type propositions. I consider these two types of sentence-ending evidential forms to be "indirect" in effect.

(F) type information is another genre of indirect evidentials for obvious reasons. However, the data demonstrated that the opposite type
of evidential forms, direct evidentials, were also preferred for propositions with (F) type information. Low formality of situation seems to enhance the occurrence of direct evidentials for this information type. In using direct-endings, the speakers did not overly mark, in a sense, the difference between their "own" information and (F) type information. On the other hand, they showed careful consideration about the status difference between their "own" information and the hearer's information in dealing with (C), (D) and (E) type information. A possible explanation is that some speakers tend to express (F) type information rather assertively because they may naturally be more caring about the hearer than some other people who "own" (F) type information but are not present at the time of the utterance. The same tendency was seen with (G) type "public information" which also entailed the occurrence of both most-direct evidentials and indirect evidentials being most popular.

The second possible explanation for the speakers' preference for direct forms may be the high truth value attached to public or other peoples' information. (G) type propositions were found to be treated as "distant" information with indirect hearsay or inference forms in my earlier study, however, this time, public information was found to be often spoken with direct forms. This may have been caused by the choice of topics; the topics which I used for informal discussions were very well-known among the informants so as to be considered to be in-territory information. Naturally, if certain public information has
been continuously noted, digested, developed, discussed, and analyzed for a sufficiently long period of time, and if it is very closely related to people's daily life, the topic may become everybody's own-territory-information to some extent, thus meeting condition (d) of Corollary two, namely "information which is unchallengeable by the hearer due to its historically and socially qualified status as 'truth'". When one first heard that Princess Diana was killed by an accident, hearsay forms may be used initially to convey the information to others, but after hearing details of the accident, seeing photos of the accident, and witnessing the reaction of the society, one will stop using hearsay forms. The information has penetrated into people's mind as fact. In such a way, (G) type information can be "information which is unchallengeable by the hearer". The same phenomena can occur with (F) type information when it is shared within a group as truth. In this respect, Labov and Fanshel's distinction between O-Events (events which are publicly known as truth) and D-Events (events which are considered to be disputable) may be applicable to Japanese (cf. chapter three) as far as this research result is concerned.

But it should be noted that there was also a large proportion of utterances that handled public information as out-of-territory information. It seems that the discourse type, formal or casual, makes a difference in the choice of evidentials for (G) type and (F) type propositions. As a matter of fact, carelessly chosen direct evidentials by a speaker for a third person's information as a referent can be
offensive to the hearer since the behavior can be seen as an over-extension of the speaker's information territory. Discussion on this point will continue in a later section in relation with politeness.

The model also reflects theories of Japanese modality expressions, where most evidentials occur. Sentence-ending evidentials have interactional functions as discourse markers in that they function to inform the hearer of the speaker's purposes in uttering a sentence: transferring new information (direct ending), reminding of the hearer's knowledge (tag-question etc.), confirming that information is shared ("sharing -ne", etc), requesting new information (question), and so on. Sentential and noun-phrasal modalities (e.g. deixis) work to involve the hearer's knowledge in the speaker's utterances by connecting the speaker's knowledge with the hearer's knowledge of any given proposition, and enhance smooth communication by showing the speaker's respect to the hearer's information territory and knowledge.

It should be emphasized again that the rules that this model proposes are genuinely pragmatic; they are not part of prescriptive grammar and thus never explicitly taught at school, and therefore Japanese speakers seem to learn these rules through interaction with people. For the same reason, and also due to the nature of the evidentiality rules which are not well understood, in Japanese-as-a-foreign-language class the use of sentence-ending forms are not systematically explained. On the other hand, as we noted, following
these rules which represent the general preference of Japanese
speakers may be crucial to be a good community speaker of the
language. In fact, even social stigmatization may be expected against
offenders. Therefore, this model may be of help in the field of language
teaching in that it shows in an organized way how to end sentences, in
relation with the proposition types, in order to be a competent speaker
of Japanese.

To construct the evidential model framework, so far the data was
mainly viewed from proposition-types with which evidentials appeared.
Then, the data was analyzed with other perspectives such as discourse
types. Results are shown in the following sections.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT SENTENCE-ENDING EVIDENTIALS

This study started with the popular observation that Japanese
speech is indirect. Then, the question was asked as to whether the data
supports this belief. Data analysis of (F) type propositions indicates that
Japanese utterances may not be as indirect as they have been
considered to be. Statistical analysis that simply added up the
occurrences of direct and indirect sentence-endings show that Japanese
speakers use more direct sentence-ending evidentials than expected in
all discourse types (i.e., speech situations) as in the following [5-46]:
The results indicate that Japanese sentences frequently end with direct evidentials. Direct sentence-ending forms were found to be dominant in all discourse types as shown below in [5-47].

Since the figures in [5-46] and [5-47] are simple summations of occurrences of forms without consideration of the propositional content of the sentences, they do not suggest any statistical meanings for a realistic model of evidentiality. However, these figures do provide an overview of Japanese indirectness. First, Japanese speakers use direct speech in approximately half of all speech opportunities. This does not appear to be "overly indirect", however, since relevant data from other languages are not available for comparison, it is an open question as to whether or not Japanese speech is significantly more indirect than some universal norm. Obviously, "semi-direct forms" (SD) and "direct forms with questioning nuance" (DQ) contribute to the indirect nature of Japanese speech. Although SD and DQ sentences end with direct forms of verbs, adjectives and the copula, they still demonstrate the
Speaker's sensitivity to the hearer's knowledge via interactional sentence-final particles, negative forms, rising intonations, and so on.

This point is figuratively shown in [5-48] below by the occurrence of Group (1) ending-forms in each proposition type in comparison with other direct forms: Group (2) to Group (5). Group (1) consists of only direct endings and direct plus vocative type suffixes. Group (2) forms are direct forms with the hearer-conscious rapport -ne.
Group (3) and Group (5) are semi-direct, and Group (4) is DQ. For the proposition types, (B), (C), (D), and (E), direct Group (1) forms were not preferred, even though the speaker may have knowledge of (B), (C), and (E) type propositions.

[5-48] Occurrences of G(1) to (5) type direct endings in the proposition types (B), (C), (D), and (E) in all discourse types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition type</th>
<th>G(1) direct ending</th>
<th>G(2) to (5) direct ending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(B) In the speaker's inf. territory, the hearer may have some knowledge</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) In both speaker's and hearer's inf. territory</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) In the hearer's inf. territory only</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E) In the hearer's inf. territory and speaker has knowledge</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, as [5-49] shows, Group (1) type sentence-ending forms which indicate the speaker's high commitment to his proposition are dominantly used in describing (A) type propositions (i.e., information in the speaker's territory that the hearer does not know), and also found frequently in (G) type propositions (i.e., publicly known information), and (H) type propositions (i.e., speaker's self-talk). It also occurred fairly often with (F) type propositions (i.e., information outside both speaker's and the hearer territory) although indirect
forms were used more often for (F) type propositions than Group (1) direct-ending forms.

[5-49] Occurrence of Group (1) to Group (5) endings in proposition types (A), (F), (H), and (G)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition type</th>
<th>G(1) direct ending</th>
<th>G(2) to G(5) direct ending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) In the speaker's information territory, the hearer has no knowledge</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F) Out of both speaker's and hearer's information territory</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G) Public information</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H) The speaker's self-talk</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The popularity of Group (1) type direct-ending forms in (A) and (H) proposition-type sentences is understandable for obvious reasons: both (A) and (H) type propositions are "speaker-only" information in which the hearer's knowledge is not anticipated (for A) or the speaker temporarily pretends ignorance of the hearer's existence for a strategic purpose (H). However, the high occurrence of G(1) type direct-sentence-endings was not expected for (F) and (G) type sentences as discussed earlier.

Japanese speech then can be fairly direct with certain propositions. However, if we limit the scope to basic forms of direct-
ending forms without interactional suffixes, the occurrence of such basic forms is fairly rare although they are the major forms taught and used in Japanese-as-a-foreign-language class until learners become fairly proficient in the language. Those forms are generally -desu or -masu (and related forms) for formal endings and -da (and related forms) for informal endings. These basic forms of direct-endings do not convey the speaker's interactional concerns so they may be considered to be too straightforward and simple for use in conversation. For (A) type propositions, basic forms of direct endings are used to some extent, but for other proposition types, basic direct endings were rarely used even for describing the speaker's own information. The informants, being aware of the hearer's presence, used Group (1) and (2) type sentence-final particles to suffix basic forms of direct endings. The next figurative chart [5-50] indicates the occurrence of basic direct forms in each propositional type:
## Occurrences of basic forms of direct-sentence-endings in each proposition type [D direct (formal/informal)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition type</th>
<th>basic forms of <strong>formal</strong> direct ending (-<em>desu</em>, <em>masu</em>, etc.)</th>
<th>basic forms of <strong>informal</strong> direct ending (-<em>da</em>, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) In the speaker's info. territory, out of the hearer's knowledge (total: 3254)</td>
<td>415 (12%)</td>
<td>533 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) In the speaker's info. territory, the hearer may have some knowledge (total: 171)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) In both speaker's and hearer's info. territory (total: 1039)</td>
<td>59 (5%)</td>
<td>61 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) In the hearer's info. territory, out of the speaker's knowledge (total: 349)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E) In the hearer's info. territory, the speaker also has some knowledge (total: 349)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>3 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F) Out of both parties' info. territory (total: 437)</td>
<td>6 (0%)</td>
<td>93 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G) Publicly known information (total: 437)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>63 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H) The speaker's self-talk (total: 164)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>61 (37%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the above table indicates, basic forms of direct endings, both formal and informal, are not often used in Japanese discourse except for (A) type propositions (i.e., information belongs to the speaker's territory, the hearer does not have knowledge about it) and (H)-type propositions (i.e., the speaker's self-talk). The data support the assumption that the use of basic direct-sentence-ending forms is seriously limited pragmatically in Japanese discourse.

Now we turn to indirect forms (or ID forms). ID forms are almost exclusively used for the proposition type (F), and also (G) to a lesser extent (cf. [5-39] and [5-42]). This result conforms to the universal view of evidentiality in that a proposition with indirect evidence results in an indirect expression, although the use of indirect sentence-ending-evidentials is also influenced by the discourse type.

Although the proportion of indirect sentence-ending forms was not as high as had been expected, it seems that individuals sometimes make conscious choices between using direct forms and indirect forms. When engaging in an informal conversation, a female speaker (F2) declared that she was very knowledgeable in a variety of both worldwide and domestic gossip topics (she said "Ask me, ask me anything!"), and so the amused hearers started to ask questions and F2 pretended to be an "all-knowing housewife" and spoke in this fashion for half an hour. The following data compares F2's normal speech and her "all-knowing housewife" speech for (F) and (G) type propositions (cf. Appendix E). In her "pretend" speech, the use of indirect forms
decreased from 60% of regular speech to 40%, suggesting that the speaker's view of the relationship between herself and the proposition affected her choice of evidentiality.

[5-51] Evidential-choice shift for speaker F2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total number of F+G proposition sentences</th>
<th>Number of INDIRECT and QUESTION (inc. DQ) sentence-ending forms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular F2 speech</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>68(ID)+18(Q) 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Reporter&quot; F2 speech</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20(ID)+4(Q) 40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from public talk discourse suggest that a reporter who is talking to the public tends to treat information he is transferring to unspecified hearers as his own information, i.e., (A) type proposition. Although F2's "reporter" speech in [5-51] still involved a high proportion of indirect endings (40%), obviously the speaker consciously shifted her choice of ending forms to "reporter" modality responding to the hearer's expectations. This case also suggests that generally direct evidentials are less preferred for (F) and (G) type propositions.

On the other hand, it was observed that propositions which obviously belonged to a speaker's information territory were occasionally expressed in an indirect sentence-ending form. This phenomenon happens when the speaker does not wish to express the closeness of the proposition to himself. For example, one witness for the Yakugai-AIDS court case, when uttering a statement that was seemingly inconsistent with his own previous testimony, had a problem with
M17: We were seriously thinking about the cases [of AIDS patients] of Teikyo University Hospital, well, we were consulting with the Ministry [of Health] on this point. But as to the date [of our actual contact with Teikyo], today I, tentatively in a preparatory action for the future, say that it was the time when Teikyo announced [the cases of AIDS patients] to newspapers,

The speaker was the chief of an AIDS-patient-designating committee who was suspected of being partially responsible for the delay of the recognition of the first AIDS patient in Japan. It was also suspected that he knew that Teikyo University had twenty-three HIV
positive patients but concealed the fact for a year in collaboration with Teikyo University Hospital. Those hemophiliac patients were all infected with AIDS through the use of unheated blood-forming enhancer which the United States had cautioned earlier not to use. It is suspected that the Ministry purposefully permitted the continued use of this licensed medical product. Weeks before, Speaker M17 once testified that he inquired at Teikyo University about the twenty-three HIV positive patients one month before the Teikyo's press release on the Japanese first officially "recognized" AIDS patient who lived in America then. However, in the above statement he testified that he actually contacted Teikyo regarding hemophiliac patients after the press release, contradicting his own previous statement. In testifying the above (the second testimony), the speaker could not smoothly present the final-sentence-modality coding, as if he had difficulties in deciding on the appropriate sentence-ending mode and finally finished the sentence with the phrase "kyoo wa ohanashi shite okimasu" (I speak like this today) in which okimasu connotes "tentative behavior": a very unusual lexically-indirect ending. Since in Japanese the modality marker is at the very end of the sentence, in uttering a given sentence, psycholinguistically speaking, the speaker has some time to decide the sentence modality. The speaker paused for a while before the sentence ending, and the hearers were waiting for his modality coding. The speaker then used an indirect-form sentence-ending in haste. If he uttered the testimony with a direct sentence-evidential form such as
**deshita** (direct form copula) in "sono jiki wa shinbun ni happyoo ga atta ato deshita" (The contact with Teikyo was performed just after the newspaper announcement.), the testimony linguistically presents 'realis' from his epistemic viewpoint, which was not presented in his testimony above.

There are other examples of the use of indirect evidentials for the speaker's own information. In (5-53) the speaker used a conjecture auxiliary, *deshoo* (probably) in talking about his own feeling about choosing his first job after graduation. The event happened a long time ago, therefore, I got the impression that the memory has become "distant" enough to the speaker himself to let him use an indirect evidential. In the course of this discourse, generally the speaker presented a retrospective view of the early stage of his life. He also added a confirmation -ne to pretend that the information is shared by the hearer as a common understanding resulted from the previous discourse (i.e, "as you might imagine").

(5-53)

M13: iya yoosuruni ne, suugaku toku rika toka sooiu shiken
    well, in short RAPP math. etc. science etc. like exam

    ga attatra moo zettai dameda-tte iu ki
    NOM exist(COND) EMP absolutely no-good-QUOTE feeling

    ga atta-n desu yo. de benkyooshitenai kara
    NOM existed-n-COP(For) VOC then studied(NEG)(STAT)because

    nanka muudo de nanka koo sukida-tta-ra haireru
    somewhat mood INS somewhat just like like(COND) enter(POT)

    mitaini amai kimochi de ita-n- deshoo ne,
    like that optimistic feeling I was-n-probably(AUX) CONF

265
M13: In short, [I felt like] I absolutely wouldn't do well if there were exams such as math or science. Then, I hadn't studied, so, if I liked [the job], somewhat, I would be able to get the job. I probably was feeling in such an easy way (as we both know).

PUBLIC SPEECH AND DIRECT EVIDENTIAL FORMS

Another case that presents unanimous usage of direct forms is public talks (in which a speaker talks to the public). Public talks, which are usually one-way information transmission, showed two major characteristics. First, in talking to the public, a speaker does not have a specific audience so naturally he is not concerned with the same sort of interactional modalities such as interactive sentence-final particles and Group (3) or Group (4) type evidentials to show respect to the hearer's knowledge. As a matter of fact, I listened to a public speech conducted at a pharmaceutical company's media briefing meeting, and found only one sentence-ending mode for the entire two hour conference; the modality coding was polite direct-ending. This is a natural consequence since it was spoken to the public where the speakers did not need to use interactional sentence-endings. In this meeting, the speakers talked about the history and status quo of their products, so naturally all propositions were in the speakers' information territory as their professional knowledge; therefore, indirect sentence-ending forms were not used. This is the second characteristics of public speech.

Data from news-shows indicate that speakers consider their propositions to be in their own information territory as professional
knowledge. However, this does not mean that those speakers consider that they have the most privileged, primary access to the information. The G (10) type evidential, "I think" was unanimously used in public talk situations in the form of \textit{omoware-masu} (it is thought that...). \textit{Omoware-masu} is a passive-voice but is still a direct-ending (i.e., -\textit{masu}) being consistent with overall reporting modality. It appears that news-casters hesitate to say \textit{omou} (I think) straightforwardly since strong subjectivity of \textit{omou} does not match with their role as information-transmitters. In this sense, newscaster type speech behavior is not personal but only a "role-based" behavior. In the following, [5-54] shows that (A) type propositions are dominant in public talks, and [5-55] indicates, accordingly, that Group (1) type direct evidentials were most frequently used in this discourse genre. These features of newscaster talks as a "register", a "occupational register" in particular, are also seen with teachers, doctors, etc. (e.g. Cazden, 1988).

[5-54] Occurrences of sentences with each proposition type in "public speech" discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPOSITION TYPE</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) The speaker's territory information</td>
<td>238 (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) The speaker's territory, the hearer's knowledge</td>
<td>11 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Both parties' territory</td>
<td>51 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) The hearer's territory information</td>
<td>24 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E) The hearer's territory, the speaker's knowledge</td>
<td>10 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F) Out of both parties' territory</td>
<td>56 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G) Public information</td>
<td>8 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H) The speaker's self talk</td>
<td>3 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

267
Occurrences of sentence-ending forms by groups for public discourse, for combined discourse types

### ENDING-FORMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group (1)</td>
<td>(direct)</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (2)</td>
<td>(D rapport -ne)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (3)</td>
<td>(SD tag question)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (4)</td>
<td>(DQ direct but questioning)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (5)</td>
<td>(SD sharing ne#)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (6)</td>
<td>(Question forms)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (7)</td>
<td>(ID inference)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (8)</td>
<td>(ID hearsay)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (9)</td>
<td>(Auxiliary)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group (10)</td>
<td>(ID I think)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>401</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each speaker of public speech has a different speech style, but generally, direct modality coding is used in talking to the general public. Evidentials that appeared in other genre of proposition types besides (A) are from the "insider-communication" part of public speech. As seen, a news show, for example, is often presided by multiple speakers (newscasters) and they talk on and off with their colleagues. This insider-talk kind of speech situation provided an occurrence of interactional hearer-sensitive sentence-endings in the data. Also, if a show is broadcasted from multiple places with speakers who are dispatched to places other than the broadcasting station, to show local conditions, these "dispatchers" often talk with hearer-sensitive evidentials such as Groups (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6). That they often have something visible in front of themselves to show and describe seems to make the speaker's modality coding more interactive: they have direct evidence of their proposition. Furthermore, they have specific hearers.
in the station in addition to the general public. These factors may influence the dispatcher's psychology of talking and make his talk different from that of reporters at TV stations.

COURT CASES AND DIRECT EVIDENTIALITY

The Japanese government sometimes conduct court-like proceedings called "Shoonin-kanmon" (summoning witness) when a serious violation of a law or citizen's rights is suspected inside national governmental bodies or related private areas. Usually it is very difficult to prove that a crime occurred in the governmental system since government activity is quite secretive. In order to decide the possibility of existing criminal acts, Shoonin-kanmon is sometimes conducted within the Diet and/or the Parliament. Informants of the case are summoned and required to testify under oath, and if untruthful testimony is given, they may be prosecuted for false testimony. This is not exactly a "court" (rather "pre-court" proceedings), but the purpose and system are fairly similar. The data showed a part of the Shoonin-kanmon for the Yakugai-AIDS case (the case of patients that acquired AIDS from medical treatment). In the data, the questioners (diet members) typically used direct forms in talking about the every aspect of the case. Naturally, the testimony itself belongs to the witness's information territory, but it is understood that the known facts are also in the questioners' information territory. So the questioners used the codings of shared information for a large proportion of their
utterances. However, for the person testifying, the information is his own, and the discrepancy between their understandings appeared in sentence-ending evidential forms. The pattern of this discourse type is unique in that this does not happen in regular daily conversation.

The next table shows the occurrence of sentence-ending forms by the two groups. Both sides used Group (1) direct-type forms for a large proportion of their utterances suggesting that there is consciousness of direct evidence in this speech situation.

[5-56] Occurrences of sentence-ending forms by group for court-defendant and court-prosecutor discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENDING-FORMS</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROSECUTOR</td>
<td>DEFENDANT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G1) D direct</td>
<td>162 (50%)</td>
<td>243 (78%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G2) D rapport -ne</td>
<td>13 (4%)</td>
<td>8 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G3) SD tag-question</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G4) DQ questioning direct forms</td>
<td>10 (3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G5) SD sharing -ne</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G6) Q Question</td>
<td>62 (19%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G7) ID inference</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G8) ID hearsay</td>
<td>18 (5%)</td>
<td>9 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G9) AUX</td>
<td>9 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G10) ID 'I think'</td>
<td>47 (14%)</td>
<td>45 (14%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>310</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FORMALITY OF SPEECH AND EVIDENTIALS

In an earlier section, formal and informal (friend and family) discourses were contrasted to see the influence of formality on the speaker's choice of evidential for all proposition types. It was found that in talking with friends, speakers sometimes evidentially handle
some information that is outside of both parties' territories (F, and G) as if it were in their information territory; however, it is also noted that they do not treat their conversation partner's information as their own. On the contrary, the speakers respect the hearer's information territory and knowledge even in informal friend discourse. This point was statistically supported by sentence-ending forms for (B), (C), (D), and (E) information types in which information is shared by both parties.

In family discourse, on the other hand, speakers did not pay significant respect to the hearer's information territory and knowledge as much as they did in friend discourse. In particular, when expressing (B) and (C) type propositions, which fall in the speaker's information territory but are shared by both parties, the speaker's sensitivity to the hearer's knowledge was quite low in family discourse. In the following [5-57], occurrences of Group (1) to Group (6) ending forms are listed for (B) and (C) type propositions for family and friend discourses. The underlined ending-forms in [5-57] are "recommended" informal evidential groups for (B) and (C) respectively from the model. Friends and family are both uchi (inside) type speech situations, but the speakers were obviously less assertive to their friends. Family is the most fundamental uchi unit, so that the concept of each other's information territory in family situations is different from other informal discourses. The use of direct forms in (C) type propositions in family discourse probably occurred due to the intimate feeling among
family members. Friend discourse also tended to be spoken with direct
evidentials sometimes with (C) type propositions that fall into both
parties' information territories.

[5-57] Occurrences of sentence-ending forms for (B) and (C) type
propositions in family and friend type discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition type</th>
<th>Ending form</th>
<th>Discourse type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) type</td>
<td>G(1) D direct, etc.</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(2) D rapport -ne</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(3) SD confirm-ne, etc.</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(4) DQ</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(5) SD sharing -ne#</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(6) Question</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) type</td>
<td>G(1) D direct, etc.</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(2) D rapport -ne</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(3) D confirm-ne, etc.</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(4) DQuestion</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(5) SD sharing -ne#</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(6) Question</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, for (D) and (E) propositions (i.e., information
that falls primarily into the hearer's territory), the appropriate use of
evidentials was observed in family discourse. In family discourse,
Group (4) type endings occurred 43% of the time and Group (6) type
endings occurred 20% of the time in expressing (E) type propositions.
The result is comparable to that from the friend discourse as well as the
sum of all discourse types. But the sum of occurrences of Group (1), (2),
and (3) ending forms is proportionally highest in family discourse for
even (D) and (E) information. This data implies that speakers treat the
hearer's information as their own more often in family discourse than
in other speech situations although they pay some respect to the information owned by the hearers. This is natural since, as Corollary Two stipulates, a speaker is entitled to treat a close person's information as his own.

Before data analysis, it was expected that family members would be "un-respectful" to each other's information territory in every way, but this result indicates that family discourse conforms to the general model to a large extent. Blum-Kulka (1990) paid attention to parent-children discourse and said the there are three key notions in family politeness: power, informaility, and affect. Power difference must naturally be the most influencial politeness factor in parent discourse and makes utterances highly direct (i.e., direct speech acts in her study), but the informality of the speech situation mitigates the directness of utterance and make them non-offensive. Also the factor of affect was found to be very important in indexing positive politeness. Although the "directness" of language is viewed differently in this research, Blum-Kulka's research supports the tendency to use direct forms in family discourse due to its environmental appropriateness.

MALE VS. FEMALE DIFFERENCES

Female speakers were expected to be more indirect than male speakers, as this had been clearly observed in my early study (Trent, 1993) reflecting a stereotype both in Japanese culture and in the research on women's language. However, in this research, male/female
differences turned out to be less obvious. Female speakers seem to prefer direct evidentials more than male speakers did in some speech situations or in talking about certain propositions; however, as [5-46] shows, as a whole, female informants' direct speech was still proportionally less than male speakers'.

First, in describing (A) type propositions, which can be the most direct, in formal speech situations, female speakers used direct Group (1) and Group (2) ending forms 64% (vs. male 54%) and 28% (vs. male 27%) of the time respectively across a variety of speech situations. In friend discourse, female speakers used Group (1) direct forms 75% (vs. male, 70%) of the time and Group (2) direct forms 7% (vs. male 17%) of the time. However, in family discourse, the percentage of Group (1) forms used by female speakers (73%) for (A) type propositions is smaller than that of male speakers (87%), implying that male speakers are possibly more direct in a family speech situation.

For (C) type propositions, which fall into both hearer's and speaker's territories, females' evidential behavior was much less direct than that of male speakers as indicated in [5-58]. The data in [5-58] show that male informants were more direct than female informants in expressing (C) type information to which the hearer equally has direct access. This result may imply that female speakers are possibly more sensitive to the hearer's knowledge and territory.
Female vs. male speakers' use of ending-forms for (C) type information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse Type</th>
<th>Ending Form</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal G(1) D Direct</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(2) D rapport -ne , etc.</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(3) SD confirm -ne , etc.</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(4) DQuestion</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(5) SD sharing -ne#</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend G(1) D direct</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(2) D rapport -ne , etc.</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(3) SD confirm -ne , etc.</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(4) DQuestion</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(5) SD sharing -ne#</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Female speakers' sensitivity to information shared with hearers was also implied in the data for (E) type propositions, i.e., information which falls in the hearer's territory that the speaker has some knowledge about. Since the total occurrences of E type information were small in numbers among the entire data set, a comparison between male and female usages cannot be considered strong evidence, but at least it seems that male speakers preferred direct forms more than female speakers in both formal and friend discourse. Interestingly, as [5-59] suggests, in expressing E type propositions, male speakers preferred Group (1)-direct, Group (4)-DQ, and Group (6)-Q type sentence-ending evidentials consistently for both formal and informal discourses. On the other hand, female speakers used Group (4), (6), and (8)-hearsay type endings for formal discourse, and (4) and (6) for informal discourse. This difference implies that female speakers may be more conscious of situational difference than male speakers (cf. [5-
Female vs. male speakers use of ending-forms for (E) type information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse Ending form</th>
<th>male</th>
<th>female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal G(1) D direct</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(2) D rapport -ne</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(3) SD confirm -ne , etc.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(4) DQuestion</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(5) SD sharing -ne#</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(6) Question</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(7) ID Inference</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(8) ID hearsay</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(9) AUX</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(10) I think</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend G(1) D direct</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(2) D rapport -ne</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(3) D confirm -ne</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(4) DQuestion</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(5) D sharing -ne#</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(6) Question</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(7) ID Inference</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(8) ID hearsay</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(9) AUX</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G(10) I think</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EFFECT OF AGE - CHILDREN'S DISCOURSE

The quantitative data viewed by age groups are calculated for eight different groups. However, since the informants were not spread out evenly over age groups nor speech situations, it was difficult to positively identify solid patterns by the age factor. For example, when talking about (A) type propositions, speakers from each age group used direct Group (1) evidentials frequently as shown below [5-60]. These
surface figures may imply conclusions such as that speakers in their 30's may be most assertive in formal conversation and informal friend discourse but that in family discourse, teenagers were most assertive. However, this observation is hardly realistic due to the small number of informants that supplied information for each age group.

[5-60] Occurrences of Group (1) type direct sentence-ending evidentials for (A) type propositions in formal, friends, and family discourse by each age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Friends</th>
<th>Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10s</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20s</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30s</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50s</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60s</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70s</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80s</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For this reason, a detailed analysis of the age factor was abandoned except for the youngest informants; second-graders and teenagers. Young people seemed to talk more directly. Naturally, single word utterances and simple direct endings were frequently heard. Children's speech was direct across proposition types as well as discourse types. For example, in the category of school students, (A) type information was exclusively expressed by Group (1) type evidential forms (98% for second-graders, 100% for eighth-graders). As to (C) type
propositions, i.e., shared information, 100% were expressed with Group (1) forms by second-graders, and 50% by eighth-graders. Even (D) type information, which is usually expressed by question forms, was expressed in Group (1) type direct forms 40% of the time by eighth graders, although standard question forms occurred 40% of the time. Using direct forms in expressing the hearer's thoughts or inner feelings (i.e., D-type information for the speaker) can be an expression of intimacy between the two parties. An example is shown below. The speakers are both early teenagers (brother and sister) and obviously have a good relationship.

[5-61]

F3 (1): _dareka sukina yakyuu senshuu imasu_  
anybody you like baseball player exist(FOR)

M23(2): _eeto ne, jaiantsu no ootaki senshu_  
well RAPP Giants POSS Ootaki-player

(3): _nanka suraidingu ga kakkoi-n-desu._  
somewhat sliding NOM cool-n-COP(FOR)

(4): _nirui ni iku toki ashi de tacchi-shinaide_  
second base DIR go time feet INST touch-NEG  
te de tacchi-suru  
hand INST touch

(5): _nanka kakkoi_  
somewhat cool

F29 (6): _sore-dattara daredatte ii-n da._  
it-COND anybody good-n-COP

F3 (1): Do you have any preferred baseball player?  
M23(2): Well, Ootani player in the Giants.
His way of sliding is somewhat cool.

When [he is] going to the second base, he touches the base with his hands not his feet.

F29 (5): If somebody is [doing] so, you like anybody.

In the conversation, F29 expressed her brother's thought in (5) with direct ending n-da. Judging from the whole context, F29 had no background information for M3's idea about his favorite baseball player before this conversation; therefore, utterance (5) is not based on hearsay or inference. Her intention in being assertive in this proposition is to tease her brother in his overly simplistic reason for preferring a baseball player. The use of a direct ending in this case emphasizes the close relationship between the speakers. In adult siblings and friends discourse, utterances like (5) would likely be said with question forms or DQ-type forms.

Another example from children's data from school discourse provides the same kind of function of direct forms in expressing the hearer's proposition. In this conversation among eighth-graders, S1 started to introduce himself to the interviewer, but other students S2, S3, and S4 took over the discourse:

(5-62)

S1 (1): name wa AA desu. shozoku wa...
   name TOP AA COP(FOR) Belonging to..

S2 (2): go-kyoodai wa
   HON-siblings TOP
S3 (3): yoku niita otooto ga hitori
   well look alike younger brother NOM one

S4 (4): sokkuri identical

F25(5): futagona-n-da yo ne .
          twin-n-COP VOC CONF

S1 (1): (to interviewer) The name is AA. I belong to..
S2 (2): (to S1) Any siblings?
S3 (3): (to S1) A younger brother who looks exactly like [you]
S4 (4): (to S1) very alike
F25 (5): (teacher) You are twins, am I right?

Students S2, S3, and S4 were trying to help the interviewer, in a sense, by offering more background data about S1 and also to tease S1. The students' hearers were not only S1 but also the other students present, the interviewer and their teacher. However S2, S3, and S4's attention was still toward S1 himself, so utterances (3) and (4) are considered to be (E) type utterances with direct endings. The direct forms that appeared in this case also imply the close relationship among the speakers.

One of the differences between the adult and child groups is that children did not use "rapport -ne " with direct forms (i.e., Group 2 ending forms) as much as adults did. Children's preferred direct sentence-final forms were simple direct endings, simple noun endings, and vocative sentence-ending particles such as -no, -sa, and -no.
Adults preferred **ne** (with any tones) probably because of the friendly effect that **ne** easily creates even with assertive direct-endings. It seems that this function of **ne** was not the children's concerns. I speculate that possibly when a speaker is very young, in telling (A) type information to others, the function of language is exclusively information-transmission for the child speaker. (F) Type propositions, i.e., outside of both speaker's and hearer's information territories, was also preferred to be expressed directly in Group (1) forms in 52% of the time by children. However, these results do not necessarily mean that young speakers of Japanese do not have the concept of information territory and evidentiality. Their concept may not have yet fully developed but it was observed that seven and eight years old children already have some understanding of interaction of speech territories. Their preference of directness is probably due to two factors: underdeveloped consciousness of information territory, and casualty of speech environment (i.e., high degree of intimacy among speakers). Observing young children, I had a strong impression that child friends and adult friends are different; adult friends can be intimate, of course, but each individual's ego is more respected in an adult relationship. As Brown and Levinson argued in their politeness theory (1978, 1987), an adult individual's ego should be respected through being free from imposition (negative "face-wants"). Thus, in adult conversation, utterances such as "No, you are not hungry" for a (D) type proposition (i.e. information belongs to the hearer's information territory only) are
not normal, but yet can often occur in child discourse. In eighth-graders' data, direct-ending forms from Group (1) such as direct forms, n-da yo forms were found for (D) type proposition. The use of these direct forms for (D) type propositions appears too rude to occur in adult discourse. Yet at the same time, children used hearer-sensitive ending-forms to some extent. In second-grader's data, DQ (n) daroo forms appeared for (E) type propositions, Q daroo ka and Q no appeared in eighth-graders' data also for (E) type propositions. These hearer's-territory-sensitive endings are standard forms for (E) type propositions in the model. However, for (C) type propositions (i.e., information falls in both parties' territories), Group (1) type direct endings were dominant in second-graders' discourse but confirmation ne and sharing ne# endings were seen in eighth-graders' proposition (C) type utterances, suggesting that a sub-division of the speaker's territory information, (A), (B) and (C), is difficult to realize at younger ages.

As expected, for (F) type information i.e., information out of either party's territory, children were more direct than adults: Group (1) type direct forms appeared in 52% of the data in students' (F) type discourse while Group (1) type forms occurred in 28% of the combined data of all types of discourse situation. However, children's consciousness about distant information was seen in their use of ending forms. For this genre of propositions, even second graders used AUX kamoshirenai (might be), ID da-tte (hearsay), ID mitai (seems), ID omou (I think), DQ n daroo (tag-question), Q janai no (negative question)
and other types of indirect forms or semi-direct forms, suggesting that they have certain awareness that some information does not belong to their information territory, or at least they indicated low degree of commitment to some proposition.

In addition to school situations, children's discourse was collected from family discourse situations. Children's (ages from ten to fourteen) data from family discourse do not differ substantially from those of school students' data: their utterances for (A) type propositions were exclusively direct, mostly with Group (1) type endings. For (C) type shared information and (E) type, the hearer's information, children at home also used direct endings, but hearer-sensitive Q forms and DQ forms were also used. For (F) type information which is out of the territories of both parties, the most frequently used forms were from Group (1) type: D direct (30%), D noun (10%), and D kara, D yo, and D no (4% each) are used. But at the same time, indirect forms such as ID omou (I think), ID mitai (appear), AUX kamoshirenai (might be) and DQ n da yo ne (tag-question) were used to indicate their uncertainty about expressing other people's information. These hearer-sensitive ending forms also appeared with children's (G) type propositions, i.e., public information.

Children's psychology in dealing with other people's information besides their own seems to be underdeveloped from the viewpoint of my evidentiality model and needs to be further cultivated in social interaction. The amount of data was small due to the difficulty in
having lengthy discourses with young informants, but I had the impression that young informants have a fundamental concept of information territory.

EVIDENTIALITY SHIFT

Each individual most likely has favorite sentence-ending forms in each proposition type and also in each group of ending-forms. But a speaker's set of preferred evidential forms should not be exclusively used across all kinds of speech situations he encounters. Some of the informants provided data in different discourse situations for possible comparison.

Speaker F3 provided both informal friend and formal business discourse data (cf. Appendix H). For all proposition types, the speaker apparently kept her "favorites" in both discourse types with the difference of formal/informal grammatical forms. For the proposition (A), the speaker used D kara, D kedo, D n dakedo, D n desu no ne for both informal and formal discourses showing consistency of personal preference. Only in informal discourse, the speaker used vocative type sentence-ending particles, yo or wa yo, noun-endings and rapportive-ne. (These selections conform to my model). Therefore, the speaker was reasonably more assertive with her own information (i.e. proposition type A) in informal discourse. On the other hand, the basic desu/masu direct form, which is most direct for type (A) propositions, was outstanding in formal discourse (98%) as shown in [5-63]. This is,
probably, due to the nature of the given formal discourse: business discussion. The speaker talked with several service providers for her office and management staff, so there was a power difference between the speaker and her hearers. Even though her speech is completely "formal," in the speaker's psychology the need for interactionally less assertive evidentials was low in talking about her own business. Formal "daily conversation", on the other hand, involve fewer assertive direct evidentials for the same type (A) propositions as we noted earlier. Therefore, obviously there are different genres of formal discourse in relation to situational features such as power, affinity, and purpose of discourse. Some politeness studies demonstrate that "affinity" is one of the most important politeness factors: higher affinity results in higher politeness (e.g. Brown and Gilman, 1990). In formal business discussions, such as F3's example, the speakers do not need to be 'affectionate' toward the hearer due to the practical purposes of discourse. Certainly the same is true with courtroom discourse in which emphasis is not laid on affectionate interpersonal relationship between the interlocutors. Obviously, in courtroom discourse also, the power difference between the defendant and questioners is a reason for the tendency to use direct evidentials for prosecutor sides. These "formal" discourse types are all in formal language forms, but are not truly polite in terms of evidentiality (see chapter six on this point).

In this study, I treated "courtroom discourse" and "public talk" independently as special formal discourse situations. Still, within the
genre of 'ordinary' formal conversation, since there are situational
differences, unified quantitative analysis, which I did in this study, can
be misleading. This is an issue that I would like to study further in the
future.

[F-63] F3's ending forms in formal and informal discourse for type (A)
propositions (cf. Appendix H)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition type</th>
<th>Ending form</th>
<th>formal</th>
<th>informal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) The speaker's territory</td>
<td>G(1) D direct</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(2) D rapport -ne</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(3) SD confirm -ne etc.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(4) Question</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(5) SD sharing -ne#</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(6) Question</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(7) ID Inference</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(8) ID hearsay</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(9) AUX</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(10) I think</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A difference was found with proposition (F) type utterances (i.e.,
other people's information). For (F) type propositions, in formal speech,
F3 exclusively used indirect forms, while direct forms appeared in her
informal discourse more than half of the time. This result complies with
the overall analysis of evidential forms occurring for (F) propositions
in formal and informal situations. (cf. [5-39] )

Speaker F5 provided three types of discourse: family, friend, and
formal discussion. This speaker also showed difference in her
preference of evidentials across speech situations (cf. Appendix I). In
expressing an (A) type proposition, the speaker preferred Group (1) and
Group (2) type direct endings with a difference in emphasis. As the
following figures in [5-64] indicate, for formal speech, the speaker used a large proportion of Group (2), direct plus rapport-\textit{ne} endings, to mitigate the assertiveness of the proposition, but in friend speech, Group (1) use is dominant. In family discourse, the speaker's use of Group(1) and (2) forms decreased from that of formal and friend discourse; instead, indirect forms and question forms were used more often.

[5-64] F5's ending forms for (A) type propositions in formal and informal discourse (cf. Appendix I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition Type</th>
<th>Ending Form</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
<th>Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) The speaker's</td>
<td>G(1) Direct</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territory</td>
<td>G(2) Direct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rapport-\textit{ne}, etc.</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(3) SD confirm -\textit{ne}</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(4) Direct question</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(5) SD sharing -\textit{ne}#</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(6) Question</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(7) Direct inference</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(8) Direct hearsay</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(9) Auxiliary</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(10) I think</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This speaker seems to be less assertive to her family members than to her friends. In the speaker's own retrospective observation, this may happen because of her long-distant poorly-preserved relationship with her family. But the 82% rate of occurrence of Group (1) ending-forms in F5's family discourse is still larger than their frequency rate in the whole family discourse data (79%).

For shared information (table [5-65] below), F5's behavior almost conforms to my model supporting the generality of the model to some
extent. The difference from the model is that the speaker preferred Group (5) forms ("sharing -ne#") for friend and family discourse more than Group(1) type direct endings which is generally preferred in these discourse types.

Also that the speaker did not used Group (1) or (2) forms (direct or rapportive-ne) for formal discourse, which was fairly common in the general model, demonstrates her low-assertiveness in a formal environment; however, the same speaker used the same Group (2) forms to friend and family situations indicating that the speaker is more assertive to her friends and family in talking about shared information.

[5-65] F5's ending forms in formal and informal discourse for (C) type propositions (appendix I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition type</th>
<th>Ending form</th>
<th>formal</th>
<th>informal</th>
<th>family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(C) Both parties' territory</td>
<td>G(1) D direct</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(2) D rapport-ne , etc.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(3) SD confirm -ne</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(4) DQuestion</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(5) SD sharing -ne#</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(6) Question</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(7) ID Inference</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(8) ID hearsay</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(9) AUX</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G(10) I think</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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Although the size of F5's data set was not very large, F5's data for (B), (D), (E), (F), (G) and (H) proposition-types for formal and informal discourse situations are approximately in line with the model, suggesting the same speaker makes an "evidentiality shift" according to speech situations.

288
SHARED INFORMATION IN TEACHER TALK

Evidentiality rules for classroom discourse for teaching sometimes do not conform to the rules of the model. In the "known-answer teacher question" in teacher talk (i.e., questions like what the sum of 1 plus 1?), the shared-information norm is often ignored by both sides. The following is an example of an IRE (initiation-request-evaluation) sequence:

(5-66)
F26: ja kyuu senchi go miri wa nan miri desu ka?
then 9cm 5mm top how mm COP(FOR) Q
S: kyuujuu-go miri.
95 mm.
F26: kyuujuu-go miri-datte. Minna ii desu ka?
95mm hearsay. everybody right COP(FOR) Q
F26: Then, how many millimeters are equal to 9 centimeter and 5 millimeters?
S: 95 millimeters.
F26: [The answer] is said to be 95 mm. Class, is that right?

As with newscaster talk, teacher-talk is a "professional register" which is a conventionalized way of speaking in a particular social role (e.g. Cazden, 1988). Features of teacher talk have been analyzed with respect to the power or control in a teacher's role (e.g. Stubbs, 1983; Cazden, 1988; Hess, et al., 1979; Heath, 1978). Often all kinds of linguistic forms in teacher-talk were analyzed, and the "indirectiveness" of the teacher's talk was studied in relation with the teacher's authority of
imposition (e.g. Hess, 1979; Heath, 1978) but attention has not been paid

to the irregularity of evidentiality in teacher talk since the IRE form is
taken for granted as the basic form of teacher talk.

In the teacher-talk style of information exchange as shown
above (5-66), even though the proposition is shared by both parties
from the evidentiality point of view, teachers ask questions as if the
proposition belongs to only the hearer's territory (i.e., students' territory),
and students answer it as though the information of their reply is known by only themselves, not by teachers from the
perspective of evidentiality. The reason for this classroom convention is
evidently due to the fact that the purpose of a teacher's questioning is to
see if the information exists in the hearer's territory and not to
emphasize the information-sharing environment. As the proposed
model of evidentiality suggested, to express the shared-status of
information seems to be important for harmonious conversation, which
is not important in teaching knowledge.

On the other hand, teachers also sometimes incorporated the
shared-information norm when asking the same type of question:
evidential forms such as datta-kke? (was it such and such?- as we both
know?), deshoo-ka? (isn't it such and such?) that involve the speaker's
(teacher's) knowledge about the proposition.

(5-67)

F26: kono kurasu, gaikoku itta koto aru hito
this class foreign country have been to (MODI) person
This utterance implies that the teacher, F26, was sharing her pupil's information indirectly and asking for information based on that. This kind of approach to students was very significant in the classroom, particularly for context-based subjects. In the public elementary and middle schools that I visited, I observed that, in the classroom, teachers often treat their propositions as though they were already shared by the students. Sentence-ending forms that belong to Group (3), (4), and (5) were frequently used by the teachers for this purpose as in the discourse (5-68). In the discourse, the class was discussing a war-time story. The teacher was talking about the main character who secretly drank his baby brother's formula habitually even though he knew that the formula was the only nutrient the baby could possibly have. The teacher treated this information as being fully understood by her entire class (although it may not have been so) since the story had been already read by class anyway.

(5-68)

F25 (1): nomitakute nomitakute shikatanai wake.  
want to drink  want to drink  cannot help

(2): de kono kona miruku wa nonde ii no?  
then this formula  CONT drink all right  Q
(3): nonjaa ikenai-n-da yo ne
drink prohibited-n-COP VOC COMF

(4): kono non de wa ikenai, demo gaman dekizuni
this drink TOP prohibited but patient cannot

koo non-jau wake desho
this way drink-(regretfully) didn't he?

(5): dakara non jau-n-desho
so drink-(regret)-n-didn't he?

(6): non jatta ato boku wa doo iu kimochi ni natta
drunk-(regret) after "Boku"TOP how-QUOT feeling DAT became

to omoimasu ka
COMP think(FOR) Q

S (7): tsurai
difficult

F25 (8): soo da yo ne#, tsurai, kurushii, kurushimu,
so COP VOC SHAR difficult suffering, suffering
dooshite
why

F25 (9): kona miruku wa Hiroyuki ni totte daijina mono
formula TOP Hiroyuki for important thing
dakara desu ne
because COP(FOR) CONF

T: (1) He could not help craving for the formula.
(2) Then, this milk, is it all right for him to drink it?
(3) He should not drink it, should he? (confirm)
(4) Should not drink, but cannot control his desire, and he drunk it, didn't he? (confirm)
(5) Then, he did drink it, didn't he? (confirm)
(6) After he drank it, how do you think he felt?
S (7) : Unpleasant.
T (8): He felt so, as we know (shared). Why?

292
T (9): Because the formula was a very important thing for Hiroyuki [the baby's name], wasn't it? (confirm)

Together with real questioning endings in (6) and (8), confirmationg n-da yo ne (wasn't it?) in (3), deshoo (wasn't it?) in (4) and (5), and sharing ne# (as we all know) in (8) are used to confirm the students' understanding of the story, but actually functioned to transfer the teacher's view to the students.

The same teacher also used the confirming-ne ending in asserting her opinions too. In (5-69), the teacher praised her students on their progress in writing and suggested their next target is context improvement:

(5-69)

F25 (1): kanji no machigai toka ne ,
Chinese character MODI mistake etc PART(RAPP)

okurigana no machigai toka ne ,
suffix 'kana’ MODI mistake etc. PART(RAPP)

moo hotondo nakunatte kimashita ne .
already almost disappear became PART(CONF)

(2): to iuka, kyoo wa nai-n-ja nai desu ka?
COMP say today CONT NEG-n NEG COP(FOR) Q

(3): soo iu koo hyoogen no kihontekina bubun de
such like expression MODI basic part LOC

joozu ni natte-kimashita ne
skillful became PART(CONF)

(4): tsugini kondo naiyoo-teki na bubun desu ne
next next contextual part COP(FOR) PART(CONF)
F25 (1): Wrong Kanji writing and others, "okurigana" mistakes and so on are becoming less and less, aren't they?

(2): Rather, today isn't there any?

(3): [You] are becoming proficient in the part of those basic expressions, aren't you? (confirm)

(4): Next thing to do is 'context', isn't it? (confirm)

In lines (3) and (4), although she was stating her own opinion, she used the confirming-**ne** ending as though she was suggesting something everybody agreed with. This way, the teacher could appear to avoid giving an impression that she is pushing her opinion about the students on to the students themselves.

Although there are some unique professional ways to use evidentials, statistically speaking, the data from the teachers' discourse with students were almost equivalent to the summed figure of the entire data for all discourse types. In comparison with the figurative data from formal, family, and friend discourses, the teacher's discourse was found to be similar to family discourse in terms of evidentiality use in each proposition type.

In teacher's discourse, (A) type propositions (i.e., the teacher's own information) were fairly straightforwardly expressed by Group (1) type direct forms (75%) together with Group (2) type, rapport-**ne** (10%). This pattern is similar to family discourse in that Group (1) direct ending-forms were used in 79%, and Group (2) forms in 12% of the time. Group (1) and Group (2) type endings were also dominant in
formal and friend discourses with greater emphasis on Group (2) type endings.

(B) Type propositions (i.e., the teacher's territory information, and the student's knowledge) were expressed mainly by Group (2) rapportive-ne ending (35%) and by Group (4) DQ forms (direct forms seeking agreement) (23%). This result is also comparable to that of family discourse in which Group (1) was used 29% and Group (4) 24% of the time. Formal discourse had heavier emphasis on Group (4) endings and friend discourse preferred Group (3) ending forms for type (B) propositions.

Also for shared information, proposition type (C), the patterns of evidential usage by teachers and family members were, again, similar. Direct Group (1) endings were used in 27% of teacher discourse data and in 31% of family discourse data. Group (4) forms were also preferred in both of these discourse types, 34% for teachers and 32% for family. Therefore, for these two types of discourse, speakers can be fairly "direct" or "confirming". The teacher's discourse preferred Group (6) type forms also for (C) propositions. Group (6) has only question forms, and hence this is reasonable given the environment.

(E) Type propositions (students' territory information) were also expressed by question forms 35% of the time. Naturally, teachers' discourse has high occurrence of Group (6) question forms for (C), (D), and (E) propositions. The fact that 50% of (E) type propositions were expressed by Group (4) direct-question forms (DQ) is also
understandable for the same reason.

In this way, besides the frequent use of questions, the teacher's discourse to students may have a family atmosphere as far as the data are concerned.

RELATIVITY OF INFORMATION TERRITORY

In the proposed model of evidentials, the concept of information territory based on corollaries has an important role. One factor that should be noted is that an individual's information territory can be relative in relation with different hearers who have different information territories.

First, observe the following discourse which shows a case of "plural modality" to a single proposition in talking to different hearers.

(5-70)

F5 (1): *tochi no* *nedan wa* *sukoshiwa yasuku natta?*
land MODI price TOP a little cheap became

F16(2): (to F5) *daibu ochitsuite kita.* (to M5) *ne*
significantly stable became PART(CONF)

F5 (1): The land's price became cheaper?
F16(2): (To F5)It became stable very much, (to M5) Did\text{\textunderscore}n't it

In answering F5(1), F16(2) showed two different moods; F16 used a direct ending *kita (came)* because the proposition (i.e., land price) is in her territory (as a land-owner) but not in F5's territory. But F16's
husband, M5, who shares the proposition in his own territory and has more information than speaker F16 due to his business, was present, so speaker F16 turned to M5 at the end of the utterance and her last modality *ne* is directed to M5. This is an example of modality shift according to hearers which often happens in group conversation.

In this case, the proposition, the land price, was always in the speaker F16's territory in talking to both F5 and M5. However, sometimes, a given information which belongs to a speaker's territory in one speech situation, does not belong to his information territory in another speech situation. I call this phenomenon the "relativity of information territory". The phenomenon is critically related with the Japanese concept of "uchi" (in-group) and "soto" (out-group).

Following Corollary two, a speaker considers a certain person's information to belong to his own information territory also in a speech situation where the referent is considered as *uchi* event (in-group matter) of the speaker when the hearer is from *soto* (outside). However, in another speech situation, the same information about the same referent may be treated as being outside of the same speaker's territory. Usually in this situation, the hearer belongs to a immediate group of the referent (often is referent himself) and the referent becomes a *soto* person for the speaker. This is due to the relativity of the Japanese *uchi* vs. *soto* concept.

In the following conversation (5-71), speaker F5 is talking about F3 (referent) to speakers F8 and M1. Since the referent is considered to
be F5's close friend by F8 and M1, speaker F5 is using direct evidentials at the sentence-ending in describing the referent (F3), treating the referent as her uchi member. In the discourse, F5 is describing her trip to Sweden with F3.

(5-71)

F8: (1) ima doko e tsutometeru-n-desuka?
    now where LOC employed-n-COP(FOR)

F5: (2) AAA-tte iu seiyaku gaisha na-n-desu yo ne.
    AAA-QUOT pharmaceutical company-n-COP(FOR) VOC RAPP

    suueeden no.
    Sweden MODI

(3) de, mae mo suueeden no seiyaku gaisha de
    then previously also Sweden MODI pharmaceutical company

    BBB-tte iu tokoro kara AAA ni utsutta-n-desu kedo ne.
    BBB-QUOT place from AAA DIR moved-n-COP(FOR) RAPP

(4) jyooshi ni tsuite ututta-n-desu.
    boss to follow moved-n-COP(FOR)

(5) Sorede itta-n-desu kedo ne,
    so went-n-COP(FOR) RAPP

(6) moo inaka desu yo ne#
    very rural COP(FOR) PAR(VOC) (SHAR)

F8: (7) mukoo ni sundeirasharu no?
    over there LOC live (HON) (STAT) Q

F5: (8) F3 desu ka?
    F3 COP(FOR) Q

(9) ie ie, nihon ni oosaka ni tsutomete iru-n-desu kedo
    no no Japan LOC Osaka LOC work(STAT)-n-COP(FOR)

(10) maa, honsha ni ne koo insentibu torippu-tte
    Well, headquarter DIR RAPP like this incentive trip-QUOT

    F8: (1) Where does [she] work now?
F5: (2) [She works] for a pharmaceutical company called AAA, a Swedish one.
(3) Then, [she] used to work at another Swedish company called BBB.
(4) [She] moved with her boss.
(5) Then [we] went to Sweden.
(6) It is very rural, isn't it?
F8: (7) [Does she] live over there?
F5: (8) [Do you mean] F3?
(9) No, no [she] works in Japan, in Osaka.
(10) Well, it was like her incentive trip to the headquarters.

In this discourse, although speaker F5 used sentence endings with interpersonal functions for the sake of the hearers, the referent is always described with direct forms indicating F5 considers F3 as being in her information territory.

On the other hand, in the next discourse, the same speaker talked about the same referent (F3) but the speaker used indirect forms to describe F3 because the speaker was talking to F3 herself this time. In both (5-71) and (5-72), speaker F5 mentioned the fact that F3 (referent) lived in Osaka but evidentiality of the utterances was different between the cases.

(5-72)
F5: (1) F3-tte, oosaka ni sunderu janai F3-QUOTE Osaka LOC live(STAT) aren't you (CONF).
(2) Oomu no jiken, atta-n-desho Oosaka de. Aum POSS cases wasn't it? Osaka LOC
F3: (3) soooo, moo, chuushaki pon to hito tare yo. so well syringe ONOM one drop PART(VOC)
sore de shin-jau no yo.
that INS die-(regret) PART(VOC) (VOC)

F5 (1): You live in Osaka, don't you
(2): [You] had Aum problems in Osaka, didn’t you?
F3 (3): Yes, [they] dropped [poison] by syringe and a drop of
[poison] was enough to kill people.

In the above discourse, speaker F5 used semi-direct evidential,
-janai, in saying that F3 lived in Osaka which was well-known to
everybody present. This time, the fact that F3 lived in Osaka was not
considered as being in speaker F5’s information territory, which was
quite so in the previous discourse.

The next case of relativity of evidentiality was found in a TV
interview. A female interviewer, F23, had two different hearers: the
public and the person she was interviewing. In talking to the public,
F23 treated her interviewee's information as her own information:

(5-73)
F23: (to public) karoora tuu no komaasharu, hajime wa
Corolla II MODI commercial at first CONT

hachi miri video de konna fuu deshita.
8mm video by like this COP(PAST)(FOR)

F23: (to public) The commercial of Corolla II was like this at the
beginning in 8mm film.

F23’s interviewee was a commercial-film producer, and she and the
interviewee were talking about his TV commercial film for Corolla II.
In the above utterances, F23 used a direct evidential, deshita (was), suggesting that the interviewee’s information was on her side when talking to program viewers. However, when talking to the interviewee, the same proposition, the Corolla II promotion video, was treated as the hearer's information which is shared by the speaker as in (5-74):

(5-74)
F23: (To the producer) dekiagaru-to koo naru-n-desu ne
       completed-COND  this became-n-COP(FOR)  (CONF)

F23: When it (CF) is done it looks like this, doesn't it?

F23 and the producer of the film were both watching it (i.e., direct experience), but F23 used semi-direct evidential form, nee, and her linguistic attitude toward the proposition showed more distance than that of in (5-73).

Thus, the qualification to determine whether or not an individual owns information seems to be relative to the speech situation. This does not require revision to the Corollary Two regarding the speaker's information territory, which is shown again below:

**COROLLARY 2 (speaker's information territory):**

A speaker's information territory contains the following three major types of information:

(a) information obtained through the speaker's direct experience;

(b) information about people, facts, and things close to the speaker, including information about plans, actions, and behavior of the speaker or other people whom the speaker considers to be close, and information of places with which the
speaker has a geographical relation;

(c) information embodying detailed knowledge which falls within
the speaker's area of expertise (professional or otherwise).
(d) information which is unchallengeable by the hearer due to its
historically and socially qualified status as truth.

It should be noted the concept of "people, facts, and things close to
the speaker" in qualification (b) is relative to the hearer. This leads to
another corollary of evidentiality:

**Corollary 4 (Relativity of information ownership):**

The psychological distance between the proposition and the
speaker, which is a condition qualified by (b) of Corollary 2, is
relative depending on the distance between the proposition and
the hearer as stipulated in condition (b) of Corollary 3, in such a
way that a certain proposition could be regarded as belonging to
the speaker's information territory when it is told to hearer A,
yet when told to hearer B, the same proposition could be
considered to fall in hearer B's information territory, rather
than the speaker's due to hearer B's relative closeness to the
proposition.

**MULTIPLE SENTENCE-ENDING MODALITY FOR INDIRECT SENTENCES**

With proposition types (F) and (G), i.e., information from other
people's information territory, and sometimes with (E) type proposition
(the hearer's information), as the model suggested, standard speakers
used hearsay (Group 8) and inference (Group 7) sentence-ending
evidentials frequently as well as evidentials of subjective judgement
(Groups 9 and 10). Sentences with these modalities may be
considered to be syntactically indirect in that the proposition part is an
embedded S-bar sentence which is "enveloped" by a matrix verb/adjective/copula-type phrase which is lexically indirect. It was observed that these indirect sentences with (E), (F), and (G) propositions often have additional semi-direct type evidentials at the sentence end resulting in plural modality. For example, speakers used *janai?* (doesn't it?), *ne#* (as we know), *yo ne* (direct vocative + confirmation) and other hearer-sensitive semi-direct endings with indirect *mitai da* (it seems that...) which results in *mitai-janai?* (it seems...doesn't it?), *mitai-yo-ne* (it seems...am I right?) and so on. Although it was advocated that the sentence-final modality marking presents the governing modality of the sentence, it must be reasonable to think that some sentence-endings have multiple-modality of the combination of semi-direct and indirect codings; therefore, both indirect and direct evidentials that occurred together at the same sentence-ending were counted in the database for this research.

The multiple-modality-ending with Group (7) to Group (10) indirect-ending-evidentials occurred in 73% of the inference sentences, 47% of the hearsay sentences, 73% of the auxiliary sentences, and 70% of "I think" sentences (cf. appendix G). The observed frequency is fairly high. It seems that speakers did not want to end the sentences with basic forms of indirect endings (e.g. *mitaidan/desu*) probably because of their concern for the hearer.

For information that belongs to other people's direct information territory, data shows that for many speakers whether or not the
information is shared by the hearer takes precedence over whether or not the information is publicly known well enough to be told in direct forms. Theoretically, for less-assertive discourse, basic form of indirect endings are good enough for expressing (F) and (G) type propositions (i.e., other people's information), but pragmatically, plural modality of indirect plus hearer-sensitive semi-direct-type endings were preferred due to the interactional, hearer's-knowledge-sensitive function of Group (3), (4), and (5) semi-direct sentence-ending forms. This phenomenon seems contradictive to the fact that direct forms were one of the most preferred forms for (F) and (G) propositions in informal discourse, but it does not have to.

Morphologically, the basic forms of the above indirect hearsay, inference, and auxiliary endings are still direct-endings, with their indirectness coming from the lexical meanings. Therefore, the speaker's psychology which is used to mark interactional indirectness by suffix-forms such as sentence-final particles and tag-questions, seems to prefer some extra modality in addition to Group (7) to (10) type forms which are already indirect in meanings. In addition, from the perspective of sensitivity to a hearer's knowledge, basic forms of the indirect endings are still "declarative" in that they end with direct forms of indirect lexical items even if they are lexically declaring the speaker's low commitment to the truth value of his proposition. As has been argued, the speaker's consideration of the hearer's knowledge is an important factor of Japanese evidentiality system that is
morphologically realized by the use of Group (3), (4) and (5) semi-direct evidentials. I speculate that the preference of multiple evidentials in the sentence ending is due to the these two reasons.

A few examples of multiple evidentials are shown below.

(1) Proposition (F) and (G) type evidentials (e.g. it seems, I heard, probably) with Group (1) and (2) type sentence-final particles (rapport-ne, vocative -sa, yo, -na, etc. that are considered to be direct),

In the next example passage (5-75), F1 talked about the rumor about how the Aum cult got the materials for their poison gas. Hearsay mitai and G(1) vocative -yo are used. Vocative yo emphasizes the speaker's intention to be interactive, instead of merely conveying information which he indirectly obtained.

(5-75)

F1: nannka tsubureta kaisha no tokoro e somewhat bankrupted company POSS place DIR

shitadori shimasu yo mitai ni kuruma de trade-in (FOR) VOC like car by

noritsukete katte itta-tte sooiu hanashi ga drive to bought-QUOT such story NOM

ikura demo atta mitai yo many exited appeared PART(VOC)

F1: Something like, it appears that there are abundant stories as that [they] went to several bankrupted chemical companies by truck and [said] they bought everything (I am telling you).
Proposition (F) and (G) type evidentials (e.g. *it seems*, *I heard*, *probably*) plus Group (3), (4) and (5) type evidentials such as *tag-question*, "confirming" and "sharing" -ne)

In the following example (5-76), the speaker F3 was talking about the police chief who was shot and wounded by an Aum follower. She used hearsay marker -tte itta (he said) + -tte hanashi (QUOT) + janai (negative question).

(5-76)
F3: *kono jiken ga kaiketsu-sareru made wa shine-nai-tte itta -tte hanashi janai*
this case NOM resolved-(PASS) until CONT die(POT)-(NEG)-QUOT said-COMP story isn't it

F3: It is said that there was a story that he said he wouldn't die until the case was settled, isn't it?

These cases of indirect plus semi-direct evidentials may emphasize that lexical indirectness is not enough for Japanese speakers; interactive sentence-ending which indicates the speaker's will to involve the hearer's knowledge of his proposition seems to be considered more important.

On the other hand, as noted, the speakers used a high proportion of direct evidentials (Group 1-forms) in expressing the same proposition types without considering either the outside information owners nor the hearers as in the case below (5-77). The topic of the following conversation is a rumor that Asahara Shooko, the leader of the Aum-cult, was selling his hair to his followers to eat. F2 and F3 described the
proposition with direct mode:

(5-77)
F3(1) :  

Because hair even deliberately paper in wrapped\( (te) \)

F2(2) :  

so VOC that $300, \ $500 - QUOT \)

F3(3) :  

somehow LOC put(\(te\)) drink 

F2(4) :  

brew(\(te\)) drink 

F5(5):  

really? feeling bad 

F3(1): Because, even his hair, wrapped with paper.
F2(1): It is so. [The price was] 300 dollars, 500 dollars,
F3(3): Something like, [they] drank it with tea.
F2(4): [They] brew and drink.

However, this kind of direct mode for (F) and (G) type propositions is found mainly with informal conversations where the degree of politeness is not high, otherwise the use can be offensive as explained in the following section.

DIRECT EVIDENTIALS AND NEGLECT OF THE HEARER’S KNOWLEDGE

A speaker can offend a hearer by talking about (G) or (F) information in a direct form (Group 1 or Group 2) that demonstrates a low concern for the hearer's knowledge. An example of this is from a formal TV conversation between M11 and F22 in the following (5-78).
Their talk had three topics: F22's trip to Europe, M11's journalistic activities on the Aum-shinrikyo case, and M11's past working experience at carnivals. M11 was overall a very polite speaker who was proficient in honorifics and sensitive to F22's knowledge; however he used only direct evidentials when talking about the Aum case which obviously offended F22 and can be seen from line (17). There seems to be an explanation for this M11's language behavior. He is a journalist who was investigating the case at the time of talk and an expert commentary on the case on nation-wide TV shows; therefore, in his mind, the Aum case was "his" case. As a journalist, certainly he supplied information about the case to the public through his interviews and discussion with the indicted Aum followers. According to the Corollary Two, the Aum-case is certainly in M11's information territory as professional knowledge; however, at the same time, laymen's knowledge level about the case was very high at the time. So the topic is a (G) type proposition for everybody, and M11's failure to acknowledge F22's knowledge about the case seemed to eventually offend F22. The original Japanese transcription is in note 4:

(5-78)

F22: (1) For example, the suspect Joyuu, Is "suspect" all right?,
This time, there was a court case, wasn't it?
(2) Having seen it,
(3) What do you think about that?
(4) Have you seen it?
M11: (5) Yes. Before he was arrested, I argued with him a few times, and also interviewed him.

F22: (6) You did interview him a lot, as we all know.

M11: (7) Yes, yeah, and, well, I saw him in court, and

(8) He did not admit his guilt; he spoke about a sort of religious intention that he would follow his cult leader, Shookoo Asahara.

(9) I was disappointed by him; I thought I saw the worst of him.

F22: (10) What kind of person is that man, we wonder, don’t we? Do you think he thinks that way really?

M11: (11) Well, he is slightly different from the others in that he was not indicted as a suspect for the Sarine case or the murder cases and so on, but he was charged for his old false testament in a court case of 6 years ago held in Kumamoto, so he is arrested not for this Aum case....

(12): What was interesting was that he was the most interesting man among Aum leaders whom I interviewed.

(13): I talked with Murai Hideo who stabbed an antagonist to death but there was no common "circuit" of conversation between us.

(14): Same with the cult’s attorney named Aoyama.

(15): But only Joyuu could do ordinary conversation with us.

(16): In that sense he was a very interesting target in investigation.

F22 (17): Being challenged by experienced cunning journalists, that man, who is not more than 30 years old, had media interviews almost every day in that way; and anyway, he could confuse people by his talk, even if he was the winner of debate contests, usually people cannot do that good,

M11 (18): He is a man with special talent, he is very quick in thinking and he was also very cool, I tell you. .......

M11 (19): 1990, the Aum people ran for public elections.

(20): At the time, Joyuu was against the leader's idea of running for
the election.

(21): So, it was said so, when I was discussing with him, so I said to him that I heard that he was against the election, then he said, of course, nobody would win.

(22): Then we also thought nobody from Aum would win, but in that kind of pyramid organization, people tend to obey the leader's value.

(23): Actually they did, but only Joyuu was apathetic.

(24): That he said that nobody would win immediately surprised us very much.

F22: (25): There were many other things about him like that story. Therefore, his behavior in court surprised us.

In this conversation, it is very clear from the utterances (1), (2), (17), (25), and other unquoted statements that F22 knew the topic (the suspect Joyuu and related stories) as well as M11 did through public reports by journalists including M11. However, from the evidentiality point of view, M11 did not show his acknowledgement of F22's knowledge about his topic, and continued to use direct-form (Group 1) evidentials (M11's underlined sentences) because the topic is his direct experience. But for standard speakers who share the concept of the model, a direct evidential means the topic is within the speaker's territory and is not known by the hearer. F22 politely used Group (4), Group (5), and Group (6) type evidentials at first, but started to use assertive direct evidentials herself starting from line (17). It seemed to me from her attitude that she was gradually becoming uncomfortable with M11's use of direct evidentials. F22 tried to express that the topic
was shared between herself and M11 in lines (6) and (10) by using the evidentials of shared information, but M11 failed to acknowledge these "signs".

The assertive language behavior of F22 is considered to be a demonstration of her information territory or knowledge. According to the proposed model, if conversationalists talk about the same referent's same behavior or events (i.e., shared knowledge, the suspect Joyuu in the example above) with direct evidentials, the situation is not standard because it means that both sides ignore the shared-status of propositional information.

The case above is about publicly known information (F or G) which is likely to be shared by the conversationalists. The same kind of conflict over territory or knowledge occurred in the speaker's territory propositions about which the hearer had some knowledge that the speaker did not recognize. A speaker often makes the wrong decision in this manner when talking about his professional experience in particular. In the following discourse (5-78), M16, M14, and F23 talked about M16's profession, producing TV commercial advertisement in which M16 seemed to be highly acknowledged. The discourse topic was certainly about M16's professional experience; however, at the same time, his conversational partners were familiar with M16's "products" through watching TV. Therefore, M16's propositions were not solely information that only belongs to himself: it was shared as knowledge by the hearers, but this shared aspect of his own experience was ignored.
by M16.

In the following conversation (5-79), M16 was explaining the strategic use of sound in his latest commercial film for a brand of beer. In the film, a famous actor was attending a wedding ceremony as a guest and reviewing his speech on a sheet of paper which he put it down on the table to drink the beer product. M16 was asserting that muting the background music at the same time that the actor put down the sheet of paper draws TV viewer's attention to the paper itself (which will disappear a moment later in a significant fashion to advertise the beer):

(5-79)

M16: (1) then, when [I] thought it needs to be easier to understand in some way, music is stopped when the paper is put down.
(2) So the music, stop like this, [I] stopped the music.
(3) Then, the point of putting down the paper is conveyed [to the viewer].
(4) Therefore, to use the sound in that way will make [a film story] very easy to understand.

F23: (5) The sound of beer bottle being put down [on the paper] also changes in an outstanding way, doesn't it?
M16: (6) Therefore, the sound of putting the bottle down makes the story go ahead.
(7) Therefore, if the background sound did not stop at that point, the viewpoint of the TV-viewers in the living room only goes to the actor's face.
(8) He is an actor, so [the viewpoint of the "living room"] goes only there.
(9) Because it (i.e., actor's face) is the most interesting, the most interesting thing on the screen.
(10) [I] do the things like this [in this film] to make the story understood by the viewers unconsciously, and let them see what (I) want them to see in only 15 seconds.

(11) Unconsciously, the "living room" is a professional on TV.

(12) Well, on average, [they] watch TV for 3 to 4 hours a day.

(13) Since [they] have been doing for a few decades, the "living room" is a professional on TV better than anybody else.

The English translation of this discourse may sound normal (Japanese original transcription is in note 5) but in Japanese, speaker M16's behavior is problematic from the viewpoint of evidentiality. In this discourse, speaker M16 used only Group (1) direct forms and Group (2) rapport-ne evidentials. So he behaved as though the entire topic was his own information, unknown to his hearers. However, it should have been noted by M16 that the two people he was talking with had watched this commercial film on TV a number of times so that they too had knowledge about it. In this sense, in (5-79) utterances (1) and (2) should have involved evidentials of shared-knowledge because the hearers knew that the music meaningfully stops at a certain point in the CM. M16 mentions "ochanoma" (lit. living room, i.e., "viewers in the living room") from (7) onwards as the strategic target of the film production, and expressed his analysis of "ochanoma" psychology, however, his hearers are also "viewers in the living room". Therefore, his analysis of the viewers, as expressed in utterances (7), (8), (11), (12), and (13) should have included shared-information evidentials (or even hearers' territory evidentials). Also, in the process of explaining
things, generally, some kind of mutual understanding based on topic-related common sense, or common sense regarding the process of discourse development, is generally established between the speaker and the hearers. For example, utterance (3) is a natural consequence from the previous utterances, so the proposition is readily understood by rational, intelligent hearers. In this sense, utterances (4), (6), (9), and (10) also needed to be coded to some degree with shared-information evidentials. For these reasons, M16's evidentiality coding was not satisfactory as a Japanese discourse by the standard of my model. Actually, after observing this speaker for 30 minutes, it became obvious that this ignorance of the hearer's knowledge and common sense is part of the speaker's speech style. Evidentiality data for M16's speech shows that the speaker used polite forms and interactive sentence-endings consistently (cf. appendix J). On the other hand, the type of evidentials that he used were very limited within Group (1) and Group (2). The speaker did not use any evidentials from Group (4), that is, the evidentials for completely shared information. M16 is much younger than his male hearer, M14. M14 did not seem to be offended but looked somewhat amused by M14's "young-generation-style" speech behavior. The discourse was formal, but half way through, M14 started to use casual plain-forms on and off in talking to M16. This behavior of M14 may have been a reaction to M16's direct discourse style. M16's use of evidentiality codings may be universal among professionally successful young people: Relatively inexperienced in society with a strong
persona affiliated with certain professions may make a speaker act as though he is always "on stage" as the expert of his proposition. Also, it is highly conceivable that a change in "norm" may be in progress in the young generation regarding evidential marking to the direction of allowing a more "direct" and assertive pattern of usage.

EVIDENTIALS OTHER THAN SENTENCE-FINAL FORMS

In addition to the sentence-ending modality, there are other linguistic techniques to make a sentence less-assertive. Some of these devices can also be called evidentials. I call these "sentence-medial evidentials" although they may also occur at the end of the sentence in some cases. Most of these evidentials are 'lexically' less-assertive. I will discuss only some of them as examples. These sentence-medial evidentials are beyond the scope of this study but how this kind of evidential relates with sentence-ending evidentials is briefly overviewed.

(1) The first category is adverbs. The popular less-assertive adverbs include: tabun (probably), nanka (something like), dooyara (it somewhat appears/seems), doomo (it appears/seems), osoraku (probably, possibly, presumably), chotto (a bit) moshikashite (possibly)

(2) The following examples contain quotative evidential forms with to iu ka, to ka, yoo/soo-na (adj.), soo-iu, tari (adv.), kanji, (noun) and others which, more or less, mean 'something like':

F5: chotto shoohisha ga bakani-sareteru-tte iu ka.
   a little consumer NOM fooled-(PASS)-QUOT

315
F5: I had a feeling which should be said something like consumers are fooled.

(5-81)
F22:(1) NHK nanka mo anaunsaa wa sugu soku
NHK like also announcer TOP soon immediately

chiho-tte iu kanji desu mono ne .
local area-QUOT feeling COP(FOR) (VOC) (RAPP)

(2) chiho-tte iu ka tokyo igai no tokoro de
local area-QUOT or Tokyo except MODI place LOC

zuibun jyuunen ijoo iro hito mo ite
fairly 10years longer stay person also exist

motto kamoshirenai
longer might be

tookyoo e kaette kuru hito to ka ne .
Tokyo DIR return come person etc. RAPP

F22: (1) In NHK (National Broadcasting Association) also it is something like that announcers go to local areas soon (after joining NHK).

(2) There are people who stay in somewhere like, "local area" or places other than Tokyo, more than 10 years, or might be more.

(3) Then there are people who come back to Tokyo or people like that.

(5-82)
M12: sokode koo iu nyuusu ga aru-tte wakarimasu kara
then this kind of news NON be-QUOT know(FOR) ABL

maa sokode nanika motomer-are-tara koo iu
well then something ask-(PASS)-(COND) like this

M12: I can find then what news we will have [tonight on the show] so at that time, I prepare for my opinion; thinking or taking note or do something else in case I am asked for.

(3) **Passive voice** is also effective in making the sentence less-assertive by creating a distance between the speaker and the proposition:

(5-83)
F18: *shikashi izure no jidoo ni mo ketsuben no* but any pupil LOC blood stool MODI

*shoojoo wa deteorazu imano tokoro* symptom CONT appeared(NEG) at the moment

*byoogensei daichookin ooichigoonana to no* virus colon 0157 with MODI

*kanren wa usui no de wa nai ka to mir-arete imasu.* relationship TOP weak COMP NEG Q COMP see(PASS) (FOR)

F18: However, no pupil has the symptom of blood in his stools; now it is considered that they are not related with O157 virus.

(4) **Verb te-form plus verb shimau** (lit. to finish) is a conventional phrasal form that means something has been already (often regretfully) done or finished.

It may be an evidential form in that it connotes that something has
been done without the speaker's initiative. So the speaker is certain that something has been done but implies that not he but somebody else or something beyond his control is the responsible party for the doing (although he often is). *Vte-shimau* is one of the examples of lexically less-assertive verb phrase. Often a speaker uses this VP to explain his actions without being too direct as in (8-84).

(5-84)
M16: (1) *de soshitara kyuuni bazaaru de gozaaru* then then *suddenly "bazaaru de gozaaru"*

-tte *dete-shimatta-n desu* -QUOT *came out (finished)-n COP(FOR) PART (RAPP)*

(2) *de nande bazaaru de gozaaru-tte dete-shimatta-n* then why *"bazaaru de gozaaru"-QUOTE came out-(finished)-*

*daroo-tte omotta-n desu kedo,* conjecture-QUOT *thought-n-COP(FOR) but*

*itta totan moo tanoshikute shikata nai-n-desu* -n- said moment already happy *cannot help-n-COP(FOR)RAPP*

M16: (1) Then, after that, suddenly, (phrase) "Bazaaru de Gozaaru" *(voluntarily) came* to me.

(2) Then, I wondered why "Bazaaru de Gozaaru" *(automatically) came* to my mind, but, on the moment I said the phrase, I couldn't help being overjoyed.

These are some examples of sentence-medial evidential forms and
there are others, however, the number of occurrences of these sentence-medial evidentials was smaller than expected. Fewer than 150 users of intra-sentential evidentials were found in seven 7,000 sentences. This figure indicates that Japanese speech relies on sentence-ending forms in terms of epistemic modality.

As expected, in relation with sentence-ending evidentials, these types of sentence-medial evidentials are seen in sentences which end with direct sentence-ending forms, Group (1), (2), and (3) evidentials in particular. As to the proposition-type, many sentence-medial evidentials are used with type (A) propositions (i.e., the speaker's information which the hearer does not know.) It is natural to assume that a speaker unconsciously uses sentence-medial evidentials to soften the effect of direct endings in describing his own information. There are some cases in which sentence-medial evidentials are used in sentences that end with indirect forms. I assume this happens for the same reason as the occurrence of multiple sentence-ending modality. Tabun soo kamoshirenai (It might be probably so) and nannka soo rashii (it somewhat seems to be so) are examples. However, the combinations soo kamoshirenai mitai (it looks like being might be so) and osoraku kiita (I probably heard it is so) are very rare suggesting that the scope of Japanese indirectness within a sentence is not limitless.

From the perspective of propositional types, most often, actually about half of the sentence-medial evidentials occur with (F) type
propositions (i.e., information that is out of either party's information territory) expressed with rather direct sentence ending forms, particularly the verb-ending forms of \textit{omou} (I think). As observed, (F) type information is generally marked with indirect sentence-ending forms such as Group (7) (inferred) and Group (8) (hearsay) evidentials unless the proposition is widely accepted as publicly acknowledged truth. Naturally, in those cases, sentence-medial evidentials mitigate the directness of ending forms when describing other people's information.

A high proportion of those intra-sentence evidentials occurred with the verbs \textit{omou} (think), \textit{kangaeru} (think), \textit{rikaisuru} (understand), \textit{kanjiru} (feel), \textit{kigasuru} (feel) and others, in particular with \textit{omou} (think) and its gerundive form \textit{omotteiru} (think-stative). This phenomenon is also understandable because \textit{I think} is a rather subjective evidential although, in this study, it is considered to be an indirect evidential based on the speaker's inference. A speaker cannot make \textit{I think} syntactically indirect at the sentence-ending as in \textit{omou mitai} (it seems I think that), therefore, naturally, other types of evidentials are commonly used with \textit{omou} for the purpose of mitigating the subjective nuance of this evidential. Among the sentence-medial evidentials listed above, (1) adverbs and (2) quotations, are often followed by the verb \textit{omou} and its related forms. The frequent expressions include:

\textit{~ka na to omou} (I think that it might be~)
EVIDENTIALITY IMPLICATURE

It is observed that a speaker can intentionally choose certain sentence-ending evidential forms other than those which are regarded as being "appropriate" for his proposition. There are two ways to do this. In one case, a speaker pretends to be less certain about the truth value of the proposition than he actually is by choosing lower degree evidentials. In the other case, he pretends the opposite: He chooses an evidential of higher degree than his actual commitment to the proposition deserves. Naturally, the speaker has some motivation for such behavior. I call this phenomenon "evidentiality implicature" (cf. Grice's conversational implicature) in that the hearer will, provided he is a rational adult, receive some kind of message from the speaker's intentional breach of the rules of socially accepted forms of evidentiality.

One case equivalent to "evidentiality implicature" in my model is mentioned by Oishi (1985) in his research of final-particle, ね. In analyzing speakers' usage of final particles ね and のに, he found that
sometimes a speaker's choice of sentence final particles does not reflect the reality of the discourse. For example, when talking about a book he had read, a speaker was not sure if the hearer knew or had read the book. In introducing this topic, he used the "sharing -ne#" (of this research) as if he assumed that the topic is shared by the hearer. Later, when discussing this with the researcher, the informant explained that his reason for choosing the "sharing -ne#" was strategic; he did not want to use the rapport-ne (in my model) because he thought it would sound as if he was assuming that the hearer did not have knowledge and was afraid to set off his hearer's opinionated tendencies. He also did not want to use the questioning particle ka either, because he thought if he used ka, he would lose the momentum before stating his contention. So he used "sharing-ne#" pretending to assume that the hearer had the same information, and that this was a mutually shared topic. As a matter of fact, this strategy worked well and he was able to further develop his contention about the book which he suspected that the hearer had not yet read. The speaker in this way could elicit conversational cooperation from the hearer (who listened saying "Hmm, Hmm, Hmm" without interrupting the speaker). So, Oishi contends that use of sentence-final particles can change reality and constitutes reality in discourse. In this dissertation, I treated evidentiality as a "coding" issue: The evidentials "code" speaker's reality, but they do not "construct" new reality; however, the actual use of "coding" does not always straightforwardly follow the speaker's perception of reality due to his
various pragmatic intentions realized by "implicature".

Oishi's case presents a strategic use of "evidentiality implicature" to allow the speaker to voice his opinion safely without hurting the hearer's feeling. But more often, the purpose of the implicature is to be simply polite or to be aggressive toward the hearer.

Sometimes a speaker deliberately ignores the borders between information territories among the conversationalists and speaks as if some proposition which is actually out of his information territory is in his territory. In doing so, the speaker's disrespect of other people's territory is implied. The children's statements in (5-60) and (5-61) are examples of this implicature. F22's intentional use of direct forms in the latter half of (5-78)) is another example.

Sometimes, however, in order to be polite, speakers uses less indirect evidentials for certain types of propositions than the standard evidentials, which the propositions actually deserve. Observe the following examples:

(5-85)
F8: (1) iï ouchi kawareta-n deshoo
   nice house bought(FOR)-n-tag Q

F5: (2) iïe, zenzen futsuu no uchi na-n-desu  yo,
   no at all ordinary house-n-COP(FOR) PART(VOC)

F8 (1): You bought a very nice house, didn't you?
F5 (2): Not at all. It is an ordinary house.

F8 and F5 were talking about tax-returns and F5 mentioned that she had purchased a new house recently. Since F8 did not know this, for
F8 the proposition (i.e., F5 bought a nice house or not) is a type (D) proposition in that the proposition completely falls in the hearer's information territory and the speaker does not know anything about it. Therefore, the standard statement expected from F8, according to my model, would be a question sentence such as *did you buy a nice house?*

However, actually in stating F8(1), the speaker, F8, treated the information as if it was known to her as a presupposition (e.g. *If you bought a house, it must be a nice house*), and then used the evidential `deshoo` which is basically for type (C) propositions (belonging to both speakers' territories) or D propositions (in the hearer's information territory but the speaker knows). F8's evidential implicature was made for the sake of being polite. A short conventional reply of agreement such as `soo desu yo ne#` (*It is so, I agree*) and `hontoo ni ne#` (*It is truly so, I agree*) which is often used by female speakers in replying to statements regarding the hearer's matter characteristically shows this kind of politeness: The speaker pretends to share information in the hearer's territory and also pretends that the hearer's contention can be easily verified with common sense.

In the following example (5-86) of implicature of this type, speakers F5 (who live in America) and M1 were talking about F5's car about which M1 happened to be familiar even though it is an American car not available in Japan. F5 commented on M1's knowledge and pretended that M1 knew much about the car which was in her own information territory. Before line (2), F5 did not know that her hearer
had some knowledge about the proposition; therefore F5 treated it as in her information territory by introducing the name, Neon, indirectly in the quoted form, as a new piece of information to the hearer:

(5-85)
F5: (1) watashi, ima, Neon-tte iu no ni notteru-n-desu
I now Neon-QUOT NML drive(STAT)-n-COP(FOR)

kedo ne .
PART(RAPP)

M1:(2) neon, neon, doddi no yatsu
Neon, Neon, Dodge POSS car

F5: (3) soo na-n desu. Yasukute...
so-n- COP(FOR) Cheap (te)

M1:(4) nihonsha taikoo-tte yatsu ne
Japanese care competitive-QUOTE car PART(CONF)

F5: (5) soo desu. sasugani yoku go-zonji desu ne .
so COP(FOR) as expected well HON-know COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)

F5(1) : I am driving a car named Neon,
M1(2): Neon, Neon, Dodge's?
F5 (3): Yes. it is cheap and...
M1(4): [That] is the one which is said to be Japanese-car competitive, isn't it .
F5(5): Yes it is. As expected, you know very well, don't you .

In (5), speaker F5 ended the sentence with a formal direct form plus rapport-ne indicating that she considered the proposition that "M1 is knowledgeable" belongs to her own territory as truth. By doing so, F5 paid M1 a compliment about his knowledge. The direct evidential functions here to imply that F5 treats the preposition "M1 knows very
well about American cars" which is D type proposition, as highly truthful. A short formulaic complimentary response to the conversational partner's matter is often used in casual conversation for the same purpose. Examples include sugoi janai (That is great, isn't it_), ii janai (That is good, isn't it_) and yatta janai (You did it, didn't you_). In these phrases, a speaker pretends that the distance between the proposition (i.e., the hearer's matter) and himself is shorter than it actually is to express sympathy. This use of "evidentiality implicature" shows an aspect of Japanese politeness that is "positive politeness" in Brown and Levinson's politeness framework (1978, 1987).

But more often, speakers used the concept of "evidentiality implicature" by using less direct evidentials than their propositions deserve. This view is supported by the statistical fact that (A) type information (the speaker's territory only) was more indirectly described in situations with higher formality.

The relationship between evidential-coding and politeness is the topic of the next chapter. In the next chapter, I will argue that the rules in the model, both corollaries and standard evidential forms for each proposition, must be followed to be a polite speaker in Japanese discourse. Besides children, only a few adult speakers were found to noticeably and constantly go against this framwork. The cases in which those speakers whose evidentiality behavior did not follow the model are not always evidentiality implicature; the informants may have a different set of rules or understandings of the concept of information.
territory. In discourse, their conversational partners showed some kind of reaction to this non-standard speech behavior. Examples of speakers who do not seem to conform to the commonly preferred selection of evidentials were quoted earlier in (5-78) and (5-79). There were a few other speakers who habitually used direct forms for non-(A) type propositions; they used direct forms for all information types. In everyday life, one occasionally encounters this kind of habitually-direct speaker, and according to my subjective observation, these people are not popular in general among Japanese people. A comment that is frequently heard about these speakers is hakkiri mono o iu (He says things clearly). Hakkiri, meaning clear, straightforward, or outspoken does not have a good connotation in this context. People may not realize what is wrong with being hakkiri, but feel offended nonetheless. In the above critical comment, hakkiri actually means the overuse of direct-evidentials across all types of propositions. In this sense, non-conformity to the standard model of evidentiality may provoke social stigmatization, as discussed earlier.

From the perspective of politeness, the most problematic feature in the speech behavior of speakers who do not appear to subscribe to the commonly accepted norms is that they did not make a distinction among proposition types (A), (B), and (C): information in the speaker's territory which the model stipulates as follows:

(A) information that the speaker assumes the hearer does not know,
(B) information that the speaker assumes the hearer knows,
information that the speaker assumes also falls into the hearer's territory.

A speaker fully commits himself to the truth value of each of these three types of propositions since they each fall into the speaker's information territory; however, if the hearer may know even just a little about it, linguistically the proposition should be treated differently. In this sense the hearer's assumed knowledge about the proposition takes precedence to the fact that the speaker knows the proposition very well. For speakers who appear not to use the commonly preferred norm of evidentiality coding, these three proposition types are the same to all hearers: information which the speaker knows. Those speakers may speak about the information in their information territory in the same way to everybody without considering varying knowledge levels among different hearers.

CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY

In this chapter, I proposed a model of the Japanese sentence-ending evidentiality system, which presents a set of widely accepted pragmatic usages of the evidential forms. The main arguments in this chapter are summarized as follows:

(1) The model is based on the universal concept of linguistic evidentiality in that direct evidentials are used to express propositions for which the speaker has direct evidence on which to base his proposition so that his commitment to the proposition is strong. Otherwise, a speaker uses indirect evidentials (i.e., Corollary One). This
concept of direct and indirect evidence in Japanese is explained through the concept of the speaker's information territory: only propositions characterized by Corollary Two belong to the speaker's information territory, and thus are expressed by direct evidentials. Otherwise, a proposition may belong to the hearer's information territory or someone else's.

(2) A Japanese speaker's evidential usage is very sensitive to his hearer's assumed knowledge about his proposition, i.e., the hearer has information about the speaker's proposition in his own information territory, or the hearer has mere knowledge about the proposition, or the hearer does not have any knowledge. Each situation requires the speaker to use different kinds of direct evidentials.

(3) Based on (1) and (2) above, I have grouped propositions into six basic types, and proposed "preferred" forms of sentence-ending evidentials for each proposition type, respectively for formal and informal speech situations (cf. appendix D). Competent Japanese speakers seem to conform to the commonly preferred forms which the model presents. The model is, to some extent, supported by the evidential-shift performed by the same speakers in different speech situations with different formality levels.

(4) Japanese speakers were found to use more direct forms than expected. However, the forms which were abundantly used were "semi-direct forms" and "direct question forms". Those forms are sensitive to the hearer's knowledge. Basic forms of direct sentence ending (da, desu, masu, etc.) were not preferred except for limited situations. This may be the reason that Japanese speech is perceived to be very indirect.

(5) Information which does not belong to either the speaker's or the hearer's territory was expressed with direct evidentials more
frequently than expected, particularly in low-formality speech situations. It seems that, in informal settings, the speakers were less concerned with the third person's information territory than their hearers' information territories. Information which is publicly known to be highly trustworthy, in particular, tends to be expressed with direct evidentials. On the other hand, a large percentage of the speakers still expressed the same kind of information with indirect forms (e.g. hearsay, inference), conforming to the boundaries of information territory.

(6) Formal speech situations made the speakers more indirect and more sensitive to their hearer's knowledge than informal speech situations.

However, in formal discourse, such as business discussions and courtroom speech, which has a significant power difference among speakers and a low-concern with "affect", formality did not always enhance the use of indirect evidentials.

(7) The concept of the speaker's information territory can be relative to different hearers due to its dependency on the concept of *uchi* (*inside*) (Corollary Four). According to Corollary Two, in Japanese, a speaker is entitled to consider other *uchi* people's information as his own territory information (i.e., information with direct evidence). In a family atmosphere, speakers were more assertive with direct evidentials and even less-sensitive to the hearer's (i.e., family members) information territory and knowledge. Japanese grammar in general has a distinction between *uchi* (*insider*) and *soto* (*outsider*) in terms of reference and addressee. A speakers' territory is considered to include all *uchi* members' information territories.

However, one's *uchi* concept can be different in each speech situation with different hearers from different social groups ("relativity of the speaker's information territory").
(8) Public speech, teacher talk, and courtroom discourse have different concepts of information territory in that coverage of the speaker's information territory is considered wider than in ordinary conversation due to different views on the perceived distance between the speaker, the hearer, and the proposition. Usually, in these speech situations, the speaker's information territory includes the hearer's information. At the same time, teacher discourse is found to be similar to family discourse in terms of evidentiality use.

(9) In terms of evidential usage, female speakers were not as unassertive (i.e., not indirect) as expected when compared with male speakers. However, female informants' frequent usage of semi-direct evidentials suggests that they may be more sensitive than male speakers to the hearer's assumed knowledge. In this sense, female speakers may sound less assertive than male speakers. It is also suggested that female speakers shifted their preference of evidentials between formal and informal speech situations while male speakers tended to consistently use the evidentials of the same types in different speech situations.

(10) Young speakers under fifteen years of age were generally found to be direct in expressing all types of proposition. However, the concept of information territory was confirmed to be developing in seven and eight year old children. At this age, the use of addressee-oriented honorifics is observed to develop also, suggesting that the concept of information territory of speakers is a part of the language of social interaction.

(11) Speakers utilize a system of standard (i.e., commonly preferred) usage of evidentials in order to be assertive or less-assertive by not conforming to the common forms (i.e., "evidentiality implicature"). Speakers often use evidentiality implicature for the
purpose of expressing higher politeness.

Overall, I argued that usage of commonly-preferred forms is, more or less, pragmatically required; otherwise an individual may be socially indexed. However, since it is not grammaticalized, and the concept itself is not clearly known systematically, the usage of sentence-ending evidentiality is not explicitly taught to non-native learners of Japanese.
CHAPTER 5: Note

1 Kamio's conditions for the information in the speaker's territory are shown in chapter three, note 2. I quote them here again:

(1) Information about direct experience
(2) Information about personal data
   (2a) Personal information
   (2b) Geographical information
   (2c) Information about plans, actions, and behavior
(3) Information about expertise

However, sometimes the relative distance between the speaker and the information and that between the hearer and the information seem to matter on the surface. But this can be explained from a different perspective of the speaker's information territory (Relativeness of the territory concept) discussed in a later section.

3 Group (10) forms (i.e., I think) were used 10% of the time by defendants in court discourse for (A) type propositions. This may be due to the situational characteristics of court discourse. Except for the court cases, Group (4) and Group (10) forms were not used in other discourse types for (A) type propositions.

4 Original Japanese transcription for (5-78):

F22 (1): tatoeba Joyuu, Joyuu hikoku ga, for example Joyuu, suspect Joyuu Nom

hikoku de ii-n-desu ne
suspect right-n-COP(FOR) (CONF)

(2): kono aida hikoku ga saiban de arimashita yo ne .
the other day suspect NOM trial LOC existed (VOC)(CONF)
(3): are go-ranninatte ikaga deshita ka?
that HON-watch how COP(PAST)(FOR) Q

(4): goran-ni-narimashita ka?
watch(HON)(PAST) Q

M11(5): hai, maa, taiho-sareru mae wa nankaika
yes well arrest-(PASS) before CONT a few times
yariat-tari shuzai de hanashi o shiteta...
debated etc data-collection by talked

F22 (6): intabyuu mo zuibun nasai-mashita yo ne#
interview also a lot do (HON)(PAST) PART(VOC)(SHAR)

M11(7): ee, hai. de maa hatsukoohan no toki
yes, yes, then well first trial MODI time
kare o mite.
him OBJ watched(te)

(8): kare ga kekkyoku tsumi o mitomenai de sono
he NOM eventually guilt OBJ admit-NEG(te)
asahara ni tsuiteiku to iu shushi no shuukyootenina
Asahara follow QUOT content MODI religious
hatsugen o shita-n-desu ga ne.
statement OBJ said-n-COP(FOR) but PART(RAPP)

(9): nannka ichiban tsumaranai Joyuu o mita naa
somewhat most boring Joyuu OBJ watched PART(VOC)
konnnna otoko to yoriatteka no ka-tte iu shitsuboo
such man with argued COMP Q QUOT dissapointment
deshita ne.
COP(FOR)(PAST) VOC(RAPP)

F22 (10): ano hito wa nan na-n-deshoo . hontooni soo
that person TOP what kind of n-CONJ. really so
omotteru-n-deshoo ka
think(STAT)-n-CONJ Q
M11 (11): ano kare wa chotto tokubetsuna no wa
well he TOP a little special NML TOP

ichirenno hokano hikoku to chigatte
a series of other suspect different(te)

tatoeba chikatetsu sarin ni kanyoshita to ka
for example subway Sarin with related etc.

rinchi satsujin jikenn ni kannyoshita to ka
rinch murder cases with related etc.

soo iu tsumi de sukamatteru wake janakute
such crime by arrested(STAT) NEG

furui aru rorunen mae, kumamoto de
old one 6 years ago, Kumamoto LOC

okita saibann no gishoo o yatta to iu
happened trial MODI false testimony OBJ did QUOT

koto de sukamatteru kara aru imi de oomu no
COMP arrested(STAT) because a certain sense by Aum POSS

ichirenno jiken no honnkenn to wa bekken de
series of cases MODI core case CONT different case by

sukamatteru wake desu ne.
arrested(STATE) COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)

(12): omoshiroi no wa ichirenno oomu no kanbu-tachi no
interesting thing TOP top AUM POSS executives POSS

hanashi o shuzaisiteru naka de jitsu wa Joyuu ga
story OBJ cover(PROG) within in fact Joyuu NOM

ichiban omoshirokatta-n-desu yo.
most interesting(PAST)-n-COP(FOR) PART(VOC)

shuzai de wa ne.
covering story CONT PART(RAPP)

(13): ano tatoeba sashi-koros-areta Murai Hideo to iu
well for example, stabbed-killed-(PASS) Murai Hideo QUOT
hanashi o shita-n-desu kedo amari kyootsuuno talked -n-COP(FOR) not much common

kairo to-iu mono ga nai-n-desu yo ne . circuit-QUOT thing NOM NEG-n-COP(FOR) PART(VOC)(RAPP)

(14): maa bengoshi no Aoyama to-iu bengoshi no well attorney MODI Aoyama QUOT attorney MODI

hikoku ni mo nai-n-desu ga, suspect with also NEG-n-COP(FOR) but

(15): shikashi Joyuu dake wa wareware to futsuu-no but Joyuu only TOP we with ordinary

kaiwa ga dekiri otoko datta-n-desu yo. conversation NOM capable man was-n-COP(FOR) PART(VOC)

(16): sono hen ga hijooni shuzai-joo that parts NOM very much covering story-upon

wa omoshirokatta otoko desu yo. CONT interesting(PAST) man COP(FOR) PART(VOC)

F22(17): sono hen no umisen-yamasen no masukaomi o that areas MODI cunning mass-communication OBJ

aite ni shite ne , mada sanjuu soko soko no opponent DAT had RAPP only 30 years old barely MODI

hito ga aa yatte mainichi kishakaiken o shite person NOM that way did everyday press interview OBJ did(te)

tonikaku kemuni-maku ni shite mo nan ni shite mo anyway fooled doing whatever doing

iikurumeru yoona koto o yareru-tte kotojitai ga ne confuse like act OBJ do(POT)-COMP itself OBJ (RAPP)

ikura sore wa benron taikai de ichii datta-tte even though that TOP debate contest LOC best was-but

nakanaka futsuu wa sonna ni ikanai desu kara. hardly generally CONT that much go(NEG) COP(FOR) because
M11(18): are wa hontoni tokubetsu no sai no o motteru
that TOP really special talent OBJ have(STAT)

otoko datta naa-tte,
man was VOC-QUOTE

hijoo ni atama no kirikae ga dekiru otoko to...
at first thinking switching NOM capable man COMP

soreni hijooni kuuruna otoko deshita ne
in addition very much cool man COP(PAST)(FOR) (RAPP)

M11(19): de koo-iu hanashi o, 90-nenn ni oomu ga senkyo
then this-QUOTE story OBJ 1990 TEMP Aum NOM election

ni utte-deta.
to advanced

(20): sono toki ni Joyuu-hikoku ga Asahara ni senkyo ni
that time TEMP Joyuu suspect OBJ Asahara to election to

hantai-shita to iu-koto ga atta-n-desu ne.
opposed QUOT COMP NOM was-n-COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)

(21): sorede tooji soo-iu-hanashi ga atta node
therefore at that time so-QUOT-episode NOM exited because

shuzai no ato zatsudanshitete soo-ieba
coverage MODI later chatting(te)

senkyo ni hantaishita-n-datte-tte iu-fuuni
election to opposed-n-heard -QUOTE-fashion

kii tara atarimae desho daremo hitori mo
asked(COND) of course tag-Q nobody one person even

toorimasen yo-tte koo iu wake desu.
elected(NEG) VOC-QUOT COMP say COP(FOR)

(22): de sore wa wareware mo toora-nai to omou kedo
then that TOP we also pass(NEG) COMP think but

aa-iu kyooso o chushin to shita piramiddo
such leader OBJ center make pyramid
組織 CONDI で どの程度もあると

かれの絶対的な価値を従う

(23): みんな なので 視えた ke do

Joyuu だけは 同じく ne

(24): だれも たどりつけないてすぐに itta

ところが そう珍しく wa 私たちは TOP "what"-QUOT

surprised(FOR) PART(RAPP)

F22 (26): そのほかに も も も も行許多 take

arimashita kedo. but

(27): だから 一番に 太って いちばん 受けた

therefore, trial became most surprised(FOR)

yo ne .

PART(VOC)(RAPP)

(28): ああ たって お たとる こと ga ね

such attitude OBJ take(STAT)COMP NOM PART(RAPP)

5Original Japanese transcription of (5-79) :

M16 (1): で どんなりけり shite たましき だemon wakariyasuku

then by some way たとえ easy to understand

deki-ke-nai-tte omotta toki ni kore ね

make-NEG-Q VOC-COMP thought when TEMP this OBJ
kō yatte kami o fuseta toki ni ongaku mo
tomeru-n-desu ne

(2): ongaku mo dakara yamete kudasai-te

kō fuseteru-tte koto o tometa-n desu.

(3): soosuru-to desu ne, sukunakutomo kami o
doing so-COND COP(FOR) RAPP at least paper OBJ

oita-tte iu storii no kaname no pointo ga

(4): desukara oto o tsukau-to sugoku wakariyasuku

(5): demo biiru no ton o okareru oto mo

(6): desukara kouyatte don to naru-to sokode storii

(7): desukara asokode oto ga tomara-nakat-tara

ochanoma no hito no shisen wa Hagiwara-san

living room MODI person POSS viewpoint TOP Hagiwara(HON)
no kao shika ika-nai wake desu yo.
POSS face only go-NEG COP(FOR) PART(VOC)

(8): sore wa tarento-san desu kara soko shika that TOP talent-HON COP(FOR) because there only
ika nai wake desu yo.
go-NEG COP(FOR) PART(VOC)

(9): soko ga ichiban omoshiroi, sono naka no that NOM most interesting that within
gamen no naka de wa ichiban omoshiroi screen POSS inside LOC CONT most interesting
tokoro dakara.
part because

(10): oto de muishikini eeto soo-iu tokoro o sound INST unconsciously well such factor OBJ
nanka mite morau, soshite stoorii de somewhat watch-receive then story
15 byoo shika nai keredo soo-iu koto o 15 seconds only NEG but such COMP OBJ
kushi-shite stoorii o wakatte moraerutte utilize (te) story OBJ understand-receive(te)
koto o yatteru-n-desu ne .
COMP OBJ doing-n-COP(FOR) PART(RAPP)

(11) muishiki no uchi ni, ochanoma wa moo unconsciously living room TOP very
terebi no puro desu kara ne TV MODI professional COP(FOR) because PART(RAPP)

(12) maa ichinini ni san yo jikan miru no ga well one day three four hours watch COMP NOM
heikin de arimasu yo ne average exist PART(VOC)(RAPP)
One of the most important sentence-medial evidentials in relation to speaker's psychological territory of information is the use of deixis, which is introduced in chapter three, note 4.
CHAPTER 6: JAPANESE LINGUISTIC POLITENESS AND EVIDENTIALITY

So far it has been demonstrated that the situationally appropriate use of evidentiality marking is not grammatically obligatory but rather is a pragmatic requirement for competent speakers of the language. This issue is closely related to linguistic politeness in Japanese. In this chapter, I will examine how the system of Japanese evidentiality coding is positioned in politeness theory.

In general, across most languages, linguistic evidentiality markings are primarily based on the speaker's source of information, i.e., the speaker’s direct or indirect experience. I have demonstrated in this study that Japanese evidentiality marking is sensitive to both (1) the "owner of information" and (2) the "assumed hearer’s knowledge" about the proposition. It is a minimum requirement, in interpersonal communication, for the speaker to demonstrate sensitivity to these factors with appropriate sentence-ending evidential forms.

A speaker may use two techniques to be more polite than required through the use of evidentiality implicature: The speaker minimizes his our information territory, or conversely expands his hearer's information territory. A speaker may thus make a certain piece of information appear to be known more by the hearer or shared between himself and the speaker.

Two integral politeness factors resulting from this concept of Japanese evidentiality coding are "demonstrating the speaker’s indirect relationship to the proposition" and "demonstrating the shared nature
of the proposition". As a matter of fact, these two factors have been considered to be important politeness rules and strategies in classic studies of linguistic politeness. First, regarding "indirectness", Held (1992), for example, commented that "...the broad scope of polite behavior has also undergone a certain reduction to rational, goal-directed behavior strategies in which the component of respect is almost exclusively anchored in indirectness" (p. 131). Speech-act theory, which introduced the linguistic aspect of politeness into the framework of pragmatics, is primarily based on the concept of indirectness (e.g. Searle 1975; Lakoff 1973a, b; Leech 1983).\(^1\) Politeness strategies to help other people save face through a low degree of imposition also enhance indirect behavior (see Brown and Levinson, 1987:60). As Held claims, the traditional concepts of "respect" and "tact" have been recognized and analyzed by both Grice (1967, first published 1975) and Searle (1975) as "theories of indirectness" in the beginning, and have been further re-shaped by Lakoff, Leech and also by Brown and Levinson(1978, 1987).

Second, the linguistic behavior of "information sharing", in which a speaker demonstrates expectation that the listener has extensive knowledge, is relevant to Lakoff's politeness rule of "show camaraderie" and also corresponds to a portion of Brown and Levinson's "positive face" strategies (e.g. "presuppose common ground", "assume reciprocity").

343
In the following sections, first, recent studies of linguistic politeness are reviewed and discussed, secondly, I propose my view of politeness from based on perspective of this research, and lastly I examine how Japanese evidentiality marking fits in the politeness system.

LITERATURE ON LINGUISTIC POLITENESS

Since the 1970's, in particular, a range of thoughts have been expressed in this field of study. Although they differ one from another in details, most of them seem to fall into one of several main approaches. For convenience, I would like to review the principal theories from two different viewpoints. The first approach can be called the "normative view" in which politeness is considered to be conformance to rules such as universal "pragmatic rules" or culturally or historically defined "social orders". The second approach, the "strategic view", treats politeness as a set of strategies to realize conversational goals. Some researchers apply a combination of the two approaches to politeness: both rule based and strategy based.

Politeness as normative rules

Before politeness was discussed within the framework of pragmatics, pre-pragmatic linguists paid attention to the normative aspects of politeness. Generally, politeness was considered to be a
common-sense concept. Lakoff was the first scholar to advocate that politeness can be conceived as a pragmatic rule. Earlier, in his influential theory of Cooperative Principle (1967, 1975), Grice has argued that rational people unconsciously follow four mutually understood principles in conversation: (1) the speaker should be as informative as necessary; (2) he should be precise; (3) he should be truthful; and (4) he should be relevant within the context of the conversation. Grice also associated these four major principles with a set of more specific maxims and sub-maxims. Grice assumed that "anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g. giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstance, in participation in speech exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principles and Maxims" (1975: 49). Grice suggested that violation of any of the conversational maxims is a message to the listener that the speaker's utterance is to be interpreted in a manner other than its literal meaning.

Based on Grice, Lakoff (1973a) argued that a person's choice of words and sentences reflects more than just literal semantic and syntactic meaning. She said that there are pragmatic rules which govern language use, and that people violate Grice's maxims for the pragmatic purpose of being polite. Lakoff proposed two rules of
"pragmatic competence": "be clear" (based on Grice's maxim) and "be polite". She claimed that being polite is often more important than being clear in conversation if the speaker wants to foster a good relationship with his listener: The goal of most conversations is not necessarily the exchange of information in the most clear and efficient manner possible, but rather it is often to strengthen relationship between participants. Lakoff delineated three rules of politeness. They are: (1) don't impose on other people's business (formal/impersonal politeness); (2) give options to the listener (informal politeness), and (3) make the listener feel good by telling him what he wants to hear (intimate politeness). The first and the second rules give the listener autonomy by allowing him to decide to go along with the speaker's conversational attempts and goals. The third rule primarily aims to make the opponent "feel good" by using warm fuzzies such as praise and compliments, or conveying a sense of equality or camaraderie.

Leech (1983) also elaborated on Grice's theory by introducing a set of rhetorical principles and maxims that constrain rational speech behavior. Leech argued that a speaker always has social goals, and that in pursuing these goals he should avoid any verbal or nonverbal conflict. Politeness, in order to maintain harmonious interaction, is one of his "Interpersonal Rhetorical Principles". Interpersonal Rhetoric has maxims that fall in three different domains: (1) the Cooperative Principle, (2) the Politeness Principle, and (3) the Irony Principle. Leech proposed six major "Politeness Maxims", which Fraser (1990: 225)
organized as follows:

(a) Tact Maxim: Minimize hearer cost; maximize hearer benefit.

(a') Meta-Maxim: do not put the hearer in a position where either the speaker or the hearer has to break the tact maxim.

(b) Generosity Maxim: Minimize your own benefit; maximize your hearer's benefit.

(c) Approbation Maxim: Minimize hearer dispraise; maximize hearer praise.

(d) Modesty Maxim: Minimize self-praise; maximize self-dispraise.

(e) Agreement Maxim: Minimize disagreement between yourself and others; maximize agreement between yourself and others.

(f) Sympathy Maxim: Minimize antipathy between yourself and others; maximize sympathy between yourself and others.

Leech further proposed five different "scales" to measure the degree of conformance to the maxims: the Cost-Benefit Scale, the Optionality Scale, the Indirectness Scale, the Authority Scale, and the Social Distance Scale. So, theoretically, these six maxims and five scales should be sufficient to "diagnose" human politeness behaviors. Since the word "politeness" was too "generic" for Leech, he identified four different types of politeness; Competitive Politeness, Convivial Politeness, Collaborative Politeness, and Conflictive Politeness. He did not, however, discuss a speaker's motivation for choosing one type of politeness over another. Although scholars tend to consider Leech's overall approach to be too theoretical to apply to actual language use (e.g. Fraser, 1990; Watts et al, 1992), Leech did indisputably provide us
with a detailed elaboration of Grice's concept.

Interestingly, Leech implied that the goal of politeness is to establish and maintain social rules ("comity"). In this sense, his approach based on communication maxim leads to a "social norm/order view" of politeness that also sees politeness as a normative behavior in a culture-oriented way. A group of researchers of non-Western languages (e.g. Hills et al., 1986; Matsumoto, 1989; Ide, 1989; Koo, 1995) see politeness as a set of standard behaviors in a given society to which each individual is obliged to conform. In this "social norm" view, politeness is a social rule, part of common ground of community members. This view will be discussed after the strategic view.

**Politeness as a strategy**

While Lakoff and Leech viewed politeness as a regulative principles which govern our linguistic behavior, other scholars argued that speakers use politeness behavior as an interactional strategy in an attempt to attain their conversational goals. It is not too radical to assume that all human interaction is strategic to some extent in that it usually has goals to attain (e.g. Read et al., 1989; Pervin 1989). Politeness behavior is not an exception.\(^3\) Looking at the definitions of politeness may help to clear this idea. There have been a variety of definitions of politeness although there is not a single universally accepted one. Many researchers claim that the purpose of politeness is to make the
hearer feel good, to make the conversation harmonious and human relations peaceful (e.g. Lakoff 1973, Held, 1992). However, under these "surface" purposes there may exist a speaker's intended goals which can be achieved only on peaceful terms. Watt et al. (1992) quoted a definition of politeness from "1702 The English Theophrastus: or the manners of the age", and paraphrased it as follows:

Politeness is a form of social behavior encompassing both linguistic and non-linguistic activity; that it is a skill which, if acquired, is to be used in a rational, premeditated fashion to achieve very specific aims; that its principal aim is the enhancement of ego's self-esteem and his public status esteem; that it demands a subtle interpretation of the social context in which it is to be used (45).

Watt compared this definition with the modern definitions by Lakoff (1975:64), Leech (1983:104), Fraser and Nolen (1981), and Brown and Levinson (1987:1)\(^4\), and commented that the modern definitions of politeness from "maxim/rule" viewpoint (e.g. Lakoff and Leech) interestingly do not differ significantly from the eighteenth century idea of politeness. He said that those definitions are lacking basically egocentric nature of politeness behavior, and concluded that whereas on the surface politeness may appear to fulfill altruistic goals, a communicative partner may be potentially aggressive as Brown and Levinson posit; thus politeness is, nevertheless and to some extent, a mask to conceal the ego's true frame of mind.

P. Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) proposed a theory of politeness that viewed politeness as a set of goal-oriented and situation-
dependent behavioral strategies. They referred to Grice's Cooperative Principles in that a deviation from the Principles (i.e., conversational implicatures) demonstrates the speaker's intention to be polite (also see Fraser, 1990). Their theory was based on several crucial assumptions. First, they assumed that politeness behavior is universal, although specific methods for expressing politeness may differ from one culture to another. Second, they also assumed that humans rationally use strategies which help them attain their goals, and that one of their goals is to mutually maintain "face" (individual's self-esteem) in communicative interactions. This concept of face maintenance is central to their framework. They adapted the notion of face from Goffman (1967) to whom they dedicated their 1987 book. In his book "Interactional Rituals", Goffman proposed that face is the ideal social image which an individual wants to portray of himself. Goffman wrote that "face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (p. 5). He also claimed that a speaker must be considerate as to maintain not only his face but also his interactants' face, and that the mutual maintenance of face is a basic feature of any social encounter. Brown and Levinson adopted this concept of face in human interaction, and assumed that there are two dimensions of human "face wants". They called these "negative face" and "positive face". Negative face is everybody's desire to be free from imposition by others, to have their personal prerogatives, and to maintain and respect
for their territory. Positive face represents one's desire to be approved of, to be appreciated, and looked upon favorably by others. Brown and Levinson concurred with Goffman in that rational individuals will try to maintain each other's negative and positive face unless there is some other goal which is more important than fulfilling each other's face-wants. Furthermore, speakers must be most aware of their interactant's face-wants when pursuing a potentially threatening goal. Brown and Levinson described these "intrinsic face threatening acts " (or FTA's) as introducing the potential for interpersonal conflict. Therefore, according to the theory, the speaker will either try to minimize the damage which an FTA may cause, or decide not to do the FTA at all, or if he is not concerned with causing a conflict, he will boldly exercise FTA's to his hearer's face. Brown and Levinson considered FTA to be an important determinant of one's use of politeness. Actually, all forms of politeness are linked to FTA's in Brown and Levinson's theory. As the estimation of risk of face loss by an FTA becomes greater, a speaker will need to resort to higher levels of politeness strategies. The following chart [6-1] represents the core concept of the theory. The chart shows that if a speaker estimates that a minimal loss of hearer's face will be caused by his FTA, the speaker may perform an FTA without redressing it. This type of speech is Grician-maximally efficient speech: telling the truth straightforwardly in an unambiguous way with the least necessary amount of information. That is strategy (a) in [6-1]. As the estimated face loss increases, the speaker may need to resort to a higher
degree of politeness. Strategies are: (b) redress or make up for his threatening action by positive politeness strategies to satisfy the hearer's "positive face wants" (e.g. compliments, in-group references, familiar address, and sympathy); (c) redress or make his action which may be threatening to the hearer's "negative face wants" by using negative politeness strategies (e.g. minimize the size of imposition, guarantee its nonrecurrence, and indirect request); (d) do a FTA but in a circumlocutious or ambiguous way so that the hearer may not interpret it as face threatening but inefficient communication; and (e) do not say anything which is potentially face threatening when the greatest face loss is estimated, but since most communications are in some way face threatening (e.g. R. Brown, 1990) this strategy may result in a lack of communication.


Lesser face loss is estimated

(a) without redress, boldly
    on record

Do the FTA
    with redressive action

(b) positive politeness strategies

(c) negative politeness strategies

(d) off record
    (do FTA but ambiguously)

(e) Don't do

352
the FTA
(but no communication)

Greater face loss is estimated

Commenting on P. Brown and Levinson's framework, R. Brown and Gilman (1989) suggested that negative and positive politeness are not independent of each other as P. Brown and Levinson posit. They said that whether a strategy is positive or negative is not the nature of the strategy itself but rather depends on how the strategy is used in a particular situation. Accordingly, they collapsed these two categories (b) and (c) in [6-1] into one. Baxter (1984) also found from her empirical studies that negative politeness strategies scored high only for the negative politeness ratings whereas positive politeness strategies scored high on both positive and negative politeness dimensions. Baxter, therefore, speculated that positive politeness may be a higher politeness strategy since it subsumed both positive and negative politeness strategies. These studies threw some doubt on the boundary in reality between the negative and positive strategies of Brown and Levinson's framework. As a matter of fact, in their 1987 book in which Brown and Levinson reassessed some aspects of their original model, they acknowledged that the actual boundaries between the strategies are far less clear than their original model had implied: The three super-strategies, positive politeness, negative politeness, and off-record, which were ranked unidimensionally to achieve mutual exclusivity, may be used inclusively in real utterances (pp. 17-18).
In order to determine what politeness strategy should be used in a given situation in accordance with the level of FTA, P. Brown and Levinson identified three situational factors: the horizontal (or social) and vertical (hierarchical) distance between interactants, and the speaker's assessment of the probable imposition degree that a certain FTA would create between the participants in a particular speech setting. Based on these ideas, Brown and Levinson originated the following formula to calculate the weightiness of FTA ($W_x$) as follows:

$$W_x = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + R_x$$

In the formula, $D(A,T)$ is the social Distance between the Speaker and the Hearer, $P(T,A)$ is the relative Power the Hearer has over the Speaker, and $R_x$ is the absolute Ranking of imposition of the intended action (e.g. requesting, complaining, promising, and apologizing) in a given culture. Brown and Levinson assumed that Distance and Power factors are universal determinants of politeness strategy and that there would be a cultural difference in the evaluation of R factor. This formula suggests that the seriousness of an FTA and the consequent need for appropriate politeness level are calculable based on a linear combination of three contextual factors; the social distance between the actors, the hearer's power, and the degree of imposition.

The strength of Brown and Levinson's framework is its interactional context dependency which is advantageous when
compared with the rule/maxim views presented by scholars such as Leech and Lakoff. As a matter of fact, in general opinion, Brown and Levinson's theory excels in representing politeness as a system in broad outline based on the natural human desire of face-wants as well as potentially goal-oriented human behavior. As a whole it is a grand intellectual work (see also R. Brown, 1989) that has been empirically supported by the fellow researchers (e.g. Ervin-Tripp, 1976; Baxter, 1984; Blum-Kulka, et al., 1985; Holtgraves, 1986; R. Brown and Gilman, 1989; Holtgraves et al., 1990).

At the same time, follow-up studies by various researchers have yielded some findings which partially dissent from Brown and Levinson's theory. Ervin-Trip (1976) found that requesting behaviors between intimates are more direct than those between strangers when "D" (social horizontal distance) is defined as solidarity. Interestingly, Wolfson (1988) found that her subjects were more polite to acquaintances than strangers or intimates friends; therefore, she reported that there is a "bulge" between two extremes of social distance; "very close and very distant" and "neither close nor distant". R. Brown and Gilman (1990) reported that when "D" is defined as "affect" (liking), the higher affect resulted in higher politeness. They proposed two components of "D", "interactive closeness" and "affect", and claimed that, in four Shakespearean tragedies, those two factors are not closely associated to each other: Interactive closeness has little to do with politeness. This finding suggests that the "D" factor that actually
influences the choice of politeness strategy is "liking". Field (1991) and Koo (1995) proposed that the D (distance) factor should be broken into three independent factors: "affect" (liking), "familiarity", and "familiarity-by-affect interaction". These reports suggested that a re-examination of the distance factor might be necessary.

Along with these observations, the theory received some serious disagreement from scholars regarding its basic postulates. There seem to be two major criticisms. The first criticism is that the concept of face-wants is not universal. Since the concept is central to Brown and Levinson's framework, the critics contend that the universality of the theory is questionable (e.g. Blum-Kulka, 1990; Gu, 1990; Matsumoto 1989). The second argument is based on the concept of "deference". On the face concept, for example, a Japanese researcher, Matsumoto (1988, 1989) claims that Japanese people's concept of face is different from that of Brown and Levinson's model because of group-orientation in Japanese society. Matsumoto's assertion that Japanese people have no concept of territory was introduced in chapter three of this dissertation. She argues that Japanese group-orientation leads to the lack of the both concepts of "face" and "territory".

What is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her own territory, but the position in relation to the others in the group and his/her acceptance by those others. Loss of face is associated with the perception by others that one has not comprehended and acknowledged the structure of the group.

What is most alien to Japanese culture in the notion of face, as attributed to the model person, is the concept of negative face wants as the desire to be unimpeded in on's action. Postulating as
one of the two aspects of the Model Person's 'face', the desire to be unimpeded, presupposes that the basic unit of society is the individual. With such an assumption, however, it is almost impossible to understand behavior in the Japanese culture. (1988: 405)

Matsumoto argues that in societies with very strong "group interdependency" such as Japanese society, members do not exactly have negative face wants. I argued in chapter three that Japanese group-orientation does not indicate an absence of the concept of territory. Again, I also believe that Japanese speaker's interdependency does not mean they do not have the concept of both types of face. As a matter of fact, as Matsumoto argues, in such a society, each individual may be concerned with being acknowledged by or depended on by other members of the group (i.e., Brown and Levinson's positive face wants) so that, within a social group, members may present a strong interdependency encouraged by intra-group positive politeness behavior. At the same time, as noted earlier, Japanese people typically do not want to be impeded by other group members (e.g. Nakane, 1967; Doi, 1973). This is a form of negative face wants where an individual represents his group's face. No matter how diverse international cultures are, it is likely that all human beings have both basic positive and negative face wants.

At the same time, however, the Japanese case may present different boundaries between negative and positive strategies from Brown and Levinson's original model. For example, the imposition from a lower status speaker to a higher status addressee is sometimes
conventionally regarded as positive politeness. An example is a mother speaking to her daughter's teacher, that "musume o yoroshiku onegai shimasu" (lit. "Please take good care of my daughter") If we regard this behavior as attending to the hearer's wants to be depended upon, this is an authentic positive face strategy. In this sense, the speech could be considered an "imposition", which should be avoided as a negative strategy in Brown and Levinson's model. However, the nuance of imposition is mitigated with the word "please". Also the sentence acknowledges at a deeper level of trust that the speaker has upon the hearer. Such an entrusting act can be seen as a "compliment" to the hearer. In this way, the interpretation of the model must depend on each speech community, however, Brown and Levinson's model may be found highly relevant in any speech community.

Regarding the concept of FTA, in Brown and Levinson's framework, as written earlier, every exercise of politeness strategy is linked with an occurrence of FTA and the corresponding needs to strategically redress FTA for the sake of the actor's intended goal. This leads to the second major criticism. It was claimed that deferential politeness, i.e., "ordinary everyday politeness" (Koo, 1995), seems to be realized without FTA and that politeness is not only strategic but also part of socially required normal standard behavior. This type of view generally considers politeness to have two dimensions: politeness as a social rule and politeness as situational strategy. For convenience, I will temporarily call this type of view the "two-dimensional politeness"
Two-dimensional-politeness view

The two-dimensional view arose in response to the appearance of Brown and Levinson's theory. Non-Western researchers (e.g. Hills et al., 1986; Matsumoto, 1989; Ide, 1989; and Koo, 1995) argue that languages with honorifics such as Japanese, Javanese, and Korean have a different dimension of politeness: deferential type politeness. Ide (1989), for example, criticized all major existing pioneering politeness theories, by saying that all the theories "could not avoid an ethnocentric bias toward Western languages and the Western perspective" (p. 224) and that they are not adequate for languages with honorifics such as Japanese (Brown and Levinson, however, claimed their model could handle honorifics. See later section). Those Eastern researchers claim that speakers of languages with honorifics express politeness through two different channels. Ide (1989) described the two channels as "intentional strategies to allow his or her [i.e., speaker's] message to be received favorably by the addressee" and the "speaker's choice of expressions to conform to the expected and/or prescribed norms of speech appropriate to the contextual situation in individual speech communities" (p. 225). The first channel seems to be relevant to Brown and Levinson's framework if we interpret Ide's "to make message be received favorably" as meeting a hearers' face-wants. This type of
politeness is speaker-intentional, and is thus called "volitional
politeness". Ide claimed that the second type of politeness is neglected in Brown and Levinson's framework. The second type of politeness is described as a socially required standard behavior to be a competent member of the society; therefore, if a speaker does not meet this social demand, some kind of social sanction may be applied. This politeness is called "discernment politeness" (e.g. Hills et al, 1986, Ide, 1989). Discernment (wakimae in Japanese) refers to the use of a standard in formal setting (Watts et al. 1990). Wakimae may also refer to a set of programmed behavioral patterns recognized as appropriate by community members in each social setting. This view of politeness involving socially required discernment is called the "social-norm" view.

The social-norm view emphasizes the importance of deferential politeness which had been routinely separated from the scope of politeness for some reason. Hwang (1975, 1990) proposed to distinguish deference from politeness, since in the Korean language they are two distinctively different sociolinguistic concepts. This brings up the question of how the scope of politeness should be defined in a universal way. Hwang said that we may identify politeness with "sentiments" (a psychological matter) and deference with "conventional norms" (a matter of social code). Koo (1990) claimed that Korean honorific use is not a strategic politeness, which is to mitigate predictable effects of FTA,
but simply an expression of the speaker's discernment which occurs even in non-FTA situations. Matsumoto (1987) also claimed earlier from her experiment with Japanese speakers that even in a "non-FTA" interaction, the obligatory use of honorific expressions was confirmed in hypothetically high formality settings. However, the basic question which came to my mind here is how large is the set of 'one hundred percent FTA-free speech situations' among all speech situations we have. If we assume that speech behavior is goal-oriented and targeted at someone else who has an independent ego, its proportion seems to be very small or even null (also see the next section).

Focusing on the wakimae aspect of language, researchers of non-Western languages oppose the view that discernment and politeness are mutually distinct sociolinguistic aspects (e.g. Fraser and Nolen, 1987; Hwang, 1990); instead, they incorporate deferential aspects of speech as a major part of politeness, i.e. "non-FTA" politeness.

The scope of these researchers may, at least, tell us something about the basic problem of defining politeness in a cross-culturally valid way. In some cultures, what is emphasized can be the strategic aspect of language, in another culture it can be the social standard form of language, and in another culture, it can be the principle of benevolent modesty from the Buddhism (e.g. Kummer, 1992). Across languages and cultures, we undeniably have different stresses in wielding our politeness behavior, and in particular how to incorporate discernment into the theory of politeness remains as a critical question.
Similar approaches to the two-dimensional view can be seen among Western scholars too. For example, Janney and Arndt posit (1992) two different types of politeness: "social politeness" and "tact". According to these researchers, social politeness is "rooted in people's need for smoothly organized interaction with other member of their group" (p. 22) primarily by following social conventions (e.g. "conversational routines", "politeness formulas", "politeness conventions", and "formulaic expressions"). This social politeness seems to belong to the category of discernment. On the other hand, tact is rooted in people's need to maintain face: Janney and Arndt said that "for the preservation of face and avoidance of conflict, people need to behave tactfully in an interpersonally supportive way" (p. 23). This tact seems similar to Brown and Levinson's face-saving strategies or Ide's volitional politeness.

POLITENESS VIEW IN THIS RESEARCH

The argument of Eastern scholars in the previous section leads us to the question of whether or not there is a universal theory of politeness. If there is, this theory should be capable of satisfying a culturally varied concept of politeness across speech communities. However, cultural variance may not be as radical as it at least seems. As R. Brown (1990), referring to S. Asch (1952), said, "if we looked only at cultural features, externally viewed, we should see a high degree of
cultural relativism, but if we look at intercultural meanings in term of P and D [for example], we see universality or invariance" (p. 31). This observation may hold some truth in the deference issue of politeness too. Fraser and Nolen (1981) attempted to characterize deference through their empirical study of deferential expressions in English as well as Spanish. They tried to distinguish deference from politeness under the hypothesis that deference is not the same as politeness, but that the inappropriate use of deference can result in an impolite behavior. They found that both English and Spanish speakers consistently agreed on the relative degree of deference associated with prepared sentences. They found that the similarity between English and Spanish speakers in their understanding of deference in language to be systematic. Fraser and Nolen suggested that certain semantic aspects of deferential expressions may function comparably across languages. Koo (1995) also found that American students also expressed deferential politeness in a similar way to Korean students. Before the experiment, Koo presumed that only Korean subjects would express politeness in hypothetical non-FTA speech setting and that American subjects would only show politeness in situations with FTA. But the results did not match his expectation. It seems that deference (or discernment) is not limited to Asian languages, but is a widely shared social function. Hills et al. (1986) commented that both American English and Japanese speakers had both discernmental and volitional dimensions of politeness, but for Japanese speakers discernment was
prominent whereas for American speakers volitional politeness was prominent. So it seems reasonable to say that the difference among cultures is one of emphasis of one function of politeness over another and that it is reasonable to incorporate discernment/deference into the scope of politeness in cultures that have an emphasis on it.

However, I do not agree with the view that deferential politeness has nothing to do with FTAs, and thus has no relation with Distance and Power factors in speech situations. Rather, I believe, all types of politeness behavior are possibly related to the speaker's strategic motivation to mitigate possible FTAs. Matsumoto (1989) points out that saying *it is Sunday today* to someone is not a FTA, yet Japanese subjects used polite expressions when higher formality is required; therefore, politeness can exist without FTA (also Koo, 1995). Certainly, the phrase *it is Sunday today* is not an FTA sentence since there is no $R_x$, however, the interaction itself can conceivably be a FTA for either party if there is a great contrast in power such as status difference in a given organization, or if the interactants do not know each other at all or dislike each other (great "D" and "P"). In short, we can assume that every instance of speech behavior has the potential to be an FTA. As argued earlier in this chapter, all human interaction may be considered goal-oriented and consequently any interpersonal speech behavior may be considered strategic in order to serve some purpose.

A Japanese sociolinguist, Maynard (1989), took the position that
Japanese linguistic politeness is strategic as a whole. She claimed that Japanese speakers use a variety of strategies which may achieve the desired goal by "maximizing the effect of personal appeal" and "achieving maximum agreeableness to the recipient" (p. 31). Maynard called this whole system of the strategies "social packaging", in that Japanese speakers should "package" the propositional content of their talk appropriately with strategies. Packaging is "a socially motivated act to construct the content of the utterance in such a way as to achieve maximum agreeableness to the recipient" in keeping "interpersonal feelings intact when the semantic content is conveyed to the other interactant" (p. 31). Maynard claimed that Japanese speakers do this by the use of frequent final particles, fillers to hide the message, incompleteness to soften the statement, delaying and avoidance in reacting to avoid direct confrontation. Maynard suggested that these strategies are positive politeness in emphasizing positive aspects of interpersonal relationship although they may fall into the category of negative politeness in Brown and Levinson's model. Maynard claimed that the background of these speech packaging strategies is Japanese society as a homogeneous speech community in which members are assumed to hold similar or identical views (Mizutani, 1983, quoted by Maynard). This explanation may be true, but at the same time, this kind of strategic decoration of speech must be undertaken in any speech community for politeness in communication.

Theoretically, as Maynard suggests, even the use of honorifics...
may be considered to be a "socially-motivated strategy" in the sense that its purpose is to demonstrate that the speaker is a competent social person. Referring to deference represented by honorifics, Brown and Levinson (1987) said that deference is not encoded in language by the use of arbitrary forms, but by the use of motivated forms" (p. 23). They suggest that grammaticalized or conventionalized aspects of honorifics are deferential being opposed to open-ended politeness strategies. They state that honorifics can be motivated by various channels: (1) through a strategy of giving deference; (2) through a strategy of impersonalization; (3) through negative politeness in general for higher strata in complex societies; and (3') through positive politeness which is internal in lower strata. Brown and Levinson also remarked that deference is for "the most part 'frozen' or grammaticalized outputs of productive politeness strategies" (p. 23). Therefore, Brown and Levinson saw honorifics (i.e., deferential language) as strategic also and further claimed that this argument is supported by a variety of cross-linguistic research (they quoted Bean, 1978 for Kannada; Hill et al., 1978 for modern Nahuatl; Paulston, 1976 for Swedish; McClean, 1973 for Nepali; Haviland 1982, for Australian Guugu Yimidhirr; Duranti, 1981 for Samoan).

Based on this, Brown and Levinson maintained that "there is not a certain quantity of politeness to be conveyed by one channel (the grammaticalized honorifics) or another (strategic language use)...politeness is usually redundantly expressed in both" (p. 25). In
their 1987 publication, Brown and Levinson's treatment of honorifics was not too different in effect from the two-dimensional politeness theories. I believe that Brown and Levinson's implication about honorifics is probably correct: deferential politeness like honorifics does not differ from intentional politeness in its goal-orientation, but deferential politeness can become so conventionalized or structured in the system of a language that its users do not need to labor hard to produce deference in speech, rather they just follow the social norm. The resulting normative nature of deferential language must be stronger in Asian languages with honorifics than in Western languages since, as is often pointed out, these Asian languages (e.g. Japanese, Korean, and Javanese) have no neutral forms: Speakers have to choose informal or formal forms, or if necessary, super honorific forms. A speaker's intentional politeness strategy and his conformation to socially-defined deferential rules (or "frozen strategies") may appear to be two different aspects of politeness in reality, but they function collectively to produce politeness which is adequate in each speech situation from the speaker's perspective.

An example shown below is a Japanese four-year old child's utterance from my data. The child played in our home for eight hours and with one exception spoke only in plain forms (i.e., she used only informal sentence endings). The only time she used a polite sentence was to request an ice-cream cone. She asked three times and used the
exactly same sentence that included both polite form (formal sentence ending) and strategic politeness (a question form asking for permission). Notice, the sentential ending form -ka conforms to the standard of the model for (D) type (the hearer's territory) propositions for formal discourse.

\[(6-3)\]

\begin{verbatim}
 sakkin no aisu-kuriimu mata mora-tte mo iidesu-ka?
 a short time ago MODI ice-cream again receive-te PERMISSION(FOR)-Q
 \end{verbatim}

(May I again receive the ice-cream which I had a while ago?)

According to Brown and Levinson, Mackie (1983) reported that negative and positive open-ended politeness strategies are learned by Japanese children before they learn deferential honorific politeness. In the case of the child that uttered (6-3), even though her social experience is still very limited and her knowledge of honorifics is at the novice stage, she seems to have felt it necessary to use both channels to be very polite. Generally, these two channels are combined in formal speech settings with adults' speech too. Brown and Gilman (1989) said that a greater number of strategies may be necessary as FTA seriousness level increases. This idea was implied by P. Brown and Levinson too by their remark that "the more effort a speaker expends in face-saving work, the more he will be seen as trying to satisfy the hearer's face wants" (1987:143). This point is intuitively appealing.

Based on these thoughts, my view of politeness in this research is
summarized as follows: the purpose of linguistic politeness is to save each other's face to attain the goal of communication in each speech event; therefore, its use is primarily strategic. However, in Japanese culture, honorific and formal language use in formal speech situation is considered to be an almost mandatory social requirement due to unique grammatical restrictions in Japanese (i.e., neutral forms are not abundant) as well as to the historically Confucianistic social atmosphere. Therefore, there are two major categories of Japanese linguistic politeness: (1) honorifics and formal language use, and (2) polite linguistic behavior other than (1). Through both channels, Japanese speakers realize linguistic politeness.

Type (1) linguistic politeness, the use of formal forms, is only for formal speech situations. However, I believe there is politeness for informal situations also, and that type (2) politeness behavior is used in both "politeness for formal speech situations" and "politeness for informal speech situations"; even in informal speech occasions with intimate partners there are some rules of linguistic politeness. The use of evidentiality coding belongs to the type (2) "miscellaneous" politeness and it is not entirely strategic but partly a set of pragmatic rules.

I will characterize type (2) politeness with the politeness of evidentiality in the next section.

EVIDENTIALITY CODING AND POLITENESS
Then, where in this system of politeness is evidentiality use incorporated?

Some expressions corresponding to evidentiality markings in Japanese are mentioned as "strategic politeness" by Ide (1989) in contrasting with honorific expressions as "discernment." Table [6-4] is quoted from Ide. Ide included expressions that try to "seek agreement", "questioning", and "minimize imposition" (for example) within the category of strategic "volitional" politeness behavior. These are important functions of Japanese sentence-ending evidentials.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use (speaker's mode of speaking)</th>
<th>Language (kinds of linguistic device mainly used).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCERNMENT</td>
<td>FORMAL FORMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>honorifics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pronouns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>address terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>speech levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>speech formulas, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOLITION</td>
<td>VERBAL STRATEGIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>seek agreement*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>joke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>question*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>be pessimistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>minimize the imposition*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Underlining is mine.)

These forms of evidentiality marking (or their equivalents) can also be found among positive or negative strategies in Brown and
Levinson. Charts [6-5] and [6-6] show the possible correlations that I observed. Strategies are numbered as originally done by Brown and Levinson.
Brown and Levinson's **negative** politeness strategies (1987) and corresponding Japanese sentence final evidentiality markings.

Negative politeness strategies (p. 102) Japanese linguistic evidentiality markings at the sentence end

1. Be conventionally indirect

2. **Question, hedge**

   Groups (4) and (6) evidentials from the model
   
   ka? (question)  
   no? (question)  
   janai? (negative question)  
   daroo? (tag-question), etc.

3. Be pessimistic

4. **Minimize the imposition**

   Groups (7), (8), (10), (4), (6), and part of (9) evidentials from the model
   
   omou (I think)  
   rashii, mitaida, vooda (It seems)  
   sooda (I heard-plain)  
   daroo (probably)  
   kamoshirenai (might be)  
   ka? (question)  
   no? (question)  
   janai? (negative question)  
   daroo? (tag-question)

5. Give deference

6. Apologize

7. Impersonalize speaker and hearer:

8. State the FTA as a general rule

9. Nominalize

10. Go on record as incurring a debt or as not indebting hearer.
Brown and Levinson's **positive** politeness strategies (1987) and corresponding Japanese sentence final evidentiality markings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive politeness strategies (p. 102)</th>
<th>Japanese linguistic evidentiality markings at the sentence end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Notice, attend to hearer (his interests, wants, needs, goods)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with hearer.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intensify interest to H.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Use in-group identity markers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <strong>Seek agreement</strong></td>
<td>Group (3), (4), and (5) evidentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ne? (confirming)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ne# (sharing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>janai? (negative question)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>daroo? (tag-question), etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Avoid disagreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <strong>Presuppose/raise/assert/common ground</strong></td>
<td>Group (3), (4), and (5) evidentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ne? (confirming)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ne# (sharing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>janai? (negative question)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>daroo? (tag-question), etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Joke</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Assert or presuppose speaker's knowledge of and concern for hearer's wants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Offer, promise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Be optimistic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Include both speaker and hearer in the activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Give (or ask for) reasons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Assume or assert reciprocity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Give gifts to hearer (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in [6-5] and [6-6], the Japanese politeness function of sentence-ending forms are mainly equivalent to the following four strategies listed by Brown and Levinson:

1. "use questions" (negative strategy)
2. "minimize the imposition" (negative strategy)
3. "seek agreement" (positive strategy)
4. "presuppose/raise/assert common ground" (positive strategy)

I believe that Japanese speakers use most of the strategies listed by Brown and Levinson in [6-5] and [6-6]: They pretend to be pessimistic, they apologize, impersonalize themselves and the hearers, attend to the hearer's interest, exaggerate sympathy, use in-group identity markers, try to avoid disagreement, give presents, and so on, to be polite. However, in terms of morphological manipulation at the sentence ending, which I have been attempting to characterize as evidentiality marking, available strategies are limited. It is noteworthy that these four strategies are all participant territory related: by "asking questions" and "minimizing impositions", a speaker tries to pay respect to his hearer's information territory; and by "seeking agreement" and "asserting common ground", the speaker tries to extend his hearer's information territory to overwrap with his own territory. These strategies work on the psychological concept of information territories shared by interactants and are required in order to be polite.

The argument so far may suggest that the use of Japanese sentence-ending evidentials is a strategic (or volitional) part of
politeness. However, in actuality, the use of sentence-ending evidentials is not entirely "open-ended" or optional. The basic part of evidential usage is fairly conventional also in that conformance to the "preferred" evidential forms of each level of formality is expected by the community, as demonstrated with the proposed model, and nonconformance may immediately produce impoliteness even with the existence of honorifics (e.g. discourse [5-78], [5-79] in chapter five). The appropriate use of evidentials can be deferential in that it involves respect of other people's territory and knowledge. Therefore, evidentiality coding functions to create both kinds of politeness: deferential and strategic. I will examine this point with sentences with and without honorific and evidential politeness.

Ide (1989) also contrasted four types of sentences with possible combinations of discernment and volition attempting to distinguish these two aspects of politeness in utterances. Sentence types are the following four:

[6-7] (a) -discernment, -volitional
    (b) +discernment, -volitional
    (c) -discernment, +volitional
    (d) +discernment, +volitional

These combinations also seem to be relevant in Korean language (e.g. Hwang, 1990). In Japanese as well as Korean, obviously the sentence type (d) that involves both discernment and volition is the politest, and
type (a) sentences with neither attribute are ought to be least polite. Type (b) and (c) sentences can both be polite: type (b) sentences are polite in terms of formality and type (c) sentences in terms of speaker's intention. Therefore, whether or not type (b) or (c) utterances are sufficiently polite needs to be evaluated in each individual speech situation. Ide showed examples for (a') to (d') types in Japanese as follows in which each corresponds to (a) to (d) in [6-7].

[6-8]

(a') #Kore-o yome. (The # marks a non-polite sentence.)
   this-ACC read.
   (English equivalent: "Read this.")

(b') Kore-o o-yomi-nasai mase.
   read-HONO FOR
   (English equivalent: "Read this.")

(c') Kore-o yomanai ka?
   read-NEG Q
   (English equivalent: "Won't you read this?"

(d') Kore-o o-yomi-ni-nari mase- n- ka?
   read-HONO FOR. NEG. Q
   (English equivalent: "Won't you read this?"

(1989:226)

Sentence (a') is most casual with plain form ending, yome (Read), and (d') is most formal with honorific o-yomi-ni-naru (read) and with negative question nasai-masu-ka (Do you?). Now, I would like to focus on the difference between (b') and (c'). Sentence (b') is formal due to its use of honorific suffix -o with the verb read and formal imperative verb ending, nasai-mase. Ide (1982) said that formal forms "create a
formal atmosphere where participants are kept away from each other, avoiding imposition; non-imposition is the essence of polite behavior; thus, to create a formal atmosphere by the use of formal forms is to be polite" (p. 382). Certainly, sentence (b') produces a formal atmosphere, but on the other hand, since it is an imperative without room for negotiation by the addressee, I believe it can be adequate only when the speaker is authoritative and has every right to give commands to the addressee. If this kind of sentence is used for other speaker-hearer relationships, the sentence may produce an effect of "ingin-burei (____ + )" meaning insolent politeness or haughty under a cloak of apparent politeness which is often found with statements about the hearer's territory information as (6-9) sentences:

(6-9)

(a) o-uchi ga taishite hiroku-nai-n-desu kara
HON-house NOM not much spacious-NEG-NOM(FOR) because

-o-futari tomo konya wa oteyawarakani
HON two people both tonight CONT easy

onenaihashimasu ne.
I beg you (FOR) RAPP

[Your] house is not very big so I beg you two to be quiet tonight.

(b) anata ga nasatte-iru koto wa zenzen buzinesu
you NOM doing-GER(HON) COMP CONT at all business

nanka jaarimasen.
something like NEG(FOR)

[What you are doing is not anything like business.]
Both utterance in (6-9) are polite in terms of forms involving honorifics but impolite in terms of information territory. In (a), the speaker used direct evidentials to state that the hearer's house is not big enough (E type proposition) to ensure her privacy during her overnight stay in formal forms. In (b), the direct plain evidential (ja-arimasen) which was used to criticize the hearer's behavior (i.e., D type proposition) together with employment of some lexical items (e.g. zenzen, nanka) makes the whole utterance impolite even with the existence of honorifics. As the examples suggest, if we define politeness as behavioral strategies to make possible communication between "potentially aggressive partners", formal sentences using honorifics may sound impolite if they are not accompanied with speaker's strategic manipulation at the sentence ending.

The type (c') sentence in [6-8], on the other hand, is without either honorifics or formal ending so it is not appropriate for formal settings; however, the sentence can be polite enough with the negative-question ending (yomanai-ka - Won't you try reading?) when uttered in informal speech situations. So this is a case of "politeness for informal occasion". In engaging in an informal conversation, the participants generally preferred plain form speech because it emphasizes the close (in-group) relationship among the participants (cf. emphasis on "in-group identity" is one of Brown and Levinson's positive politeness strategies); however, the informants generally kept using so-called strategic politeness in such an informal speech setting. Strategies are,
as earlier explained, "ask questions", "mitigate imposition", "seek agreement", and "assert common ground" in Brown and Levinson's terms. An old (but still popular) Japanese saying says "shitashiki naka ni mo reigi ari" (There ought to be politeness among intimates). In order to accomplish this "intimate politeness", these strategies are realized by the choice of evidentiality markers at the sentence ending, not formal forms.

In chapter five, it was demonstrated that speakers show willingness to express respect towards the hearers' knowledge and information territory through sentence-ending evidential forms. In talking about (B) type propositions (the speaker's territory information) in formal situation, speakers used Group (4) tag-questions and Group (6) question forms most often, after "rapport -ne" forms which was most popular. Even in informal settings, "confirmation -ne" was most popular. For (C) type propositions (i.e., shared information) in both formal and informal situations Group (4) type tag-question endings as well as Group (5) "sharing -ne#" endings were most frequently used. Although both (B) and (C) type propositions are in the speaker's information territory, speakers emphasized "common grounds". From the viewpoint of Brown and Levinson's theory, this use of evidentials is a form of positive politeness. Even with (D) type information (i.e., the hearer's territory information with which the speaker has no knowledge), when the topic is something favorable for the hearer, the speaker sometimes used rather direct evidentials which
is theoretically an imposition of the hearer's territory. But it implies the speaker's understanding that good news about the hearer is always true (cf. chapter five). This is a case of evidentiality implicature of positive politeness. In expressing (E) type propositions (i.e., the hearer's territory information), not only formal but also informal utterances used questioning forms from Group (4) and (6). In formal situations, Group (8) hearsay expressions were also preferred for (E) propositions even though speakers had some knowledge about the topic, suggesting that, in speaking about (E) type propositions, speakers attempted to mitigate imposition into the hearer's information territory (i.e., negative politeness). In particular, the use of pure question forms with -ka in this proposition type shows the speaker's intention to distance himself from the hearer's territory.

I have claimed that this research identified and described systematic use of evidentiality coding in both formal and informal speech settings based on informant behavior. I believe that the pattern of commonly-preferred use of evidentiality markings in reference to information territory as proposed by the model may be regarded as an adequate and almost pragmatically required politeness rule in the same way that appropriate honorific use is pragmatically obligatory in formal settings. In addition, the use of evidentiality implicature for the purpose of less assertive utterances produces higher politeness. This is a strategic use of evidentiality coding.

An additional function of evidentiality use in the Japanese
politeness paradigm is that evidentiality usage contributes to extending the domain of the speaker's volitional expression of politeness which is fairly restricted by socially required honorifics and related formal language usage. As discussed earlier, honorific usage is not automatically and perfectly molded by participants' social status: There is some room for flexibility depending on conversationalists' emotional relationships, and so forth. However, rational Japanese speakers still seem to observe the socially established honorific framework with the concept of *wakimae*. In this restricted environment, some speakers, following the framework of honorifics on one hand, use evidentiality coding to express the low degree of politeness which they judged to be appropriate towards a particular hearer. An example of this is the above-mentioned *"ingin-burei"* (*insolent* politeness) case. A hearer's reaction to *ingin-burei* utterances is often such as "the speaker is conventionally polite but too direct." The reaction is negative toward the speaker but the speaker's conformance to the social rules of honorific use at the surface level should be acknowledged. In this sense, evidentials, in relation with honorifics, may give room for assertion by an outspoken speaker. This is another case of strategic use of evidentiality, i.e., evidentiality implicature. However, again, it should be noted that the violation of the evidentiality rules for the purpose of being assertive will bring forth a negative image of the speaker.

Therefore, evidentiality use is, from the viewpoint of linguistic politeness, both deferential and strategic. I summarize the entire
picture of Japanese politeness in relation with evidentiality as follows:

[6-10] Types of Japanese linguistic politeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of language</th>
<th>Types of politeness</th>
<th>Speech situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal forms</strong></td>
<td>Deference</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including honorifics, pronouns, address terms, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidentials</strong></td>
<td>Deference Strategic</td>
<td>Formal, informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Formal, Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including use of ellipsis of case-marking particles, back channelling, hedges,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we view the place of evidentiality coding through two sets of opposing factors, formal vs. informal and deferential vs. strategic, the whole picture would be as follows in [6-11]:
Types of Japanese linguistic politeness behavior in formal and informal speech situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOCIALLY-REQUIRED RULES</th>
<th>OPEN-ENDED STRATEGIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FORMAL SITUATION</td>
<td>-honorifics</td>
<td>-hyper-honorifics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-formal forms (including address terms, pronouns etc)</td>
<td>-evidentiality implicature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-evidentiality coding for formal situations</td>
<td>-back channelling, hedges, observation of turn-takings, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMAL SITUATION</td>
<td>-evidentiality coding for informal situations</td>
<td>-evidentiality implicature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-back channelling, hedges, observation of turn-takings, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We may possibly assume that the use of evidentiality expressions is "frozen" into the role of conventional politeness just Brown and Levinson argued that honorific usage is "frozen or grammaticalized" as deferential politeness (1987; 23). If honorific use is a speaker's "automatic" response to a formal atmosphere (e.g. Hills et al., 1986), to some extent, so is evidentiality marking. This view is supported by the informants' comments on their own speech behavior. When applicable, I asked informants whose selection of evidentiality markings conformed to my model of evidentiality (i.e., pragmatically correct), to tell me their reasons for choosing a certain evidentiality marking over another. Generally, they answered that they did not know: Somehow they felt that way. Some gave slightly more specific observations. The
following is a subset of their answers.  

(In talking to somebody superior)

"We should speak about the person's personal matters indirectly.  
desho and daroo are appropriate."

"When we talk with a superior person, we should talk indirectly."

"Direct forms are too decisive."

"Direct forms are too clear-cut."

Speakers did not use the word polite in their comments, and obviously the speakers themselves were not aware that the sentence final forms function to produce different levels of politeness.  I would like to claim that speakers' general low awareness of the function of sentence ending forms indicates how deep the concept of evidentiality marking is rooted in the Japanese psychology of inter-personal communication.  Furthermore, it is important to note that the appropriate use of evidentiality marking is indispensable to make all kinds of formal and informal speech interaction polite while honorifics create only formal politeness which can be "haughty politeness" in some cases.  Data analysis shows that the use of both formal forms (i.e., addressee honorifics) and evidential politeness are normative in higher formal situations (except a few cases with only formal forms i.e., only deferential politeness).  On the other hand, in informal speech settings, the use of formal form sentence-endings and hyper-polite honorific language decreased drastically to almost none; however, the informants
continued to use hearer-sensitive and territory-sensitive evidentials even in the most casual family discourse.

From this observation, I speculate that the system of evidentiality markings in Japanese interacts with Japanese politeness in a very fundamental way: the speaker's awareness of interactants' invisible territory of information may be a very basic psycho-linguistic foundation of Japanese speakers. This view is supported by developmental evidence from children's speech in the following section.

Socially, the concept of territory is obviously power-related. The use of evidentiality in Japanese women's speech provides supportive evidence on this point.

DEVELOPMENTAL EVIDENCE: CHILD'S EVIDENTIALITY MARKINGS

The argument that there are two different kinds of politeness behavior (i.e., normative and instrumental, or deferential and strategic) is supported by developmental evidence from child language development research. An overview of the literature shows us that children seem to learn two types of politeness behavior independently (e.g. Ervin-Tripp, Guo, and Lampert, 1990; Blum-Kulka, 1990; Snow et al., 1990). The literature generally suggests that children acquire strategic variation of language use from their natural environment; on the other hand, formal deferential politeness is taught explicitly (e.g. Brown and Levinson, 1987). Snow et al. (1990) observed that parents generally
address children's positive and negative face when making requests. Researchers found ample use of both positive and negative strategies in parent-child interaction although children rarely received explicit instruction on how to be polite. Snow et al. concluded that children at younger ages are already aware of three critical factors of politeness: distance, power, and degree of imposition. Ervin-Tripp et al. (1990) observed that children become increasingly polite between the ages of two and five: At this stage, they identify "on-record" politeness as appropriate to control a certain addressee, and also use the forms of "formulaic social indices". By five, they can differentiate to whom they should be polite, and have learned how to use politeness as a persuasive tactic. Ervin-Tripp et al. claim that at the age of five, children conform to Brown and Levinson's model regarding the relative relationship between the degree of imposition and the social tactics used to maintain good human relationship, suggesting that children are capable of using strategic politeness at an early stage of life. In his research with four and five year-old children, James (1978) found that those children adjusted the politeness level on the basis of their listener's age status and the nature of the situation (e.g. command, request); and that situational factors take precedence over status difference. Axia and Baroni (1985) reported that at an early stage of life (five to seven year's old) children showed their ability to react to the predicted cost of their request according to the social situation, but their ability to be appropriately polite with different status addressees did not seem to
develop before the age of nine. Bates (1976) found that, from her research on Italian preschool children, the first politeness strategies that children learn are those for minimizing the offense of a request; children were creative in "softening" their requests. These studies commonly suggest that at early stage of their life, children are aware of the need to be polite when the situation requires, thus they learn strategic politeness first.

MacKie's study (referred to by Brown and Levinson, 1987) was with Japanese children (1983). In Japanese, as is generally understood, learning a fully elaborated system of honorifics requires lengthy exposure to formal social environments; therefore, children may take a long time to become competent in honorific use. Although it is difficult to say exactly how long due to differences in individuals' environmental factors, it is said to take twenty years or even a lifetime. MacKie claimed that Japanese second-grade children were at least using formal sentential-ending forms (i.e., -desu, -masu, etc.), and that they also presented an early stage of strategic politeness: tone of voice, sentence final particles, and asking for agreement with questions or tag-questions, which in some cases are evidentiality codings.

The data for this research also supports MacKie's view. As for the second-graders, I observed that, in classroom situations, generally they did not use formal sentences to their female teachers. This is understandable because it was obvious that the children considered the teachers to be their "friends". Teachers did not particularly intend to
create a formal atmosphere; rather intimacy between the teachers and the pupils was emphasized. Edwards et al. (1978) quoted Flanders (1967) who called "classrooms [in English-speaking countries] as 'affectional desert' because almost all the talk there is devoted to official business, and even teaching which is cognitively stimulating has been described as leaving no room for passion and emotion" and said formality is difficult to escape in interaction in classroom (p. 24). Although this must be true to a certain degree, in the Japanese classrooms I observed, teachers called their pupils by their first name using terms of endearment, -chan for girls, and -kun for boys (for example, a girl named Nana Suzuki is addressed as Nana-chan just like in intimate family situations). This phenomenon was quite alien to me since in my own experience in the Japanese education system, teachers used pupils' family name with -san (equal to Mr., Mrs., and Miss in English) at least for girls. Obviously, a family-like atmosphere has been introduced in the Japanese classroom as an official public educational policy at some time in the past twenty years. I have observed that teachers often talked to pupils as they would talk to their own children or young friends, but sometimes use formal sentences to "straighten up" the classroom atmosphere. However, interestingly, there were occasions when second-graders consistently used formal sentences. As we noted earlier, Japanese speech is in either formal form or informal form so that switching from one to the other is usually performed intentionally for some reasons. One of the formal occasions for the pupils was
"Thank-You-Friend" time, in which children volunteer to express their thanks to one or two particular friends for whatever nice things the friends had done to or for them on that particular day. A possible explanation for the children's voluntary use of formal forms for the event is that children considered this speech setting to be formal since it is a time to be thankful to somebody. Another occasion that formal sentences were used by these young children was when commenting on other students' compositions at composition time. They were encouraged to praise good aspects of each other's composition without being critical. This indicates that at the age of seven, Japanese children are able to, or beginning to, understand the difference between formal and informal speech settings. It seems that the foundation of formal deferential politeness is acquired in early elementary school years. In the next discourse by second-graders, speaker S1 asked for his classmates' opinion of his composition, and they unanimously used formal sentence-endings to praise S1's presentation. Their level of evidentiality is indirect as it uses omou (I think). This sentence-ending form is very appropriate to give opinions on the hearer's information (i.e., D and E type propositions) in a rather one-way communication from the speakers to S1.

[6-11]

S1: (finishing the reading)

owari desu. ii tokoro arimasu ka?
end COP(FOR) good point exist(FOR) Q
S2: *yoku kakette* *ii to omoimasu.*
icely write(POT)(STAT) good COMP think(FOR)

S3: *koe no ookisa ga hakkiri shitette ii to omoimasu.*
voice MODI volume NOM clear(STAT) good QUOT think(FOR)

S4: *kaiwa no bubun o irette ii to omoimasu.*
conversation MODI part OBJ include(STAT) good QUOT think(FOR)

S1: This is the end [of my composition]. Is there anything good with this?
S2: I think it is well-written and good.
S3: I think the volume of voice was clear (=big) and good.
S4: I think it is good because conversation parts were included.

The teacher also spoke in polite forms when conducting this session. Instead of asking direct questions to verify comprehension such as *Then what did S1 do?*, she asked indirect questions such as *Then what did he say he did...?*, *What do you think is important there?*, and *Does it seem such and such?* thus distancing S1's information territory from herself as well as from other pupils. I strongly felt that the teacher's language behavior, as a part of the learning environment, certainly drew pupils' attention to the given social context in which politeness is preferred. Vygotsky (1978), Bakhtin (1981) and other researchers demonstrated the importance of dialogue between a child and an adult in assisting children to learn critical literacy (i.e., "social constructivist" view). Using adults as mediators, children reorganize and reconstruct their social experience and internalize it as their own individual experience. It was suggested that children follow a certain
process before internalizing their social cognition through building an "intersubjectivity" which is shared with their teacher in classroom discourse. For example, children's writing often shows that they are responsive to the social and cognitive norms of the discourse community (e.g. McCarthey, 1994). Not only literacy but also cultural concepts such as politeness with regards to participants' information territory in language use must be learned by children in this interactional process with adults including teachers.

Whereas I did not have an opportunity to observe older students' classes in the elementary school, I did have a chance to attend a whole school gathering. At the end of the observation day, there was a whole school meeting where all the students and teachers got together (it was a small school) and discussed how to prepare for the coming summer break. As a convention, the gathering was conducted by the student-body that is organized by a few student representatives (the oldest six-graders) with help of a teacher in charge of the student organization. The male teacher in charge, who sounded both nice and authoritative, used both informal and formal sentence-ending forms. He used formal sentences to call the whole gathering to order, and informal sentences to speak to a particular student. The teacher's strategy worked well in that his formal sentence created the formal atmosphere of the gathering while the informal speech to students on call enhanced his "authority" over the students, i.e., the male teacher used informal forms to indicate power difference between himself and the students. The
female teacher of the second-graders used both informal/formal speech also as noted earlier, however, being in contrast to the male teacher, her informal speech created an "intimate" atmosphere with the pupils.\(^9\)

It was performed through the use of hearer-sensitive evidential forms such as confirming -(\textit{yo})\textit{ne} (am I right?), and -\textit{deshoo} (tag-question). This case corresponds to the female speaker's strategy to use evidentials to "involve" the hearers' knowledge and attention to the speaker's discourse.

In the whole-school gathering, all students on call used formal sentences regardless of the forms that the teachers used. Although the speakers were from older graders (grades four to six), this suggests that they become aware of formal/informal speech settings by these ages.

Then, what about the development of politeness of informal forms? As discussed in chapter five, the data showed that elementary school second-graders presented some initial development of the use of hearer-sensitive evidentials even though they rarely used formal sentences as shown in the following table:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
& ADULT & CHILD (7, 8, and 10s) \\
\hline
FORMAL & 2940 (45\%) & 56 (9\%) \\
\hline
INFORMAL & 3515 (54\%) & 513 (90\%) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

392
The primary reason for the dominance of informal sentences in children's discourse at school is, as noted, that the situations were considered to be informal by the young speakers. In addition, the speakers were not yet used to formal utterances due to insufficient experience with social interaction. But still the use of evidentiality coding which conforms to the the rules of the speaker's and the hearer's information territory could be seen in the children's utterances. Of course, it was not yet fully developed, but was already noticeable. (cf. chapter five) Therefore, the emergence of an honorific-related concept of formality and a territory-related concept of evidentiality may develop together starting from the early elementary years.

WOMEN'S LANGUAGE AND EVIDENTIALITY MARKINGS

There have been claims that women's linguistic behavior is both less assertive and politer than that of men's (e.g. Lakoff, 1975, P. Brown, 1980). Although this is not so in some cultures (cf. Keenan about Madagascar, 1974a, 1974b), Japanese women, in general, have been said to speak more politely than Japanese men do (e.g. Ide et al., 1986, 1991; Wetzel, 1988). It is not the intent of this section to consider why different linguistic variations, which create difference in politeness level in particular, are found between man and women, but I will briefly touch upon some popular arguments among scholars regarding
the "explanations" for the existing differences between male and female speech norms. Some sociolinguistic studies on sex difference observe that women are more sensitive than men to forms of socially prestigious language or standard forms, formality levels of speech settings, and other sociological significance of linguistic variables (e.g. Labov, 1966a, 1966b; Trudgill, 1972, 1983a, 1983b; Gal, 1978). The general findings from those studies demonstrate rather consistent observations with respect to gender-difference in linguistic variables, at least in urbanized societies (Trudgill, 1983a). A variety of explanations on how the pattern of sex-differentiated variations in language occurs had been proposed, but none of them seems to be satisfying. (e.g. Walters, 1989: pp. 111-113, introducing Trudgill’s examination, 1983a).10 In addition, there is a question of the social "norm" of linguistic variables, i.e., male speech has been considered to be the "norm" and female speech had to be explained with reasons of deviation from the "norm" (e.g. Coats, 1986). For example, Robin Lakoff, in her series of seminal writings, argued that women are taught and destined to speak in women's style (e.g. 1975, 1977). Lakoff described women's language and speech style as characteristically less assertive than men's: Female speech is hesitant, tentative, agreeing, trivializing, asking, and indirect. Lakoff attributes characters of "insecurity" of women's language to women's secondary social status. The basic premise of Lakoff's argument was that men's language is the social norm from
which women deviate and that the male norm is superior to the female deviation. Her work was criticized for this primary standpoint and also for the anecdotal data which the study mainly based on. P. Brown (1980) suggested that Lakoff's concept of "women's language" needs to be modified in that "some or all these features (of women's language) appear to be more closely related to social position in the larger society and/or the specific context" (p. 109), not primarily related to gender. In Brown's research on courtroom discourse, some men spoke with the features of women's language described by Lakoff and some women did not. In short, P. Brown meant that powerless people in a given speech setting (including the society itself) speak a "powerless language". She agreed with Lakoff in that powerless language may be a reflection of a powerless social situation, but it also would seem to reinforce their "inferior status".

Originally, woman's sensitivity to the language they use must be related with the historical power imbalance in society, or possibly the traditionally acknowledged role differences between men and women. Trudgill (1983a, b) speculated that women tend to gain their status through how they appear so that they tend to secure their status by showing it clearly through their language of sophistication. In modern society, there is not an explicit demand for women to speak politer than men. If average female speakers really speak politer than average male speakers in the same circumstances, perhaps female speakers choose to do so strategically for their own good being aware of some social
expectation based on social sexist tradition.

Considering the speaker's sensitivity to social power among interlocutors in using language, I feel that P. Brown may be correct in arguing that what matters is the speaker's level of power over other interlocutors in a given circumstance. Then, we inevitably come back to the same point: women's general status in society.

Japanese society has historically been a men's society where women's subordinate status is literally "visible". Even today, Western-style feminism has not yet fully become an influential doctrine in Japanese society. McGloin et al. (1991) commented on the low achievement of feminism in Japan by stating that "Japanese women prefer a complementary vision of status and role differences, giving them equal dignity, despite differences in form" (p.2 of the introduction). Wetzel (1988) proposed that "power" as a sociolinguistic variable to control female or male speech may need to be redefined in societies such as Japanese, suggesting that talking in feminine ways is not always powerless in some cultures. Contrary to Wetzel, Smith-Shibamoto claimed that Japanese women's traditional status is secondary to men and, accordingly, the norm of women's language is practically powerless (1987, 1992). Shibamoto (1992) argued, in her study of Japanese women's "directives", that Japanese women who are in positions of authority (which is not traditional in the society) appeared to experience linguistic conflict. Then, how do they solve this conflict? They may minimize their feminine speech (Reynolds, 1990), or resort to
some female "strategies". Sunaoshi (1995) found that some Japanese women in a managing or supervising position did not talk like male managers; but talked like a mother or sister in family which was effective in managing their subordinates without conflict (the "Passive Power Strategy" of Reynolds, 1990). Along with Smith-Shibamoto (cited below), I feel that linguistic changes are expected regarding Japanese women's language as their status in the modern society gradually changes, although significant language change will likely take a long time.

The relative stability of the gendered cultural norms of appropriate linguistic style that constrain women to using nonassertive, "polite," and in certain contexts less effective forms of speech should not blind us to the various creative solutions to the problem of incongruity between these norms and actual social status being found by today's Japanese women. (Smith-Shibamoto, 1992:79)

Returning to the issues of this dissertation, regardless of whether Japanese women are powerless or powerful, the reality is that they are said to speak politer than men do. Ide et al. (1986) and Ide (1991) claimed that, in expressing discernment (wakimae) politeness (i.e., honorifics and formal forms), gender differences affected the choice of language forms. Based on their survey studies, researchers have advocated three major factors in the women's politer speech: (1) women's lower assessment of the politeness level of linguistic forms, (2) women's higher assessment of appropriate politeness level that should be used to different types of addressees, and (3) the higher frequency with which women engage in interaction patterns which require higher linguistic
forms (1991: 65-66). For factor (1), subjects scored the politeness level for eighteen different Japanese forms that meant "when do you go?" Female subjects scored most of the forms lower than the male subjects did. For factor (2), subjects scored the politeness level that they thought to be appropriate to twelve addressees: the addressees are (supposedly in order from "low" to "high") child, spouse, delivery person, friends, workplace inferior, same-status colleague, neighbor, spouse's friends, parent at P.T.A. meeting, instructor of hobby group, their children's professor, and workplace superior. Female subjects scored the politeness level that these hypothetical addressees deserve higher than the male informants did (except for "child", "neighbor", "PTA meeting"). Factor (3) relates to the informant's interactional patterns: Women reported they have more frequent interaction than men do with the kinds of addresses who were associated with of higher politeness level than their statuses actually were scored with. In short, the studies suggested that Japanese women feel some forms are less polite than men feel; they feel that addressee's status is higher than men feel; and they socialize more with people with whom they feel a need to be especially polite to. Although these studies are based on surveys which use self-reported behavior, these data suggest that Japanese women's deferential politeness with honorifics is higher than men's. Then, what are the actual forms of Japanese women's politer language? How are they related to the Japanese evidentiality system?
Numerous forms that reflect Japanese women's higher politeness have been reported: use of personal pronouns (e.g. Kanamaru, 1993), hyper-correct honorifics, feminine sentence-final-particles such as wa, no, kashira (e.g. McGloin, 1986 cited by Ide 1991), ellipsis of topic marker wa and the subject marker ga (Smith-Shibamoto, 1992), and if we include broadly pragmatic feminine behavior such as "use of silence", "frequent hedges", "frequent back-channelling", "avoidance of vulgar expressions", "observation of turn-taking", there must be even more aspects of feminine politeness (e.g. Shigemitsu, 1993, Suzuki, 1993). These studies suggest that Japanese women's strategic politeness. Therefore, it seems that Japanese women are more polite than Japanese men both deferentially and strategically.

In this study, it has been suggested that women's evidentiality markings, in contrast with men's, indicate women's politer linguistic behavior through evidentiality coding. Some evidentiality forms such as "questioning" (e.g. Shigemitsu, 1993) have been pointed out as common behavior among female speakers. The data analysis of chapter five also showed that female speakers actually used more question sentences (29% of all utterances) than male speakers (13% of all utterances). Also female speakers' proportion of direct forms was smaller than males (52% vs. 66%). The data also showed that female speakers were more evidentially sensitive to the hearer's knowledge and territory and also to difference in formality level than men were. Coates (1986) introduced a similar observation of Jones (1980):
Her [Jones'] most significant observation is that, where men disagree with or ignore each others' utterances, women tend to acknowledge and build on them. In other words, it seems that men pursue a style of interaction based on power, while women pursue a style based on solidarity and support. (Coates, 1986: 115)

Yet the hypothesis that Japanese women speak less directly than men about their own matters (i.e. speaker's territory information) was not supported in this research: Both men and women equally spoke with more direct language than expected about their own information as well as third person's information. But, in expressing shared-information with the hearer, female speakers positively asserted "common ground" with the hearer through evidentials in both formal and friend discourses.

In conclusion, there may be a possible relationship between the effect of sex-difference on politeness in the Japanese language and with evidentiality markings.

THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITENESS FACTORS AND EVIDENTIALITY MARKING

In previous chapters, I presented two factors that affect the choice of evidentials: proposition type (i.e., topic) and discourse type (i.e., degree of formality in a given speech situation) in a way that both factors related with "distance". The proposition type is related with the "distance" between the topic and the speakers' territory and knowledge. Discourse type is related to "distance" among speakers.
Brown and Levinson's original formula, $W_x = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + R_x$ for positive and negative face strategies has been accepted in many politeness studies. Although cross-culturally, people might perceive the same social situations—as well as the relative importance of each social parameter—in different ways (cf. Blum-Kulka and House, 1989), the three factors, "D", "P", and "R" have been acknowledged to be useful in various languages (see Brown and Levinson, 1987:24). However, there have been a variety of suggestions regarding the "D" factor as discussed earlier in this chapter (e.g. Brown and Gilman, 1989). Each culture may possibly show unique incalculable factors that influence the level of politeness. Minami (1974), for example, explained that Japanese honorific choice is usually based on the following factors:

[6-13]

(a) PARTICIPANTS' RELATIONSHIP
- gender, social status, age, in/out group membership,
- historical relationship between the participants (e.g. One of them is in debt to the other.),
- temporary social relationship between the two (e.g. at store, hospital, street)

(b) TOPIC (referent)
- the owner of the topic: formal topic, general topic, or personal topic of either of the participants

(c) SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTERACTION
- formal/casual environment,
- group/one-to-one/one-to-many communication,
- ways of communication (e.g. letter, telephone talk, telephone message)

(d) INTRA-DISCOURSE FACTORS

401
It seems that (a) "participants' relationship" in above [6-13] is measured by "D" and "P", and (b) the "topic" factor is measured by "D" and "R". The major part of (c) and (d) seems to be both "D" and "P" as well as social conventions, but there seem to be more factors to be considered in order to "compute" the appropriate honorific level in Japanese. Ide (1989) suggested that besides social variables, there are psychological variables such as affinity and affect, which influence a speaker's choice of politeness in general, and which certainly affect honorific choices as well. Ide's proposal is in line with R. Brown and Gilman (1990), Field (1991), Koo (1995), and others who proposed a modification of Brown and Levinson's formula through suggesting "affect" or "familiarity" factors. Further, Hill et al. (1986) proposed to combine all the relational and situational factors by introducing the concept of "PD" ("perceived distance"). They defined "PD" as "the distance perceived by a speaker to exist between the self and a particular addressee in a particular situation and operating in a shared sociolinguistic milieu (p. 351)" and explained that "PD" also comprises the additional factor of "degree of imposition" ("DI") of behavior, thus "PD" is the sum of the factors of addressee status and situational "DI". This theory proposed the following formula:
PLx = PDx

This simple formula suggests that the concept of politeness is too abstract to be pinned down by a few relational and situational factors. The strength of the "PD" concept is in that it is based on the distance which the speaker "perceives" between his hearer in each speech situation in a given culture. Perceived distance is a result of the interactional effect of real social distance in relation with "rank", "class", "group", and "psychological distance" such as "liking" and "familiarity". Some studies (e.g. Brown and Gilman, 1989, Wolfson, 1988) found different effects of these D factors, horizontal distance in particular, without being consistent with the Brown and Levinson framework which stipulates that further distance generally produces higher politeness. Hill et al.'s formula, PLx = PDx, accommodates all possible D factor-related aspects. This concept may seem to be indefinite but I believe it is acceptable; since we produce polite behavior possibly from two or more different channels, and emphasis on each channel may be different in each speech situation in a given culture. Also the number of influential situational/relational factors as well as emphasis on each differs from the culture to another; each culture may require a complex formulation of influential factors on politeness to systematically predict the politeness behavior of the members of that culture. For these reasons, I believe that Hill's formula is sufficiently
abstract to be generalized in universal terms. Shibatani (1990) also emphasized that the basic concept of honorifics is "distance" and that formality factors contribute to produce distance between people:

The honorific system appears to be ultimately explainable in terms of the notion of (psychological) distance. Honorifics (inclusive of the polite forms hereafter) are used in reference to someone who is psychologically distant. The formality factors that tend to trigger honorifics contribute to creating a sense of distance between people. The use of honorifics toward someone unfamiliar, regardless of the addressee's social standing, and the non-use of honorifics toward someone familiar, even if the addressee's social standing is higher, are both controlled by the factor of psychological distance.

(1990: 379)

Shibatani, in agreement with Fillmore (1975), also commented that honorifics universally "can be considered as deictic expressions by virtue of their role of anchoring the referent and speech-act participants in particular social locations, i.e., status" (p. 378). He remarked that this deictic function of honorific forms in relation with the social status of the referent is presumably universal.

Although I have attempted to demonstrate that the concept of perceived distance seems to be useful to see "overall" politeness across cultures, some modification may be necessary for Japanese from the perspective of evidentiality marking. Through the previous chapters, I have demonstrated that politeness level should be determined not only by the association of the "distance perceived by a speaker to exist between the self and a particular addressee" and the "degree of
imposition of the behavior", but also a "perceived distance between the participants and the referent". A speaker also perceives a distance between self and the referent, and a distance between his addressee and the referent. Therefore in deciding the overall politeness level a speaker ought to perceive three kinds of distance:

[6-15]

(1) distance between himself and the addressee
(2) distance between the referent and himself
(3) distance between the referent and the addressee

Distance (1) is a social difference in such as (a) hierarchical organizational rank, (b) economic status, (c) gender, (d) age, (e) race, (f) familiarity, (g) liking, and (h) interpersonal history between the two participants. This kind of distance also includes some situational factors. For example, the act of answering an intimate friend's question as a presenter of a paper at an academic conference requires higher level of politeness than one's usual conversation with the same addressee. Also, we might use higher politeness in writing than when talking to the same person face-to-face. In this way, the situational setting may affect this type of distance.

Distances (2) and (3) are important from the perspective of evidentiality marking in Japanese. This kind of distance should be correctly perceived by the speaker in order to conform to the rules of information territory; the speaker must consider how much the hearer
knows about the referent. A speaker makes "inferences" based on perceived distances (2) and (3) and thus chooses appropriate evidential forms.

It should be emphasized here that, like the Japanese honorific system, the notion of distances (2) and (3) is not absolute but relative (cf. Corollary Four of relativity of information territory, chapter five). Again, Shibatani explained this "relativity of distance" in relation with the honorific system as follows:

One of the characteristics of the Japanese honorific system is that this notion of distance is relativized in such a way that the same person can be distant or close depending on the distance between the speaker and the addressee. When the speaker and the addressee are close, and the referent is distant, then referent honorifics (subject or object honorifics) will be used. Thus, when a mother and daughter are speaking about the father, honorifics in reference to the father are or can be used (depending on how strict the family is). However, the daughter is not supposed to use honorifics in reference to her father when she is speaking to someone outside her family. Likewise, in reference to the company president, colleagues would use honorifics when speaking among themselves. But when they are speaking to an outsider, e.g. a customer, the president is placed on the speaker's side, and no honorifics would be used in reference to the president.

(1990: 379)

In this way, the psychological distance that a speaker perceives among participants and referents is relative. This perception of relative distance plays a crucial role in Japanese politeness. As noted, a speaker's perception of his information territory is also relative depending on in-group or out-group speech situations. The evidentiality system is largely based on a speaker's perception of the territory to which his proposition belongs, therefore the evidentiality
system is also sensitive of in-group/out-group speech settings.

As explained in Corollary Two of chapter five, certain kinds of information (e.g. the speaker's personal matters) are socially defined as belonging to the speaker's information territory. Therefore, his company president's personal matter falls into the secretary's own territory when he talks to somebody outside of his company, while the same information, naturally falls into the president's information territory when the secretary talks to the president himself. Therefore, a speaker needs to set-up a distinctive framework of information territory between his hearer and himself for appropriate evidentiality markings in a similar way when he uses honorifics; hence, close association between Japanese politeness and evidentiality marking is also suggested.
In Leech’s theory (1983), indirect speech acts are evaluated as "polite" while direct speech acts are considered polite under very restricted speech circumstances. However, there are some conflicting observations on this point. For example, Blum-Kulka (1987, 1990) claims that indirect speech does not necessarily imply being polite and direct speech is not invariably impolite. She argues that the need for pragmatic clarity and the need to avoid conflict should be balanced. Sometimes, lack of clarity makes a speech indirect and impolite. Blum-Kulka reports that the balance between the two needs is most achieved in conventional indirectness. I agree with Blum-Kulka in that being indirect and being polite are not the same phenomena, however it must also be true that indirectness is one of the ways to attain polite behavior.

Fraser (1990), for example, categorized the major existing ways to view politeness into four groups: the conversational-maxim view (e.g., Grice, 1967, first published 1975; Lakoff 1973, 1979; Leech 1983), the face-saving view (e.g. Brown and Levinson, 1978, 1987), the social-norm view (e.g. Kasher, 1986), and the conversational-contract view (e.g. Fraser 1975, Fraser and Nolen, 1981. 1990).

In the strategic view of politeness, the purpose of politeness is claimed to be the attainments of a "goal"; however, Ervin-Tripp et al. (1990) documented a case of younger children who seemed to discard tactical politeness in order to attain their goals. They found school-age children "dropped" the use of polite forms and mitigators, after increasing use of polite forms from the age two to five. One of the speculated reasons claimed by the researchers is that the children found that politeness is not sufficiently persuasive; in fact it can reduce
compliance in speech settings with peers and older siblings; and urgent pressure can be more persuasive than polite requesting behavior. This is a case in which speakers avoid politeness to be goal-oriented.

4 In her early seminal writings, Lakoff did not clearly define politeness but in her article, "the logic of politeness", she wrote that "politeness usually supersedes: it is considered more important in a conversation to avoid offense than to achieve clarity. This makes sense, since in most informal conversations, actual communication of important ideas is secondary to merely reaffirming and strengthening relationships" (1973: 297). Also in "Language and woman's place" (1975) she wrote "as is often suggested, politeness is developed by societies in order to reduce friction in personal interaction..." (p. 64). These statements imply that Lakoff viewed politeness as a means to avoid friction in human interaction. Later she defined politeness clearly as "a means of minimizing the risk of confrontation in discourse---both the possibility of confrontation occurring at all, and the possibility that a confrontation will be perceived as threatening" (1989: 102).

Having adapted the Grice's framework, Leech said that "far from being a superficial matter of 'being civil', politeness is an important missing link between the CP and the problem of how to relate sense to force" (1983: 104). He defined politeness as "those forms of which are aimed at the establishment and maintenance of comity, i.e., the ability of participants in a socio-communicative interaction to engage in interaction in an atmosphere of relative harmony" (Watts, 1989:46).

Fraser and Nolen's view of politeness is called a "conversational contract" which says that conversational partners of any kind enter into a conversational contract which is primarily determined by factors prior to the conversation, and that during the course of interaction both parties re-adjust/re-negotiate the conversational contracts regarding each party's mutual rights and obligations. In their view,
each action that violates the conversational contract results in impoliteness. Fraser and Nolen characterized politeness with a few remarks. First, politeness is a property associated with a voluntary action. Second, no sentence is inherently polite or impolite. Third, whether or not an utterance is heard as being polite is totally in the hands of the hearer. Finally, there is some kind of a continuum of politeness rather than being a dichotomous notion (1981: 96). However, politeness itself was not explicitly defined.

Brown and Levinson, basing their model of politeness on social theory, presupposed that "the problem for any social group is to control its internal aggression while retaining the potential for aggression both in internal social control, and, especially, in external competitive relations with other groups" and from this perspective "politeness, deference, and tact have a sociological significance altogether beyond the level of table manners and etiquette books... Politeness, like formal diplomatic protocol (for which it must surely be the model), presupposes that potential for aggression as it seeks to disarm it, and makes possible communication between potentially aggressive partners" (1987: 1).

5Hills et al. (1986) explained wakimae (discernment) as "the almost automatic observation of socially-agreed-upon rules" which applies to both verbal and non-verbal behavior. A capsule definition would be "conforming to the expected norm" (p. 348). Part of this system is honorific language use in Japanese, but it certainly involves other behavioral patterns of Japanese (and probably other Asian) people. Some researchers treat discernment as being almost equivalent to deference, but there are some differences between the two concepts. Hills et al. and also Ide (1982) used wakimae to describe the entire social common sense behavioral rules among people in Confucianistic societies although it seems that wakimae (discernment) in language involves deferential language. It is also similar to Kasper's (1990)
"social-indexing". Treicher et al. said that "deference is power as a social fact, established a priori by the differential positions of individuals or groups within the social structure" (p. 65 quoted by Hwang, 1990). Goffman wrote that "deference ... is that component of activity which functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed (1971: 56 quoted by Fraser, 1981). Fraser commented on this remark and said "the sense in which Goffman uses the term 'appreciate' reflects a giving of personal value to the hearer, the giving of status, and by doing so creating relative symbolic distance between the speaker and the hearer" (1981: 97) Discernment as well as deference reflects the relative status of the interactants on a hierarchical social dimension. However, the sense of discernment is based on the community members' understanding of the social value of their place in the society which they have gained through experiential knowledge; therefore, discernment is "process"-oriented, and not exactly the automatic adoption of social order that is forced upon each community member. It is the result of an individual's analysis of the relationship between his social value and other community members'. An individual, therefore, has the possibility of showing his rational understanding and respect of his place through discernment. In any case, his behavior will be treated by others as evidence of his understanding (or failure of understanding) his place in the social order. Ide (1991) stated that discernment (wakimae) is something that is partially realized by obeying the rules of "formality" and "deference" in R. Lakoff's framework (p. 65). (This note about the discernment is based on personal discussion with Dr. K. Walters of University of Texas at Austin.)

6Janney and Arndt explained "social politeness" and "tact" from three different perspectives: focus, frame, and function. They said that social politeness focuses on the "group" (other members of the group)
providing the speakers with socially appropriate communicative forms, norms, routines, etc, and social politeness functions in the interactional frame (people's need for smooth interaction with other members of their group). Its function is regulative in facilitating the coordinated exchange of routine conversational roles and responsibilities. Tact, on the other hand, focuses on the partner in providing interpersonally supportive communicative techniques, styles, and strategies. The frame for tact is interpersonal since it is concerned with people's need to preserve face and maintain positive relationships with others. The function of tact is conciliative in that it helps avoid threats to face, and facilitates the peaceful negotiation of interpersonal affairs. Note that they made a distinction between "the group" (the target of "social politeness") and "the partner" (the target of "tact"). I assume that in their framework social politeness is the same as conforming to social normative rules and convention, so the target was set as the group.

7 However, there is no dichotomy that formal forms are polite and informal forms are not polite; the degree of politeness that polite/plain forms create all depends on each speech setting. (Refer to chapter four, p. 125.)

8 I also obtained the same information from a questionnaire. Before collecting data in 1996, I used a questionnaire to elicit self-reported data from participants on the sentence-ending forms of evidentiality markings. I described twelve different speech contexts following Kamio's six different information territories both in formal and informal settings. I asked the participants to choose utterances which they felt were appropriate from listed alternatives or to write utterances with their own words if appropriate, and to explain the reason that the chosen evidentiality marking is better than others. In the end, it was decided not to carry out this questionnaire for 1997 data.
collection since the work would be too extraneous, but in the pilot study, I had more then a dozen reports that remained informative.

9In the same way, the speech style of Japanese women in management positions has been analyzed as "motherese" style in resolving the conflict between socially expected women's powerless speech and their actual authoritative position (e.g. Smith-Shibamoto, 1992; Sunaoshi, 1995)

10Trudgill examined the sociolinguists' explanations of their findings in gender based speech differences. Explanations include (1) "researcher's rejections" that the proposed differences between male and female speech do not exist in reality, (2) male researcher's sexist interpretation of data, (3) female speakers' status-consciousness being higher than male speakers, and so on.

Cameron and Coates (1985) and Cameron (1985) also analyzed possible explanations. Those are summarized with five aspects: (1) "conservatism" (women are more conservative than men, so they stick to traditional standard prestigious forms), (2) "social climbing" or "status" (women are more sensitive than men to the social meaning of speech, and imitate prestige usage in order to elevate their social status), (3) "feminine identity", (4) "covert prestige" (masculinity cultivated by males has real prestige for working-class males so that in reality the standard form that used by women is not prestigious), and (5) "solidarity" (women's social network is loosely-knit so that women do not feel the pressure that men feel with vernacular norm). Cameron and Coates demonstrate that these observations are, more or less, problematic. For example, some studies observed women are "conservative" and some observed women are "innovative" (e.g. Labov, 1972a). Cameron and Coates argued that "it appears women are only said to be conservative when the attribute is out of favor" (1985: 143). They
also argued that "status" and "covert prestige" explanations are also problematic due to commonly used research methodology which stratifies women as subordinate to man (i.e., father or husband) which is not often realistic. The observation suggests an existing problem of using the traditional model in which the family is considered as the primary unit of stratification.

"Child care", "socialization with neighbors", and "attending P.T.A. meetings as children's guardian" characteristically belong to a traditional women's domain of responsibility in Japanese society. Therefore, it is highly practical to assume that women have more intimate feelings toward these addressees than men do, and this intimacy reduces the politeness level that these targets deserve in women's scoring.

This analysis is a little complicated, but very interesting. The research attempted to separately view the "politeness level assigned by the subjects to the addressee's status" [factor (2)] from "the politeness level of the actual language forms that the informants claimed to use to the addressees of the status" [combination of factor (1) and (2)]. These two factors had often been unquestioningly viewed as identical. In this research, the researchers found discrepancies between the two levels of politeness: the politeness levels of language that the subjects claimed to use to certain kinds of addressees (i.e., "spouse", "delivery person", "friend", "neighbor", "spouse's friend", "parent at PTA meeting", "instructor of hobby group" and "children's professor") are higher than the politeness levels that the informants assigned to those addressees. Therefore, for these addressees (group 1 addressee), the subjects are choosing politer sentences than they actually think the addressees deserve while addressees of "work-place inferior", "same-status colleague", and "work-place superior" (group 2 addressee)
received lower level of politeness in actual language forms than their status received in the informants' assessment to the status of addressees. The researchers claimed that female speakers have more frequent contacts with the group 1 addressees than with group 2 addressees, therefore, women are more likely to be overly polite to group 1 addressee.

13Field (1991 quoted by Koo, 1995), and Koo (1995) also used a modified version of the formula from Brown and Levinson's model to calculate the weightiness of FTA and politeness level for strategic politeness and discernment politeness respectively. Field broke down the variable of social distance into three separate variables: the familiarity (F) of the speaker with the addressee, the relationship affect (A), and the familiarity-by-affect interaction (F x A). Field's study (1991) with American subjects is reported to have confirmed that politeness was a function of Affect, Power, Risk and interaction of Familiarity and Affect (Koo, 1995: 130). On the other hand, in Koo's research with both American and Korean subjects, Affect was not a significant predictor of politeness. He concluded that Power and Risk were undoubtedly related to politeness; however, the function of Affect and Familiarity needs further investigation. Field's formula for volitional politeness is as follows:

\[ W_x = P(H, S) + F(S, H) + F \times A(S, H) + Rx \]
\[ PL_x = P(H, S) + F(S, H) + F \times A(S, H) + Rx \]

- \( W_x \): the weightiness of the FTA
- \( P(S,H) \): the power that the addressee has over the speaker
- \( F(S,H) \): the familiarity of the speaker with the addressee
- \( A(S,H) \): the positiveness of affect (i.e., liking) of the speaker toward the addressee
- \( Rx \): the degree to which the FATx is rated as an imposition in

415
that culture.

PLx : the level of politeness used by the speaker to the addressee

The question that arises here is whether two different types of politeness can be measured in isolation from each other in a certain utterance. Koo (1995) assumed that the same three relational factors determine the level of discernment. When a speaker is not exercising any FTA (i.e., non-Rx situation) "pure politeness" is shown in his speech, and only interpersonal distance factors decide the level of politeness (discernment politeness). Koo's formula is as below:

\[ PLx = P(H, S) + F(S, H) + A(S, H) + F \times A(S, H) \]  
(for discernment politeness)

However, as I argued earlier, we can assume that no interaction can be one hundred percent free from potential FTA, thus "pure" politeness in Koo's sense may not exist. It should also be noted that Brown and Levinson articulated that their discussions of 'calculating' the relative weight of an FTA are to be taken metaphorically and that they are not concerned with (or interested in) efforts to operationalize their theory in positivistic terms.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

In this research, I have tried to empirically demonstrate several major contentions. Those arguments are listed in the following to describe the research results together with the summary listing for chapter five (p. 325):

(1) Japanese sentence-ending forms present the strongest modality marking in a sentence that includes evidentiality in which a speaker expresses the degree to which he commits himself to his proposition. Sentence-medial evidentiality codings generally function to mitigate the effect of assertive sentence-ending forms.

(2) The choice of sentence-ending evidentiality is not grammaticalized; however most often the use of situationally appropriate evidentials is a pragmatic requirement for a competent speaker of Japanese, because the proper evidentiality concept functions to make the utterance polite in both formal and informal speech situations. The use of proper sentence-ending evidentials, together with the appropriate use of honorifics and other formal forms, is a pragmatic requirement in formal speech situations. In addition, the appropriate use of evidentials is also required to be competent in informal speech situations by providing "intimate politeness" that creates a harmonious interpersonal mood (i.e., the concept of "wa"). A speaker who is incompetent in using situationally appropriate evidentials might be stigmatized in Japanese community due to the overly assertive nature of his linguistic behavior.

(3) The proposed model of Japanese evidentiality is based on the concept of territory of information. There are certain types of information to which a speaker has socially authorized primary access.
Each individual has information which belongs to his own information territory that he can claim by using direct evidentials. Indirect evidentials are used to express information which does not fall in the speaker's information territory. Therefore, the Japanese system of evidentiality is not based on the speaker's experience only. I argued that native Japanese speakers share the concept of information territory and tend to express their respect for other people's information territory--particularly the hearers' information territory--through the use of appropriate evidential forms.

(4) The model suggests that speakers are more respectful of other people's information territory in formal speech situations than informal speech situations: speakers tend to be more indirect in formal communication (i.e., emphasis of distance). In informal situations, speakers did not unanimously respect other people's information territory, but did show respect for the hearer's information territory in particular. In informal communication, the evidentials of shared information are most emphasized (i.e., emphasis of closeness). The evidentials of shared information among conversationalists are a characteristic of Japanese evidentiality coding.

(5) The use of appropriate evidentiality is both discernmental (or deferential) and strategic. To a certain degree, the use of commonly preferred evidential forms can be considered as a kind of common-sense discernmental linguistic behavior. Strategic use of non-standard evidentials functions as "evidentiality implicature". Characteristically, evidentiality implicature is strategically used for either showing intentional assertiveness or being more indirect than required.

(6) The phenomena explored in this research have not been paid sufficient attention to, nor even understood, even by teachers of Japanese. As a result, learners of Japanese tend to use simple direct
endings which are grammatically correct but in reality are not popular among native speakers due to a strong nuance of assertiveness. Since there is an apparent discrepancy between grammatical sentence forms and situationally appropriate sentence-ending forms from the evidentiality perspective, this study may provide a pedagogical implication for teaching the Japanese language to non-native speakers.

My interest in this research topic arose from my teaching experience with American students who made me wonder about the reasons for the difficulty of learning and using natural sounding Japanese sentence endings. To begin with, it was necessary to analyze what "natural" ending forms are. It was observed that learners do not acquire situationally appropriate Japanese sentence-ending forms for the simple reason that they are not explicitly taught the system (i.e., the model I proposed). It was also observed that learners transfer their native concept of evidentiality into the target language, Japanese. Thus, the issue is partly a cultural matter.

JAPANESE HOMOGENEOUS CULTURE AND INFORMATION SHARING MILIEU

At the beginning of this dissertation, I wrote that I treat the less assertive nature of Japanese speech as a "linguistic" phenomenon. However, obviously the issue is closely tied with culture. The close relationship of the evidentiality concept in politeness with the Confucian wakimae (discernment) concept suggests the significant role of culture in this linguistic issue.
Furthermore, the territory-conscious psychology of Japanese may also be a cultural issue. In chapter one, I briefly discussed Hall's idea of high- and low-context cultures. Hall (1976) hinted at the totalitarian character (or "collective egos" by Araki, 1980) of the Japanese approach to life as follows:

In Japan, the over-all approach to life, institutions, government, and the law is one in which one has to know considerably more about what is going on at the covert level than in the West. It is very seldom in Japan that someone will correct you or explain things to you. You are supposed to know, and they get quite upset when you don't. Also, Japanese loyalties are rather concrete and circumscribed. You join a business firm and, in a larger sense, you belong to the Emperor. You owe each a debt that can never be repaid. Once a relationship is formed, loyalty is never questioned. What is more, you have no real identity unless you do belong. This does not mean that there aren't differences at all levels between people, ranging from the interpersonal to the national. It is just that differences are reexpressed and worked out differently. As in all high context systems, the forms that are used are important. To misuse them is a communication in itself. (97-98)

Hall's observation was made only twenty one years ago, but I should say that this view of Japanese culture is slightly anachronistic (and was likely so even at the time it was made). Most Japanese no longer feel that they "belong" to the Emperor, and nowadays people may not be concerned with Confucian "debt which is never repaid" (that is inherently attached to one's existence).

But Hall's observation does hold some truth regarding unique Japanese cultural behavior: It is considered impolite to explain things in detail since the hearer might already know; an individual tends to identify himself with groups to which he belongs and maintain loyalty;
and all kind of customary "forms" are important in human relationships.

The preferred behavior of avoiding correction and explanation referred to by Hall is a part of Japanese lack of assertiveness. Japanese society is, as is well-known, homogeneous, thus, for an individual, to expect (or pretend to expect) that other people share the same information functions very effectively to create a mood of homogeneity. Clearly speaking what one believes to be true is not preferred by either speakers or hearers, thus speakers tend to be ambiguous regarding the core meaning of their assertions and allow the hearer to decipher the meanings based on an assumed common understanding. Due to possible ambiguity created by this behavior, effective communication is not always realized.

In terms of evidentiality coding, the emphasis on shared information among the speakers through "evidentials for shared information" was strongly confirmed across all speech situations. The evidentiality behavior in this research presents an aspect of the traditional cultural behavior of emphasizing common background information among group members. An observer may speculate that a Western individual-oriented culture is likely to be more sensitive to each other's information territory than a group-oriented Japanese culture. No contrastive analysis was done between East and West in this study; therefore, an observation on this point would not be empirically valid. Although, in my 1993 study, both American and Japanese
informants showed consciousness of a difference in the speaker's and the hearer's information territory, the difference was that Japanese informants were more sensitive to information shared by participants' territories. This tendency in Japanese was also confirmed in this research. Presumably both Western and Japanese cultures have the concept of both personal territory and group territory, although the emphasis may be placed differently.

Yet at the same time, it was noted that even in informal Japanese situations, the speaker does not breach the information territory of the hearer. Thus the techniques on "emphasis of common knowledge" and "respect for each other's personal group information territory" were found to be important in Japanese with regards to the concept of information territory. These two evidentiality aspects seem to correspond to the social uchi vs. soto concept in Japanese.

JAPANESE UCHI VS. SOTO CULTURE AND TERRITORY OF INFORMATION

Japanese people's loyalty to groups and sense of identification with groups typically accounts for the group-orientation of Japanese society. Hall (1976) also stated that high-context cultures make greater distinctions between insiders and outsiders than low-context cultures. The idea is that Japanese society is administered through the "logic of group" while Western societies are driven through the "logic of individual". A Japanese anthropologist, Watsuji (1935), earlier proposed this kind of concept, a dichotomy of uchi (inside) vs. soto (outside). He
argued that in Japanese culture an individual embraces the concept of uchi (lit. household) as being the group(s) to which he belongs. The important aspect here is that the concept of uchi is relative and flexible. The smallest unit is said to be a household, but uchi can also mean vicinity, school, business organization, or the Japanese race. This relativity of the uchi concept leads to the relativity of information territory in that one's information territory is similar to a person's uchi territory. Within uchi, members feel safe and comfortable; they cooperate, and rely on each other excessively.¹ This uchi and soto concept is seen in the use of the Japanese language, including grammar. Wetzel (1984) devoted her dissertation to this uchi/soto concept in Japanese linguistic phenomena such as polite forms, donatory forms, and deixis.

One example of uchi/soto-related grammar in Japanese is the use of go/come verbs added to other action verbs to emphasize the action of going and coming while performing some target actions. Ando (1986) showed the following examples of sentences to explain this grammar point:

(7-1)

(1) a. itte-kimasu.
    go(te)-come(FOR) (I will leave [and will come back].)

    b. hanako ga hon o katte-kita
    Hanako(name) NOM book ACC buy(te)-came
Ando explained that if a speaker adds the verb *kuru* (to come) to another action verb--for example, *iku* (to go) and *kau* (to buy) in (7-1)(1)--the compound verb phrase indicates that a person (or his behavior) is coming to the speaker's territory, and if the verb *iku* (to go) is added to main action verbs as in (2) sentences of (7-1), it emphasizes the action is going out of the speaker's territory. Ando argues that this structure of an action verb plus *iku* (to go) or *kuru* (to come) is a cultural artifact of the Japanese *uchi/soto* distinction which is critically important in Japanese psychology. In this sense, the social aspect of group-orientation has a common ground with the linguistic aspect of territory-consciousness in language use.

Watsuji also said that individual distinctions disappear in *uchi* circumstances: in other words, the solidarity of individuals is not important in *uchi*. I wonder to what degree this observation is true in present Japanese culture, but this likely holds some truth in contrast with Western cultures. At least, people are often "encouraged" to do as other people do, and as long as one behaves as others do, one is "safe" in

424
Regarding evidentiality, in family speech settings, certainly speakers were less attentive to each other's information territory than they were in a formal or friend discourse. I have attributed this phenomenon to the issue of politeness, but at the same time, the tendency of using direct evidentials in family discourse can be considered to be a representation of the unindividualistic atmosphere inside uchi. The uchi concept from the sociological viewpoint may represent collectivism, while with the viewpoint from information territory, uchi represents sharing of the same information territory. Social and linguistic uchi phenomena are seen in culturally conventional behavior. Ando (1984) pointed out that, for example, in Japan when an individual's family member(s), especially children, receive a gift, the individual is expected to thank the sender of the gift even though he himself may not be the ultimate receiver of the gift. A Japanese wife is (traditionally) expected to greet her husband's business associates (including superiors, colleagues, or even lower-status workers) by saying such as itsumo shujin ga osewa ni natte-imasu (lit. I know that you always take good care of my husband). It sounds strange in English translation but conveys a humble appreciation in Japanese. This kind of utterance is absolutely necessary in dealing with family members' soto relations and if one does not perform in this manner, he will be labelled socially incompetent. If a family member commits some crime, it will possibly result in the end of all family members' normal
life. It is common for the family of a criminal to publicly apologize for the actions of this family member. This happened recently this year (August, 1997) in the case of a ninth-grader who beheaded a second-grader, drawing the attention of the entire country due to the criminal's cruelty and his propaganda against the Japanese education system.

This is in stark contrast to American mainstream culture, where the role of the family is often to proclaim the guilty party's innocence and good character, or possibly to expound on reasons that the guilty party is not responsible for his actions. This difference is likely seen because in a Japanese group, a member is considered responsible for the actions of all other group members, and the group as a whole is responsible for maintaining harmony with other group units within the same larger group. In contrast, in American culture, group members are primarily responsible for looking out for other group members, when galvanized by outside pressure.

The shame, responsibility, and guilt the family feels toward the sekan (society) may be an influence of Confucianism. Ando concluded that such Japanese uchi behavior indicates that the life of all members is "connected" ("renzoku-teki ningen kankei") in an uchi environment.

I have observed that some phrases of appreciation are conventionally used among members to emphasize the "connected" human relationship. The phrase okagesama de (lit. thanks to you, [something good has been accomplished]) is a necessary response to
praise for something that has been done or happened to the speaker himself or his immediate family. Usually the hearer of the phrase has nothing to do with the incident; thus, the underlining meaning is something like *thanks to your support which is created by your kind existence*. This Japanese *uchi*-related behavior is so conventional that it should be considered to be "forms" for both formal and informal environments. Thus, Japanese conventional forms of social interaction emphasize the "connection" among members of *uchi*; in other words, it presents an aspect of territory-consciousness in Japanese language use.

**LESS ASSERTIVE JAPANESE CULTURE**

In a society such as this with a strong emphasis on "*wa*" (*harmony among people*), being assertive is not a good idea. Avoidance of conflict, which results in less assertive linguistic behavior, is often said to be one of the stereo-typical aspects of Japanese "*wa*" culture. In her study on the "functional interdependence" between conflict and culture, Ting-Toomy (1985) argued that conflict and culture are two inseparable concepts, and said that high-context cultures such as Japanese have high "cultural cognitive, emotional, and behavioral constraints" on conflict which suppresses interpersonal antagonism, public tension, and public confrontations. In reality, I know that Japanese people do occasionally have confrontations in public, but certainly the basic cultural agreement of direct confrontation
avoidance is probably valid. "Nemawashi" (lit. root binding) is a famous custom which is well-known as a confrontation-avoidance system. Nemawashi is the use of "unofficial" discussions and negotiation for the purpose of securing the agreement of the members before the "official" decision-making process. For example, if a group of people within a larger organizational body want to reach a certain organizational decision, they contact other important members, one by one, explaining their views and persuading them. Thus, when the time comes to have a formal discussion to decide the issue, almost all participants already share the same view, and the final official decision is instantaneously reached smoothly without antagonism. This custom of nemawashi seems to be deeply rooted in Japanese culture. Phrases such as nemawashi-shitokoo (let's do "nemawashi" in advance) can even be heard from middle-school students.

Ting-Toomy (1985) also mentions the similar "ringi-sei" and "go-between" systems of Japanese culture. The ringi system (lit. circulation discussion) is used to involve a large number of people in a single (not uncommonly, unimportant) decision. Obviously, the purpose is to distribute responsibility to "everyone" and diffuse it by emphasizing that the decision is unanimously agreed upon. The existence of a "chuukai-sha" (go-between) also helps avoid direct confrontation between two parties (note: chuukaisha are ordinary people, not lawyers), and thus works to save both parties' face (e.g. Gudykunst, 1993,
1994). Obviously the nemawashi and ringi systems function in uchi group situations, and the go-between system functions between groups. These systems demonstrate how the Japanese culture values wa (harmony of people) within the group, and avoids direct confrontations with other groups. Both respect of wa and avoidance of confrontation establish the foundation for less assertive linguistic behavior of Japanese.

In this research, it is found that Japanese speakers use direct forms more frequently than expected. However, it is also found that the use of simple direct forms is limited; speakers preferred to add some kind of indirect or semi-indirect modality to direct forms which I tentatively called "direct question forms", "sharing forms", or "rapport forms". Even when a speaker's commitment to the proposition is high, he often includes a questioning flavor in the sentence-ending--confirming if the hearer agrees with him, or reminding that the hearer has the same information, or even genuinely questioning if he is right---using the shared concept of hearer-sensitive evidentiality. These phenomena exist among uchi members. Towards soto information, usually the distance that a speaker perceives between himself (or his uchi world) and the topic is expressed through indirect evidentiality, particularly, in formal situations. Thus, I have explained it as a consequence of politeness based on territory consciousness. As I wrote in note 1 of this chapter, Japanese people appear to be apathetic towards soto members. Although there is a frequently quoted proverb that says
an individual must anticipate three enemies once he leaves his home, in actuality, Japanese people are not that hostile to strangers. But they certainly are unwilling to interact unless absolutely necessary. If interaction is required, the politeness of linguistic indirection is commonly maintained towards soto speakers as the standard evidentiality model suggests.

In this work, I have attempted to identify the Japanese cultural phenomena which appear to be related with the use of proper evidentiality coding which I tried to propose in an organized way. Provided with sufficient accurate information, people can learn other cultures and accept them at least on the surface. The use of evidential codings appropriate to each speech situation is a part of Japanese cultural behavior, as it is necessary to correctly express the Japanese concept of human relationship in linguistic forms. Without understanding and using the concept of evidentiality, one can not produce culturally appropriate utterances in Japanese.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study had several limitations which further studies might address:

First, although I believe that the informants as a whole represent the Japanese community to a considerably high extent, since it is a
group of "convenience" samples gathered from my associates, they may well represent Japanese speakers from "my" linguistic environment rather than the entire Japanese speech community. Although Japanese society is highly homogeneous, there are likely regional and class differences within the scope of this research. Therefore, a random sampling from a wider population will certainly be necessary for more reliable data.

Second, since I wanted to acquire a model which could be generalized, the quantity of analyzed data superseded the deeper qualitative analysis of each individual discourse or utterance. Although the method I used may serve the purpose of this study, it is undeniable that "deep analysis" of a limited number of interactions for each discourse type, for example, might have revealed different research results. In this sense, my analysis may have fallen short of understanding the deep meaning of the speakers' evidential usages. The best method, I suppose, would involve an informant's explanation and retrospective analysis of his own speech behavior, something which this study could not attain to a sufficient degree.

Third, for the same reason as above, I had to simplify the types of discourse: six discourse types were considered to represent the parts of various speech situations. In a sense, I have attempted to view Japanese speech behavior through a limited set of six types of human interaction. Naturally, there are plenty of additional speech situations that were not considered in this research. Moreover, a finer stratification based on
additional situational variables seemed to be desirable in each discourse type. Regarding the "formal discussion" genre, for example, I have realized that there possibly were a number of situational features of this genre, which influence the speaker's use of evidentials. Although all formal discussion discourses which were analyzed in this genre had two basic common features, i.e., "high formality" and "group discussion", variables among participants' relationship such as power, affinity, familiarity, and also each person's personal psychological traits in interacting with others, seemed to affect their use of linguistic evidentiality. It was not possible to include these finer differences sufficiently to make complete observations due to the expected extraneous work of analysis, therefore the simple categorization of formal vs. informal was chosen. I can defend this method by pointing out that the speaker's "perceived distance" among himself (his knowledge or information territory), the referent, and the hearer (his knowledge or information territory), which also decides the level of appropriate politeness that the speaker perceives, is theoretically inclusive of all situational features. However, it is still difficult to tell what distance a speaker perceives from the various features he is facing. We may possibly gain some answers to this question through consulting the speaker himself.

Forth, although the setting of the proposition types was performed based on the earlier analysis of empirical data, six basic types of proposition can still be too simplistic to represent the topics of the
entire speech with epistemic modality. The classification was done in relation with the theory of speaker's information territory which I believe, is a theoretically and also empirically meaningful framework; however, there, of course, must be an infinite number of other perspectives that can be used to categorize the speaker's propositions in order to study evidentiality coding even within the framework of the theory of speaker's information territory. As the traditional analysis of evidentiality has been criticized due to its dependency on "truth or false" aspect of the proposition, the viewpoint of this research may have some points which require reassessment.

These and other thoughts on possible limitations suggest that a close qualitative analysis of fewer discourses will show different aspects of this research, which may provide future direction to this course of study.
In contrast, Japanese people are sometimes said to be exclusive and hostile towards soto. Ando (1984) refers to Japanese tourists' shameful behavior in foreign countries, Japanese people's careless attitudes towards keeping public places clean, bullying alienated pupils at schools, and so on. Most characteristically, I believe, Japanese people avoid interaction with strangers as much as possible. That is totally different from American mainstream culture in which strangers often engage in friendly conversations in elevators, on public transportation, and in other public places. This demonstration of instantaneous friendliness with strangers usually amazes Japanese people visiting America.

Japanese governmental policy also exposes the same kind of exclusive tendency. For example, it is extremely difficult for non-Japanese people to obtain Japanese nationality, and Japan rarely receives permanent immigrants.

Ando cited Watsuji (1936:165) saying that in Japanese life which has been centered on "home", people did not learn to assert individual rights, and at the same time, did not come to realize their responsibility towards public life (soto). Japanese people developed delicate interpersonal emotions such as omoiyari (consideration), hikaeme (modesty), and itawari (concern and care) which are only benevolent in an uchi relations, and not strong enough for the soto world where they did not share warm emotions with outsiders. Thus, people came to feel surrounded by enemies once they step out of their home.

I agree with Ando's comments that the truth of Watsuji's observation is still valid today after sixty years.

I believe that this emphasis on homogeneity is explicitly taught through everyday life. When I was a child, the most common reason
which I was told that I should not do something was that other children did not do so. School regulations for clothing, grooming, and after-school activities were extremely detailed (I think they are still so today). It is a culture that emphasizes "negation of self" instead of "assertion of self" as seen in, for example, American mainstream culture. Emphasis on homogeneity may work effectively to achieve the holistic purpose of a group but there is a danger of creating members who are unable to perform independently or who are not willing to explore their creative potential to the maximum. I feel that this is a serious disadvantage of being a Japanese.

3 Ting-Toomy explained as follows:
Cultural cognitive constraints refer to belief systems or ideologies that prevent or discourage group members from cognitively thinking in a particular direction. Cultural emotional constraints arise from cultural norms that dictate what sorts of emotional expressions (such as anger, frustration, or grief) are acceptable or unacceptable to be outwardly displayed in the public cultural context. Finally, cultural behavioral constraints refer to cultural rules and codes that govern the behavioral appropriateness of a given gesture, or words and phrases in a given socio-cultural context. Hence, a low cultural demand/low cultural constraint system represents a diverse heterogeneous cultural paradigm (for example, U.S. culture); a relatively unified, homogeneous cultural paradigm (for example, Japanese culture). (p. 74)

4 In large Japanese organizations, most documents have designated locations for reviewers to stamp their "seals" (a seal is used as a signature in Japan). The bigger the organization is, the more often members in high level positions are required to affix their seals on documents, possibly hundred times a day; so, often they simply affix their seals without reading the document. This is called mekura-ban (blind seal). Therefore, in reality, the usefulness of "ringi-sei" is questionable. However, its surface function is still valued.
That Japanese people are apathetic towards strangers (soto people), and that Japanese people feel responsibility towards society for their family's crime, may seem contradictory. However, they can be explained by relativity of uchi concept. In the latter case, society as a whole is regarded as uchi in relation with the enhanced responsibility of an individual or a family as a member of society, while in normal circumstances, unknown people are regarded as outsiders.
List of informants’ code, age, and discourse type.

Informant: f01 Age: 40s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f02a Age: 40s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f02b Age: 40s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f03a Age: 40s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f03b Age: 40s Discourse Type: formalgroup
Informant: f04 Age: 40s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f05a Age: 40s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f05b Age: 40s Discourse Type: formalgroup
Informant: f06 Age: 20s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f07 Age: 20s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f08 Age: 20s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f09 Age: 20s Discourse Type: formalgroup
Informant: f10 Age: 30s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f11 Age: 20s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f12 Age: 40s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: f13 Age: 40s Discourse Type: family
Informant: f14 Age: 40s Discourse Type: family
Informant: f15 Age: 40s Discourse Type: family
Informant: f16 Age: 30s Discourse Type: family
Informant: f17 Age: 20s Discourse Type: public
Informant: f18 Age: 20s Discourse Type: public
Informant: f19 Age: 20s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: f20 Age: 30s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: f21 Age: 20s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: f22a Age: 60s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: f22b Age: 60s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: f22c Age: 60s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: f22d Age: 60s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: f23 Age: 20s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: f24 Age: 50s Discourse Type: courtprosecutor
Informant: f25 Age: 40s Discourse Type: schoolteacher
Informant: f26 Age: 40s Discourse Type: schoolteacher
Informant: f27 Age: 10s Discourse Type: family
Informant: f28 Age: 10s Discourse Type: family
Informant: f29 Age: 10s Discourse Type: family
Informant: m01 Age: 70s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: m02 Age: 30s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: m03 Age: 30s Discourse Type: informalgroup
Informant: m04 Age: 40s Discourse Type: family
Informant: m05 Age: 30s Discourse Type: family
Informant: m06 Age: 20s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m07 Age: 30s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m08 Age: 30s Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m09   Age: 30s  Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m10   Age: 70s  Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m11   Age: 40s  Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m12   Age: 40s  Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m13   Age: 40s  Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m14   Age: 40s  Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m15   Age: 60s  Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m16   Age: 30s  Discourse Type: formal
Informant: m17   Age: 70s  Discourse Type: courtdefendant
Informant: m18   Age: 50s  Discourse Type: courtprosecutor
Informant: m19   Age: 50s  Discourse Type: courtprosecutor
Informant: m20   Age: 80s  Discourse Type: courtdefendant
Informant: m21   Age: 50s  Discourse Type: courtprosecutor
Informant: m22   Age: 40s  Discourse Type: family
Informant: m23   Age: 10s  Discourse Type: family
Informant: m24   Age: 10s  Discourse Type: family
Informant: m25   Age: 10s  Discourse Type: family
Informant: m26   Age: 30s  Discourse Type: public
Informant: m27   Age: 20s  Discourse Type: public
Informant: m28   Age: 40s  Discourse Type: public
Informant: s01   Age: 10s  Discourse Type: schoolstudents
Informant: s02   Age: 8   Discourse Type: schoolstudents
Sentence-ending forms

**Direct endings**

**GROUP I** sentence-ending forms are the most direct sentence-ending forms including direct-forms of verbs, adjectives, and copula, and simple noun utterances. These direct forms are followed by vocative sentence-ending suffixes, eg, -**yo**, -**no**, and -**sa**.

In English, it is difficult to show the difference in meanings in these ending forms, but roughly, nouns and simple direct endings are "direct". Vocative final particles extend the speaker's conviction (i.e., I am _telling you_), -**n+da** cluster and -**wake** have an "explaining" nuance (i.e., _if you understand_), and conjunctive-endings, -**kara**, -**node**, -**kedo**, and -**ga** show direct modality with pretended hesitancy.

**Noun (informal)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D (direct) (informal, formal)</th>
<th>D n+da (informal, formal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D yo (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D n+da+yo (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D wa+yo (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D wake+yo (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D no+yo (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D no+yo (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D wake+yo (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D wake+na+n+da+yo (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D wa (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D sa (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D no (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D n+da+mo+no (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D wake (da) (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D wake+na+n+da (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D kara/node (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D n+da+kara/node (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D kedo/ga (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D n+da+kedo/ga (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D wake+da+kara (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D wake+da+kara (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D wake+da+kedo (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D wake+da+kedo (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GROUP 2** sentence endings include endings that use -**ne** with a falling intonation. Endings of this group are also direct, but are hearer-conscious in that the use of a falling -**ne** aims to draw the hearer's attention to the speech.

In English, the meaning of all the following forms is to attract hearer's attention (e.g. _you know_, _you see_).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D no+ne (informal, formal)</th>
<th>D n+desu+no+ne (formal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D kara+ne (informal, formal)</td>
<td>D n+da+kara+ne (informal, formal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GROUP 3 sentence endings, daroo, and janai, and related forms, are also direct evidentials but are sensitive to the hearer's knowledge in checking or confirming the hearer's knowledge.

The general meaning of these endings is that of a tag-question (i.e., isn't it) which is not actually asking for the hearer's agreement.

GROUP 4 sentence endings are direct sentences with a questioning tone. The speaker asks for the hearer's agreement to his speech with these ending forms.

So the meaning of the following is, in general, a tag-question such as isn't it?
GROUP 5 sentence-endings (`ne#`) emphasize the common knowledge between the speaker and the hearer. The meanings of the following forms are, thus, as we both know.

- **SD** `ne#` (informal, formal)
- **SD** `yo+ne#` (informal, formal)
- **SD** `no+ne#` (informal, formal)
- **SD** `kara(node)+ne#` (informal, formal)
- **SD** `kedo(keredo)+ne#` (informal, formal)
- **SD** `janai+ne#` (informal, formal)

GROUP 6 sentence endings are question forms that request for new information.

- **Q** `kashira` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `ka` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `ka+na` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `ka+ne` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `CONJ daroo+ka` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `CONJ deshoo+ka+ne` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `Direct ending` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `Noun` (informal)
- **Q** `ka` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `no` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `wake` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `ka+na` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `no+ne` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `ka+ne` (informal, formal)
- **Q** `-kke` (informal, formal)
**Indirect endings**

**GROUP 7** sentence-endings are indirect in meaning and have syntactically indirect structures. Group 7 forms express propositions inferred from indirect evidence. *Mitai, yoo, and rashii* mean *looks like, seems like, or appears to be*. *Rashii* can be a hearsay evidential too.

ID mitai/yoo (informal, formal) ID mitai/yoona+N+da (informal, formal)
ID mitai/yoo+y o (informal, formal)
ID mitai/yoo+na+no (informal)
ID mitai/yoo+da+kedo (informal, formal)
ID mitai/yoona+n+da+kedo (informal, formal)
ID mitai/yoona+na+da+ne (informal, formal)
ID mitai/yoona+no+ne (informal, formal)
ID mitai/yoona+n+da+ne+na (informal, formal)
ID mitai/n+da+ne+kedo/ga (informal, formal)
ID rashii+yo (informal, formal) ID rashii N da yo (informal, formal)
ID rashii+yo+yo (informal, formal)
ID rashii+no (informal, formal)
ID rashii+no yo (informal, formal)
ID rashii+na (informal, formal)
ID rashii + kedo/ga (informal, formal) ID rashii n da kedo/ga (informal, formal)
ID rashii+yo ne (informal, formal)
ID rashii+ne (informal, formal)
ID rashii+no ne (informal, formal)
ID rashii+ne (informal, formal)

**GROUP 8** sentence endings are indirect in meaning and construct syntactically indirect structure. Group 8 forms express that the proposition is second-hand information.

(1) *(da)tte* means *'it is said such and such'*. It directly transfers second-
hand information without modification.

ID -datte, -tte, etc (informal, formal)  ID n+datte (informal, formal)
ID n datte + yo (informal, formal)

ID (da)tte+ne (informal, formal)  ID n datte + ne (informal, formal)

(2) -(da)soo(da) means it is said so or I heard so.

ID (da) soo (da) (informal, formal)  ID n da soo (da) (informal, formal)
ID (da) soo (da) ne (informal, formal)
ID (da) soo (da) ne (informal, formal)
ID (da) soo (da) ne# (informal, formal)
ID (da) soo dakedo (informal, formal)

(3) -to kiita (I heard so), -to iwareteiru, -to iu hanashi, and others all mean I heard or it is said. For convenience, -kiita is used to represent all of them.

ID -to kiita (informal, formal)  ID -to kiita N da (informal, formal)
ID -to kiita+yo (informal, formal)  ID -to kiita n da yo (informal, formal)
ID -to kiita+kedo (informal, formal)  ID -to kiita n da kedo (informal, formal)
ID -to kiita+kedo ne (informal, formal)  ID -to kiita n da kedo ne (informal, formal)
ID -to kiita + ne (informal, formal)  ID -to kiita n da ne (informal, formal)
ID -to kiita + no (informal, formal)
ID -to kiita + no ne (informal, formal)
ID -to kiita + no yo (informal, formal)
ID -to ka

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GROUP 9 endings are epistemic auxiliaries.

(1) Kamoshirenai means might be. The degree of necessity of propositional truth is low in the speaker's judgement.

AUX kamoshirenai/kamo (informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai+na (informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai+yo (informal, formal)  AUX kamoshirenai n da yo
(informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai node/kara(informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai kedo/ga (informal, formal)
AUX kamo- + yo ne  (informal, formal)  AUX kamo- n da + yo ne
(informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai+ne (informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai+ne (informal, formal)  AUX kamo- n da kedone
(informal, formal)
AUX kamo-+kedo + ne (informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai+ne+ne (informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai+ne#(informal, formal)
AUX hazu(da) yo (informal, formal)  AUX hazu-CONFIRMdaroo (informal, formal)
(2) Hazu(da) means "it must be such and such based on some evidence"
expressing the speaker's strong belief in the necessity of the
proposition.
AUX hazu(da) (informal, formal)  AUX hazu na n da yo
(informal, formal)
AUX hazu(da) yo (informal, formal)  AUX hazu na n da yo
(informal, formal)
AUX hazu na n da kedo
(informal, formal)
AUX hazu na n da ne
(informal, formal)
AUX kamoshirenai + janai
AUX -ni chigainai (i.e., it must be so, there is no mistake about it)
provides an inference with strong conviction. This type was used only
once in the data.
AUX -ni chigainai (informal, formal)
(3) "Conjecture daroo" means probably.
AUX CONJ daroo (informal, formal)  AUX n+ daroo kedo/ga
(informal, formal)
AUX CONJ daroo + kedo/ga (informal, formal)
AUX CONJ daroo + kara (informal, formal)
AUX CONJ daroo ne (informal, formal)  AUX n+ daroo ne
(informal, formal)
AUX CONJ daroo na (informal, formal)
AUX CONJ daroo+kedo+ne (informal, formal)
GROUP 10 includes endings meaning I think. These evidentials indicate that the proposition is speaker-subjective. The speaker's commitment to the proposition is high with this group, but subjective nature of inferences is emphasized.

Lexical items which are related with "thought" are all involved. Omou (think), omot-teiru (think-tentative), kangaeru, kanga-teiru (think), rikaisuru, rikaishi-teiru (understand), kanjiru, kanji-teiru (feel) etc. All listed ending forms here use omou for convenience.

ID omou/omotteiru (informal, formal) ID omou/omotteiru n da (informal, formal)
ID omowareru (informal, formal)
ID omou yo (informal, formal) ID omou n da yo (informal, formal)
ID omou wa (informal, formal)
ID omou wake (da) (informal, formal)
ID omou wa yo (informal, formal)
ID omou no (informal, formal)
ID omou na (informal, formal) ID omou n da na (informal, formal)
ID omou kara/node (informal, formal) ID omou n da kara (informal, formal)
ID omou kedo/ga (informal, formal) ID omou n da kedo/ga (informal, formal)
ID omou kedo ne (informal, formal) ID omou n da kedo ne (informal, formal)
ID omou no yo (informal, formal)
ID omou no ne (informal, formal)
ID omou no yo ne (informal, formal)
ID omou ne (informal, formal) ID omou n da ne (informal, formal)
ID omou yo ne (informal, formal) ID omou n da yo ne (informal, formal)
ID omou yo ne (informal, formal) ID omou n da yo ne (informal, formal)
ID omou wake da yo ne (informal, formal)
ID omou no ne (informal, formal)
Q omou (informal, formal)
Q omowanai (informal, formal)
Meanings of grammatical evidentials by Willett (1988:96)

I. Direct evidence: the speaker claims to have perceived the situation described, but may not specify that it is sensory evidence of any kind.

A. Visual evidence: the speaker claims to have seen the situations described.

B. Auditory evidence: the speaker claims to have heard the situations described.

C. Sensory evidence: the speaker claims to have physically sensed the situation described. This can be viewed as (a) in opposition to one or both of the above senses (i.e. any other sense), or (b) unspecified as to sensory mode (i.e. any sense).

II. Indirect evidence: the speaker claims not to have perceived the situation described, but may not specify whether the evidence he does have is reported to him or is the basis of an inferences he has made.

A. Reported evidence: the speaker claims to know of the situation described via verbal means, but may not specify whether it is hearsay (i.e. second-hand or third-hand), or is conveyed through folklore.

1. Second-hand evidence: the speaker claims to have heard of the situation described from someone who was a direct witness.

2. Third-hand evidence: the speaker claims to have heard about the situation described, but not from a direct witness.

3. Evidence from folklore: the speaker claims that the situation described is part of established oral history.

B. Inferring evidence: the speaker claims to know of the situation described only through inference, but may not specify whether such inference is based on observable results or solely on mental reasoning.

1. Inference from the results: the speaker infers the situation described from his observable evidence.

2. Inference from reasoning: the speaker infers the situation described on the basis of intuition, logic, a dream, previous experience, or some other mental construct.
Appendix E-1

Speaker F2 ("normal" discourse), Informal friend discourse, occurrence of ending forms for each proposition type.

Informant: f02a  Age: 40s  Discourse Type: informalgroup

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<thead>
<tr>
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447
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Appendix E-2

Speaker F2 ("Reporter" discourse). Informal friend discourse, occurrence of ending forms for each proposition type.

Informant: f02b  Age: 40s  Discourse Type: informalgroup

Information type A
- D (direct) informal : 3
- D noun informal : 1
- D no yo informal : 1
- D yo informal : 2

Information type B

Information type C
- DQ daroo ascending informal : 2

Information type D
- q direct ascending informal : 1
- q noun ascending informal : 1

Information type E

Information type F
- D daroo descending informal : 1
- DQ daroo ascending informal : 2
- D (direct) informal : 5
- DQ ja nai ascending informal : 1
- D kara informal : 1
- D n dakara informal : 1
- D n da mono informal : 1
- D ne descending informal : 2
- DQ n ja nai ascending informal : 1
- D no descending informal : 7
- D noun informal : 3
- D no yo informal : 7
- D wake informal : 1
- D wake yo informal : 1
- D yo informal : 5
- id (da) tte informal : 3
- id -to kiita informal : 1
- id -to kiita kedo ne descending informal : 1
- id mitai na n da informal : 1
- id mitai (da) yo informal : 3
- id n da tte formal : 9
- id n da tte informal : 2

Information type G
- DQ daroo ascending informal : 1

Information type H
Appendix F

Occurrence of ending forms by group for each proposition type for each discourse type.

**Discourse type: formal**

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<td>590 + 474 + 0 = 1064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>29 + 17 + 0 = 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>94 + 182 + 0 = 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>17 + 169 + 0 = 186</td>
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<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>13 + 138 + 0 = 151</td>
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<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>87 + 82 + 0 = 169</td>
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<td>g</td>
<td>14 + 14 + 0 = 28</td>
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<td>h</td>
<td>27 + 46 + 0 = 73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>871 + 1122 + 0 = 1993</td>
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**Discourse type: public**

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<td>b</td>
<td>5 + 6 + 0 = 11</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>4 + 47 + 0 = 51</td>
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<td>3 + 21 + 0 = 24</td>
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<td>0 + 10 + 0 = 10</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>17 + 39 + 0 = 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>0 + 8 + 0 = 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>h</td>
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**Discourse type: friend**

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<td>e</td>
<td>16 + 35 + 0 = 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>86 + 258 + 0 = 344</td>
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<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>74 + 211 + 0 = 285</td>
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<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>14 + 40 + 0 = 54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>542 + 1362 + 0 = 1904</td>
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Discourse type: family

Info type: Male+Female+Student=Total
a: 240 + 380 + 0 = 620
b: 10 + 31 + 0 = 41
c: 75 + 172 + 0 = 247
d: 40 + 110 + 0 = 150
e: 10 + 34 + 0 = 44
f: 129 + 89 + 0 = 218
g: 71 + 40 + 0 = 111
h: 11 + 20 + 0 = 31
Total: 586 + 876 + 0 = 1462

Discourse type: prosecutor

Info type: Male+Female+Student=Total
a: 46 + 6 + 0 = 52
b: 5 + 4 + 0 = 9
c: 102 + 19 + 0 = 121
d: 37 + 17 + 0 = 54
e: 55 + 6 + 0 = 61
f: 21 + 6 + 0 = 27
g: 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
h: 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
Total: 266 + 58 + 0 = 324

Discourse type: defendant

Info type: Male+Female+Student=Total
a: 261 + 0 + 0 = 261
b: 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
c: 16 + 0 + 0 = 16
d: 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
e: 6 + 0 + 0 = 6
f: 22 + 0 + 0 = 22
g: 5 + 0 + 0 = 5
h: 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
Total: 310 + 0 + 0 = 310
Discourse type: school

Info type: Male+Female+Student=Total

\[ a: 0 + 57 + 159 = 216 \]
\[ b: 0 + 17 + 2 = 19 \]
\[ c: 0 + 123 + 14 = 137 \]
\[ d: 0 + 96 + 38 = 134 \]
\[ e: 0 + 20 + 6 = 26 \]
\[ f: 0 + 44 + 51 = 95 \]
\[ g: 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 \]
\[ h: 0 + 3 + 0 = 3 \]

Total: \( 0 + 360 + 270 = 630 \)

Discourse type: all

Info type: Male+Female+Student=Total

\[ a: 1501 + 1594 + 159 = 3254 \]
\[ b: 61 + 108 + 2 = 171 \]
\[ c: 331 + 694 + 14 = 1039 \]
\[ d: 121 + 520 + 38 = 679 \]
\[ e: 100 + 243 + 6 = 349 \]
\[ f: 362 + 518 + 51 = 931 \]
\[ g: 164 + 273 + 0 = 437 \]
\[ h: 55 + 109 + 0 = 164 \]

Total: \( 2695 + 4059 + 270 = 7024 \)
Appendix G

Occurrence of ending forms by group for all proposition types.

Group 1
823/3247 (25%) D (direct) informal
487/3247 (14%) D (direct) formal
242/3247 (7%) D no descending informal
195/3247 (6%) D noun informal
141/3247 (4%) D n dakedo formal
122/3247 (3%) D yo informal
120/3247 (3%) D n da formal
113/3247 (3%) D kara informal
108/3247 (3%) D n da yo formal
99/3247 (3%) D kedo formal
88/3247 (2%) D kedo informal
80/3247 (2%) D no yo informal
78/3247 (2%) D n dakedo informal
67/3247 (2%) D kara formal
60/3247 (1%) D wake informal
57/3247 (1%) D wake formal
53/3247 (1%) D sa informal
53/3247 (1%) D n da yo informal
31/3247 (0%) D n da informal
30/3247 (0%) D yo formal
26/3247 (0%) D wake da yo formal
23/3247 (0%) D da yo formal
15/3247 (0%) D dakedo formal
15/3247 (0%) D wa yo informal
12/3247 (0%) D wake dakedo formal
11/3247 (0%) D n dakara formal
9/3247 (0%) D wake da kara formal
9/3247 (0%) D n dakara informal
7/3247 (0%) D n da mono informal
6/3247 (0%) D wa informal
6/3247 (0%) Q omou ascending formal
6/3247 (0%) D no descending formal
6/3247 (0%) D wake na n da yo formal
6/3247 (0%) D wake yo informal
5/3247 (0%) id omou informal
4/3247 (0%) id omou n da kedo formal
4/3247 (0%) noun informal
4/3247 (0%) D n wake yo informal
3/3247 (0%) D wa informal
3/3247 (0%) D wake na n da formal
3/3247 (0%) id omou kedo formal
2/3247 (0%) id omou n da kedo informal
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3247</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>id omou yo formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3247</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>D wa yo formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3247</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Q omou ascending informal</td>
</tr>
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<td>1/3247</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>D wa y o ne descending informal</td>
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<td>D n desu no ne descending formal</td>
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Group 3
60/ 173 (34%)   D daroo descending informal
59/ 173 (34%)   D ja nai descending informal
14/ 173 ( 8%)   D daroo descending formal
13/ 173 ( 7%)   q ja nai ka descending formal
11/ 173 ( 6%)   D n daroo descending informal
 5/ 173 ( 2%)   D n daroo descending formal
 3/ 173 ( 1%)   D n janai descending informal
 2/ 173 ( 1%)   q n ja nai ka descending formal
 1/ 173 ( 0%)   D ja nai ka formal
 1/ 173 ( 0%)   q ja nai ka na descending informal
 1/ 173 ( 0%)   D ja nai descending formal
 1/ 173 ( 0%)   AUX n conjecture daroo ne descending formal
 1/ 173 ( 0%)   q ja nai no descending informal
 1/ 173 ( 0%)   q ja nai no ka descending formal

Group 4
124/ 744 (16%)   DQ daroo ascending informal
 79/ 744 (10%)   DQ ne ascending formal
 73/ 744 ( 9%)   DQ ja nai ascending informal
 61/ 744 ( 8%)   DQ yo ne ascending formal
 56/ 744 ( 7%)   DQ daroo ascending formal
 46/ 744 ( 6%)   DQ ne ascending informal
 38/ 744 ( 5%)   DQ n daroo ascending informal
 37/ 744 ( 4%)   DQ n ja nai ascending informal
 26/ 744 ( 3%)   DQ yo ne ascending informal
 25/ 744 ( 3%)   DQ n da ne ascending formal
 25/ 744 ( 3%)   DQ quasi-q intra
 20/ 744 ( 2%)   DQ n da yo ne ascending formal
 16/ 744 ( 2%)   DQ no ne ascending informal
 12/ 744 ( 1%)   DQ n daroo ascending formal
 11/ 744 ( 1%)   q ja nai no ascending informal
 10/ 744 ( 1%)   DQ quasi-q ending
  9/ 744 ( 1%)   DQ n da yo ne ascending informal
  9/ 744 ( 1%)   q ja nai ka ascending formal
  8/ 744 ( 1%)   DQ daroo ne ascending formal
  7/ 744 ( 0%)   Q yo ne ascending informal
  6/ 744 ( 0%)   DQ n daroo ne ascending formal
  6/ 744 ( 0%)   q n ja nai no ascending informal
  5/ 744 ( 0%)   DQ no ne ascending formal
  5/ 744 ( 0%)   Q ja nai no ascending informal
  5/ 744 ( 0%)   q ja nai n desuka ascending formal
  3/ 744 ( 0%)   DQ n daroo ne ascending informal
  3/ 744 ( 0%)   DQ kara ne ascending informal
  2/ 744 ( 0%)   DQ n da yo ascending formal
  2/ 744 ( 0%)   q -kke ascending informal
| Group 5 | 60/219 (27%) | D yo ne # formal |
|        | 54/219 (24%) | D ne # formal |
|        | 35/219 (15%) | D ne # informal |
|        | 30/219 (13%) | D kara ne # formal |
|        | 7/219 (3%) | D no ne # informal |
|        | 6/219 (2%) | D n da yo ne # formal |
|        | 4/219 (1%) | D n da ne # formal |
|        | 4/219 (1%) | D n da ne # informal |
|        | 3/219 (1%) | D no ne # for |
|        | 2/219 (0%) | D kedo ne # informal |
|        | 2/219 (0%) | D n da yo ne # informal |
|        | 2/219 (0%) | n da yo ne # informal |
|        | 1/219 (0%) | D n dakara ne # informal |
|        | 1/219 (0%) | DQ ja nai ne # informal |
|        | 1/219 (0%) | D kedo ne # formal |

| Group 6 | 161/898 (17%) | q direct ascending informal |
|        | 132/898 (14%) | q ka ascending formal |
|        | 121/898 (13%) | q no ascending informal |
|        | 81/898 (9%) | q noun ascending informal |
|        | 45/898 (5%) | q direct ascending formal |
|        | 38/898 (4%) | q n desu ka ascending formal |
|        | 36/898 (4%) | q ka na ascending informal |
|        | 32/898 (3%) | q ka na descending informal |
|        | 27/898 (3%) | q daroo ka descending formal |
|        | 26/898 (2%) | q -kke ascending informal |
|        | 24/898 (2%) | q ka descending formal |
|        | 22/898 (2%) | q n desu ka descending formal |
|        | 17/898 (1%) | q ka ascending informal |
|        | 17/898 (1%) | q wake ascending informal |
13/ 898 ( 1%) q no ka ascending informal
11/ 898 ( 1%) q kashira descending informal
 9/ 898 ( 1%) q no ascending formal
 9/ 898 ( 1%) q no ka ascending formal
 7/ 898 ( 0%) q n da ka ascending formal
 7/ 898 ( 0%) q n daroo ka descending formal
 6/ 898 ( 0%) q ka ne ascending formal
 6/ 898 ( 0%) DQ -kke ascending informal
 5/ 898 ( 0%) q ka ne descending formal
 5/ 898 ( 0%) q ka ne ascending informal
 5/ 898 ( 0%) q -kke ascending formal
 5/ 898 ( 0%) q no ka na ascending informal
 4/ 898 ( 0%) q ka descending informal
 4/ 898 ( 0%) q daroo ka ne descending formal
 4/ 898 ( 0%) q direct ascending formal
 2/ 898 ( 0%) q ka na descending formal
 2/ 898 ( 0%) q n desu ka ne descending formal
 2/ 898 ( 0%) q no ne ascending informal
 2/ 898 ( 0%) q daroo ka descending informal
 2/ 898 ( 0%) q wake desu ka ascending formal
 2/ 898 ( 0%) Q no ka descending formal
 2/ 898 ( 0%) q n da kke ascending informal
 1/ 898 ( 0%) q n da -kke ascending
 1/ 898 ( 0%) q kashira descending formal
 1/ 898 ( 0%) Q wake ascending formal
 1/ 898 ( 0%) q n da -kke na descending informal
 1/ 898 ( 0%) q n daroo ka ne descending formal

Group 7
16/ 115 (13%) id mitai informal
10/ 115 ( 8%) id rashii no ne descending informal
 8/ 115 ( 6%) id mitai (da) yo informal
 8/ 115 ( 6%) id rashii informal
 7/ 115 ( 6%) id rashii yo formal
 5/ 115 ( 4%) id mitai da kedo formal
 5/ 115 ( 4%) id mitai formal
 4/ 115 ( 3%) id mitai (da) ne descending formal
 4/ 115 ( 3%) id rashii kedo informal
 3/ 115 ( 2%) id rashii yo informal
 3/ 115 ( 2%) id rashii n da ne ascending formal
 3/ 115 ( 2%) id rashii kedo formal
 2/ 115 ( 1%) id rashii formal
 2/ 115 ( 1%) id rashii n dakedo ne descending formal
 2/ 115 ( 1%) id rashii no descending informal
 2/ 115 ( 1%) id rashii yo ne descending formal
 2/ 115 ( 1%) id rashii n dakedo ne descending informal
 2/ 115 ( 1%) id mitai na n da kedo informal
2/ 115 (1%) id rashii n dakedo formal  
2/ 115 (1%) id rashii n da ga formal  
2/ 115 (1%) id mitai (da) ne descending informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii n da yo formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai (da) ne descending informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii n dakedo informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai na n da ne ascending formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai na n da ne descending formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai (da) yo formal formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai (da) ne ascending formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai na no descending informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii n da yo ne descending formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai na n da formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii ne descending informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai (da) ne ascending informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii no yo informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii na descending informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai ja nai ascending informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii kara informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai da ne # formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id mitai na n da informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii n da ne descending formal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii no ne ascending informal  
1/ 115 (0%) id rashii ne ascending informal  

Group 8  
67/ 299 (22%) id (da) tte informal  
31/ 299 (10%) id n da tte informal  
31/ 299 (10%) id -to kiita informal  
28/ 299 (9%) id -to kiita formal  
27/ 299 (9%) id n da tte formal  
16/ 299 (5%) id -to kiita yo descending informal  
16/ 299 (5%) id -toka descending informal  
10/ 299 (3%) id n da tte yo formal  
9/ 299 (3%) id -to kiita kedo formal  
9/ 299 (3%) id (da) soo (da) formal  
6/ 299 (2%) id (da) tte formal  
6/ 299 (2%) id -to kiita no ne descending informal  
5/ 299 (1%) id n da tte ne ascending formal  
4/ 299 (1%) id -to kiita ne descending informal  
4/ 299 (1%) id (da) soo (da) informal  
4/ 299 (1%) id -to kiita kedo informal  
3/ 299 (1%) id -to kiita kedo ne descending formal  
2/ 299 (0%) id n (da) soo (da) ne ascending formal  
2/ 299 (0%) id -to kiita n da kedo formal  
2/ 299 (0%) id (da) soo (da) ne descending formal  
2/ 299 (0%) id -to kiita kedo ne descending informal  

458
2/ 299 ( 0%)  id (da) soo dakedo formal
2/ 299 ( 0%)  id to kiita n da ne descending formal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id -to kiita n da yo formal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id n da soo da formal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id (da) tte ne ascending informal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id (da) soo (da) ne # formal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id (da) soo (da) ne ascending formal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id (da) tte ne # formal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id -to kiita n da informal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id -to kiita no descending informal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id -to kiita no yo descending informal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id -to kiita n da kedo informal
1/ 299 ( 0%)  id -to kiita n da formal

Group 9
17/ 152 (11%)  AUX kamoshirenai informal
10/ 152 ( 6%)  AUX conjecture daroo ne descending formal
10/ 152 ( 6%)  AUX conjecture daroo ne # formal
 9/ 152 ( 5%)  AUX conjecture daroo ne descending informal
 9/ 152 ( 5%)  AUX conjecture daroo descending formal
 9/ 152 ( 5%)  AUX conjecture daroo descending informal
 6/ 152 ( 3%)  AUX kamoshirenai kedo formal
 6/ 152 ( 3%)  AUX conjecture daroo kedo informal
 5/ 152 ( 3%)  AUX kamoshirenai ne ascending informal
 5/ 152 ( 3%)  AUX conjecture daroo kedo formal
 4/ 152 ( 2%)  AUX kamoshirenai kedo informal
 4/ 152 ( 2%)  AUX conjecture daroo ne # informal
 3/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX kamoshirenai n da yo ne descending informal
 3/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX hazu (da) formal
 3/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX kamoshirenai ne descending informal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX n conjecture daroo ne descending informal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX n conjecture daroo ne descending formal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX n conjecture daroo ne descending informal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX kamoshirenai yo ne descending formal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX n conjecture daroo ne descending informal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  q daroo ka descending formal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX n conjecture daroo descending informal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX kamoshirenai ne ascending formal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX hazu na n da kedo informal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX kamoshirenai kedo ne descending informal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  AUX n conjecture daroo kedo formal
 2/ 152 ( 1%)  q n daroo ka descending formal
 1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai yo formal
 1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX hazu na n da yo ne ascending formal
 1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX conjecture daroo kara informal
 1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX n daroo ne # formal
 1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX hazu na n da yo formal

459
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX -ni chigai nai informal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai n da ne # formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai n dakedo ascending formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX n conjecture daroo kedo informal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai n da yo formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  D conjecture daroo na descending informal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai yo ne ascending formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai node formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai na descending informal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX conjecture daroo kedo ne ascending formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX n conjecture daroo ne # formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX hazu (da) yo informal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai kara informal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX n conjecture daroo ne descending formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX hazu deshoo ascending informal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai ne # formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX conjecture daroo kedo ne descending formal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai ja nai ascending informal
1/ 152 ( 0%)  AUX kamoshirenai kedo ne ascending informal

Group 10
67/ 314 (21%)  id omou formal
33/ 314 (10%)  id omou kedo formal
32/ 314 (10%)  id omou n da kedo formal
29/ 314 ( 9%)  id omou informal
18/ 314 ( 5%)  id omou n da formal
14/ 314 ( 4%)  id omou n da yo ne descending formal
13/ 314 ( 4%)  id omou kedo informal
10/ 314 ( 3%)  id omou n da ne descending formal
10/ 314 ( 3%)  id omou n da kedo informal
  8/ 314 ( 2%)  id omou n da yo formal
  8/ 314 ( 2%)  id omou no descending informal
  8/ 314 ( 2%)  id omou ne descending formal
  7/ 314 ( 2%)  id omou kara formal
  7/ 314 ( 2%)  id omou kara informal
  5/ 314 ( 1%)  id omou yo informal
  5/ 314 ( 1%)  id omou wake formal
  4/ 314 ( 1%)  id omou na descending informal
  3/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou yo ne descending informal
  3/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou n da kedo ne descending formal
  3/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou no ne descending informal
  3/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou wa informal
  3/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou no yo descending informal
  3/ 314 ( 0%)  id omowareru formal
  3/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou wake informal
  2/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou ne descending informal

460
2/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou n da kedo ne descending informal
2/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou n da kara informal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou wake da yo ne ascending formal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omowanai ascending informal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou yo formal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou no yo ne descending informal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou wa yo formal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou kedo ne descending informal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou n da informal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou n da na descending formal
1/ 314 ( 0%)  id omou kedo ne descending formal
**Appendix H-1**

**Speaker F3, Informal discourse, occurrence of ending forms for each proposition type**

**Informant: f03a  Age: 40s  Discourse Type: informal group**

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<td>D sa informal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D wake yo informal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>id (da) tte informal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>id n da tte informal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>id rashii no descending</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q -kke ascending</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q direct ascending</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information type H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q n da -kke na descending</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q n da -kke ascending</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix H-2

Speaker F3, Formal discourse, occurrence of ending forms for each proposition type

Informant: f03b  Age: 40s  Discourse Type: formalgroup

Information type A
D (direct) formal : 37
D kara formal : 8
D kedo formal : 3
D n da formal : 6
D n dakedo formal : 19
D n desu no ne descending formal : 1

Information type B
q ja nai ka ascending formal : 1

Information type C
D n dakedo formal : 1
D ne descending formal : 1
D yo ne # formal : 2
id omou n da kedo formal : 1

Information type D
q direct ascending formal : 3
q ka ascending formal : 26

Information type E
DQ n da ne ascending formal : 6
DQ n daroo ascending formal : 1
D n da yo ne # formal : 2
DQ n da yo ne ascending formal : 3
q daroo ka descending formal : 7
q n desu ka ascending formal : 3

Information type F
AUX kamoshirenai node formal : 1
id (da) soo (da) formal : 3
id n (da) soo (da) ne ascending formal : 1
id n da soo da formal : 1
id omou kara formal : 1
id omou kedo formal : 1
id omou n da kedo formal : 4
id rashii n da ga formal : 2
id rashii n dakedo formal : 1
id rashii n da ne ascending formal : 3

Information type G
Information type H
Appendix H-3

Speaker F3, Informal friend discourse, occurrence of ending forms by group for each proposition type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type</th>
<th>Discourse type</th>
<th>name: f03a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=16/18 (88%) g2=2/18 (11%) g3=0/18 (0%) g4=0/18 (0%) g5=0/18 (0%) g6=0/18 (0%) g7=0/18 (0%) g8=0/18 (0%) g9=0/18 (0%) g10=0/18 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=0/6 (0%) g2=1/6 (16%) g3=0/6 (0%) g4=5/6 (83%) g5=0/6 (0%) g6=0/6 (0%) g7=0/6 (0%) g8=0/6 (0%) g9=0/6 (0%) g10=0/6 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=0/4 (0%) g2=0/4 (0%) g3=2/4 (50%) g4=1/4 (25%) g5=1/4 (25%) g6=0/4 (0%) g7=0/4 (0%) g8=0/4 (0%) g9=0/4 (0%) g10=0/4 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=0/9 (0%) g2=0/9 (0%) g3=0/9 (0%) g4=0/9 (0%) g5=0/9 (0%) g6=0/9 (0%) g7=0/9 (0%) g8=0/9 (0%) g9=0/9 (0%) g10=0/9 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=0/2 (0%) g2=0/2 (0%) g3=0/2 (0%) g4=1/2 (50%) g5=0/2 (0%) g6=1/2 (50%) g7=0/2 (0%) g8=0/2 (0%) g9=0/2 (0%) g10=0/2 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=7/24 (29%) g2=1/24 (4%) g3=1/24 (4%) g4=6/24 (25%) g5=2/24 (8%) g6=0/24 (0%) g7=2/24 (8%) g8=4/24 (16%) g9=0/24 (0%) g10=1/24 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=14/30 (46%) g2=1/30 (3%) g3=0/30 (0%) g4=8/30 (26%) g5=0/30 (0%) g6=4/30 (13%) g7=1/30 (3%) g8=2/30 (6%) g9=0/30 (0%) g10=0/30 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=0/2 (0%) g2=0/2 (0%) g3=0/2 (0%) g4=0/2 (0%) g5=0/2 (0%) g6=2/2 (100%) g7=0/2 (0%) g8=0/2 (0%) g9=0/2 (0%) g10=0/2 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

person: f03a All info types Total
| g1=37/95 (38%) g2=5/95 (5%) g3=3/95 (3%) g4=21/95 (22%) g5=3/95 (3%) g6=16/95 (16%) g7=3/95 (3%) g8=6/95 (6%) g9=0/95 (0%) g10=1/95 (1%) |
Speaker F3. Formal discourse, occurrence of ending forms by group for each proposition type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: a</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f03b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=73/74 (98%) g2=1/74 (1%) g3=0/74 (0%) g4=0/74 (0%) g5=0/74 (0%) g6=0/74 (0%) g7=0/74 (0%) g8=0/74 (0%) g9=0/74 (0%) g10=0/74 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: b</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f03b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=0/1 (0%) g2=0/1 (0%) g3=0/1 (0%) g4=1/1 (100%) g5=0/1 (0%) g6=0/1 (0%) g7=0/1 (0%) g8=0/1 (0%) g9=0/1 (0%) g10=0/1 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: c</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f03b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=1/5 (20%) g2=1/5 (20%) g3=0/5 (0%) g4=0/5 (0%) g5=2/5 (40%) g6=0/5 (0%) g7=0/5 (0%) g8=0/5 (0%) g9=0/5 (0%) g10=1/5 (20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: d</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f03b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=0/29 (0%) g2=0/29 (0%) g3=0/29 (0%) g4=0/29 (0%) g5=0/29 (0%) g6=29/29 (100%) g7=0/29 (0%) g8=0/29 (0%) g9=0/29 (0%) g10=0/29 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: e</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f03b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=0/22 (0%) g2=0/22 (0%) g3=0/22 (0%) g4=10/22 (45%) g5=2/22 (9%) g6=10/22 (45%) g7=0/22 (0%) g8=0/22 (0%) g9=0/22 (0%) g10=0/22 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: f</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f03b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=0/18 (0%) g2=0/18 (0%) g3=0/18 (0%) g4=0/18 (0%) g5=0/18 (0%) g6=0/18 (0%) g7=6/18 (33%) g8=5/18 (27%) g9=1/18 (5%) g10=6/18 (33%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| person: f03b All info types Total |
| g1=74/149 (49%) g2=2/149 (1%) g3=0/149 (0%) g4=11/149 (7%) g5=4/149 (2%) g6=39/149 (26%) g7=6/149 (4%) g8=5/149 (3%) g9=1/149 (0%) g10=7/149 (4%) |

466
Appendix I-1

Speaker F5, Informal friend discourse, occurrence of ending forms by group for each proposition type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type</th>
<th>Discourse type</th>
<th>name: f05a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=23/25 (92%) g2=2/25 (8%) g3=0/25 (0%) g4=0/25 (0%) g5=0/25 (0%) g6=0/25 (0%) g7=0/25 (0%) g8=0/25 (0%) g9=0/25 (0%) g10=0/25 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=0/4 (0%) g2=2/4 (50%) g3=2/4 (50%) g4=0/4 (0%) g5=0/4 (0%) g6=0/4 (0%) g7=0/4 (0%) g8=0/4 (0%) g9=0/4 (0%) g10=0/4 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=2/38 (5%) g2=13/38 (34%) g3=0/38 (0%) g4=5/38 (13%) g5=13/38 (34%) g6=2/38 (5%) g7=0/38 (0%) g8=0/38 (0%) g9=3/38 (7%) g10=0/38 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=0/64 (0%) g2=3/64 (4%) g3=0/64 (0%) g4=0/64 (0%) g5=0/64 (0%) g6=60/64 (93%) g7=0/64 (0%) g8=0/64 (0%) g9=0/64 (0%) g10=1/64 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=0/25 (0%) g2=0/25 (0%) g3=3/25 (12%) g4=19/25 (76%) g5=0/25 (0%) g6=3/25 (12%) g7=0/25 (0%) g8=0/25 (0%) g9=0/25 (0%) g10=0/25 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=1/10 (10%) g2=1/10 (10%) g3=1/10 (10%) g4=2/10 (20%) g5=1/10 (10%) g6=2/10 (20%) g7=0/10 (0%) g8=0/10 (0%) g9=2/10 (20%) g10=0/10 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=3/31 (9%) g2=0/31 (0%) g3=0/31 (0%) g4=7/31 (22%) g5=0/31 (0%) g6=12/31 (38%) g7=2/31 (6%) g8=7/31 (22%) g9=0/31 (0%) g10=0/31 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>g1=11/18 (61%) g2=0/18 (0%) g3=0/18 (0%) g4=0/18 (0%) g5=0/18 (0%) g6=7/18 (38%) g7=0/18 (0%) g8=0/18 (0%) g9=0/18 (0%) g10=0/18 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

person: f05a All info types Total
g1=40/215 (18%) g2=21/215 (9%) g3=6/215 (2%) g4=33/215 (15%) g5=14/215 (6%) g6=86/215 (40%) g7=2/215 (0%) g8=7/215 (3%) g9=5/215 (2%) g10=1/215 (0%)
Speaker F5, formal conversation discourse, occurrence of ending forms by group for each proposition type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f05b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=85/129 (65%)</td>
<td>g2=38/129 (29%)</td>
<td>g3=1/129 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g6=1/129 (0%)</td>
<td>g7=0/129 (0%)</td>
<td>g8=0/129 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: b</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f05b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=1/8 (12%)</td>
<td>g2=1/8 (12%)</td>
<td>g3=1/8 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g6=1/8 (12%)</td>
<td>g7=0/8 (0%)</td>
<td>g8=0/8 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: c</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f05b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=1/64 (1%)</td>
<td>g2=0/64 (0%)</td>
<td>g3=1/64 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g6=3/64 (4%)</td>
<td>g7=0/64 (0%)</td>
<td>g8=0/64 (0%)</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: d</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f05b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=0/57 (0%)</td>
<td>g2=1/57 (1%)</td>
<td>g3=0/57 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g6=55/57 (96%)</td>
<td>g7=0/57 (0%)</td>
<td>g8=0/57 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: e</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f05b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=0/32 (0%)</td>
<td>g2=0/32 (0%)</td>
<td>g3=2/32 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g6=4/32 (12%)</td>
<td>g7=0/32 (0%)</td>
<td>g8=0/32 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: f</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f05b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=2/24 (12%)</td>
<td>g2=2/24 (8%)</td>
<td>g3=0/24 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g6=2/24 (8%)</td>
<td>g7=1/24 (4%)</td>
<td>g8=1/24 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: g</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f05b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=0/11 (0%)</td>
<td>g2=0/11 (0%)</td>
<td>g3=0/11 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g6=3/11 (27%)</td>
<td>g7=4/11 (36%)</td>
<td>g8=0/11 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info type: h</th>
<th>Discourse type: formal</th>
<th>name: f05b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g1=27/31 (87%)</td>
<td>g2=2/31 (6%)</td>
<td>g3=0/31 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g6=1/31 (3%)</td>
<td>g7=0/31 (0%)</td>
<td>g8=1/31 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

person: f05b All info types Total
| g1=117/356 (32%) | g2=44/356 (12%) | g3=5/356 (1%) | g4=40/356 (11%) | g5=54/356 (15%) |
| g6=70/356 (19%) | g7=5/356 (1%) | g8=2/356 (0%) | g9=11/356 (3%) | g10=8/356 (2%) |
Appendix I-3

Speaker F5, Informal family discourse, occurrence of ending forms by group for each proposition type.

Info type: a Discourse type: family  name: f05c
\[ g_1=57/69 \ (82\%) \ g_2=5/69 \ (7\%) \ g_3=0/69 \ (0\%) \ g_4=0/69 \ (0\%) \ g_5=0/69 \ (0\%) \ g_6=3/69 \ (4\%) \ g_7=0/69 \ (0\%) \ g_8=1/69 \ (1\%) \ g_9=0/69 \ (0\%) \ g_{10}=3/69 \ (4\%) \]

Info type: b Discourse type: family  name: f05c
\[ g_1=1/12 \ (8\%) \ g_2=2/12 \ (16\%) \ g_3=5/12 \ (41\%) \ g_4=3/12 \ (25\%) \ g_5=0/12 \ (0\%) \ g_6=1/12 \ (8\%) \ g_7=0/12 \ (0\%) \ g_8=0/12 \ (0\%) \ g_9=0/12 \ (0\%) \ g_{10}=0/12 \ (0\%) \]

Info type: c Discourse type: family  name: f05c
\[ g_1=6/45 \ (13\%) \ g_2=6/45 \ (13\%) \ g_3=0/45 \ (0\%) \ g_4=19/45 \ (42\%) \ g_5=13/45 \ (28\%) \ g_6=1/45 \ (2\%) \ g_7=0/45 \ (0\%) \ g_8=0/45 \ (0\%) \ g_9=0/45 \ (0\%) \ g_{10}=0/45 \ (0\%) \]

Info type: d Discourse type: family  name: f05c
\[ g_1=0/92 \ (0\%) \ g_2=0/92 \ (0\%) \ g_3=0/92 \ (0\%) \ g_4=3/92 \ (3\%) \ g_5=0/92 \ (0\%) \ g_6=88/92 \ (95\%) \ g_7=0/92 \ (0\%) \ g_8=0/92 \ (0\%) \ g_9=1/92 \ (1\%) \ g_{10}=0/92 \ (0\%) \]

Info type: e Discourse type: family  name: f05c
\[ g_1=1/21 \ (4\%) \ g_2=1/21 \ (4\%) \ g_3=4/21 \ (19\%) \ g_4=6/21 \ (28\%) \ g_5=4/21 \ (19\%) \ g_6=4/21 \ (19\%) \ g_7=0/21 \ (0\%) \ g_8=0/21 \ (0\%) \ g_9=1/21 \ (4\%) \ g_{10}=0/21 \ (0\%) \]

Info type: f Discourse type: family  name: f05c
\[ g_1=0/16 \ (0\%) \ g_2=3/16 \ (18\%) \ g_3=0/16 \ (0\%) \ g_4=4/16 \ (25\%) \ g_5=3/16 \ (18\%) \ g_6=2/16 \ (12\%) \ g_7=1/16 \ (6\%) \ g_8=2/16 \ (12\%) \ g_9=1/16 \ (6\%) \ g_{10}=0/16 \ (0\%) \]

Info type: g Discourse type: family  name: f05c
\[ g_1=2/10 \ (20\%) \ g_2=0/10 \ (0\%) \ g_3=0/10 \ (0\%) \ g_4=5/10 \ (50\%) \ g_5=0/10 \ (0\%) \ g_6=3/10 \ (30\%) \ g_7=0/10 \ (0\%) \ g_8=0/10 \ (0\%) \ g_9=0/10 \ (0\%) \ g_{10}=0/10 \ (0\%) \]

Info type: h Discourse type: family  name: f05c
\[ g_1=2/14 \ (14\%) \ g_2=6/14 \ (42\%) \ g_3=0/14 \ (0\%) \ g_4=0/14 \ (0\%) \ g_5=0/14 \ (0\%) \ g_6=6/14 \ (42\%) \ g_7=0/14 \ (0\%) \ g_8=0/14 \ (0\%) \ g_9=0/14 \ (0\%) \ g_{10}=0/14 \ (0\%) \]

person: f05c All info types  Total
\[ g_1=69/279 \ (24\%) \ g_2=23/279 \ (8\%) \ g_3=9/279 \ (3\%) \ g_4=40/279 \ (14\%) \ g_5=20/279 \ (7\%) \ g_6=108/279 \ (38\%) \ g_7=1/279 \ (0\%) \ g_8=3/279 \ (1\%) \ g_9=3/279 \ (1\%) \ g_{10}=3/279 \ (1\%) \]

469
Appendix J

Speaker M16, occurrence of ending forms for each proposition type.

Informant: m16  Age: 30s  Discourse Type: formal

Information type A
- D (direct) formal : 1
- D (direct) informal : 4
- D kedo informal : 1
- D kedo ne descending formal : 1
- D no descending informal : 3
- D wa informal : 1
- D yo informal : 4

Information type B
- D ja nai descending informal : 1
- DQ n da yo ne ascending formal : 1

Information type C
- DQ ja nai ascending informal : 1
- DQ n da yo ne ascending formal : 1
- D ne # informal : 2
- DQ ne ascending informal : 2
- D yo ne # informal : 1

Information type D
- DQ ne ascending informal : 1
- q daroo ka descending informal : 1
- q direct ascending informal : 2
- q noun ascending informal : 2
- q no ascending informal : 5

Information type E
- DQ daroo ascending informal : 1
- q -kke ascending informal : 1
- q ja nai no ascending informal : 1

Information type F
- AUX conjecture daroo ne descending informal : 1
- DQ daroo ascending informal : 2
- D (direct) informal : 3
- D kedo informal : 1
- D n da yo ne # formal : 2
- DQ n da yo ne ascending formal : 2
- DQ ne descending informal : 2
- DQ ne ascending informal : 2
- D ne descending informal : 2
- D wake informal : 1
- id (da) soo (da) informal : 1
- id (da) tte informal : 4
- id -to kiita no descending informal : 1
id n da tte informal : 1
q n ja nai no ascending informal : 1

Information type G
DQ daroo ascending informal : 2
D (direct) informal : 1
D no descending informal : 1
DQ no ne ascending informal : 1
D no yo informal : 1
D yo ne # informal : 1
id (da) tte informal : 2

Information type H